UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903770012-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 30, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

_. _. _ ..
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THc WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 30, 1983
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information.
Recent unauthorized disclosures of classified information
concerning our. diplomatic, military, and-intel:l.igence activities
threaten our ability to carry out national security policy.
I have issued a directive detailing procedures to curb these
disclosures. and to streamline procedures for investigating them..
However, unauthorized disclosures are so harmful to our
national security that I wish to underscore to each of you
the seriousness with which I view them.
The unauthorized disclosure of our Nation's classified informa-
tion by those entrusted with its protection is improper,
unethical, and plain wrong. This kind of unauthorized disclosure
is more than a so-called "leak"--it is illegal. The Attorney
General has been asked to investigate a number of recent
disclosures of classified information. Let me make it clear
that eve intend to take appropriate administrative action against
any_._Federal employee found to have engaged in unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, regardless of rank or
position. Where circumstances warrant, cases will also be
referred for criminal prosecution.
The American people have placed a special trust and confidence
in each of us to protect their property with which we'arel
entrusted, including classified information. They expect us
to protect fully the. national security secrets used to protect
them in a dangerous and difficult world. All of us have
taken an oath faithfully to discharge our duties as public
servants, an oath that is violated when unauthorized disclosures
of classified information are made.
Secrecy in national security matters is a necessity in this
world. Each of us, as we carry out our individual duties,
recognizes that certain matters require confidentiality. 6Ve
must be able to carry out diplomacy with friends and foes on
a confidential basis; peace often quite literally depends on
it--and this includes our efforts to reduce the threat of
nuclear war. .
We must also. be able to protect our military forces from
present or potential adversaries. From the time of the Founding
Fathers, we have accepted the need to protect military secrets.
P7uclear dangers, terrorism, and aggression similarly demand
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,in .peacetime, .lives depend on our. ability to keep certain
about these dangers--and our sources of this information '. .
must be protected if we are .to continue to receive it. Even.:
..that we must.~be able to gather n~~ellig~nce information
to these unauthorized disclosures.. There are other means
?As public servants,-we.have no legitimate excuse for resorting.;
matters secret.,
.available to express ourselves:`:
right ao damage our.country, by ,gi~ing,~away its necessary .secrets:
people informed about national-security policies
We: make,:":every. effort to keep:the Congress and th.e..
.concerning national security.-policy-must be
classified.
;-views and opinions.. within our, government. ,
We have mechanisms_fo'r presenting alternative
material and .for downgrading.information that may
Established procedures exist fbr'declassifying
be.overclas
?Workable procedures also exist for reporting wrong--
doing or illegalities`, both to,-the. appropriate ,
Executive Branch offices and to the Congress...
Finally, each of us has the right to leave our position of
-trust and criticize our government and-,.its policies, if that
is what our conscience..-dictates,.. What we do hot have is. the :?
must understand the duty we have to those who place their
-trust in use ?I ask each of you to join.me in redoublirig.our
action. As servants of the people, we in the .Federal, Government
..everwant.to change.ahat. But we are also a mature and
disciplined people who understand the?need for responsible,
L~
~ae:are as a Nation.an upen and trusting People, with a proud
tradition of free speech, robust debate, and the right to
disagree strongly over all national policies. ?: No one would
efforts to .protect that trust..,.
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THE. NOT QUITE 1AIAR
IME TO PAY..ATTENTION: CENTRAL AMERICA JUST
won't go away. "For better or worse-and often for
worse=the United States has been intimately in-
volved in the affairs of Central America for more than
a century. Today, no one who is serious disputes that
the region is within America's sphere of influence.'Still,
hegemony has its limits, and there are legitimate questions
concerning the United States' proper role in the area. The
debate is heating up, and the Reagan administration's plans
for Central America are likely to become the dominant
foreign-policy issue in the ]984 presidential campaign.
This much is given: Scarcely another region in the world
knows greater poverty and inequality. 'Greed and neglect,
much of it encouraged acid abetted by the United States in the
twentieth century, have spawned widespread discontent. In
Nicaragua, where a dictator of unrivaled callousness and
cruelty was finally overthrown in ~ ]979, aself-proclaimed
Marxist-Leninist regime now .rules with an iron hand-a
government willing and eager to spread its doctrines to its
neighbors, by force if necessary and first in EI Salvador.
