LETTER TO (SANITIZED) FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001500080015-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2007
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: June 20, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

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The Director of al intelligence ?
WashingIon.D C.20505
20 June 1984
Dear Allen,
Thanks so much for sending the documents
prepared for the European Parliament on the
destabilizing activities of eastern countries
in Europe. I had not seen them and they do a
remarkable job of pulling together a lot of
information, most of which we do have. I
appreciate your thinking of me.
Yours,
William J. Casey
STAT
cc w/incoming documents - DDI
NIO for Counterterrorism
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Terms of Reference
EXPLANATORY-STATEMENT
In attempting to report to the European Parliament about the "destabilising
activities" of the Soviet Union and her allies, I am anxious at the outset
to define which activities are meant. 1 assume that the main topic of this
report must be international terrorism generally and the attempt on the life
of Pope John Paul II in particular. It was this last event that motivated
colleagues to draft Motions for Resolutions and initiate the report.
However, the Motions refer not only to terrorism and the attempt on the Pope's
life. They mention international ]inks between east European secret services
and efforts made by these services to des-abilise western countries. I have
therefore thought it necessary to report to Parliament in terms wider than
terrorism which cover any activity by the Soviet Union and her allies deemed
dangerous, clandestine or improper.
1','hat are these "improper" ana "destabilizing" activities? We know that there is
today an adversarial relationship between the Soviet bloc and western Europe.
Nine of our Community members belong to the North Atlantic alliance, and the
tenth, Ireland, although neutral militarily, is ideologically an ally of the
others. The Soviet Union is the dominant ration of the Warsaw Pact.
The two groups of European nations are therefore in conflict, militarily and
ideologically. We regret this. It is expensive and dangerous. We would prefer
detente and we are hoping to achieve detente. but our efforts in this direction
are hindered by a numbei of factors: disputes over influence in the Third
World, dissatisfaction over the division of Europe, the separation of peoples
and families, above all by the problems that naturally arise when a group of
countries governed by the principles of Marx and Lenin con?root at their borders
countries with governments elected on a multi-party basis.
This very fact, the Community's commitment to plurali:.t democracy, causes a
further complication. We are not monolithic and we do not believe that we are
infallible. We admit the Tight of other ideologies to carry on political
activity, to try and gather support, perhaps even to gain power. We allow all
shades of non-violent opinion, including those that reject the western alliance,
even those that support our adversary, the Soviet Union. A minority of people
in the Community do support the Soviet Union and they are represented in the
European Parliament.
It therefore follows that the Soviet Union and her allies are free to dis-
seminate their point of view throughout the Community and, operating openly
through their representatives, to present arguments in favour of their internal
and external interests. And the fact that Soviet-bloc countries do not reciprocate,
that they refuse to allow any but the Marxist-Leninist view to be disseminated
in their own territory, is not seen as sufficient reason to withdraw their right
to enjoy these privileges.
T.a(div Moscow kroadcasts to western Europe in Er.,1ish, French, Italian and
Greek. Its broadcasts are not jammed, even though west European broadcasts to
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the Soviet Union are jammed. Soviet publications are available in the West
on subscription at subsidised rates. There are 22 available in Britain alone.
Neste rn journals frequently print articles and letters written by Soviet
representatives, invariably putting forward the Soviet government's point of
view. The Soviet side does not reciprocate.
Soviet-bloc diplomats in western Europe cultivate personal relations with
influential people from many walks of life in the countries to which they
are accredited, entertaining them and explaining the Soviet viewpoint. They
also maintain links with local communist parties and other leftist groups,
among whom there are many who share the Soviet ideology and are ready to assist
the Soviet government politically and in other practical ways.
This Soviet-bloc activity, designed as it often is to present the western
alliance as aggressive and its leaders as warmongers, to stir up public
opinion against the alliance and to stimulate disagreement within it, to
portray as a myth the evidence of Soviet arms expansion, to denounce as
"interference" or "anti-Soviet propaganda" or "red-baiting" any expression
of concern over oppressive Soviet policies at home or abroad, can certainly
be termed confrontational and adversarial. Its unfairness angers majorit,
west European public opinion, especially since we are refused access to * east
'European press or media and denied a chance to set the record straight.
