WALLOP'S STATEMENT ON NICARAGUAN BIOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903780006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 24, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Directorate of Intelligence
Office of Central Reference
24 July 1985
NOTE FOR: Y"'
DD/OCR
SUBJECT: Wallop's Statement on Nicaraguan Bios
This excerpt from the Congressional Record
of 3 October 1984 evidently is the one
mentioned by Senator Wallop. It contains
biographic material on the Nicaraguan contra
leaders, as well as some background material on
the opposition to the Sandinistas, and was
introduced into the Record by Senator Wallop.
The biographies were produced by State
Department (Office of the Coordinator for
Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the
Caribbean) and were based on reports OCR
prepared in December 1983 (for Assistant
Secretary Motley) and on data obtained by
Public Diplomacy from contra organizations.
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S 12866
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 3, 1984
down that street in th , wrong direc-
tion.
Either this country stands for, and
seeks for, and will support, legitimate
aspirations to freedom, or it is not the
country that I think It is, and this is
not the Senate that I hope it Is.
Mr. GOLDWATER..,.One additional
question, and I shalTit down:
The decision in these matters in my
opinion and according to the Constitu-
tion rests with the President, the Com-
mander in Chief. The Commander in
Chief has seen an ultimate threat to
our freedom on borders 800 miles
away. I might suggest that is the clos-
est we have ever come siii`ce the attack
on Pearl Harbor to hi.ting our free-
dom threatened.
I might add that because I live on
the Mexican border, I might feel a
little more closely associated with this
threat than others who live a greater
distance away.
But does the Senator from Wyoming
not feel that regardless of what word-
age we might adopt on this floor in
the form of an amendment, ultimately
it is the Commander ht Chief who is
going to have to make ut, our minds or
we are going to have to amend the
Constitution, and I frar cly think that
this might be a good tes , for the Presi-
dent to try his case, 1 ecause before
this Constitution of outs can survive
and we can go along as a free people,
in my opinion, we have to defeat the
War Powers Act. I do n, t like to bring
this in at this time, but I Just wanted
to raise that one poin , before I sit
down; that Is. It Is our 1 'ommander in
Chief, not us, who has o make these
final decisions, and mtt h as I dislike
arguing with my friend from Hawaii,
because I have the utmist respect for
him-he is one of the great heroes of
our World War II; he is tL man who is
dedicated to our princip cs-but in this
case, I have to agree a i th my friend
from Wyoming that the language of
this amendment should not be adopt-
ed by this body.
Ma WALLOP. I thank the Senator
from Arizona.
Mr. President, I made my case on
the floor, and I will not r lake It again,
for the strategic significance of this
area. I have asked whetter this coun-
try wants another Cubs. In this hemi-
sphere, and whether it t; willing to live
with the resulting eJ f !cts on the
Panama Canal and on )ur southern
border. Today, I wish t' concentrate
on something a little d' f [erent, an es-
sential issue that we love neglected.
Whatever we do with re trd to Nicara-
gua, our action or ini.< tion will re-
dound to someone's beii'fit. If we do
not support the contra:, then we sup-
port the Communists. I war, there is
no equivocation. What is going on
down there Is a war wi red by people
seeking their freedom, a id by Commu-
nist tyrants trying to cn sh it.
I have in my hand S mate Concur-
rent Resolution 74 sign I by 70 Sena-
tors of this body to enco gage and sup-
port the people of Afgh: nistan, on the
other side of the world, on the Soviet
border., in their struggle to be free
from Soviet domination.
We all -know who we are, the cospon-
sors of Senate Concurrent Resolution
74. and I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the RECORD the list of
cosponsors.
There being no objection, the list
was ordered to be printed In the
RECORD, as follows:
Mr. TsoNGAS (for himself, Mr. ABDNOR,
Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. BENTSEN.
Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. Boscnw TZ, Mr. BRAD-
LEY, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CHILES,
Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COHEN. Mr. D'AMATO, Mr.
DECoNcINI, Mr. DIXON, Mr. DOLE. Mr.
DURENBERGER. Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. ExoN, Mr.
FORD, Mr. GARN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. GRASSLEY,
Mr. HART. Mr. HATCH, Mr. HEINZ, Mr. HUD-
DLESTON. Mrs. KASSESAUM, Mr. KENNEDY,
Mr. LAXALT, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. MAT-
TINGLY, Mr. MELCHER. Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr.
MURKOWSKI, Mr. NICKLES, Mr. PELL. Mr.
PRESSLER. Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. PRYOR. Mr.
QUAYLE. Mr. RANDOLPH, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr.
RUDMAN, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SASSER. Mr.
SIMPSON, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. STENNIS, Mr.
WARNER, Mr. WILSON, Mr. ZORiNSKY, Mr.
HOLI.tNGS, Mr. PEncY, Mr. JEPSEN, Mr. CRAN-
STON. Mr. HEPLiN, Mr. DENTON, Mr. Symms,
Mr. EAST, Mr. INOUYE, Mr: DODD, Mr.
KASTEN. Mr. HECHT, Mr. McCLURE, Mr.
LEAHY, Mr. WALLOP, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr.
TOWER, and Mr. LAUTE.NSERG) submitted the
following concurrent resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions.
Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I
wonder what they see as the differ-
ence, those who feel one way about Af-
ghanistan and another about Central
America. Sure, they will be saying that
there are Soviet occupation troops in
Afghanistan.
But is not Cuba and the Soviet
Union in effect an occupation force
with the Sandinistas? Who In here
thinks that the Sandinistas can oper-
ate on their own independently and
could trigger a free election if they
wanted to without the permission of
their Soviet and Cuban masters?
Why would we vote to help freedom
on the other side of the globe and to
further the cause of the Soviet Union
near our own border?
Does anyone in here doubt that a
victory over the Nicaraguan resistance
would be a victory for the Soviet
Union? Of course It would be.
Why is it that there are some In this
body so eager to give that victory to
the Soviets and the Cubans?
Do the Nicaraguan people have less
right to be free than the Afghans?
The resolution says:
. It would be Indefensible to provide the
freedom fighters with only enough aid to
fight and die but not enough to advance
their cause of freedom.
Where are all my consistent fellow
cosponsors? What is the difference be-
tween people seeking freedom In the
mountains of Central Asia or the
mountains of Central America?
Where are you? Why Is it that it is
more important to be free there than
in our own hemisphere?