No matter what one thinks of the domino theory, Central
America is too close to have its future left to chance. In the
- United States, there is a growing awareness of the region, but
confusion is still the common denominator. According to the
polls, most Americans can't even identify which side the
United States is on in the region's two major conflicts.
Nevertheless, one principle controls: Americans' don't want
our boys fighting their war.
The politicians, and especially those in Congress, are as
perplexed as the people-and even' more scared. They're
afraid for their political lives, afraid that their constituents
will hold them responsible for "losing" 'Central America if
they object too strongly to the president's prescriptions. Not
the least of their concerns is their inability to figure out what
"losing" the region actually means. '
Reading the headlines doesn't clarify-matters. On any given
day, some "expert" is quoted saying the war in El Salvador is
on the verge of being won, or perhaps lost. ('The correct
answer is' "C: Neither.") In Nicaragua, the counterrevolu-
tionaries (or contras) are said to be either "growing" stronger
or about to be trampled by the Sandinistas.
A close reading of the president's own statements doesn't
help much, either. Ronald Reagan has welcomed a Sandinista
"peace" overture-only to say later that peace can never be
realized as long as the Sandinistas are in power. American
j2 hEW YORK/SEPTEMBER 12, 1983
troops won't be sent to the area, says the president, but
remember, he says later, presidents "never say 'ne"ver."
"War scares," "peace scares"-the media proclaim both,
and someone somewhere is always threatening to "talk," or
"discuss," or "negotiate," or "dialogue." All that's clear is
that these terms mean radically different things depending on
who's speaking.
Only the money can be quantified. For the four .years
ending in early 1983, United States aid to El Salvador, in-
cluding loans, totaled $l.3 billion, or $260 for each of the
nation's 5 million inhabitants. The administration still wants
$110 million in military assistance for El Salvador in the
current fiscal year-a sum so paltry it would service the
United States national debt for only eleven hours. Con-
gress has agreed to $8].3 million.
Central America is not a laboratory experiment or
hypothetical case invented by a cloistered academic. It is a
real place, a real problem. A visit to the region, to Nicaragua
and El Salvador especially, and talks with the leaders on both
sides help put the situation in perspective-and show that
the administration's policy, so chaotic from afar, surprisingly
seems more coherent and effective than expected. Here, then,
is one view of a region not quite at total war, and an educated
guess at what's going to happen down there.
HE ONLY MAP OF NICARAGUA 1'VE SEEN THAT CLEARLY
delineates Sarapiqui is produced by the United States
Central Intelligence Agency. Sarapiqui isn't a town.
It's aplace-an "elevation," in military parlance-a
clay mound with a commanding view of the San Juan
River, which forms a stretch of the border between Nicaragua
and Costa Rica. Sarapiqui is on the edge of a dense jungle that
consumes half the country. It is hot, humid terrain teeming
with colorful parrots, wild boars, and poisonous snakes.
From the air or ilp close,-Sarapiqui is the kind of desolate
outpost familiar to all Americans old enough to have watched
their army fight in Vietnam.
Sarapiqui is Pastora country, home of the "good-guy con-
tras," agroup of former believers currently dedicated to
ousting the Sandinistas from Nicaragua. They are lead by
Eden Pastora, 47, the greatest hero of the Nicaraguan revolu-
tion. Pastora isn't tall (about five feet seven), but he is pow-
Photograph by Susan MeisclnsfMugnum.
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erfulh~ built. ~~'itti Jiis +va+~~'olack hair and strong face he has
the look of a matinee idol-and the accompanying tempera-
ment. Four years ago, Pastora was the toast of Managua,
evcrvone's favorite war hero, the George Patton of the Revo-
lution, the man all Latin America knew by his nom de guerre,
"Commander Zero." "We are the true Sandinistas," says
Pastora, who hates the term "contra.""Those in Managua are
Communists. We are the ones who believe in the original
promises of the revolution. We are the exact opposite of the
Marxist-Leninists who rule my country today:"
Pastora is sitting in a makeshift headquarters. On his desk
are his personal weapons: an AR-15 ++~ith a night scope, an
M-79 grenade launcher, and a .45-caliber automatic pistol.
Grenade paperweights hold down piles of memorandums.
(The grenades are live.) Pastora is fond of saying that he "must
join in the battle when the bullets fly," because it is "in my
blood." In fact, his role is more like chief cheerleader: He
welcomes new recruits and gives pep talks, either in person
or via radio, but he rarely fights. He's the franchise. If he dies,
the movement dies with him.
