UPSURGE OF ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001103890098-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 98
• Publication Date: September 17, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103890098-6
UNCLASSIFIED CON NTIAL SECRET
1 DCI
2 1 -nn
122
D/DCI/RM
D/DCI/CT
Compt
DATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
3637 (12-77) 34-
tf .z.ra o i; 3
Dot. '
Approved For Release 2007/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443R001103890098-6
 Approved For Release 2007/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103890098-6
5 E C R7, , E T
17 September 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Upsurge of Anti-American Terrorism
1. The 17 September draft on the upsurge of anti-American terrorism
isn't a bad start, but I wish you would weed out the remnants of the old
approach which is whether the Soviets are responsible for the whole business
or not. The focus of this should be operational:
--What are the groups which are functioning today?
--What do we know about their strength, focus, thrust
and techniques?
--What are their interests, where would they be most
likely to strike, and what motivates them?
The Soviet interest in supporting, encouraging and exploiting should be
considered---but only as part of the whole picture. The contagious nature of
the phenomenon should be developed, i.e., the success of anti-government
terrorist assassinations in Iran stimulated people elsewhere. The history
and scale of earlier efforts should be looked at as a guide to what may be
happening today, particularly in Libya. The various elements of the PLO
should be carefully identified and distinguished. This in itself will be
helpful in policy responses to the PLO.
2. See the piece attached from Sunday's New York Times. I assume that
.we are seeing what we can get out of the FBI, the terrorism group at State,
and the terrorism group in our own
Operations Directorate. I would like to take a quick look at National Humint,.
Collection Plan No. 46, Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence, published in
July 1981. I would think that selected Station Chiefs would have a good feel
as to indicators that the probability of terrorist action is on the rise, as
well as on the perfunctory mode of action for various Bolivian, German, Syrian,
Italian, Japanese, and Cuban terrorists, as well as those operating for various
insurgencies. I am passing along also some material I got together yesterday
for my testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
in which I didn't go very far into terrorism.
A
William J. Casey
Approved For Release 2007/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103890098-6
 Approved For Release 2007/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103890098-6
Saleb Khalef,-better known by his code
name, Abu Iyad. "y 4r;
Well-placed sources say that althougls,
Abu Nidal is now working with one of the;
branches of Syrian intelligence; his, or.
ganization in-the past tried twice'to as-1
sassinate Foreign Minister Abdel Halim
Khaddam of Syria. Abu Nidar's organs-{
ration at that time was under the protec-
tion and sponsorship of the rival Baa-
The Syrian motivation in supporting
the Abu Nidal splinter, while somewhat
murky, is believed by Middle Eastern
experts to be to keep Mr. Arafat and his
organization under Syrian control and to
assure that Syrian cooperation is indis-
pensable. The Syrians,.. diplomats say,
view themselves as historically the
most important element in the. Middle
East. . , . In the past, Syria has frequently acted'
to insure its dominance over the guerril_.
las, sometimes by using its own faction
of the guerrilla movement, As Saiga:..
Relations betwen Syria and the P. L.O:..
have been particularly, strained in, the
last several months, according to an Ad-
ministration official. '
Mr. Arafat was said to have been dis-
pleased by what he viewed as insuffi-
cient Syrian assistance during the
Palestinians' clash with Israel in south-
ern Lebanon this summer.
Syrian officials were said to have been
unhappy about Mr. Arafat's role in con-
cluding a cease-fire agreement in the
Lebanese conflict, which they viewed as
another indication-of the P.L.O. chief's
growing independence. Syrian officials
suspectthat Mr' Arafat might be willing
to strike a separate bargain with Israel.
-New Round of Violence .= `
In the recent round of incidents, Abu
Iyad, who heads Al Fatah's intelligence
service, .has-. publicly accused Abu-
Nidal, who. was born Mazen Sabry al.
Banna, of the killing-of the P.L.O.'s rep-
resentative in Belgium, Naim Khader,
on a. Brussels street on June 1. Mr.
Khader was an important figure in the
Palestinian. diplomatic campaign to,
gain European support.,: ,
bra communique issued from Damas
cus.- Abu-NidaL accused Abu Iyad of
being- behind the attempted assassina-
tion Aug. 1 of a Palestinian. leader, -Mo-
hammed Daoud Oudeh, who also' is
widely known by his code name Abu.