Perhaps here is the anwser. The res-
olution says:
That it should be the policy of the United
States to support effecitvely the people of
Afghanistan In their fight for freedom; ...
Perhaps these cosponsors are willing
to say such things when there is little
chance of achieving them, but when a
real choice is before them, Instead of
backing freedom, in effect they are
backing a Soviet victory in our own
hemisphere.
How good Is It to have votes on clear
Issues? How clear can you get? The
choice is absolutely there. Voters can
cast their votes and decide between
sincerity and hypocrisy.
Both of those causes are worthy of
the support of a free people proud of
freedom, and this I hope to God In
America is still one.
Mr. President. lest there be any
doubt as to the nature of the leaders
of the contras, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the biographies of the contra
leaders, showing them to be freedom-
loving people, many of whom formerly
were Sandinistas, be printed in the
RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
INTRODUCTION
The Sandinistas are waging an Intensive
propaganda campaign to discredit their op-
ponents as counter-revolutionaries. They de-
nounce the leaders of the armed anti-Sandl-
nista organizations as henchmen of former
President Somoza. But the facts show that
nearly all the so-called "contra" leaders
were actually staunch opponents of Somoza.
Many fought against Somoza and contribut-
ed to his defeat. Subsequently, they became
disillusldned when they saw that the demo-
cratic revolution for which they had sacrl-
ficed so much was being transformed by the
Sandinistas Into a Marxist-Leninist dictator-
ship. This paper provides an overview of the
reasons many Nicaraguans turned against
the Sandinistas and examines the composi-
tion of the groups that form the armed op-
position.
WHY THE OPPOSITION DEVELOPED
The Sandinistas' victory In 1979 depended
largely on the spirit of rebellion against
Somoza which had developed during the
1970's. Political parties-including the Con-
servatives, who were the traditional opposi-
tion force, dissident Liberals, Social Chris-
tians. and Socialists-all clamored for an
end to Somoza's total domination of the na-
tion's political system. Businessmen, farm-
ers, ranchers, and professionals-united in
the Supreme Council of Private Enterprise
(COSEP)-struggled against Somoza's con-
trol of Nicaragua's economy. Independent
labor confederations fought for workers'
rights and an end to repression of the orga-
nized labor movement. The Catholic
Church. under the leadership of Archbishop
Miguel Obando y Bravo, became an outspo-
ken critic of the-Somoza regime and advo-
cated freedom and Social Justice. The Per-
manent Commission on Human Rights ex-
posed the abuses of the Somoza government
to the world. The Independent daily La
Prensa spearheaded the crusade against
Somoza: In early 1978, the assassination of
the paper's editor, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro
Cardenal. Sparked the revolution.
The Sandinistas concluded that by deem-
phasizing their Marxist-Leninist Ideology
and forming a tactical alliance with the
broad spectrum of organizations opposed to
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October 3, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Somoza, they could seize power. According-
ly. they appealed to all Nicaraguans to Join
their revolutionary movement and pledged
that the pillars of the new government
would be pluralism, a mixed economy, and
nonalignment. The Nicaraguan people came
to view the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN), the major armed anti-
Somoza organization, as the only viable al-
ternative to Somoza's continued rule. Plac-
ing faith in the FSLN's promises, Nicara-
guans from all walks of life and all political
persuasions rallied round the Sandinistas
banner and joined In the popular revolution
that triumphed in July 1979.
The Sandinistas determined to maintain
the appearance of a broadly based popular
regime. The original junta of the new Gov-
ernment of National Reconstruction (GRN)
contained moderates as well as Sandinista
militants, and the cabinet included non-San-
dinistas. Even the key post of Defense Min-
ister was given to a defector from Somoza's
National Guard, Colonel Bernardino Larios.
However, the Sandinistas viewed this
merely as an interim arrangement that
would facilitate the consolidation of their
power. In September, the FSLN National
Directorate held a secret strategy session
which produced the "72-hour document," a
blueprint for the creation of an FSLN-con-
trolled Marxist-leninist State in Nicaragua.
As the Sandinistas labored to consolidate
their power, groups that had struggled so
long against Somoza became increasingly
opposed to Sandinistas policies and actions.
These groups found themselves confronting
a regime far more formidable and doctri-
naire than its predecessor. Activists in oppo-
sition parties were harassed and their op-
portunities to proselytize were limited by
law. Members of the private sector saw the
government take over the lion's share of the
economy and impose rules greatly restrict-
ing their ability to manage their own firms.
Independent labor leaders were frequently
persecuted, and strikes were outlawed while
the real wages of workers declined. The
leadership of the Catholic Church was at-
tacked by the FSLN for continuing to speak
out on Issues such as human rights, church
unity. Individual freedom, and the right to a
religious education. The Permanent Com-
mission on Human Rights was persecuted
for revealing Sandinistas human rights vio-
lations, and its president was driven into
exile. La Prensa was muzzled by a harsh
censorship law, and on numerous occasions
the paper did not publish because virtually
all the day's hard news had been prohibited
by government censors. Defense Minister
Larios was replaced by a member of the
FSLN's National Directorate, and he subse-
quently spent more than two years in prison
accused of being a counter-revolutionary; he
still Is not permitted to leave the country.
The Sandinistas have reneged on their
promise to bring democracy to Nicaragua,
and an ever-growing number of Nicaraguans
see their revolution betrayed by the FSLN.
Many have remained in Nicaragua thus far,
trying to wage a civic battle with the Sandi-
nistas. Others have concluded that the civic
course was futile, and that the only way the
Sandinistas would leave power was the same
way they acquired it. through military
force. In the past few years, a number of
armed anti-FSLN organizations have
emerged and initiated combat operations
against the Sandinistas. These groups repre-
sent widely differing constituencies within
Nicaragua, reflecting the diversity of the
groups that formerly had opposed Somoza.
A lack of unity has hampered the effective-
ness of the anti-FSLN efforts. In the
summer of 1984, however, the three major
exile organizations-FDN, MISURA, and
ARDE-formed an alliance named the Nica-
raguan Unity for Reconciliation (UNIR).