When Anastasio Somoza was defeated, the Sandinistas
made Pastora deputy minister of defense. There was little for
him to do. He was not trusted. "They were Marxists, and they
knew 1 wasn't," he says. "They were scared of me because of
he ?bad-guy contras," the F.D.N.,
operate in the north of Nicaragua with
considerable C.I.A. support.
ber of the first junta of the Sandinista government. To date.
he is the regime's highest-ranking defector. "Things are a
little different this time," says Robelo. "A goocJ many of us
businessmen, moderates mostly, helped to make the 1979
revolution-even though the Sandinistas say we were of little
importance. When we won, we were easily dismissed by the
new government because we had always been only the politi-
cal side of the struggle. We had no weapons, and when it
came time to set things up, it was the Sandinistas, the party,
the F.S.L.N. [Frente Sandinista de Liberacibn NacionalJ, who
had the monopoly on the guns and hence the power. They
could kick us out at will. Now, even though Eden and 1 are
close like brothers, I take no chances. I am in charge of the
political side of our group, but people from my party, people
who go way back with me, are also fighting inside with Eden.
When we win, my people will have weapons and will have
been a key part of the military victory. Just in case."
There is nothing sadder than an exile alone with his
thoughts. Robelo's office attracts them in droves. They hang
out in a shabby house in San Jose and talk to one another all
day. By sundown, as in a game of "Telephone," the rumors
have taken on gigantic proportions, and everyone seems
convinced that Eden has had a miraculous success against the
Sandinista army somewhere in the jungle-invariably, noth-
ing from there has actually been heard.
Pastora himself makes no extravagant claims. Rather, he
seems to have stepped out of A~tnie. Everything is going to
happen "tomorrow." The "spectacular feats" he and Robelo
promised for July 19, the fourth anniversary of the Sandinista
revolution, never materialized. "Of course not," says Pastora.
"The enemy was ready because 1 said that. 1 wouldn't be so
foolish to have attacked then, when they were waiting."
"Well, when, then?"
"Tomorrow." ,
HE ONLYTANGIBLE GAIN BY PASTORA'S FORCES IN TtiE
past five months has been their capture of the San
Juan River itself-a filthy, shark-infested waterway of
some strategic value. Cornelius Vanderbilt made a
fortune off New Yorkers destined for California's gold
rush by transporting them via the San Juan until the cross-
continent route became cost-effective. The latest plan for the
San Juan, this from the Soviets, is to build a new canal to rival
Panama's.
For most of its length, the San Juan is in the hands of Tito
Chamorro, one of Pastora's key commanders. Chamorro con-
trols the river with five boats: "Tito's navy." Four of the boats
are 30-foot-long Indian canoes with 35-horsepower Evinrude
motors. Tito's flagship is afifteen-foot skiff he bought second-
hand in Panama. It is powered by a 150-horsepower Johnson
Sea Horse motor: Three men must ride in the bow as counter-
weight when Tito screams upriver to Sarapiquf.
In the region where Tito is fighting, it is almost always the
"rainy season," as understated a phrase, as was ever coined.
It seems as if someone turned on a faucet and went on
?.vacation. "Isn't this just the best weather?" says Chamorro,
who alternates between genuine U.S. Army jungle fatigues
and ared-and-white T-shirt that says "Drink Coca-Cola" in
Hebrew. "This is our weather, guerrilla weather. The San-
dinistas can't bomb us, because the clouds are so low. We
can move at will."
Most of Tito's days are consumed in setting up ambushes.
The problem is that no one walks into them. The Sandinistas.
came to power as a guerrilla army, and they haven't made the
mistake of converting to a conventional force. On the radio-
everyone listens to everyone else in Nicaragua-the Sati-
dinistas can be heard setting up theirown ambushes. And no
one walks into them either. So Tito's men spend a good deal
of time, cleaning their weapons. In monsoon warfare, the
greatest enemy is rust.
Most nights are spent sleeping in hammocks or working.