However, in your rapporteur's view, since such activity is open and public,,
it is not improper and it has no destabilising effect. It is part of the
uneasy relationship that is bound to exist between countries that challe .,e
one another's system of government on moral as well as political grounds, while
at the same time maintaining diplomatic representatives in each other's capital
cities and trying to maintain the peace.
The Soviet Union and Terrorism
Terrori'm is part of the Soviet Union's historical background. It was part of
the philosophy of the 19th century Socialist. Revolutionaries who assassinated
Tsar Alexander II. During the Russian uprising of 1905 Lenin instructed the
Bolsheviks of St Petersburg to "supply each group with brief and simple
recipes for making bombs" and to "undertake to kill a spy or blow up a
police station". He added, "let every group learn, if it is only by beating
up a policeman." Likewise Trotsky pointed out the important political effect
of the terrorist act: "It kills individuals did intimidates thousands."
After the October 1917 revolution the Soviet leaders continued to authorise
the use of terror in western countries, mainly against former Soviet citizens
deemed particularly dangerous. Two of their most famous victims are Walter
Krivitsky, once head of Soviet military intelligence in western Europe,
murdered by the NkVD in the United States in 1941, and Stefan Bandera,
killed by the KGB in West Germany in 1959. During the past twenty years,
however, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that the KGB have
themselves carried out acts of murder in Community countries.
Nowadays the Soviet Union supports "national liberation movements" and
encourages them in the use of force against colonialism or foreign occupation.
For inf.tance, the Palestine Liberation Organisation representative at the
United Nations, Zehdi Lahib Terzi, said in 1979, "They (the Soviet Union)
give us full support - diplomatic, moral, educational - and also they open
their military academies to some of our freedom fighters." He also made it
clear that the PLO receives military equipment from the Soviet Union. The
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L!_
Soviet Union has also given facilities to the African National Congress and
to Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. This includes training,
equipment, propaganda material and rest and recreation facilities.
At the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1976 Leonid Brexhne/
said, "Our party supports and will continue to support peoples fighting
for their freedom.... We act as we are bidden by our revolutionary conscience
and our communist convictions."
This report makes no value judgement on such organisations as ANC, ZAPU
and the PLO. Some in the European Parliament will see their members as
terrorists, others as freedom fighters. The line between the two is hard
to distinguish. This means, however, that the Soviet policy of assisting
national liberation movements is also on occasion bard to distinguish from
aid to terrorism.
For instance, Soviet publications regularly present the crisis in Northern
Ireland as a popular uprising by an oppressed colonial community against
British imperialism, ascribing sectarian differences to a supposed British
policy of "divide and rule". An I:vestiya article in February 1983 claimed
that Protestant extremists were carrying out genocide against the Catholic
population and that shooting at "living targets" had become "a common
occupation of British tommies". The violence of the Irish Republican Army
is hardly ever mentioned.
In March the newsagency Tass accused Britain of abandoning the search for
a political solution In Northern Ireland and of trying to "preserve
colonial practices by intensifying terror and repression". A former Pravda
correspondent in London, V.V. Oychinnikov, in a recent book accused Britain
of using northern Ireland as a "training ground" for her armed forces, to
give them the experience they would need to deal with future uprisings by
British workers.
Soviet-dominated international bodies maintain a continuing interest in
Northern Ireland. The World Peace Council issued a statement condemning
Britain's "continuing military oppression" in May 1981, at the time of the
death of hunger-striker Bobby Sands. The World Federation of Trade Unions,
based in Prague, backed the H-t?i.,ck prisoners' demands during the first
hunger strike in November 1980 and its newspaper Voice reproduced an H-block
Committee leaflet in ten languages.
In October 1971 weapons bought by Irish terrorists from the Omnipol arms
factory in Czechoslovakia were intercepted in Amsterdam and in November
1977 a large quantity of east European armaments, including Kaleshnikov
rifles, were discovered in Antwerp on their way to Dublin. Soviet and east
European weapons are often discovered in Northern Ireland, although most
of them have been bought on the open market in the Middle East.
Although there is no conclusive evidence linking the Soviet Union with the
Provisional IRA, there is little doubt that the Soviet authorities encourage
Irish terrorists with inilammatorv statements, indicating that they are
in'e -d a liberation movement fightir4, a c~ ^1 oppressor. Press reports
have suggested that three Soviet officials expelled b the Irish government
i:: September 1P 3 for "unacceptable activity" hac, visited Northern Ireland
and been in touch with extremist groups.