THE ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS
1. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCE-FDN
The FDN is the largest of the armed anti-
FSLN organizations. It was founded in 1981
under the leadership of former National
Guard officers. As the focal point for armed
resistance to the Sandinistas, it quickly at-
tracted many of those who had become dis-
affected with the FSLN. Its ranks were
swollen by influential political and business
figures, by peasants from northern Nicara-
gua who were fleeing Sandinista repression,
and even by disillusioned Sandinistas them-
selves. The Influx of new members led to a
fundamental transformation of the FDN,
and in December 1982 a new National Direc-
torate was formed which was dominated by
anti-Somoza civilians. The new civilian lead-
ership purged any former National Guard
members whose background was question-
able. It retained other former National
Guard members with clean records in posi-
tions where their military expertise was
needed. A further reorganization of the
FDN occurred In October 1983, and Adolfo
Calero, a prominent Conservative and busi-
ness leader, assumed the position of Presi-
dent of the National Directorate and Com-
mander in Chief. The FDN's rapid growth
has permitted it to field 42 task forces for
combat operations. All but four of these
units are currently led by civilians or ex-
Sandinistas. Overall, less than 1% of the
FDN's total strength were previously mem-
bers of the National Guard, while about
15% were actually ex-Sandinista fighters.
The FDN claims to have between 10,000 and
12,000 members.
II. MISURA AND BLACK CREOLES
MISURA evolved out the Alliance for the
Progress of Miskitos and Sumos (ALPRO-
MISU), an Indian organization founded in
1973 with the help of Protestant churches
working in the Atlantic Coast region. The
initial objective of the organization was to
compel the Somoza regime to respect the
rights of the indigenous Indian populations.
Following the fall of Somoza, the Sandinis-
tas renamed the organization Miskito,
Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity (MIS-
URASTA). Gradually, Sandinista mistreat-
ment of the indigenous population led MIS-
URASATA leaders to criticize the FSLN
and, finally, to flee into exile. By the end of
1981, Sandinista persecution and forced re-
location of Indian communities prompted
the beginning of a large-scale exodus of Mis-
kito Indians from Nicaragua. The govern-
ment officially disbanded MISURASATA,
but the organization lived on as former
members developed a center of armed resist-
ance to the FSLN. This group was headed
by Miskito leaders such as Wycliffe Diego
and Steadman Fagoth. In 1983, it adopted
the name MISURA. This organization
claims to have between 1.000 and 2,000
members.
III. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE-
ARDE
ARDE is a coalition of organizations led
by individuals who took an active role in the
revolution, including many who were initial-
ly officials of the Sandinista government.
ARDE was formed in exile in 1982. For a
year, its leaders sought to restore the origi-
nal course of the revolution through politi-
cal means. In mid-1983, after peaceful politi-
cal efforts proved futile, ARDE began mili-
tary operations in southern Nicaragua.
Since it was founded, ARDE has attracted
thousands of former Sandinista fighters and
civilians who have lost faith in the leader-
ship of the FSLN. In 1984, a split occurred
within the organization. The MDN, UDN/
S 12867
FARM, FSDC, end STDN-four of the com-
ponent organizations which held the major
political leaders of the alliance and a few
hundred of Its guerrillas-entered a pact
with the FDN end MISURA. The FRS and
MISURASATA- which included most of the
guerrillas and some of the civilian leaders-
refused to aligr themselves with the FDN
and have contin led to operate independent-
ly. While these differences remain unre-
solved, the two factions agreed in Septem-
ber 1984 to coo( inate their activities when-
ever possible. Tins following are the member
organizations of .kRDE:
A. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT-MDN
The MDN is a social-democratic party
founded in 1978 It drew its support from
middle class Nicaraguans, including many
professionals, and it played an active role
during the revolution. Its head, Alfonso
Robelo, was One of the original members of
the ruling GRN junta, but he resigned his
position In 1980 In protest to Sandinista ac-
tions. The leaders of the MDN, particularly
Robelo, subsequently were subjected to
heavy FSLN harassment and fled into exile
in 1982. Robelo has emerged as a key civil-
ian leader of ARDE.
B. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/NICARA-
GUAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES-UDN/
FARN
The UDN/FARN is a political/military ors
ganization founded in 1981 by veteran anti-
Somoza fighter Fernando "El Negro" Cha-
morro. The UDN/FARN was one of the
original groups of ARDE, but Chamorro
pulled his group out in the spring of 1983
and worked with the FDN for several
months. In the spring in 1984, his differ-
ences with ARD $ were overcome and the
UDN/FARN rejc ned the alliance.
C. CHRISTIAN DEM' CRATIC SOLIDARITY FRONT-
FSDC
The FSDC wat formed in 1983 by Chris-
tian Democratic !eaders who had fled Into
exile. It is led by figures such as Roberto
Ferrey who were long-time opponents of
Somoza.
D. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC WORKERS'
SOLIDARITY-STDN
The STDN was founded in 1983 by labor
leaders such as Zacarias Hernandez who
were forced into exile by Sandinista perse-
cution of the Independent labor movement.
They had been steadfast opponents of the
Somoza regime.
R. SANDINO REVOLUTIONARY FRONT-FRS
The F'RS, headed by Sandinista hero
Eden Pastore, was created in 1982 by disillu-
sioned Sandinista militants, many of whom
had fought alongside Pastors. on the South-
ern Front during 1979. The FRS was a
founding member of ARDE, but it severed
its ties when the leaders of other ARDE
groups decided form an alliance with the
FDN and MI RA. Many of ARDE's
combat troops chose to follow Pastora. The
FRS claims to have more than 5,000 mem-
bers.
F. MISKITO, SUM'), RAMA, AND SANDINISTA
UNI'I Y -MISURASATA
MISURASATA ii the other Indian organi.
zation that evolv:(1 out of ALPROMISU. As
noted above, the. Sandinistas renamed the
Indian organized )n MISURASATA, and
later officially disselv'Ad it when its leader-
ship become highly cirtical of FSLN actions.
In 1982, Miskitc? leader Brooklyn Rivera
Joined with other MISURASATA members
in the south anc commenced operations
against the Sandinistas. This group retained
the name MISURASATA and acted inde-
pendently of MISURA forces in the north.