During the time I was with Tito, a soldier named Peter who
my popularity. Tomas Borge [probably the most powerful
Sandinista leader) made me his daughter's godfather. They
would invite me to their orgies and to their beer-drinking
parties, and 1 could come, unannounced, to the meetings of
the nine cornandantes, but I was just for show:" It took a while
for Pastora to become disillusioned: "I kept thinking the
moderates could gain control. 1 was naive: '
When he finally left Nicaragua, Pastora wasn't silent for
long. On April 15, 1982, he held a news conference in San
Jose, Costa Rica. He told the Sandinistas to straighten up or
else he would personally lead an army to Managua and drag
them from "their Mercedes-Benzes and their mansions" and
"bury them." By all accounts, Pastora had such a firm belief
in his own. popularity that he thought the Sandinistas would
retreat. A year to the day later, with the Sandinistas showing
no sign of moderation, Pastora announced that.he was going
to war. In the five months since, Pastora's ragtag collection?of
troops has grown from fewer than 400 to something over 2,000
men and women.
The political half of Pastora's effort is housed in Costa Rica
and is headed by Alfonso Robelo, also 47, a graduate of the
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, in Schenectady, New York,
and ahigh-school classmate of Pastora's. Robelo was a mem-
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had been to a series of'.4merican
special-forces schools stayed up
almost till dawn painstakingly
translating into Spanish a U.S.
Army manual for the 81-mm.
mortar. Occasionally. Tito's
troops are lucky enough to stay at
base camps-broken-down shacks
they call "hotels." In the jungle,
the typical diet is whatever can be
picked o(t trees. At the "hotels,"
there's rice and beans-and at the
one I stayed in there was even an
ancient battery-operated fifteen-
inch black-and-white Sharp TV.
Watching reruns of The Muluters I EL
was a high priority. SALVADOR
tract oil from coconuts so the men
can clean their guns. Ammunition
doesn't grow on trees, but fighting
is rare, so target practice is a must.
On one of the days I spent with
Tito, we came upon an unex-
ploded Soviet air-to-ground
rocket. It had been fired from a
Sandinista plane a few weeks
earlier during the only hours of
clear weather anyone could. re-
member. For 40 minutes, the men
took turns trying to explode the
stiletto-thin missile by firing
from a distance of about 100 meters. No one came close.
The only Pastora operation actually scheduled for the
Nicaraguan revolution's )uly 19 anniversary was an attempt
to interfere with the television transmission of the speech
made by Comandante Daniel Ortega, the coordinator of the
Sandinista junta. A group of Pastora's men, including Alvaro
Taboada. formerly the Sandinistas' ambassador to Ecuador,
had backpacked sophisticated electronic jamming gear about
70 kilometers inside Nicaragua from the San Juan. `We were
set up for Channel 2," says Taboada. "That's what was
announced in the paper. But they switched to Channel 6, and
we couldn't do anything."
S THIS THE GANG THAT CAN'T SHOOT STRAIGHTS IT'S EASY
to draw that conclusion but too early to say so de-
finitively. Both Pastora's men,
in the south of Nicaragua, and
the other contras, in the north
(the ones totally supported by the
C.I.A.), have yet to engage the
Sandinistas in any meaningful bat-
tle despite their combined
strength of approximately 10,000
men. Nevertheless, the signs
aren't good-and .for Pastora the
signs are particularly bad. "Eden
had to prove three things when he
challenged the Sandinistas," says
Arturo Cruz, a former Sandinista
ambassador to the United States
who is himself in exile at the Inter-
American Development Bank, in
Washington. "He had to scare the
Sandinistas into talking with him,
because they feared his hold on
the people. In that way he could
pressure them to return to the
original promises they made. Sec-
ond, he had to convince the social-
ist countries that have been most
strong in supporting the Sandinistas that he is right about the
betrayal of the revolution and that they should come out
against it as it is now being conducted. Third, because of who
he is, he had to precipitate defections from the Sandinista
army. So far, he has done none of these."
Most galling to Pastora has been his inability to inspire
defections from the Sandinista forces, despite talking to them
almost every day on shortwave radio. In a surprise move-
which means he lucked out-Pastora captured 37 Sandinista
army troops a few months ago. Magnanimously, he released
them all, declaring that they were free to return home or join
him. Every single one went back. "It's because of the
Cubans," says Pastora. "The Cubans are everywhere in
Nicaragua, and they've got the soldiers scared that if they
come over to me their families will be killed." ?
den Pastora's troops, the "good-guy
contras," wait in the jungled south for
an enemy who rarely appears.