Tne Soviet authorities' link with the PLO, which is established, has in
the past resulted in terrorist activity on west European territory. In ]973
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a trainload of Soviet Jewish emigres was seized near Vienna by PLO fighters
who had crossed fully armed into Austria from Czechoslovakia. This border
is very closely guarded and they could hardly have crossed without Czechoslovak
and Soviet approval.
A number of well known t:st European terrorists have made frequent visits
to the Soviet bloc. Red Brigade leader Renato Curcio had Czechoslovak visas
in both his real and his fake passports when he was arrested in 1974. During
the April 1978 trial in Turin of Red Brigade's terrorists accused of
kidnapping a Fiat executive it was alleged that one of the gang had been
trained at a camp in Czechoslovakia
The following month the Rome publication 11 Settimanale published details,
allegedly leaked b the Italian security services, of the training of Italians
and Germans near Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia. Students received training,
according to the article, in sabotage, use of explosives and forgery of documents.
During the 1970s there were close links between German terrorists and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In 1970 a group including
Andreas Baader and Ulricke Meinhof was trained at a PFLP camp in Jordan.
There fr;ilowed a series of incidents involving collaboration between German
and Palestinian terrorists:,the raid on the OPEC headquarters in Vienna in
December 1975, the hijacking six months later of an Air France airliner to
Entebbe (Uganda) and the hijacking of a Lufthansa aircraft in October 1977.
In view p( Soviet assistance to the PLO and its offshoot the PFLP, it appears
that there was an indirect link between the Soviet Union and various Italian
and German terrorist groups, the Palestinians being intermediaries. One cannot
be certain to what extent these links were forged by Soviet intelligence
with the clear aim of destabilising west European society, but there can be
no doubt that the effect of the cooperation was destabilising.
Community citizens have been thrown into the web of intrigue that surrounds
the Soviet Union's admitted assistance to national liberation movements.
For instance, Siegfried Haag, according to Die Zeit in April 1977, was
employed as n training officer at a camp for guerilla fighters in the
People's De..ocratic Republic of Yemen, a country under Soviet influence.
The Soviet Union and her allies admit such activity and take pride in dt.
The GDR official communist newspaper Neues Deutschland revealed in August
1980 that more than 2,300 "patriots" had in recent years received medical
treatment in GDR hospitals, many of them wounded in "liberation struggles".
Some members of the European Parliament would doubtless look sympathetically
on some of the individuals wounded in some of the liberation struggles referred
to in the Neues Deutschland article. However, it is your rapporteur's view
that the Soviet Union and her allies interpret the term "national liberation
struggle" in a narrow, carefully defined sense. They do not, for instance,
support national liberation struggles in Poland or Afghanistan. They support
mainly those struggles which are likely to favour Soviet foreign policy and
disrupt the Community or her allies.
These struggles, irrespective of their owr, intrinsic merit, often attract
individual Community citizens who reject our democratic institutions and
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strive to overthrow our systems of government by violent means. Therefore,
although there is no conclusive evidence of direct Soviet involvement in
terrorist groups operating in Community countries - or, if there is, such
evidence is not releasable for security or diplomatic reaS5ns - it seems
clear that the Community suffers from the "spill-over" into western Europe
of the conflicts that the Soviet Union encourages. And Fast-tVest relations are
bound to suffer in consequence.
Terrorism and Bulgaria
There is evidence to suggest that the Bulgarian government is less inhibited
Shan the kremlin and other allied governments in the use of terrorism and
violence outride her borders.
In Jul', 1973 a Bulgarian exile, Boris Arnoff, disappeared from his home in
Aarhus, Denmark. Shortly afterwards he appeared beFore a Sofia court charged
with anti-state activity. he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. He died
in prison a few months later. The Communist Youth periodical Narodna Mladeh
then printed an article about the "traitor" Arnoff announcing that "the same
fate awaits anyone who forgets the ideal of the fatherland".
In August 1978 another Bulgarian defector, Vladimir Rostov, was leaving the
Paris metro with his wife when he felt a sharp pain in his thigh. He developed
a high fever, which lasted three days. He then recovered.
