DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ART FORM FOR INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001704300059-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: April 3, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Executive registry
85- 1448
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Development of New Art Form for
Intelligence Memoranda
3 April 1985
1. The new art form addressing alternative means of resolving specific
problems is an interesting experiment which should be pressed further.
I would like to see it tried on Afghanistan and Nicaragua.
2. The Suriname paper indicates a bleak outcome no matter how it is
addressed. The A la nanpr is more interesting and potentially useful.
I am going to ask 7 o see if he can give it a more lively and
practical twist.
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DDI #01682-85/1
29 March 1985
NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence
1. About a month ago, you asked that we experiment with a
new kind of paper that would attempt to address a few key foreign
policy problems with a view to laying out alternative means of
resolution of those problems. Discussion of each alternative
would explore how it might be formulated and the likely reaction
to it. You suggested that we simply take an earlier Angola
paper, and reformat it to see what it would look like using this
approach.
2. Attached are two prototypes of such papers, one on
think it interested in
Angola and the other on Suriname.
couldur
reaction to the approach. you merit,
next tackle Afghanistan and perhaps Nicaragua.
3. My criticisms of the attached papers is that the
alternatives put forward are pretty conventional and do not
demonstrate very much creativity in looking at these problems.
If this type of paper is to have real value, it seems to me we
need to deal not only with the rather routine alternatives but
try to dream up two or three that perhaps people haven't given
serious attention to so far. This would be particularly true in
4. Again, your thoughts on this approach would be
Afghanistan and Nicaragua.
welcome.
Robert M Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
As Stated
SECRET CL By Signer
DELL OADR
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22 March 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
VIA: Director of Global Issues
Chief, Instability and Insurgency Center/OGI
SUBJECT: Development of a New Art Form for
Intelligence Memoranda
1. The attached memoranda were prepared by the Instability
and Insurgency Center in response to your request for a new art
form that will help policymakers focus on resolutions to
particular issues or problems. As we understand it, the
inspiration for this project was a typescript memorandum,
Angola: Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements, drafted by
the office of African and Latin American Analysis.
2. In developing these two sample papers our primary
objective is to provide the reader with a structured way of
thinking about the costs and opportunities associated with
pursuing specific policy sets. We applied our model first to the
Angolan settlement issue, but felt the situation was unique given
the complexity of this problem and the number of actors
involved. In order to test the flexibility of new art form and
further develop some of its elements, we prepared a second
paper addressing the impact of alternative strategies the
West could adopt toward Suriname. This version allows for a
fuller discussion of the underlying conditions in a country,
future directions a country could take, and the extent to
which it is susceptible to foreign influence. To this end,
it is more representative of future issues open to similar
treatment.
3. In drafting these papers, it quickly became evident that
the simple act of thinking about issues in this way has
stimulated analysts to be much more creative. On the whole we
found the exercise stimulating and look forward to your reactions
and comments on its utility.
Attachments:
As stated
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SFrRFT L
ANGOLA :L IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL SETTLEMENTS
This memorandum explores alternative strategies that could
lead to a resolution of the regional conflict involving Angola,
UNITA, and South Africa. It seeks to provide the reader with an
understanding of the basic forces at play in the region, sets out
alternative strategies that could be employed to resolve the
conflict, and assesses the extent to which the problem is
susceptible to external influence. The format is purposely
provocative; it is not intended to predict what may or may not
occur. The paper discusses the viability of each potential
course of action, but does not endorse any particular policy
alternative. Rather, it provides a structured way of thinking
about the costs and opportunities associated with each approach
and some idea of what new openings or dangers might be emerge if
a given course of action were to be pursued.
UNITA insurgents have made steady gains in Angola's nearly
10-year civil war, despite being outnumbered and outgunned by the
Cuban-and Soviet-supported Angolan Army. The insurgents have
made good use of their advantages in quality of manpower and
leadership to take and hold the military initiative.
We judge, however, that neither side is likely to gain a
decisive advantage over the other in the coming year, although
the intensity of the fighting probably will increase throughout
the country. UNITA most likely will make some gains but not at
the pace it has enjoyed in the past; nor will it be able to seize
key positions the government chooses to hold and defend.
Luanda's inventory of Soviet fighters has tripled in the past
year, and Luanda's greater use of air superiority will pose
growing problems for UNITA
This relatively even match--despite the imbalance of
forces--could be changed significantly by outside factors such as
Namibian independence under UN Resolution 435 and some form of
Cuban troop withdrawal or if the Luanda regime and UNITA initiate
negotiations toward a reconciliation agreement. UN Resolution
435 states that following the arrival of a UN peacekeeping
forces, South African troops would be confined to their garrisons
and, in steps over a period of 12 weeks, would be reduced to a
total of 1,500 men. At the end of seven months, elections would
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be held and the remaining South African contingent would
depart. This would deprive UNITA of its main lines of outside
support, eliminate South Africa as a deterrent to An olan action
and open UNITA's base areas to Angolan attack. 25X1
UNITA's military successes over the past two years also have
forced the MPLA regime in Luanda to consider trying to end the
fighting through negotiations. Although the MPLA has maintained
a rigid public stance opposing talks with UNITA, reliable
reporting makes it clear that considerable ferment continues
within the party supporting national reconciliation. Many see a
rapprochement as a device for ending the civil war, lessening
Angola's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and opening
the country to greater Western aid.
