LETTER TO DONALD J. DEVINE FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001404080074-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: August 2, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

C cr n r- IT, I
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The Directorc' '?ntral Intelligence
2 August 1983
The Honorable Donald J. Devine
Director
Office of Personnel Management
1900 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20415
Dear Don,
Enclosed is that portion of the report going to the
NSC on countermeasures against the hostile intelligence
threat which deals with personnel security programs.
Under NSDD-84 the Attorney General has the committee
for dealing with personnel security standards. I
recommended to Bill Clark that whatever action is taken
on this be considered in the light of the recommendations
you briefed me on recently so that investigations for
security purposes and for suitability purposes are
integrated with the view to getting maximum overall
effectiveness focused on those levels where the risks
are greatest.
Yours,
Enclosure
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Distribution
Ori Adse
.1- DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - D/ICS
1 - DDA
1 - ER
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A. Personnel Security Programs
The programs covered under this section include the measures taken
? to ensure that persons employed by the United States, whether in a
civilian or military capacity, or under contract to the United States can
be trusted (1) to protect classified information to which they are given
accest or (2) to undertake responsibilities of sensitive national
security duties. The fundamental elements of such programs include:
o Basic standards upon which personnel security clearance
determinations are based.
o Criteria relating to whether the standard has been met.
o Background investigations to develop information relevant to
the criteria and standard.
o Adjudication of all relevant background information for the
purpose of determining whether the standard has been met.
o Administrative process to be followed when adverse-
determinations are made.
o Continuing security programs, including reinvestigations,
designed to detect substantive changes in a cleared
individual's security eligibility.
Authority
- There is no law and no single Executive branch policyl that
specifically authorizes and encompasses all of personnel security.
Authority to institute such programs has been implied, however, from the
authorities of department and agency heads to manage and operate their
respective agencies. Also, the DCI is charged by Executive Order to
ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security
and access standards and to protect intelligence sources and methods.
There are four relevant Executive Orders. E.O. 10450, entitled
"Security Requirements for Federal Employment" issued 27 April 1953,
1NSDD-84, signed by President Reagan on 11 March 1983,. calls for an in-
depth review and revision of personnel security policy by the Justice
Department, in coordination with OPM, but to date no overall policy in this
area ex;st
s
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provides requirements governing the suitability of civilian applicants
for Federal employment, which include minimal requirements for persons
going into "sensitive" positions. These are positions which, if misused,
could bring about, by virtue of the nature opposition, a material
adverse effect on the national security.
'The clearance standard under E.O. 10450 is whether the employment
and retention in employment of any civilian officer or employee within a
department or agency is "clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security". E.O. 10450 charges the head of-each department or
agency of the Federal Government with "the responsibility for
establishing and maintaining within his department or agency an effective
program" to insure employees meet the standard. The Office of Personnel
Management, as successor to-the Civil Service Commission, is given the
responsibility with the continuing advice and collaboration of
representatives of the departments and agencies" to make a continuing
study of the manner by which E.O. 10450 is being implemented.
The second, E.O. 10865, entitled "Safeguarding Classified -
Information Within Industry" issued 20 February 1960, establishes the
standard and procedures for granting contractor employees clearance for
access to classified information and provides procedures to_ appeal
proposed adverse actions taken on the basis derogatory information
indicating that the standard has not been met. The clearance standard
under ED 10865 is that "access to classified informtaion shall be granted
or continued only to those applicants who have been.- termined eligible
based upon a finding that to do so *is clearly consistent with the
national interest." The Department of Defense administers the personnel
security aspects of the industrial security program for most departments
and agencies of the Federal Government under a standardized approach set
forth in the Defense Industrial Security Regulation, DoD 5220.22-R.
The third of the Orders, E.O. 12356, entitled "National Security
Information" issued 2 April 1982, does not deal with personnel security
per se, but provides that persons may not be given access to classified
information unless they have been determined to be trustworthy and access
is necessary for the performance of official duties. Thus, there is a
third personnel security standard, i.e. a determination of
"trustworthiness" which must be made.
The fourth of the Orders, E.O. 12333, entitled "United States
Intelligence Activities" dated 4 December 1981, is applicable solely to
intelligence matters and makes the DCI responsible to ensure the
establishment by the Intelligence Community of common security and access
standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems,
information, and products, and to ensure that programs are developed
which protect intelligence sources, methods, and analytical procedures.