Ten days later Georgi Markov, another Bulgarian who also worked for the emigre
radio station Radio Free Europe, was walla ng near the BBC offices in Aldwych,
London, when he too felt a sudden pain in his leg. He turned round and saw a
man, who seemed foreign, running away.
That evening (September 7th) hlarkor developed a fever and the next day he was
admitted to hospital. Three days later he died. An examination of his body
revealed a circular area of inflammation on the right thigh with a central
puncture mark about two millimetres in diameter.
Further examination showed that beneath the victim's skin there was a spherical
piece of metal 1.52 millimetres in diameter and made of a platinum/iridium alloy
used mainly in the aircraft industry, pierced with four tiny holes. According to
the scientists who gave evidence at Markov's inquest, such an object could only
be made with the aid of a high-temperature furnace and precision drilling
equipment.
The inquest concluded that Markov had been killed by the introduction of poison
into his bloodstream by means of this pellet. The London police carried out
enquiries for many months and in many countries, but the murderer was not found.
After these facts were published, Vladimir Rostov recalledbis own experience
in the Paris metro and went in for a medical examination. An X-ray of his thigh
revealed a small metal object. Detectives came to Paris from London and, in
their presence, a French surgeon removed a two-centimetre square of flesh that
contained the object. Microscopic examination of the object showed that it was
identical to the one f',Lnd in hMarkov's body.
French and 3.-:tirh scientists are not sur._ what poison was used to kill Markov
and nearly kil_ T:ostov, but they suspect that it was ricin, an extremely toxic
and little-known, substance derived from the cantor oil plant.
French and British police are likewise unable to prove who was responsible for
the two murderous attacks, however, they have noted the coincidence of the two
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attacks on. two well-known Bulgaria:, defectors taking place within a few days
of each other. They have also observed the extreme technical sophistication
with which the murder weapon in each case, a tiny metal object, was manufactured.
Your rapporteur believes that the coincidence of the two attacks makes it
most probable that the motive in each case was political. He does not believe
that any private individual or emigre group would have the technical resources
to produce the murder weapon or the chemical knowledge to make such a highly
concentrated poision. He recalls that the Bulgarian authorities had a sound
motive for wishing to silence two former citizens who were criticising them
regularly and fiercely in radio broadcasts.
He believes, in short, that it was the Bulgarian authorities, probably with
the knowledge of the Soviet authorities, that committed both crimes.
The Attempt on the Life of Pope John Paul II
This report makes no attempt to apportion blame or to reach a verdict on
this crime, which is presently being investigated by Judge Ilaric Martella
and the Italian authorities. We can only hope that the investigators wial
eventually discover and reveal the whole truth about the execution of this
foul deed.
However, a political problem has been raised by the allegation made by the
assassin Hehmet Ali Agca that the act which took place on May 13th, 1981,
was conceived in a Sofia hotel room where another Turk, Bekir Celenk, offered
him $1.7 million to shoot the Pope. Agca identified three Bulgarian officials
from photographs, including the chief of the Bulgarian airline office in
Rome, Sergei Antonov, and accused the= of involvement in the plot.
Agca gave Judge Martella a description of Antonov's apartment. The description
turned out to be accurate. It was also established that Agca had spent 50
days in Bulgaria during the summer of 1980, after being sentenced to death
in Turkey, and that after leaving Bulgaria on August 31st he travelled through
western Europe, staying in hotels, spending money but cashing no cheques.
In November 1982 the Italian police arrested Antonov.
The existence of a prima facie case for Bulgarian involvement in the crime,
perhaps even Soviet involvement, has caused a crisis in relations between Italy
and Bulgaria, one that concerns not only the Soviet Union, Bulgaria's main
ally, but also the German Federal Republic, where Agca and other alleged
accomplices lived at various times.
On December 20th, 1982, Italian Defence minister Lelio Lagorio told Parliament,
"The Bulgarian connection in this affair provokes and justifies the most
acute concern." Be added that foreign secret services might be involved in
Italian terrorism and that in this context 31 foreign diplomats, ten of
them from easte mEurope and 21 from Libya, had been expelled from Italy since
1980. Foreign minister Colombo criticised Bulgaria for its unwillingness to
cooperate in the investigation.
