NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001304040087-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 87
• Publication Date: January 28, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/07/11: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01304040087-8
SECRET
28 January 1983
NEGOTIATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Venezuela is now fully cooperating with the Mexican
approach to negotiations. To understand the implication of this, it is
necessary to recognize Mexico's constant support of Cuban and Nicaraguan
Pfforts in Central America since May 1979. To date, Mexican actions
_ suggest that President de la Madrid is continuing Lne
Central American policy of his predecessor. The Hondurans and Salvadorans are
keenly aware of this and will quickly interpret US association with Mexico in
a negotiating initiative as an American endorsement for guerrilla power-
sharing and the beginning of a sellout.
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SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/11: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01304040087-8
 Approved For Release 2008/07/11: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01304040087-8
These events -- before the April 2, 1982 Falklands War -- began the
reversal of Venezuelan diplomatic cooperation with the US and led to the joint
Mexican-Venezuelan proposal of September 1982, which essentially endorsed the
Mexico style, ambiguous "political solution."
ThP right kind of political solution would be a good thing
Our judgment is that the proposals coming
from Mexico over the last two years or so are likely to lead only to the same
result as occurred in the negotiations which formed the post-Somoza government
in Nicaragua.*
The right kind of political settlement could be similar to the one which
Venezuela itself negotiated with Cuba-supported guerrillas in the 1960s. They
required that the guerrillas lay down their arms and disband in return for
amnesty and the opportunity for future political participation. At that time,
the OAS played a constructive role, which it could do again provided the anti-
guerrilla majorities of December 1981 (reflected in a 22-3 vote) and January
1982 (a 19-0 vote) were the focal point of diplomatic activities and not
Mexico until there is solid proof of changes in its pro-guerrilla attitudes
and actions.
The wrong kind of negotiating proposals could lead to a fractured El
Salvadoran government which the extreme left could take over and the
extinction of democratic opposition in Nicaragua confirming its Cubanization.
likel Last
b
e
The neutralization of Honduras and Costa Rica would also
Also important to success in the region is that in any negotiating
position, we insist upon assurances that the democratic objectives of the
anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua be included. They are exactly what the
OAS mandated and the Sandinistas promised during the June/July 1979
negotiations which led them to power. The twelve demands of the Nicaraguan
Democratic Front are at Attachment 3. Also at Attachment 4 is a brief
contrast between the Cuban-Sandinista-guerrilla negotiating purposes and the
negotiations conducted by Venezuela in the 1960s.
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SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/07/11: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01304040087-8
 Approved For Release 2008/07/11: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01304040087-8
Approved For Release 2008/07/11: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01304040087-8