Substantial resistance to talks remain, however,
particularly among the mulato-hardliners and a large number of
their black supporters throughout the government and military.
Although the Soviet Union and Cuba appear staunchly opposed to
any talks, the MPLA has repeatedly been advised to negotiate by
various African neighbors, by countries in both Eastern and
Western Europe, and by South Africa.
The following list of strategies is not intended to be
exhaustive; other approaches could be constructed by combining
elements from two or more of the strategies discussed below. Nor
is the order in which they are presented the
adoption of any particular approach.
The four alternative approaches we examine for resolving the
conflict involving Angola, UNITA, and South Africa are:
o Complete and Simultaneous Cuban Withdrawal With
Implementation of UN Resolution 435.
o Partial Cuban Withdrawal After UN Resolution 435 Is
Implemented.
o Withdrawal of All But a Small Residual Cuban Force in
Conjunction with UN Resolution 435.
o Some Form of Reconciliation Agreement involving Luanda
and UNITA in Conjunction with UN Resolution 435. (S NF)
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IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS
Strategy 1: Simultaneous Withdrawal and UN 435
Cuba withdraws all military personnel--combat troops,
advisers, and technnicians--from Angola over a period of twelve
weeks in such a manner that the number of Cubans and South
Africans in the region were essentially equal once the process
got underway.
Impact. Essentially the South African position first
advanced in May 1982, this approach would be disastrous for the
MPLA government. Luanda could not compensate for the loss of
25,000 Cuban troops defending key provincial centers, nor for the
advisers and technicians that run Angola's war machine.
UNITA would lose the deterrent value of South African forces
stationed in Namibia and Savimbi's base areas would become
vulnerable to sustained Angolan attack. UNITA also would lose
access to South Africa as an easy and secure arms supplier, but
would gain some propaganda advantage by claiming it now was
battling the Luanda regime unaided by foreign supporters.
Viability. Luanda and Cuba would opppose this approach
because they believe it would lead to the collapse of the MPLA
regime. Savimbi would be less resistant, calculating that he
would have to strike quick and hard to settle the civil war
before supply shortages cut into his capabilities.
Other Considerations. C}}~~ba and the Soviet Union would
risk 'a major propaganda debal~,if they were seen as unwilling
to provide the necessary support to keep their friends in
power.
South Africa might view the departure of all Cubans as a
golden opportunity to invade Angola in force--as it did in
1975--and install Savimbi as the new head of government in
Luanda. They almost certainly would find ways to continue
assisting UNTTA covertly. but the level of support would fall.
Strategy 2: Partial Cuban Withdrawal After UN 435
In accordance with UN 435, South Africa withdraws its Air
Force from Namibia and reduces its troop strength to 1,500 men.
Cuba then withdraws 20,000 military personnel over a three-year
period.
Impact. This proposal was advanced by Luanda in November
and apparently was vetted by the Cubans and the Soviets. Angola
could still depend on a substantial force--10,000 by Luanda's
count and 15,000 by our estimates--to defend the key provincial
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centers and provide essential technical and advisory support.
Cubans troops probably would be taken mostly from southwestern
Angola were they had helped defend against South African
incursions and where UNITA is not particularly active. Soviet
weapons deliveries would continue, major urban areas would be
protected, and economically vital oil production would be
secured.
UNITA would lose the support necessary to sustain the
conflict at its present levels and South African protection of
its sanctuary in the southeast. Savimbi probably would be
able to secure at least minimal levels of support from other
donors to continue the conflict for some years, but the trend
would be
Viability. Luanda and the Cubans would support this
approach wholeheartedly and Moscow somewhat grudgingly. Both
UNITA and Pretoria almost certainly would reject it.
Other Considerations. Lacking a South African support
structure, Savimbi might be compelled to extend his base areas
into Zambia and seek sanctuary for his troops there.
With UNITA on the run, Soviet and Cuban efforts to
consolidate the Marxist Leninist regime in Luanda would receive
much greater attention.
ANC base areas in Angola would be more secure and the
guerrillas could bring considerably more pressure on South
Strategy 3: Smaller Cuban Residual Force and UN 435
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Cuba withdraws its forces at a faster pace--perhaps within
two years--leaving behind only a small residual force of 3,000 to
5,000 troops. South At ithdrawn from Namibia in
accordance with UN 435. 25X1
Impact. UNITA would lose the South African deterrent and
sustaining supply within a matter of weeks and probably would opt
to intensify the conflict in hopes of achieving a military
victory. Luanda, however, would have substantial Cuban forces on
hand for at least one year and nrobably could contain a major
thrust by UNITA.
Nevertheless, we believe that Luanda's dependence on Cuban
manpower is greater than UNITA's reliance on a South African
presence in Namibia, and we expect over time that Savimbi's
forces would begin to prevail as the Cuban troop withdrawal
neared completion. UNITA would be able to concentrate its forces
on the few remaining areas of government strength and probably
could take effective control over most of the country.