The political. problem is aggravated by the fact that Bulgaria, of all Soviet-
bloc countries, is the one which has most blatantly encouraged and used
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terrorist methods in Community member states during recent years, as
mentioned above.
The Italian investigation has also revealed the possibility of Bulgarian
involvement in drug-running and arms-peddling. The Bulgarian government, it
is alleged, take a permissive attitude to these dealings and even exploit
them to gain foreign currency. For instance, Bekir Celenk, the man who
allegedly asked Agca to murder the Pope, is wanted in both Italy and Turkey
on smuggling charges. These charges were repeated in the Italian Parliament
by Justice minister Darida on December 20th, 1982.
This report makes no judgement about Bulgarian or Soviet involvement in the
attempt on the Pope's life. Those judgements must be made by the Italian
courts. Still, there is no hiding the fact that the whole murky story has
serious political consequences, which the Ten would be well advised to
consider most carefully, using all the available machinery.
Soviet-Bloc Clandestine Manipulation of Community Public Opinion
Your rapporteur believes that the Soviet Union is fully entitled to seek
to influence public opinion in our member countries, using any means that
is lawful and open. They may sell us books and periodicals, beam radio
broadcasts towards us in our various languages, speak to us through
diplomatic representatives, contribute letters and articles to our newspapers,
appear on our radio and television programmes.
They may suggest that the neutron bomb, Cruise and Pershing II are evil
weapons, whereas the SS-20 is not evil, that NATO is an aggressive alliance,
whereas the Warsaw Pact is defensive and seeks peace. They are free to
disseminate this point of view throughout our Community and those who
support. NATO are free to put forward the opposite view.
However, the use of Soviet propaganda becomes improper when it is disguised
with a non-Soviet facade, inserted surreptitiously into a non-Soviet body
or put forward in the form of deliberate forgeries.
In recent years, as detente has run into difficulties, Soviet intelligence
has stepped up a campaign known as "active measures" that depends on the
use of disinformation, forgeries, front groups and other secret activit'es.
Soviet "active measures" should not be confused with public propaganda
or diplomacy.
A well known tactic is the forged document amounting to a "revelation"
of aggressive western policy or of interference, usually by the United
States, in the internal affairs of other countries. These documents arrive
through the mail usually without a covering letter, always without a return
name or address. Sometimes the "sender" apologises for his own anonymity,
pleading that he fears for his life or career.
Some documents are signed by well known military or political personalities.
Others are marked with an exaggerated high security classification. This is
to enhance the news value of the forger;' and to make sure that it is given
prominent local exposure.
Some of the forgeries are put together with great skill. They are photocopies,
but they carry what look like genuine letterheads and signatures, sometimes
even genuine and little known codewords. They are compiled with great care
and detail. A local political group would not have the technical expertise
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An example of this technique is the "Clark-Stearns Letter", which surfaced
in Athens in January 1982. It purported to be a letter from the then under-
secretary of state William Clark to the US Ambassador in Greece, Monteagle
Stearns, indicating that the United States might support a military coup
in Greece in order to preserve American bases there. It was sent to Athens
newspapers in plain envelopes without a return address and, although it was
never published, it was calculated to worsen relations between the United
States and Greece's socialist government.
Another example was the "Haig-Luns Letter", allegedly sent by the then
SuprPrre Allied Commander to the NATO secretary general. It referred to
"currant projects for the limited use of US nuclear forces in Europe in an
emerc?ncy and to the possibility of NATO "being forced to make first use
of p?'clear weapons". Although denounced at once as a forgery, it was printed
in the Belgian weekly De_ Nieuwe and in the Luxembourg communist newspaper
Ze i tun g vrn Lt~tzeburger Vol lek in Apri l 1982.
During the Falklands crisis a forged press release attributing insulting
remarks to defence secretary Casper Weinherger was circulated among the
Washington diplomatic community. It said that the United States was
supporting Britain in the Falklands war so as to establish an American
military base there "from which we will assert our control of the whole
of the Latin-American continent". A year later a forged tape of a
telephone conversation between President Reagan and Prime Minister
Thatcher, designed to discredit both leaders, was sent to the Dutch
newspaper De Telegraaf with an inaccurate transcript in the Dutch language.