Thus, the DCI is responsible for the protection of intelligence
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Government-wide and can limit access to intelligence for failure to meet
acceptable security standards. The Order also directs senior officials
in the Intelligence Community to protect intelligence and intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure consistent with guidance
from the DCI. These responsibilities, limited as they are to
intelligence, have broad implications for U.S. security programs
While the approach taken by the various departments and agencies is
characterized more by commonality than differences, there is,
nevertheless, some variation with respect to procedures concerning
investigation and adjudication. For example, departments and agencies
with large investigative requirements have generally established their
own investigative capabilities; for those whose requirements are small,
investigations are conducted by OPM or by arrangement with other
departments and agencies with investigative capabilities, such as the
FBI. The General Accounting Office (GAO) recently contracted with DoD to
have the Defense Investigative Service conduct investigations on certain
GAO personnel in sensitive positions. There is no department or agency
whose employees or contractors require access to classified information
that has not instituted some form of investigation as a condition of
There are two categories of classified information--Sensitive
Compartmented Information (SCI), dealing with classified information that
reveals foreign intelligence sources and methods, and .`Restricted Data,"
involving nuclear information classified pursuant to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954--for which uniform personnel security requirements are
imposed over and beyond those adopted on a decentralized basis pursuant
to-the three Executive orders cited above. In addition, certain special
authorities have been established in law, such as PL 88-290, entitled
"Personnel Security Procee!ures in the National Security Agency," which
details the requirement for background investigations for NSA
employees. It 'directs the Secretary of Defense to prescribe such
regulations relating to continuing security procedures as he considers
necessary to assure that no person is assigned duties in NSA unless ch
assignment is clearly consistent with the national security.
With respect to SCI, the Director of Central Intelligence derives
authority under the National Security Act of 1947 to protect intelligence
sources and methods and from the provision of Executive Order 12356 that
provides for the creation of special access programs by the DCI for
intelligence activities or intelligence sources or methods. To carry. out
this responsibility and to facilitate the security certification process
among Government departments and agencies, he has imposed through DCI
Directive 1/14 of September 1981 minimum uniform standards on all
departments and agencies within the Intelligence Community governing the
investigative requirements for persons who will have access to SCI, as
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well as the adjudicative standards upon which a determination regarding
access will be based. DCID 1/14 prescribes a fourth national personnel
security standard which is that the person being granted SCI access
"shall be stable, of excellent character and discretion and of
"
unquestioned loyalty to the United States.
With respect to access to "Restricted Data," the Department of
Energy provides uniform standards'governing the access of persons to such
cies
d
.
agen
data for all departments an
Structure
As mentioned, there is no uniform national personnel security policy
which integrates the requirements of all the separate programs involving
Federal civilian employees (E.O. 10450), contractor employees (E.O.
10865), access to classified information (E.O. 12356), access to
Restricted Data (Atomic Energy Act of 1954), and assignment to National
Security Agency duties (PL 88-290). Moreover, while there is a
structured and standardized approach within each of the individual
programs operating under DCID 1/14, E.O. 10865, the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 and PL 88-290, departments and agencies operating programs
of those specialized authorities (under E.O. 10450, for example) have, as
a practical matter, formulated programs tailored to their own perceived
needs, which recognize both the sensitivity of the information to which
access is being contemplated, the frequency of such access, and the size
of'the population requiring such clearance. Thus, there is lacking
standardization in the so-called "collateral" (non-SCI) programs.
Moreover, these "collateral" programs do not attain the-d'pth that is
found in certain other programs.
For example, in NSA where all employees are cleared for access and
in CIA where all employees are considered approvable for access to
sensitive information, more extensive background investigations,
polygraph examination, and psychological tests are required of
prospective applicants as a condition of employment and for access to any
level of classified information. In other agencies where the nature and
degree of access to sensitive information varies considerably, such as
the Department of Defense (which also has the largest number of cleared
civilian, military, and contractor personnel in the Federal Government),
rviced by OPF4 lesser
i
es se
State, Treasury, and the various agenc
e in eff Pct.
"
clearances ar
requirements for "collateral
lso found it necessary from time-to-time to
Several agencies have a
adjust ifvrscleaacrequirements
lackoofclearances inas a result vestigativeoresourcesed
demands for clearances
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ndle them in a timel manner in su ort of a enc o erations.