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Viability. South Africa and UNITA might accept this package
provided they were assured of satisfactory verification and
implementation procedures. Luanda is more likely to balk at the
deal, arguing that it would postpone the MPLA's demise by no more
than a year or two. MPLA leaders might be persuaded to go along,
however, if they believed that they could cheat g or
extent of the Cuban force reduction.
Other Considerations. Luanda might try to compensate for
the loss of Cuban troops, for example, by forming a "civilian
construction corps" populated mostly by able-bodied young
Cubans. It also might seek Western assurances of greatly
increased economic--and possibly military--assistance as the
price for its acceptance.
The Soviet Union and Cuba would retain substantial influence
over the Luanda Government at least initially, but the door would
be opened to an enhanced Western role and presence. Pressure
also would mount on the US Government to afford diplomatic
recognition to the MPLA Government.
With UNITA's hopes of achieving a military victory
bolstered, Savimbi would press his friends hard for additional
support and start to rely more on supply routes through Zaire.
Even if Mobutu kept this a low-key operation, it probably would
not remain secret. His involvement, in turn, might prompt
the Soviet Union and Cuba to step up support to anti-Mobutu
Strategy 4: Reconciliation and UN 435
The MPLA Government enters into negotiations with UNITA.
Both sides agree to stop fighting, a coalition government is
formed, and provision is made for the reduction and eventual
withdrawal of all Cuban and South African military personnel
from Angola. The talks take place in the context of a regional
peace settlement that allows for a phased withdrawal of South
African forces from Namibia in accordance with UN Resolution
435.
Impact. Successful talks would end the civil war, lessen
Luanda's dependence on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and pave the
way for greater Western aid and improved relations with Angola's
neighbors. A decision to enter into negotiations with UNITA also
would appease those within the MPLA government who reportedly may
be pushing for a rapprochement, including former members of the
Catete group, an amorphous group of Army officers known as the
Young Captains. and a few of President dos Santos' closest
advisers.
On the other hand, reconciliation would entail major risks
for Luanda. Influential mulatto hardliners and a sufficient
number of their black supporters in the party, military, and
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government appear to believe that a compromise with UNITA--
especially one that enhances the stature of UNITA's charismatic
leader Jonas Savimbi--could rapidly lead to an UNITA takeover
and their own physical demise. They believe that UNITA can
eventually be defeated militarily and they might move to
oust dos Santos if he tried to engage UNITA in reconciliation
talks.
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Savimbi would view reconciliation talks as a means of
removing the Cuban presence from Angola and legitimizing his
claim to represent the political aspirations of the bulk of the
Angolan people. He would risk losing direct South African
support to his movement and foreclose the possibility of gaining
a military victory over the Luanda regime. His willingness to
sit down at the same table with the enemy also might cost m __e
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The talks could conclude with agreement on partition or
federation, with UNITA in control of the southern half of the
country. This would allow UNITA to consolidate its regional
power free from Angolan and Cuban military pressure. Such an
arrangement would significantly bolster Angola's case for
diplomatic recognition and pave the way for increased Western
assistance, thereby strengthening the Luanda government.
Viability. Serious talks between the Luanda government and
UNITA are not likely unless the MPLA's military situation
deteriorates substantially. We doubt that Luanda's agreement to
talk by itself would be enough for Savimbi to accept a package
with a sizeable residual Cuban force since the talks could fail
and leave Savimbi militarily disadvantaged. Moreover, some MPLA
leaders believe they can avoid talks through a military victory,
and they would never acquiesce to a complete withdrawal of Cuban
military personnel. Although MPLA leaders probably would find
the idea of a federation more appealing, they would be inclined
to reject it as well.
Cuba would not reject reconciliation out of hand given the
economic and political costs of maintaining a substantial Cuban
military presence in Angola and their doubts that Luanda could
ever defeat the insurgents militarily. Moscow, however, would
adamantly oppose any compromise with UNITA. It views Savimbi as
a major threat to the consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist
government in Angola and believes that his inclusion in a
coalition government would severely undermine Soviet and Cuban
influence. Cuba almost certainly would acauiesce to Soviet
desires on this matter.
South Africa, however, would be a forceful proponent of
reconciliation, largely because most key officials in the South
African government believe a rapprochement would offer the
charismatic Savimbi a shortcut to taking power. Savimbi's
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capture of Luanda also would facilitate their grand strategic
plan of surrounding Namibia with a ring of "moderate" buffer
Other Considerations. Partition or federation would put
Western governments in a much better position to provide military
and economic assistance to Savimbi. Both UNITA and the MPLA,
however, probably would view partition or a federation as a
holding action until the battle for total control of the country
is fought. Under such circumstances, UNITA's ability to attract
external military support once civil war broke out would improve
dramatically in that it had already est_ahlished itself as a
legitimate government.
On the other hand, pro-Soviet hardliners in Luanda might
rebel against dos Santos and install a more radical Marxist-
Leninist regime. They probably would seek Soviet support before
making their move and might promise Moscow increased access and
extensive base rights in Angola.
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