Daoud. He was shot five times in the cof-
fee shop of the Inter-Continental Hotel in
Warsaw.
Mr. Daoud Oudeh is a reputed leader
of the Black-September- organization,
which carried out the massacre in 1972
of Israeli athletes-at the Munich Olym-
pics and the murder of two American
diplomats-in-Khartoum, the Sudan. He
had been little heard from since P.L.O.
forces blocked him from leading guer-
rillas against Israel in violation of the
terms-of-the-settlement leading. to the
withdrawal of-Israeli forces from Leba-
non,after the 1978 invasion.
? A Long-Time Split -
'. The split within: the guerrilla move-
ment dates from the early 1970's. It in-
volves both the domination by Mr. Ara-
fat's Al Fatah organization of the um-
brella Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion and the advocacy of some of its
leaders for opening International negoti.
ations aimed at achieving a "Palestin-
ian mini-state," possibly on the West
Bank of the Jordan River.
Groups opposing the plan, such as the
Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, were known as "rejection-
ists" because they refused any dealings
with Israel.
In 1974, Abu Nidal broke with Al
Fatah over the issue and, from Bagh-
dad, vowed to fight not only Israel but
regimes" of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.
For the next several -years, Abu
Nidal's organization, operating under
the protection of the Iraqi Government,
carried out a series of actions such as
'the seizure of the Semiramis ' Hotel in .
Damascus on Sept. 26, 197lr, in which-
four hostages were killed; and the occu-
pation of the Inter-Continentht Hotel in
Amman on Nov. 17,1976i in which three
guerrillas, two Jordanian soldiers and
three civilians died after a five-hour gun,
battle.
.
Assassination Attempts-'?.
In a 1978 magazine interview, Abu
Nidal also claimed responsibility for a
mysterious explosion in the second larg-
est Saudi Arabian oil field.
His Black June commandos, named--
for the Syrian intervention in Lebanon
to save the Christian rightists and main-
tain the balance of power against the
Palestinians and leftists, claimed re-
sponsibility, for assassination attempts
against Mr. Khaddam in-Damascus on
Dec. 8,1976, and in Abu Dhab.1 on Oct. 25,
1977. - ? ?
Relations between 'the P.L.O: and
Iraq deteriorated until Abu Iyad per-
suaded the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hus-
sein, to restrain Abu Nidal. ? , - ?
A little over two years ago, Mr. - Hus-
sein, as part of his bid for a-position of,
leadership in the Arab -world, ousted
several other rejectionist organizations'
from their sanctuary in Baghdad.._:
- Same Emblem as the P.L.O.
The surfacing of Abu Nidal under the
protection of the Damascus regime of
Hafez al-Assad thus came as somewhat
of a surprise.. . '
Abu Nidal called his organization the
"correct line" of Al Fatah and has alsoff
adopted the name of its military branch
Al Asifah, or The Storm,' for his opera-I
tions. His communiques carry the same
.emblem as that of the regular organiza-
tion, a melange of a map of Palestine,,
rifles and a hand,grenade.
The rejectionist tendency was strong '
among Palestinian students studying in-
Europe during the late 1970's, giving'
Abu Nidal? a potential pool of at least
dozens of adherents, a sufficiently large
number for carrying- out terrorist ac-
'tions.
He is also believed to have picked up
some of, the remnants of the Libyan-
backed commando of Abu Mahmoud,
who was killed in a Beirut shootout with
Al Fatah police in the early 1970's. -
The strength of Abu Nidal's organiza-
tion is estimated at between 50 and 100
supporters. - i- - -,'t -
A Killing in Vienna.
The first indication of the r.esurgence
of Black June came when the Abu Nidal. ,
group claimed responsibility for the as-
sassination May 1 in Vienna of a city, councillor, Heinz Nittel, who had been.
chairman of the Austro-Isr'aeFSbciet}r.
In August, two Palestinian guerrillas,
now believed to have been associated
.with Abu Nidal, Iwere arrested`'at the it
with arms and
what an official
',an investigation
,C11laWY6 41 ? A &USc,,
o suet them at the air-
aouncement called'
synagogue attack was an attempt by the
Abu Nidal faction o discredit the diplo-
matic efforts of M . Arafat.
It is believed that -it was Mr. Kreisky'.s
closeness to the mainstream Palestin-'
inns that made him a suitable target fos
the attempt. - - .-
what he des< Approved For Release 2007/07/05: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103890098-6