In short, not only has there disparity
and agencies in terms of their 9at some of access to classified ~?ementsaevenf withiormatinonagenci, but tostheeebb and
fluctuation of such requ
ative resources.
esti
d i
g
nv
mands an
flow of investigative de
There is no single department or agency charged with personnel
security policy oversight. Clearly,-the DCI has oversight responsibility
with respect to personnel security in the CI area. tSi ilarly, the
Office of the Secretary of Defense has oversight of
Industrial Security Program covering DoD and 18 other Federal agencies.
g
limited ht role
oversi
ponsibility
While the OPM, as indicttoo civilian employees, Itsres
under E.O. 10450 with respe
does not, nor could it legally, extend to contractor or-militarryyM has
departments civilian in
personnel. Mopemitted even
traditionally perr Partments
~n~m
it hPlive the
s
implementing their programs Soe lbegng
il~
bstantaly met
su
10 w
requirements of E.O.
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Each department or agency is charged with implementing the
provisions of OCID 1/14 and for determining the need-to-know of its
employees for access to specific compartmented programs. The chart
(Figure 5) attached at the end of this section, "Implementation of the
SCI Security Clearance Process," illustrates the implementation of the
SCI clearance system by the participating agencies. Generally, each
agency adjudicates the results of investigations of its own personnel,
except for those agencies involved in compartmented programs managed by
another agency. SCI accesses granted after adjudication will be recorded
centrally
ervice o common concern. is system will centralize information
presently stored i n = separate data bases and thus provide Intelligence
Community members with the capability to determine the SCI access status
of past and present employees. The 0 system began operations in March
1983, with complete implementation in the Intelligence Community expected
by early 1984 and in the Unified and Specified Commands by 1984-1985.
Similarly, DoD in 1981 initiated a program to have all DoD agencies input
all security clearance and access determinations into the Defense Central
Index of Investigations, and expects; to bring all DoD components into the
system in the near future.
Resources
Each department and agency programs and budgets for.?its own
resources to conduct personnel security investigations and carry out
related functions, except that DoD carries out all contractor industrial
security personnel security investigations and attendant adjudicative
processing for 18 other Federal agencies at no cost to these agencies.
Most-personnel security funding is outside the National Foreign
Intelligence Program.
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Strengths and Weaknesses
The strength of the current personnel security system lies in its
flexibility and adaptability to departmental and agency needs. The
present system allows the agencies to take into account the type and
extent of access, as well as to adjust to changing demands and resource
requirements. Cooperation among the departments and agencies in terms of
mutual and reciprocal acceptances of clearances and access authorizations
of their respective employees has served to facilitate on-going
operations.
One of the primary weaknesses of the Federal- personnel security
program is the confusion brought about by E.O. 10450 as the result of its
attempting to integrate in a single program "suitability for employment"
with "trustworthiness decisions for access to classified information or
assignment to national security duties." This has resulted in court
decisions that have severely limited the utility of E.O. 10450.
Moreover, it has served to cause increasing restrictions being placed on
access to criminal history record information in that personnel security
checks are considered employment checks. Criminal history record
custodians will not provide criminal history records for "employability"
determinations, but in most cases will provide such information for
national security purposes. In fact, California state law prohibits
release of records information for employment reasons. Similarly, the
Government of the District of Columbia reaffirmed its restriction against
DIS accessing non-conviction arrest information for "eirlgloyment-
purposes," basing its decision on the "Duncan Ordinance" which provides
that the release of non-conviction arrest information by the Metropolitan
Police Department is restricted to law enforcement officers acting in
connection with a criminal investigation or criminal proceeding.
There is little reason to expect this trend to change unless E.D.
10450 is superseded by an order issued to stress security eligibility
vice employability.,
There is a 'strong belief among the departments and agencies,
particularly those extensively engaged in national security programs,
that policy, procedural, and organizational changes may result in a more
efficient and effective personnel security program.
Considerations for Personnel Security Program Upgrading
1. Perhaps the most significant undertaking under way is the
action directed by the President in NSDD-84 by which the Attorney
General, on an interagency basis, is to conduct a study of existing
related structures, Executive Orders, regulations, and directives
for the purpose of identifying ways and means of improving Federal
personnel security policies and procedures. The NSDD-84 study
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should include consideration of a new Executive order that would
provide specific and exclusive authority for personnel security
determinations involving access to classified information and
assignment to national security sensitive duties as against
suitability for Government employment. The order should include
,specific national policy pronouncements covering the six basic
personnel security elements cited on the opening page of this
section. It should provide sufficient flexibility for the various
departments and agencies to meet their individual mission
requirements while requiring minimum security procedures to assure a
sound and effective! interrelating national personnel security
prnnram
The order should cover Federal civilian employees, Armed
Services personnel, and contractor employees in sensitive national
security positions. Emphasis should be made in the new order on
separating security requirements from the requirements for
suitability for Government employment. An interagency mechanism
could be established to provide oversight of the new Executive order
and to resolve interagency problems, or the Office of Personnel
M
anagement could be charged with doing so.