MISURASATA h aders have collaborated
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S 12868 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 3, 1984
closely with Pastora's forces, and MISURA- totally disillusioned with the FSLN and the educated in Catholic schools in Nicaragua
SATA joined with the FRS in refusing to minor role it allowed other political parties, and the United States. During the revolu-
form an alliance with the FDN and Calero went Into exile to join the FDN. He tion, the Satazars collaborated with the
MISURA. was appointed to the FDN's National Direc- FSLN and harbored Sandinista militants
A<
Sandinista propaga ida seeks to portray
the leaders of the arried opposition groups
torate and In October 1983 elevated to the who were being sought by Somoza's forces.
post of President of the National Director- Her husband, a top official of COSEP.
ate and Commander in Chief of the FDN's played a key role in the civic opposition to
Armed Forces. He serves as the FDN's rep- Sandinista policies in late 1979 and 1980. He
t tl th
Di
rectorate of UNIR. was a progressive leader whose popularity
graphical sketches show the contrary: that resen a ve on a
most were arden opponents of the Somoza Enrique Bermudez Varela. Member of the was rising when Sandinista security agents
regime. FDN National Directorate and Chief of set him up and shot him allegedly for par-
Enrique
/ Adolfo Calero Portocarrero. President of firer who graduated from the Nicaraguan
_gua and subsequently joined the FDN.
,
C the National Directorate and Command- Military Academy and attained the rank of(4. Marco A. Zeledon, Member of the FDN Na-
er in Chief of the Armed Forces of the colonel In the National Guard. He was not - tional Directorate
cr\u
Adolfo Calero was a prominent business-
man and a lifelong p litical opponent of
Somoza. He received pat of his education In
the United States, graduating In 1953 from
the University of Notre Dame and later
doing graduate work In Industrial manage-
ment at the Univer. ity of Syracuse. He
holds a law degree from the University of
Central America In Nicaragua. In the late
1950s he became a major stockholder in and
manager of the Coca-Cc-la Company of Nica-
ragua. His views on social and economic
r,uuwcaily 7tUblve aim regarueu mmsen as a
professional soldier. Bermudez spent much
of his career abroad. He attended military
training courses in Brazil and the United
States. He served with the Inter-American
Peace Force in the Dominican Republic in
1965, and was head of the Nicaraguan dele-
gation to the Inter-American Defense Coun-
cil. During the years preceding the revolu-
tion. Bermnde? was Nicaraguan Defense At-
tache in Washington. After the revolution,
he helped organize other exiled National
Guard officers and was a founder of the
issues translated into tangible benefits for FDN.
his workers, such as profit sharing, pay ex Alfonso Cal!ejas Deshon, Member of the
reeding the minimun wage by 60%, and FDN National Directorate
scholarship programs. He served as a direc-
tor of the Chamber of Commerce and was a
member of the Nicaraguan Developmental
Institution (INDE) and the Nicaraguan De-
velopmental Foundat.i. ?n (FUNDS), and a
co-founder of the Hur.,an Development In-
stitute (INPRHU). In the early 1370s, he
was the dean of the faculty of Economics
and Business Adminstrztion at the Universi-
ty of Central America.
Calero began his po: tical career in 1453,
when he joined other mti-Somoza activists
including Pedro Joaq An Chamorro Car-
denal (the editors of La Prensa a>sassinated
In 1979), Rafael Cordo,r Rivas (currently a
member of the ORN junta), and Reynaldo
Antonio Tefel (curren.ly a member of the
GRN cabinet) in forming an opposition
youth movement. Late ? in the 1950s, he
became an activitist in the Conservative
party, the traditional c pposition group to
Somoza. In 1959, he helped organize mana-
gerial strikes in support of the "Olama and
Wycliffe Diego is a Miskito Indian leader
from the Atlantic Coast town of Puerto Ca-
bezas. Ile was a Moravian pastor and an
active member of ALPROMISU, eventually
attaining the office of Coordinator. In 1974,
he was jailed by Somoza for allegedly being
a Communist. Like many other Miskitos,
Diego initially supported the revolution but
became increasingly critical of the FSLN's
treatment of his people. In 1981 he fled into
exile after the Sandinistas arrested numer-
ous Miskito leaders. Although the FSLN of-
ficially disbanded MISURASATA, Diego
Los MolleJones" insurrection headed by collaborated with other members of the
Nicaragua after the revolution, and al- movement in transforming MISURASATA
Chamorro. though he was reportedly investigated and into an armed anti-Sandinista group. Ile was
Calero's stature within the Conservative cleared of any wrongdoing, his properties gravely wounded in an assassination at-
party grew during the 1960s, and in 1970 he were confiscated. He subsequently went tempt in 1982. He represents MISURA on
was offered a seat as an alternate In Con- back into exile. the directorate of UNIR.
gress as part of a part between Fernando jndalecio Rodriguez Alaniz, Member of th teadman Fagoth Muller, Member of
Aguero (Conservative party head) and FDN ,,_.,_
---------
nal
that Aguero's actions amounted to a sellout
to Somoza. Instead, Calero joined other
party members, such as current conserva-
tive leader Mario Rappaccioli, and founded
the Authentic Conservative Party. He
became the party's coordinator In 1977.
Following the assassination of Chamorro
In 1978, Calera, was it principal leader of the
strikes and civic activity that shook the
Somoza regime. He subsequently served as
his party's representative In the Broad Op-
position Front (FAO), an umbrella organiza-
tion of opposition groups. He and other
FAO leaders were jailed for a month for ini-
tiating a general strike.
Following the fall of Somoza, Calero lnl-
Alfonso Callejas was trained as a civil en-
gineer at the University of Santa Clara in
California. After working for several years
with the Standard Fruit Company, he
founded his own business and eventually
had Interests in cattle, bananas, and cotton.
Marco A. Zeledon was a prominent busi-
nessman who played a leading role In pri-
vate sector organizations. He has held key
positions, such as president of the Nicara-
guan Chamber of Industry, and served as
member of the Board of Governors of the
Central American Institute of Food Market-
ing and of the Financial Committee of the
developmental organization FUNDE. He
was a progressive businessman who was one
of the first to promote constructive forms of
interaction in decision-making among the
private sector, the government, labor
unions, and community organizations. He
became Increasingly active In anti-Somoza
politics during the 1970s, and participated in
a private sector initiative to persuade
Somoza to Implement policies that would
result in a more equitable distribution of
wealth. Zeledon went into exile after the
Sandinistas confiscated his cereal business.