In March 1983 a letter purportedly signed by the American trade union
leader Irving Brown to an Italian labour official, Luigi Scricciolo,
appeared in the weekly Sette Giorni. Scricciolo was at that time under
arrest and had admitted working for Bulgarian intelligence. The letter,
which was a forgery, suggested that Scricciolo had been used by the CIA
to channel funds to the Polish trade union Solidarity. It. was presumably
designed both to discredit Solidarity and to undermine Scricciolo's
credibility.
In March 1983 a senior Ghanaian official told a press conference that,
according to a report issued by the FGR embassy in Accra, the CIA was
planning to overthrow the Ghanaian government. The German government
declared that the document was a forgery, but not before it had been widely
printed in the Ghanaian press, where it was accepted as genuine.
Other damaging forgeries to have surfaced in recent years include a letter
from President Reagan to the King of Spain (November 1981) in which the King
is invited to crush Spanish opposition to NATO entry. There was also the
re-publication in London in October 1980 of "Top Secret Documents on US
Forces Headquarters in Europe", subtitled "Holocaust Again for Europe".
The Arne Petersen Case
In April 1982 the Danish minister for justice, Ole Espersen,, announced
that Soviet intelligence officers had attempted to use a Danish journalist,
Arne Herlov Petersen, in order to manipulate Danish public opinion,
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observed that WPC received large scale financial support from government
sources and had gone to great pains to conceal this fact.
WPC President Romesh Chandra said in December 1976 that detente would mean
no reduction in the struggle against imperialism. He added, "Detente means
the intensification of the struggle, but in new forms....". Mr Chandra
was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1977.
The WPC has never taken a position at variance with Soviet foreign policy.
It attacks NATO and the European Community. It never attacks the Warsaw Pact
or CtEA. It unwaveringly supported the Soviet viewpoint over the Hungarian
uprising in 1956, the Cuba missile crisis in 1962, the Soviet invasions
of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979).
Improaer behaviour of Soviet Press and Media Representatives
Soviet journalists, who are accredited to Community countries in large
numbers, do not confine their activity to nevc,gathering. Several have been
expelled from member states in recent years, some for espionage, c.hers
for improper interference in local politics amounting to subversion.
The most flagrant example of this occurred recently near the Community's
borders in Bern, Switzerland. In April 1983 the Swiss government closed
the Bern bureau of the Soviet newsagency "Novosti" and expelled its local
director. Two of Novosti's Swiss employees had, with the knowledge f their
Soviet bosses, been "influencing the Swiss Peace Movement from Moscow's
point of view" and "inciting young people to delinquency".
The Swiss government went on to state that the Novosti bureau had helped
organise a large demonstration in Bern in December 1981. They distributed
leaflets prepared in the Novosti office and even took part in para-military
exercises. And in July 1982 they had helped organise a disturbance during
a session of the Swiss parliament.
Novosti's Bern bureau, the Swiss government statement concluded, had become
"a centre of disinformation, subversion and agitation through the use of
'active measures' on Moscow's orders". Its actions amounted to a violation
of Swiss sovereignty.
Soviet-Bloc Technical and Scientific Espionage
As East-West relations have deteriorated, there has been an intensification
in Soviet efforts to acquire by clandestine means the fruits of west
European industrial and technical achievement. Soviet industry has habitually
imitated western design in the construction of technical goods. Their copies
range from the Leica camera to the Concorde airliner. In recent years
they have made up for their on lack of invention by expanding their network
of information-gathers in western factories, universities and research
establishments.
There has in 1983 been an alarming increase in the numbers of Soviet repre-
sentatives expelled from Community countries. There have been no such
expulsions from Greece or Luxembourg since the beginning of 1981. In the
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other eight member states there were four expulsions in 1981 and six in
1982. In the period January-September 1983 there were 68 expulsions -
47 from France, five from FGR, five from UK, four from Italy, three from
Ireland, two from Belgium and one each from Denmark and the Netherlands.
Those expelled were mainly diplomats, but they also included trade officials,
journalists, an Aeroflot official, two Morflot (merchant navy) officials,
employees of UNESCO and the International Wheat Council and a diplomat's wife.