Pastora may be unpredictable
and high-strung, but he is a whiz
with excuses.
The contras in the north-
they're called the Nicaraguan
Democratic Force, or F.D.N.-
have. been fighting longer than
Pastora (for more-than a year), and
they have considerable ties to the
Somoza regime. Hence their repu-
tation as the "bad-guy contras."
"It's a bad rap," .says Adolfo
Calero, the former Coca-Cola
manager in Managua, who is one
of the F.D.N.'s eight "directors."
Calero is right. It is a bad rap
where he and most of the other
directors are concerned. The
problem, though, is that the direc-
tors are only the political face of
the F.D.N. The guys with the
guns-and especially the top
brass-are former Somoza Na-
tional Guardsmen. Not all the
guardsmen were ax murderers,
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but two of the fiti?c members of the Lslado Mayor, the ruling
military body of the F.D.N., really are bad guys. No matter
how disenchanted the average Nicaraguan might be with the
Sandinista leadership, it is hard to find anyone who would
trade them in for the F.D.N.
In the hope of polishing the group's image, the United
States has been eager to have Pastora combine with the
F.D.N. "No." says Pastora. "I won't do it. The historic error
of the gringos has been to put the clean and the dirty together
in the same thing and believe the clean is going to clean up
the dirty. It works the other way around."
OT LONG AGO, THOUGH, PASTORA DID TRY TO DEAL
with the F.D.N. 1-le wanted to fight from the north-
infinitely easier from a military standpoint than from
the southern jungle-and he wanted to command a
joint force. The deal fizzled for many reasons, not the
least of which was Washington's fear that Pastors is a closet
Marxist who only turned on his revolutionary comrades out
of personal pique. ("I don't even know what the outside of a
Marxist textbook looks like," says Pastors. "1 want Nicaragua
to be a democracy like Costa Rica. The only thing I have in
common with Fidel Castro is that we were both taught by the
Jesuits.")
"Actually," says Robelo, "it's just as well. It would have
been the kiss of death. All Eden has is his independence. We
own ourselves. We take from the Americans, too [about half
of Pastora's monthly budget of.approximately $450,000 comes
from U.S. intelligence sources], but what we take we take
without strings. The other guys are puppets. The F.D.N. is a
wholly owned subsidiary of the C.I.A. Everyone knows this,"
continues Robelo. "The people inside Nicaragua know it-
and they.remember, too, the previous times we were invaded
by the United States in order to 'save' us. Ours is a country
where the worst~regime, the Somoza rule of over 40 years, was
tied so closely to the United States that on the 20-Cordoba bill
there was a picture of the dictator shaking hands with the
American ambassador. There is a revolution in Nicaragua
now. It has been betrayed, but it is still a revolution. The
F.D.N. reminds people of the repression of the past. For us to
combine with them would ruin whatever chance we have
to win.
If Pastors and the F.D.N. ever do ally, it will be a marriage
consummated out of weakness rather than strength. For
Pastora, the reasoning will be simple: What good is it to
remain pure and independent if such a stance doesn't pay off
with support inside Nicaragua?
Even if there is a merger, each side is certain to believe that
it will be able to dispense with the other in the event of victory.
36 NEW YORK/SEPTEMBER 12, 1983
Pastora said as much to me in July: "1f by some miracle we
do get together, it will only be tactical. And I have no doubt
that the troops of the F.D.N.-not the F_stado il4ayor, but the
troops-will come over to me when the time is ripe and I call
for them. That will leave the F.U.N. without Indians. 'fhc
chiefs will have no power."
To Pastora sympathizers like Arturo Cruz who abhor the
notion of combining with the F.D.N., there?is another way.
"What needs to happen," says Cruz, "is for the F.D.N. to
somehow begin to do well. if the F.D.N. can score some
successes, then perhaps the Sandinista army, fearing an
F.D.N. victory, will come over to Eden in order to stop the
F.D.N." "It is not so bad a plan," says Pastors. "That might
in the end be the only way to do it. Or maybe things would
get so bad for the Communists that they would go back to
what was promised to the people. We wouldn't have to come
to power. We could force a change in their policies by our
military victories. We could be like in The Godfather, make
them an offer they can't refuse."