He held various local and national offices In 1 II. MISURA AND BLACK CREOLES
his capacity as an engineer, and headed thjWycliffe Diego, Coordinator of the Political
National Office of Water Resources in the Commission of MISURA
early 1960s. He sewed as Minister of Public
Works and later was named Vice President
of the Rcpt.hlic under Somoza. He became
disenchanted with the Somoza regime, how-
ever, and In 1972 resigned as a public protest
to Somoza's efforts to maintain himself In
power. He was a member of Somcza's Na-
tional Liberal Party (PLN), but he was it
leader of a group of dissidents who sought
to restore true liberal values to the party. In
1978, he organized a PLN grassroots move-
ment designed to force Somoza to resign. He
Indaleclo Rodriguez is a veterinary doctor
who served as a professor and President of
the University of Central America in Mana-
gua. As the son of a prominent anti-Somoza
figure, he became politically active at an
early age. He participated In an opposition
youth movement, and became active In the
Independent Liberal Party (PLI). He was
jailed twice in the 1950s for his anti-Somoza
political activity, and went Into exile In 1960
where he became Involved for a time with
the newly formed FSLN. After several years
abroad, he returned to Nicaragua to accept
a position at the University of Central
America, and he remained there during the
revolution. By 1981, he had become disillu-
tially attempted to cooperate with the stoned with the FSLN and abandoned his
FSLN in rebuilding Nicaragua. He was most to go into exile.
leader of the Democratic Conservative ucia Cardenal de Salazar, Member of the
Party which was forget' during the revolu- FDN National Directorate
tion by uniting the pre% ous divided conserv- Lucia Cardenal de Salazar Is the widow of
at.ive movement, and hi was selected to the prominent Nicaraguan businessman Jorge
key position of politica, coordinator for the Salazar Arguello, murdered by Sandinista
party. By the end of 1782, having become security forces In November 1980. She was
Steadman Fagoth, a Miskito Indian
leader, was an active opponent of Somoza.
While studying biology at the National Au-
tonomous University of Nicaragua In the
early 1970s. he was arrested twice for his po-
litical activities. He became a member of the
ALPROMISU organization which defended
Indian interests. Following the revolution,
he became a leader of the Sandinista-spon-
snred successor to this group, MISURA-
SATA. He was that organizations's first rep-
resentative on the quasi-legislative Council
of State. Fagoth began to criticize Sandi-
nista mistreatment of his people, and In
February 1981 he was among a group of
Indian leaders arrested for "counter-revolu-
tionary activity." He was also accused of
having been an Informant for Somoza
during his university days, but MISURA-
SATA Insisted that his collaboration had
been at the behest of the FSLN. In May.
Fagoth was released on the condition that
he accept a lengthy scholarship in a Soviet-
bloc country. He managed to flee to ilondu-
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October 3, 1984
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SEN4TE
I)
ras where he joined other MISURASATA
members who were fighting against the
Sandinistas. In 1982, he was wounded in an
assassination attempt.
Roger Hermann, Member of the Political
Commission of MISURA
Roger Hermann, a young Indian leader
from Puerto Cabezas, became active in MIS-
URASATA in 1979 in the labor field. Two
years later, when the FSLN attempted to
coerce him into working for the secret
police (DGSE), he chose to go into exile in-
stead. He was elected to MISURA's Political
Commission in 1983.
111. DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE-
ARDE
Democratic Front. In his law practice, he
specialized in labor' cases and frequently
acted on behalf of unions affiliated with the
Christian Democratic-oriented Latin Ameri-
can Workers Central (CLAT). Because of
this involvement with strike actions, he was
jailed several times by the Somoza regime.
He become a key figure in the Social Chris-
tian Party, and went into exile in 1976 to
participate in the struggle against Somoza.
After the revolution, he returned to Nicara-
gua and became a legal adviser in the new
Ministry of Justice. In July 1983, he re-
signed his post and moved to Costa Rica
where he joined the FSDC.
NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC WORKERS'
D
.
A. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT-MDN
Alfonso Robelo Callejas, Political Coordina- j1 SOLIDARITY-STDN
for of ARDE, Head of the MDN I acarias Hernandez, Secretary General of
Alfonso Robelo was trained as a chemical the STDN
engineer and served as director of the Uni- Zacarias Hernandez was a veteran labor
versity of Central America in Nicaragua leader of the dockworkers union at the Pa-
during 1970-72. He subsequently became a cific of Corinto. He had contracts with orga-(~I~onaid Castillo
leader in the private sector and was presi- nizations such as the International Confed
dent of the Nicaragua Chamber of Indus- eration of Free Trade Unions and the AFL- Donald Castillo was a principal labor
tries until 1975. For the following three CIO, and the Somoza regime repeatedly ar- leader and held key positions in Social
years he headed the developmental institute rested him for his efforts to promote free Christian-oriented labor confederation, the
INDE. trade unionism. After the revolution, the Nicaraguan Workers' Central (CTN). He
Rebelo's work with progressive, non- Corinto union joined the Sandinista Work- was a staunch opponent of Somoza and ac-
Somoza private sector organizations led him ers Central (CST). The dockworkers grew tively supported t: n?; FSLN during the 1970s.
to a growing political role in the anti- dissatisfied with the CST, but when they at- In 1976, he was expelled from Guatemala
Somoza movement. Following the assassina- tempted to switch their affiliation to a for arms smuggling. After the revolution, he
tion of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal Social-Democratic confederation, Hernan- became the CTN'e delegate to the quasi-leg-
in early 1978, Robelo founded the Nicara- dez and other union officials were subjected islative Council of State. He became increas-
guan Democratic Movement (MDN), a polit- to a campaign of harassment and intimida- ingly disillusioned by the Sandinistas'
ical party of businessmen, industrialists, and tion. Hernandez fled into exile where he unfair labor practices, and in mid-1981
profession created to pro?'ide leadership for' became a co-founder of the STDN. served as the coordinator of a civic opposi-
the opposition to the Somoza regime. As SANDINO REVOLUTIONARY FRONT-FRS tion group which held a dialogue with the
head of the MDN, he became an activelr i. FSLN in an unsuccessful effort to resolve
member of the Broad Opposition Front Eden Pastora Gomez, Leader of the FRS national problems. He subsequently went
(FAO). Eden Pastors was the FSLN's most re- into exile where he became a co-founder of
One of the original five members of the nowned revolutionary hero and a senior of- the STDN and ;oined ARDE. When the
GRN junta, Robelo resigned In April 1980, ficial of the GRN until he broke with the STDN supported the decision to form an al-
publicly stating his opposition to the Marx- Sandinista leadership in 1981 and eventual- liance with the FDN, Castillo left the orga-
Ist-Leninist tendencies within the FSLN- ly took up arms against his former col- nization and colli,borated with Pastors's
dominated government and to the strong leagues. Pastore was reared in a conserva. FRS.