The French expulsion of 47 Soviet diplomats and other officials in April
1983 was the largest since the expulsion of 105 by the United Kingdom in
1971. There had only been about 15 such expulsions from France in the
previous 20 years. The French interior ministry explained that their
counter-espionage had uncovered "agents of the secret services of the
Soviet Union engaged in systematic search on French territory for tech-
nological and scientific information, particularly in the military area".
Several French citizens were also arrested in this connection.
Former French interior minister Michel Poniatowski said in an interview
with Le Matin on April 7th, "In France the KGB manipulates about 10,000
individuals, whether they are aware of it or not. As a general rule,
one-third of the (Soviet) diplomatic staff belongs to the KGB. They are
one-third of the total KGB staff, the rest working mainly for Aeroflot
or Intourist. This makes 200 agents on whom 400 others depend. Normally
each one manipulates 15 to 20 people ..... The primary motive of the KGB
is destabilisation."
Conclusions
It is therefore your rapporteur's view that during the past few years,
as East-West relations have worsened, there has been an increase in the
level of improper behaviour by representatives of the Soviet Union and
her allies in Community countries.
1 do not conclude that the Soviet Union is directly involved in terrorist
acts, but 1 believe that her failure to restrain her close ally Bulgaria,
which is dependent on her, is a cause for considerable concern. So is the
inflammatory nature of Soviet pronouncements on their support for movements
r
of national liberation. Terrorism is encouraged by such pronouncements.
It should also be noted that the West has never encouraged terrorism in
Warsaw Pact countries. It has attacked the governments of these countries
on moral and ideological grounds. Some western representatives have
encouraged dissenters in those countries, but only non-violent dissenters.
And in those Warsaw Pact countries there is no terrorism.
Secondly, your rapporteur is also concerned at the step-up in Soviet
"active measures", especially through the forgery of documents designed
to sow disagreement in the western alliance and in the encouragement, often
without the knowledge of the protestors themselves, of pacifist protests.
Thirdly, there must be concern about the increase in Soviet espionage
activity in our ten countries, especially in the heightened Soviet interest
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in acquiring west European technology by improper means.
The Ten should therefore seize every opportunity to coordinate their
resistance to the improper and destabilising activities of our fellow-
Europeans in the East. They should discuss the problem within the political
cooperation machinery at every level. They should raise the problem in
contacts with the Soviet Union and her allies, especially in the United
Nations and in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
They should try to make the Soviet Union and her allies understand that
this is something that can further damage East-West relations, rendering
any return to the path of detente more remote.
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MOTION FOR ARESOLUTION (Doc. 1-1074/82)
tabled by Mr ZAGARI, Mr FERRI, Mr RIPA DI MEANA, Mr DIDO', Mr PELIKAN,
Mr ARFE', Mrs MACCIOCCHI, Mr LEZZI, Mr GATTO and Mr ORLANDI
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the threat to peace posed by the emergence of international links between
some secret services and their efforts to destabilize countries in the Western
hemisphere.
The-Euroeean_Parliament,
-- --- ---------
A - which has consistently appealed for respect for the Treaties as
the basis for a stable international order and consistently supported
all the acts, such as the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act which
are designed to preserve peace,
B - deeply disturbed by the disclosures of attempts to cause international
destabilization which have culminated in the assassination attempt
against Pope John Paul II in Rome,
C - taking into account that some of the judicial inquiries in Italy
into the attack on John Paul II, and into terrorist activities and
arms trafficking have revealed indications of responsibility and links
with the secret services of an Eastern bloc country, Bulgaria,
D - considering that this destabilization factor, in the wake of others,
could provoke an irreversible crisis with ominous consequences,,
Calls on the Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation
to monitor very closely the development of the situation and to work
out uniform positions and joint initiatives by the EEC countries in
order to oppose effectively any activities which run counter to the
tenets of international law and to the basic principles of human
society.
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?