HE BELIEF THAT SUSTAINS BOTH PASTORA AND THE
F.D.N. is the knowledge that guerrilla wars often turn
around when least expected-and no one knows this
better than the Sandinistas themselves. William Lcurs
was the United States ambassador to Venezuela at the
time of the Sandinista victory. He is .one of the most astute
observers of Latin America, and he was intimately involved in
America's on-again, off-again efforts to oust Somoza before a
"
n a static-filled war
of words over
shortwave radio,
contra leader Eden Pastora
(above, In a high-school
photo) arggues almost dally
with Sandinista troops.
We
total Sandinista victory.
had a major meeting in San
Jose in the late spring of
1979," recalls Leurs. "All the
chiefs of mission in the region
gathered, along with the
'C.I.A. and other intelligence
services. This was only a few
months before the Sandinista
victory, and yet the over-
whelming consensus at the
meeting was that there was no
way the Sandinistas could
win, that Somoza was going to
hang on. Then it turned,
something sparked the people
to join in the frght, and it was
over very quickly." -
American policymakers
eager for the Sandinistas to
meet Somoza's fate latch on
to such history with a passion.
But the two situations are
vastly different. Anastasio Somoza was a man easy to despise.
Unless you were in his employ there was literally nothing
redeeming about his regime. Those Nicaraguans who actively
toppled Somoza-and their numbers are as inflated as the
number of Brooklynites who swear they were at Ebbets Field
when the Dodgers finally won the World Series in 1955-have
a sense that they made the revolution. No matter how
flawed it has since become, it is theirs, it is something to
belong to.
NSIDE NICARAGUA, THE SENSE OF BELONGING TO SOME-
thing bigger than oneself is the outstanding fact of life-
and the contras reinforce that feeling. "The sense of
danger and tension has helped to consolidate the revolu-
tion," says Agriculture Minister Jaime Wheelock, who is
one of the nine comandantes who rule Nicaragua. "To tell
the truth," adds Rita Delia Casco, another former Sandinista
ambassador to the United States,'now with the Nicaraguan
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Planning ~?fini~lry, "we"were getting flabby. ~1'e were being
worn out. Now we are united again."
The Sandinistas imposed a "state of emergency" a year and
a half ago. At that time, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the editor
of La 1'rer:sa, declared it "an experiment in totalitarianism."
If the people "take it calmly, if they don't scream." Pedro
Joaquin told me in Managua, "then it will be with us forever
and will define our lives for as long as the Sandinistas are in
power. I don't think we're like the Cubans. We won't knuckle
under." Chamorro was wrong. La Prensa itself is heavily
censored (it is permitted to remain open only so the San-
dinistas can present a moderate faFade), and the regime has
been having a propaganda field day. Almost everyone has
bought the line. Almost everyone says life would be better if
only the contras and the United States "would just leave us
alone."
Life in Nicaragua today is hardly anyone's dream. In many
respects, the nation is already classically eastern-European. A
great deal of work has been done in the areas of education
and health care-and few, if any, people are starving-but
liberty is severely restricted. Even the literacy campaign has
been made to serve the party. Students are organized. into
Sandinista support groups, and they regularly sing a national
anthem that says, "We're fighting against the yanqui, the
enemy of humanity." In math class, simple arithmetic prob-
lems often begin with introductions like "Public health is a
constant preoccupation of our People's Sandinista Revolu-
tion. How many ...?"
Political parties otherthan the ruling F.S.L:.N. exist in name
only. "Democratism," says the F.S.L.N., is "bourgeois." So,
too, is freedom of, expression: By law, "verbal or written
diffusion of expression, proclamations or manifestos which
attempt to injure popular interests and abolish the conquest
achieved by the people" are punishable by prison terms.
To be aloof in Nicaragua is a bygone luxury. "You must be
actively with the revolution," says Carlos Fernando
Chamorro, editor of the F.S.L.N. newspaper, Barricada. "To
be neutral is to be against." (Carlos Fernando is the brother
of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of La Prensa. On almost
every issue, the two brothers are 180 degrees apart. Neverthe-
less, they speak regularly and take fishing trips together.)
.F YOU are NEUTRAL OR ALOOF IN NICARAGUA, EVERYONE
knows about it. Almost every block in every town in the
country has its own spy system. The block organizations
are called Committees for the Defense of Sandinism
(C.D.S.), and they are modeled on Fidel Castro's Commit-
tees for the Defense of the Revolution. They "protect" their
neighborhoods by watching for suspicious behavior, and they
can detain and arrest whomever they wish. Those active in the
revolution participate in the C.D.S.'s "night watch" program.