Cuban influence. His efforts at civic opposi- tive Catholic family, and his father was F. MISKITO, SUMO, RAMA, AND SANDINISTA
tion provoked severe harassment by the killed in 1042 by the National Guard for al- UNITY-MISURASATA
FSLN, including Sandinista mobs vandaliz- leged subversive activities. In the 1950s. he,113rooklyn Rivera Bryan, Leader of MISUR
ing his home. Robelo fled into exile In 1982 studied medicine in Mexico, but later re Ac ATA
ARDE. He serves as ARDE's representative
on the Directorate of UNIR.
B. NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/NICARA-
GUAN REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES-UDN
rills struggle against Somoza. By the 1970s Brooklyn Rivera, a mathematician, is a
he was in charge of logistics for the FSLN Miskito Indian leader from the Sandy Bay
insurgents operating from Costa Rica and area of Nicaragua i Atlantic Coast. He ini-
was the leader of the Sandinistas' Southern tially supported the revolution against
FARM Front.
Fernando "El' Negro" Chamorro Rappac- Pastors, had gained wide fame in August
cioli, Leader of UDN/FARN, Command- 1978 when, as "Comandante Cero," he led
er of ARDE's Military Forces the Sandinista unit that seized the National
Fernando Chamorro was a prominent Palace in Managua. That operation gained
anti-Somoza figure since the 1940s. He par- the release of 59 political prisoners, but its
ticipated in numerous military operations real significance was that It captured the
against the regime, and he was repeatedly imagination of the Nicaraguan people and
exiled or imprisoned by Somoza. During the allowed the Sandinistas to become the
revolution, he executed a spectacular rocket symbol of resistance to the Sodnoza regime.
attack on Somoza's bunker from a room in During 1979, Pastore led Sandinista troops
the nearby Intercontinental Hotel. In 1979, fighting on the Southern Front.
he fought on the Southern Front. After the Following the Sandinista victory in July
Sandinistas took power, Chamorro retired 1979, Pastors, became Vice Minister of Inte-
to private life. In 1981, he went into exile rior. In January 1980, he was reassigned as
d feed th UMW/FARM In Q. tern- Vice Minister of Defense and Chief of the
r
n e
S 12869
Jose Davila studied economics at the Na-
tional Autonomous University of Nicaragua
and went on to do advanced work in eco-
nomics and development in West Germany.
He was active in student politics and later
became a senior officer of the Social Chris-
tian Party (PSC), one of the main opposi-
tion groups to Sor .oza. Following the revo-
lution, he served . s the PSC's delegate to
the quasi-legislati? e Council of State. In
1981, he became se :retary of the civic oppo-
sition umbrella on anization, the Democrat-
ic Coordinating Bc ard. The following year,
he went into exile .tnd helped form the Nic-
araguan Assoclaticn of Democratic Unity
(ANUDE). In 198), this group split and
Davila went with the faction that founded
the FSDC. That September, the FSDC for-
mally joined ARDE. When the FSDC elect-
ed to join other AIDE groups in entering a
coalition with the FDN, Davila left the
FSDC to work witl Pastora's FRS.
Somoza and was a founding member of
MISURASATA wl en it was established by
the Sandinistas in 1979. He grew increasing-
ly disenchanted w th the FSLN and began
to protest Sandinir is, repression of Indians.
In February 1981. he was among the Indian
leaders arrested, accused of "counter-revolu-
tionary activity." He was released after two
weeks, but he continued to criticize FSLN
efforts to national?ze Indian lands and cul-
turally assimilate the Indian population,
and he was forceo go into exile later that
year. In 1982, he ecame the leader of Indi-
ans who organs a separate MISURA-
SATA faction in the south.
GLOSSARY
ga
p National Militia. He became Increasingly
ber 1882o
be, he joined in founding ARDE, but over the radical policies ample- , ALPROMISU-A-1lance for the Progress
he pulled out in 1983. He rejoined ARDE in disgruntled the heavy foreign of Miskitos and Su nos.
1984, and became the commander of its mill- mented the FSLN and it e FSLN
revolution, especially heavy foreign ANUDE-Nicaraguan Association of
tary forces when Pastore withdrew that b Democratic Unity.
summer. thousands of Cubans that permeated the ARDE-Democratic Revolutionary Alli-
C. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY FRONT- posts s and government. went Jnly abroadd. . I, In A A rpril l 188298 2, he hie ance.
p and In 1
rsDC publicly denounced the FSLN leadership for CLAT-Latin American Workers Central.
Roberto Ferrey, Secretary General to the betraying the revolution and organized the COSEP-Suprerie Council of Private En-
FSDC FRS. That September, he helped to found terprise.
Roberto Ferrey studied law at the Nation- ARDE. The following spring, he became the CST-Sandinista Workers' Central.
al Autonomous University of Nicaragua and military leader of ARDE's forces when it CTN-Nicaraguar: Workers' Central.
went on to do postgraduate work at South- initiated military actions in southern Nica- DGSE-General Directorate of State Se-
ern Methodist University in Texas. During ragua. He has opposed any alliance with the curity.
his university years, he became a founder of FDN. FAO-Broad Opposition Front.
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S 12870 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE Oetober 3, 1984
FARN-Nicaraguan Rt :olut.ionary Armed
Forces.
FDN-Nicaraguan Democratic Force.
FRS-Sandino Revolutionary Front.
FSDC---Christian Democratic Solidarity
Front.
FSLN-Sandinisto National Liberation
Front.
FUNDE-Nicaraguan.. Developmental
Foundation.
GRN-Government of National Recon-
struction.
INDE-Nicaraguan Developmental Insti-
tute.
INPRHU-Human Detclopment Institute.
MDN-Nicaraguan Democratic Movement.
MISURA and Black Creoles.
MISURASATA-Miski.o. Sumo, Rama,
and Sandinista Unity.
PLI-Independent Llb(r~l Party.
