CUBAN CAPABILITIES TO DESTABILIZE GRENADA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001404100106-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2008
• Sequence Number: 106
• Publication Date: November 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

SECRET
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National Intelligence Council NIC 8123/83
9 November 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Cuban Capabilities to Destabilize Grenada
REFERENCE: Memo from DCI to NIO/LA dated 7 November 1983,
Subject: Grenada
1. Havana's capability to undermine the establishment of democracy in
Grenada is limited, at least over the short term. There are major constraints
on Havana's ability to take direct action on the island in the next few
months. Havana would have little difficulty mounting a massive international
propaganda campaign, but it may not move to establish a complementary
subversive network until it has completd an internal review of its assets,
objectives, and policies in the Caribbean Basin. New leaders will have to be
identified; new groups, political parties and front groups formed; and new
relationships established before the Cubans will be in a position to infuence
political developments in Grenada significantly other than through random acts
of terrorism.
On-Island Assets
2. A small number of Grenadian radicals probably still remain at large
in Grenada and perhaps a few Cubans have eluded capture. They could carry out
isolated bombings or other acts of terrorism, but probably have not had the
time to organize themselves to launch coordinated attacks against the new
government or US military forces. We have seen no indications such
individuals now are in rnntart with thA ri-han Government or receiving
directions from Havana.
3. Although Castro might be able to infiltrate additional agents to
conduct specific acts of sabotage or terrorism, he would have great difficulty
establishing an organized resistance or a guerrilla movement on the island.
Such a force would be difficult to establish and easy to detect because of the
smallness of the island; the dearth of popular support for radical leftists;
the current disarray in leftist ranks; possible language and cultural
differences if any non-Grenadians are involved; the alertness of the interim
government to such a threat; and the expulsion of the Cuban, Soviet, and other
Communist Bloc personnel from the island.
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Exile Activities
4. We have reliable reports that some former Grenadian Ambassadors and
High Commissioners have agreed to establish a government-in-exile which will
have as its principal aim the disruption of future elections through terrorist
acts carried out by remnants of the Armed Forces or New Jewel Movement still
on the island. The Cubans almost certainly would be called upon to play a
major role in helping to organize such a group, establish contact with
sympathizers on the island, arrange meetings, facilitate communications and
transportation, and provide advice and other support. The Cubans also are
likely to offer their island as a refuge for such exiles in hopes this will
help unify the resistance while enhancing Cuban influence over their
activities. Havana may have already organized one such meeting in Havana
which reportedly was attended by the former Grenadian Ambassador to the OAS,
Dessima Williams, and the wife of Grenada's former Ambassador to ciiha Whn has
no
d
l
d
w
ec
are
herself the new Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba.
5. The remnants of the Bishop regime, however, are in disarray and
Accoraing to a regular and reliable source of
Grenada's former Ambassador to the E n ommuni ies b
li
th
e
eves
at
t e ty should push for the total exclusion of Bernard Coard and his Marxist
supporters from the movement, as well as completel
sever th
t
'
y
e par
y
s ties
with Cuba and the USSR. At least two officials have also rejected invitations
by the former Grenadian Ambassador to the USSR to attend an organizational
meetin
f G
g o
renadian diplomats in Moscow.
6. Havana is likely to make a major effort to penetrate any group that
emerges, whether it is pro-Cuban or not. If the revised party did not contain
radicals (such as Coard or Austin supporters) or anyone associated with the
killing of Bishop and his ministers, the Socialist International might be
willing to support it as a social democratic party. Havana might even support
such an effort to reform the New Jewel Movement because such a party would be
in a good position to insist on its right to participate in upcoming elections
and to lobb
i
y aga
nst any renewed efforts to expel the Nicaraguans from the
Socialist International. Cuba, however, is not likely to be able to use such
i
ex
le groups effectively over the short term to destabilize Grenada.
Foreign Surrogates
7. The Cubans have sufficient resources at home to work the Grenada
problem, but probably lack the assets and network in the region to implement
an effective program. While the Guyanese may have provided limited support to
Havana during the Grenadian crisis, President Forbes Burnham's relations with
Castro are "correct" at best. Castro has enjoyed closer relations with
Burnham's opposition in Guyana, headed by Cheddi Jagan. A recent report that
the Guyanese might assist the Cubans in an effort to assassinate Jamairan
Primp Mini-,tar Canna is
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8. Castro can no longer rely on the Surinamese government for support,
which leaves only a rather motley group of radical and Marxist East Caribbean
activists, such as George Odlum of Saint Lucia, Bobby Clark of Barbados, Tim
Hector of Antigua, and Roosevelt Douglas in Dominica. Their organizations
lack the resources to conduct any major operations against the new government
in Grenada other than in the propaganda field, and their leaders would be
reluctant themselves too closely with such Cuban-directed
activities~ 7
9. Trevor Munroe's Jamaican Communist Workers' Party might provide a
somewhat more substantial conduit for launching anti-Grenadian activities, but
a dominant Jamaican hand in such operations would almost certainly be resented
by Grenadian radicals involved. Havana and Moscow reportedly have criticized
Munroe and other Marxists in Jamaica for mismanaging the Grenadian revolution,
and reportedly have decided to cut off their financial support and shift it to
Michael Manley's party. Moderates in Manley's party are likely to resist, such
fundina_ hnwpvpr hArjuse they want to distance their party from Cuba and the
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