Anyone out late at night is noted. Inactive citizens are noted.
"The C.D.S. is well structured and very thorough," says
Regina Picasso, who until last year helped develop new
housing for the regime. "We planned the new construction
and allocated some of the old. Cuban advisers were with us
constantly-they are everywhere-and together we made
sure that certal'n people didn't live near certain others. And
every new block had to have a state security agent and his
family living in it. That agent was the link to the C.D.S.".
Almost every consumer good is rationed in Nicaragua. For
example, citizens are entitled to a pound of sugar and half a
pound of rice per week and a roll of toilet paper per person
per month. The C.D.S. allots ration cards. Those who haven't
demonstrated sufTicient revolutionary spirit often find them-
selves with diminished allotments, no matter how much they
are "officially" permitted.
Even with the ration system-and an acceptable revolu-
tionary consciousness-it is sometimes impossible to obtain
the legal share. One woman I spoke with had waited for meat
for over four hours one day only to find that there was none
left because an army officer had come in through the back
~tr~~:
Y6'YEI'~@~i .
. r . _ .,._
~;~.~?~- =?._._....=~ __-....:.., ~,._::-mi.,..a.., ~?~
"These beasts won't return,"screams the
Sandinista party paper in an article about leaders of the F.D.N.
door to purchase 50 pounds. The store's supply was wiped
out. The army is a privileged class.
Any ranking Sandinista will tell you that the shortages
(which cannot be reported in the press) are the result of more
equitable distribution. "There are lines in Managua; and not
enough to go around," says Carlos Fernando Chamorro,
"because the people in the countryside are finally sharing in
the goods." Chamorro doesn't lie more than other top Sandi-
nistas. He is about typical: "What is true," says a Sandinista
minister, "is what serves the ends of the revolution." For all
of this, there is one redeeming reality: The streets of
Nicaragua are safe-in marked contrast to EI Salvador, where
murder is common and everyone seems to be packing a gun.
AN )UAN DEL SUR IS.A SMALL FISHING VILLAGE ON THE
Pacific coast about 90 miles south of Managua. It is
the "countryside" Carlos Fernando speaks about. San
Juan del Sur is fairly representative of Nicaraguan life
outside Managua-the capital city having about as
much in common with the rest of the nation as Manhattan has
with the rest of the United States. The Soviets are ?going to
build a dry dock there, but they haven't arrived yet; the hotel
being readied for them is a month away from being com-
pletely refurbished. About the only food available in the
stores is rice and beans. The problem isn't inequitable dis-
tribution. It's lack of production. '
Work in San Juan del Sur is at a virtual standstill. On the
day I was there the first ship in seven months had just put into
port. ]t was flying a Panamanian flag, and it was urlloadi-Tg
sugar from Guatemala. Nicaragua, long one of the wealthiest
nations in Latin America in terms of natural resources and
fertile land, has now found it necessary to import. "The red
and the black, the red and the black," says Sebastian Lanza,
a 100-year-old peasant, referring to the Sandinista colors.
"Ever since'the revolution, we have been irnporting. Before we
only exported. It is bad." Lanza is typical of his generation-
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that is. e+eryone over ~7 in \icaragua. The older people,
++ho'+e seen it a}I. appear nearly unanimous in condemning
the revolution. '1?he voungcr tiicaraguans (and almost 70
percent of the citizenry is under ~5) are still supportive.
I:rncsto Guttierez. 27, is a stevedore in San (uan del Sur.
13etwcen boats Guttierez is permitted to borrow 500 cordobas
(bct+vecn S8 and 550, depending on the exchange rate). It is
a government loan. It is all he has to live on until the next ship
comes in, and then he must pay it back out of his wages. Still,
Guttierez is a believer. "lt will all be okav once the contras are
defeated," he says. "What we did four years ago was some-
thing great."
People live and work in Nicaragua without belonging to
the F.S. L.N., but the adequacy of life and the quality of work
improve greatly if they do belong. And party membership is
often a requisite for survival for the self-employed. Tr?ena, 58,
has spent his entire life as a fisherman in San Juan del Sur.
"But I must give it up now," he says. "I will go into agriculture
(every Latin currrpesino. or peasant. describeshtmself as being
"in agriculture"]. My boat is broken. I need to get it fixed, but
I can't get a loan from the bank, because 1 don't belong to the
(par?ty~ cooperative. That's the way it is."