PLN-National Liberal flarty.
PSC--Social Christian rty.
STDN-Nicaraguan Democratic Workers'
Solidarity.
UDN-Nicaraguan Democratic Union.
UNIR-Nicaraguan Ur ity for. Reconcilia-
tion.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, the
distinguished manager of this portion
of the legislation is on the floor, as Is
the chairman of the :elect Committee
on Intelligence. I would like to direct a
question, preceded by a statement.
May I say to the Senator from
Alaska that we are discussing on the
floor of the Senate classified matters
of the greatest sensitivity. That Is to
say, statements about classified mat-
ters are being made which this Sena-
tor believes to be incorrect. But to
debate such matters fully In the open
would be to reveal what we are bound
not to reveal. And that puts at a disad-
vantage those who disagree with some
of the statements being made.
Mr. President, if tie Senator from
Alaska could just turn my way for a
moment, a quarter turn.
Mr. STEVENS. I am listening.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I have here the
report of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence accompanying the in-
telligence authorization bill for fiscal
year 1985. It is labeled "Top Secret,
Codeword."
Now, this report has teen filed for
sometime now. We have hoped we
would have an authorization bill, as we
have had each year since 1979. For the
first year since then, there is no bill.
The distinguished chairman and I
both wrote the leaders this morning
asking, "Are we not tc have an author-
izat ion bill?"
But, I say to th-? Senator from
Alaska, I do not kn(-w how I am to
debate the contents o this measure at
the moment. And t'zat is what we
seem to have chosen t) do.
Mr. WALLOP. W li the Senator
yield for a question?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I tin happy to.
Mr. WALLOP. I k now of nothing
that has been classified that the Sena-
tor from Louisiana said nor that the
Senator from Hawaii has said. Since
only one other person has spoken. I
assume the Senator from New York 1s
referring to the Senator from Wyo-
ming. I wonder if you can enlighten
me as to what you mean.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. This is the prob-
lem I raise. I have some disagreement
with some of the statements made by
the Senator from Louisiana.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator will refrain for 1 moment.
The Senate will be in order.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Would the Senate
have the kindness to pay attention?
I would disagree with some of the
statements made by the Senator from
Louisiana. I would have more specific
disagreements with the Senator from
Wyoming. But to make my case con-
trary to their statements, I would have
to discuss matters in a top secret
report to this body, which I cannot do
because we are here in open session.
Mr. STEVENS. Will the Senator
yield?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am happy to,
yield. I hope I am yielding for some
resolution.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I
might suggest this is not the place to
debate the report of the Intelligence
Committee.
Is the Senator saying that the com-
ments that are In the RECORD so far
are classified beyond that report?
Mr. MOYNIHAN. I am saying that
representations have been made as to
the nature of our involvement In the
area we are discussing which do not
comport with the specific content of
this report. Yes, I am saying that.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the
Senator addressed the question to me,
and I would just say this: It appears to
me that, in order to discuss an item
which places a, limitation on a classi-
fied program, It is necessary to skirt
quite closely to classification. I have in
my hand a completely sanitized ques-
tion and answer response so that this
Senator would not go beyond classifi-
cation In responding to any question
you want to ask about Nicaragua. I
think the Senator from Wyoming has
a similar concept in terms of what he
has done:
The mere fact that the subject
matter that is discussed In that report
that the Intelligence Committee has
classifed is discussed in these com-
ments which are totally not classified
by those that have the authority to
classify documents, is, in my opinion,
no reason to say that there has been
classified material discussed on the
floor.
As a matter of fact, the Senate of
the United States does not have the
authority to classify documents. We
do maintain classification that Is given
to us by the executive branch. But
right now we are talking about limita-
tions raised by the Senator from
Hawaii, and legitimately so, saying
that there should be a phasing out of
moneys that are contained In a classi-
fied portion of this bill that is before
us. He has raised it In an honorable
way without disclosing any classified
material.
This Senator has not heard any-
thing yet on the floor of this Senate
that has invaded the sphere of classifl-
cation. And I have tried to listen.
Though I may not look at everyone, I
do try to listen to what is going on be-
cause this is touchy. And I think we
have done our best.
I would urge the Senate to realize
that we are dealing with classified
areas. They could affect the lives and
certainly the future of a great many
people. Therefore, I would urge the
Senator to address the issue of the
Senator from Hawaii's amendment
and not the issue of classification be-
cause I disagree with the Senator as
far as the extent to which we have
gone today.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I
hope the Senator from Alaska Is not
suggesting that I misrepresented my
views on this matter or spoke in a way
that would not be warranted by the
facts as I understand them.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, the
Senator from Alaska Is saying to the
Senator from New York that his un-
derstanding of what is classified is I
feel colored by the classification of the
report of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee. And I am responding by saying
that everything I have heard on the
floor so far Is contained In Information
we have asked for and received from
those people who are involved in the
classification process concerning the
questions that are before us. They
have been sanitized and they contain
no classified material. I would be
happy to show the Senator if he would
like to see them.
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President. I
see the Senator from Hawaii has
arisen. I will yield the floor, but I will
accept the offer of the Senator from
Alaska. But I would like the Senator
from Alaska to understand that we
have taken the affairs of this commit-
tee with great care and solemnity. We
have prepared on time our materials.
We have asked to come to the floor.
We have been prepared for a closed
session. I do not say this has been
denied its, I simply say this has not
happened. That leaves those who will
represent things as being other than I
think they are the opportunity to say
that and denies this Senator the op-
portunity to reply.
Several Senators addressed the
Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
WALLOP). The Senator from Hawaii.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, In
order to clarify and clear the air, may
I suggest that we go into a quorum call
very briefly, protecting the right of
the Senator from New York, as far as
his right to the floor.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, I do
not think the Senator from New York
has the floor.
Mr. INOUYE. I have the floor now.