The FBI does not favor any standardization process which could
mandate a reduction of current FBI clearance standards. It believes
that its Director's prerogative to set and execute FBI personnel
policies should remain intact. Its concern is tr:Zit, although
limiting the order to only security requirements might meet the
standards of certain military/Intelligence Community members, some
other members of the Government must rely also on suitability
factors. Positions involving trust and responsibility may not
optimally allow a separation of suitability from clearance in the
order
The majority of the Working Group on Personnel Security
convened by the Interagency Group/Countermeasures, on the other
hand, believes that an Executive Order separating security
determinations from suitability for employment determinations is not
only feasible but is essential if the Federal personnel security
pro
ram is to
d
g
procee
on an effective basis.
2. Greater uniformity in adjudicating security clearances is
needed across the Government. Consideration ought to be given to
the development of uniform adjudication guidelines to apply to all
departments and agencies, as well as centralized training of
adjudicators on a periodic basis. In those agencies such as Navy,
where the adjudicative function is very widely dispersed (3,000
separate elements), consolidation of this function should be
considered to ensure greater consistency in outcome. The FBI would
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oppose any guidelines which would infringe on its Director's role in
setting personnel policies within the FBI. DoD would agree to
participate in the development of uniform adjudicative guidelines
but would consider implementing them only on the condition that they
are fully applicable to all Federal departments and agencies.
3. Consideration should be given to the feasibility of
establishing a system to facilitate the reallocation(s) of personnel
security investigations among departments and agencies at a
reasonable cost when conditions within any given agency result in an
investigative workload exceeding investigative resources. For
example, if DoD, due to the sudden expansion of critical R&D
programs, could not complete its required investigations on a timely
basis, a means should be available whereby such an agency could
request investigative assistance from other agencies at a reasonable
cost: The creation of an interagency system where such requests
might be brought and deliberated could prevent the development of
excessive backlogs during periods of high workload and could
additionally obviate the necessity for reduction in force which
follows periods of decreased demand for investigations (as recently
happened in OPM). CIA cover considerations, however, would not
permit its participation in such an arrangement. The FBI could not
participate because its investigative resources are already fully
committed and it would be unable to absorb any increase.
Furthermore, since resource levels are set in budgets several years
in advance, it would not be able to accept an influx created by
unexpected circumstances. DoD believes that such aasystem would be
unrealistic and unworkable unless all agencies with investigative
capability participated, with no agencies being exempted. DoD
shares much the same budget and mission considerations as FBI and
CIA.
4. Consideration should be given to establishmert of a
national policy on use of the polygraph as a means of screening for
access to classified information, including crypto access and
assignment to sensitive national security duties. The CIA would
support such a policy but would reserve the right to maintain its
own standards separately should they be more stringent than those
adopted for Government-wide and industrial contractor use. The FBI
would be opposed to any policy which would require it to operate
below that which it considers essential or which infrin es on its
Director's prerogatives in the personnel area.
The DoD would oppose implementing any policy which was not
truly a "national" policy. By virtue of the provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947 which gives the Secretary of Defense
"authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense"
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and which designates the Secretary as the principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense, DoD
would not want to implement any national policy on the use of the
polygraph which would give DoD less flexibility and independence
than that which would be given to other agencies.
The State Department opposes establishment of a general policy
requiring its employees to agree to polygraph examinations as a
condition of employment or access to classified information. The
Department believes that there remain too many legal and personnel-
related questions on this issue, and does not believe. that the
polygraph is a consistently reliable tool for such purposes. The
Department has an on-going counterintelligence gram that it
believes is sufficient for this purpose.
5. In light of the diminishing access to criminal history
record information across the nation on the part of the personnel
security investigative agencies, action should be taken to review
existing restrictions on Federal personnel investigative access to
state -and local agencies, including Federal rules or regulations
such as the 1976 Law Enforcement Assistance Agency Regulation. The
review should be broad-gauged and cover the scope and nature of the
access problems involved. While this has been a particularly
difficult problem for the Department of Defense because of the
extremely high volume of police record checks regq,ired, all agencies
are suffering, with the possible exception of the 'ederal Bureau of
Investigation which gains access under its law enforcement role.
Moreover, there is?a growing trend on the part of states and local
criminal history record custodians to charge the Federal -Government
for making police record checks if the request is for purposes other
than law enforcement. If the review's findings deem it necessary,
new legislation or a new Executive Order should be proposed to deal
with the problems involved.
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