ANNEX II
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-1076/82)
tabled by Mr ANTONIOZZI, Mr BETTIZA, Mr VISENTINI, Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS,
Mr RIPA DI MEANA, Mr DE LA MALENE, Mr BARB:, Mr ADONNINO, Mr PONIATOWSKI,
Mr PFLIMLIN, Mr DONNEZ, Mr RUMOR, Lord O'HAGAN, Mrs CASSAMAGNAGO CERRETTI,
Mr JUNOT, Mr GIUMMARRA, Mr HABSBURG, Mr BATTERSBY, Mr von WOGAU, Mr PURVIS,
Mrs SCHLEICHER, Mr CALVEZ, Mr JONKER, Mr CECOVINI, Mr KLEPSCH, Mr GAWRONSKI,
Mr LIGIOS, Mr BOCKLET, Mr MACARIO, Mr VANDEWIELE, Mr NARDUCCI, Mr LOCKER,
Mr TRAVAGLINI, Mr GONTIKAS, Mr STELLA, Mr TOLMAN, Mr GIAVAZZI, Mr van ROMPUY,
Mr DIANA, Mr PAPAEFSTRATIOU, Mrs LENZ, Mr VERROKEN, Mr DEL DUCA, Mr PENDERS,
Mr BARBAGLI, Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE, Mr COLLESELLI, Mr WEDEKIND, Mr LEGA,
Mr MODIANO and Mr SEITLINGER
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on the international links between secret services and on their destabilizing
activities in Western countries.
The_Euroeea_artiament,
--- ---- - -------
A. concerned at the numerous criminal acts which have occurred in Western
countries, culminating in the recent attempt on the life of
Pope John-Paul II,
B. aware that, in the course of legal proceedings, links are emerging which
connect the secret services of Eastern European countries - in particular
of Bulgaria - with terrorism, arms trafficking and activities aimed at
destabilizing both internal and international pol-*,ical balances,
Requests the Council of Ministers meeting in political cooperation to obtain
more detailed specific information about such activities and to react with
appropriate political measures to counter what amounts to a danger to peace
and peaceful human coexistence and to discourage any future resort to
unacceptable forms of behaviour or activity in international relations, in
total disregard for treaties, conventions and the Charters of the United
Nations and of Helsinki.
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-_J ? ?
ANNEX III
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AT ITS SITTING ON 13 JANUARY 1983
---------------------------- --------------- -----
RESOLUTION
on destabilizing activities of Eastern countries' secret services on the territory of the Community and the
Western World
The Europear. Parliament,
A. concerned at the extreme gravity of the facts emerging from the investigations being
conducted by the Italian magistrature and authorities after the attempted assassination of
John-Paul II and into the international links of terrorism and the arms trade,
B. indignant at the accusations of subversive activities in Poland made by the Soviet press
against Pope John-Paul 11, who has himself been the victim of terrorist activities.
C. having regard to the steps Taken by the Italian Government to inform the NATO
countries of the crisis in its relations with Bulgaria,
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation to speak out against
these destabilizing factors which threaten internal institutions and international peace,
2. Considers that close cooperation and an improvement in the channels of information
between the Ten may help to strengthen their defence against action of this sort,
3. With this end in view, calls for real progress towards the creation of a European judicial
area which will constitute an appropri are-form of collaboration and cooperation against all
manoeuvres aimed at destabilization and all terrorist activity,
4. Instructs its Political Affairs Committee to report on the political implications and the
consequences to be drawn from this situation,
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to. the Commission, the Council, the
Foreign Ministers meeting in Political Cooperation and the Governments of the Member
States.
PE 87.279/fin/Ann.III
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION (Doc. 1-361/83)
tabled by Mr HABSBURG, Mr d'ORMESSON, Mr ZECCHINO, Mr KLEPSCH, Mr PEDINI
and Mr WAWRZIK
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure
on attempted terrorist subversion in the Member States and various associated
countries.
The European Parliament,
A. concerned at the growing number of terrorist outrages foreboding a
fresh wave of violence,
B. deeply perturbed by terrorist and subversive activities at international
level both in the Member States and various associated countries,
C. whereas the terrorist movements have been shown to be linked and
relations between the undercover organizations of the Eastern bloc
states and the areas where terrorism, training camps, the arms trade
and subversion develop are aimed at disrupting the political balance
within the European Community and at international level,
D. whereas this subversive factor and terrorist activity could create an
irreversible crisis with tragic consequences,
1. Calls on the Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to
intensify their investigations, to monitor extremely closely the
course of events and to take the necessary political and legal
measures to prevent any further such machinations which represent a
threat to peace and are in breach of Treaties, agreements, the U.N.
Charter and the Final Act of Helsinki.
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