Mr. KENNEDY. Will the Senator
withhold that so I would be able to ad-
dress the amendment so we may at
least be able to proceed with the
debate and discussion? I have some
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October 3, 1984 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 12871
comments that are not directed not do that? We have read news re- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
toward the issue which has been ports suggesting that there were as- Senator from North Carolina.
raised now between the Senator from sault teams being supported by the Mr. EAST. Mr. President, I appreci-
New York and the Senator from Libyans that were going to attack the ate the opportunity to speak briefly in
Alaska. President of the United States. That opposition to the Inouye amendment
Mr. INOUYE. This clarification will seems to me to be more outrageous with all due respect for the very dis-
Just take a few minutes. We have the than even the violations of human tinguished Senator from Hawaii.
classified document. rights or the violation of church rights First, as regards the remarks of the
Mr. KENNEDY. I Just wanted to in Nicaragua. Senator from Massachusetts, I would
make some general comments, if I What about undermining the Syrian remind him that F'-anoe did help us in
could. Government? They are sheltering the the American Revolution, and he que-
Mr. INOUYE. I yield to the Senator. terrorists, who may be responsible for ries why we do not --
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I blowing up the marine barracks in
hope the Members of this body will Lebanon according to the administra- Mr. KENNEDY. The French helped
support the amendment of the Sena- tion. Why are we not undermining the patriots in Massachusetts? Mr.
tor from Hawaii. I intend to do so, be- that government with Its record of Senator, that is a new note in history.
cause I believe this amendment will heinous activities and the righteous- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
meap an end to the covert war, the ness of our particular cause against Senator from North Carolina has the
President's war in Nicaragua, I had in- those who were involved in the brutal- floor.
tended to offer the Senate with my ity, the terrorism, the violence, and Mr. EAST. I have the floor, and I
colleague, Senator BINGAMAN, from the assassination of brave young would like to comment. The Senator
New Mexico, a similar amendment Americans? Why are we not doing that was suggesting thr.t no one helped us
that would also terminate funding for this afternoon? Why are we not in our efforts, an 1 I was simply re-
the secret war. having a street war in Iran after their minding the Senator as a matter of
I do not intend, to delay the Senate humiliation of the United States in historical fact that France did help
a great deal to debate this issue. So I holding the 53 brave Americans, all of the United State., during the French
would like to make some comments on whom returned safely to the United Revolution as well as some other Euro-
that in support of the Inouye amend- States I might add? Why are we not pean powers.
ment, and I think that would support supporting a war there? Why are we Second, the Senator raises the inter-
the amendment the Senator from New not conducting a secret war in Cuba esting point, why are we not doing
Mexico and I would have offered. for all the reasons that have been out- something perhaps to undermine the
Make no mistake, the Senator from lined by those that have spoken Government of Qaihafl or undermine
Hawaii's amendment will put an end against the amendment of the Senator the Government In Syria, or to under-
to this illegal war. from Hawaii this afternoon? Why is mine the Government in Cuba. I
Mr. President, In listening to this there not ample justification for all of would agree with the Senator. It is
debate this afternoon, if one were not those? Why are we not sending Ameri- probably a good idea. Let us put this
entirely familiar with the Inouye cans and American taxpayers' money in a little broader perspective. Under
amendment, one might think that we all over the world trying to police the Marxist-Leninist thinking, the ration-
were passing a sense-of-the-Senate res- world? ale goes like this. This is the dimen-
olution commending the Sandinista I thought we had learned, Mr. Presi- sion that Lenin added. He said the rev-
government. We have heard the Sena- dent, that lesson in recent times. olution will not take place in the
for from Louisiana discuss the recent Mr. President, it has not been an ef- major industrial powers as Marx envi-
history of the repressive activities of fective policy and the logic of their ar- stoned it in the United States and
denial l of of freedom the Sandinistas . assembly, the gument cannot stand any fair evalua- Western Europe, but In the Third
reedom of on. Wthe tion of the facts. World. This is u here the protracted
heard the freedom
attack of on the he Sandinista have This war ought to be ended, and it conflict will take place and that the
government t respect the ought to be ended now. I applaud the motherland of the revolution, the Bol-
fre edo o of the e failing Th h n we heard amendment of the Senator from shevik revolution in Russia under
frem press. o en we heard Hawaii in ensuring that we will see an Lenin in 1917, wi:l find proxies in the
hnptherpening Senator
in enator Nicaragua, what is end to the support for the Contras, underdeveloped or soft underbelly of
happening issagua, with what is many of whom are not as interested in the world, as they put it, to take this
Mr. happening President, , the the issue e is American fighting for freedom as they are in protracted conflict through wars of
involvement in overturning an indige- plundering their countryside. We hear subversion. Then v ,hat you are to do is
nous government in Nicaragua. That is talk about how we had to fund free- take the soft underbelly, and then the
basically and fundamentally wrong. It dom fighters in Nicaragua. Who was ripe fruit of N )rth America and
is wrong under international law. It funding freedom fighters in the Europe-the majo industrial powers-
concerns activities which this body has United States at the time of of the would fall. That is precisely the strate-
not yet approved, it is a policy which is American Revolution? Who was fund- gy they have used. The Soviet Union
ineffective because It strengthens the ing them? But we have to pour out uses the PLO and Syria as surrogates
repressive forces in Nicaragua, and it American taxpayers' money on a war in the Middle E t. They use their sur-
has not been successful in achieving which is illegal, on a war which has rogates in Afric They are using in
what those who have supported this been ineffective, and a war which has Cuba in Africa I d Central America.
measure have felt that its purpose actually strengthened those that we and they are usinrr. Vietnam in South-
was; namely, interdicting the arms find are perpetuating the greatest east Asia.
flow into El Salvador. kinds of violations of the kinds of To get back to the contra aid, I
I daresay those who want to contin- values which we hold dear. think Senator JOHNSTON has stated
ue support for the contras ought to be Mr. President, I say that enough is the case extremely well.
making the positive case for continued enough on this issue and this war. We Here we have a very legitimate
support rather than just reciting and have had an opportunity in April of effort of a broad-based group trying to
repeating the repressions which exist last year where 30 Senators voted for reverse that trend, and for us to ignore
in Nicaragua today, which all 100 peace. In June we had 43 Senators it in every circumstance I think is to
Members would unanimously con- who voted for peace. Now is the last revert to the isolationism of the
demn. chance for the Senate in this session 1930's. As Jeane Kirkpatrick said a
Mr. President, if we were to follow to vote again for peace. little while ago, it is not a matter of
the logic of those that have opposed I hope that the Senate will support being hawk or dove, but a matter of
the Inouye amendment, we would be the Inuoye amendment. being an ostrich as to what is occur-
funding a secret war in Libya. Why Mr. EAST addressed the Chair. ring in the world.
in
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