That is not the way it is supposed to be. The Sandinistas are
fond of touting their "mixed economy." They say that 60
percent of the means of production is in private hands-a
figure widely accepted by the foreign press. As an accurate
statistic, however, this figure has about as much relation to
reality as the cortiras' claim that victory is just around the
corner. Alfredo Cesar is.the.man who first propagated the 60
percent figure, back in 1981. Until last year, when he fled to
Costa Rica after having lost all hope for his Sandinista
comrades. Cesar was in charge of Nicaragua's economy. "To
believe in that figure today is to believe there have been no
expropriations since 1981>" says Cesar. "Which is nonsense.
The figure is probably closer to 35 percent now, but even that
is meaningless. Most businesses-all that 1 know of-borrow
funds from banks. In Nicaragua. the banks are all owned by
the state, which also tells most businessmen what they can
produce. how much of it they can turn out, how many workers
they must have, how much those workers can be paid, and
how much they can sell their products for. Nothing is left to
be private about. That's why there's r1o incentive and why the
economy has gone to hell.'-'.
HE GREATEST MYTH ABOUT NICARAGUA IS THAT THE
Sandinistas'~turn to the left:is the result bf American
hostility. There are many people outside Nicaragua,
and particularly in the United States, who believe that
Ronald Reagan is to blame for the regime's avowed
Marxism-Leninism. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
Unlike Cuba, where Fidel Castro kept his real intentions hid-
den until well after he overthrew Batista, the Sandinistas-for
anyone who cared to read-have always been up-front about
their orientation.
Right from the start-in a-report to a special party con-
ference after only two months in power-the Sandinistas
came clean:'They were just pretending to be pluralist.rThey
described the totalitarian state they were building and vowed
that their power would never be_put to risk in free elections.
They said, too, that they were committed to a world revolu-
tion under Soviet leadership, but that it was necessary to
conceal their commitment in order to get financial help from
the imperialists. The first junta', which included two mod-
erates, was described as "an alliance of convenience ... to
thwart Yankee intervention...: It was necessary to negotiate
with the bourgeoisie, just to give some representation to
people with a patriotic reputation."
Later, Daniel Ortega, one of the nine canandantes, de-
clared that the Sandinistas were "profol~ndly anti-imperialist,
anti-Yankee and Marxist-Leninist." The temporary alliance
with the moneyed, said Ortega, is "exclusively tactical. We have
accepted the collaboration of the middle class ..,but at any
j8 NEW YORKISEPTEMBER 12, 1983
hough the church seems uneasy with
Sandinista rule, some nuns joined the
revolutionary celebrations in'July.
moment we can take its factories without firing a single shot."
Elections planned for 1985 (and still_scheduled), said Ortega,
"will in no way-like alottery-decide who is going to hold
power. f=or this power belongs to the F.S.L.N., to our Direc-
torate." (Since an election would help calm international
distress with the Sandinistas, it's curious that the regime
. doesn't simply hold one ahead of schedule, especially with an
overwhelming victory almost certain. The most intriguing
analysis I heard was offered by a European diplomat in
Managua: "If they have an election, then one of the nine
con:aruluntes would have to be president There's just too
much jealousy among them to settle on the candidate.")
ASHINGTON HEARD THE SANDINISTAS' EARLY
rhetoric but still thought it could turn things
around. During the revolution's first year, the
United States increased its economic aid to
Nicaragua and even offered to train the San-
dinista army in Panama (an offerthat was rejected in favor of
military aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union). American
assistance was suspended (while Jimmy Carter, not Ronald
Reagan, was president) only after it became evident that the
Sandinistas were actively aiding the guerrillas in EI Salvador.
Since the Sandinistas' victory in 1979, the regime has
received increased shipments of arms from, among others,
Russia, Cuba, Vietnam, and the P.L.O. Foreign Minister
Miguel d'Escoto has pledged "the firm solidarity of
(t`~icar?agua] with the struggle of Syria and the peoples of
Lebanon and Palestine against Zionist aggression supported
by U.S. imperialism." '
What most bothers the United States-and the entire re-
gion as well-is the Sandinistas' continued commitment to a
revolution "without frontiers." Here is Sandinista interior
minister Tomas Borge, the regime's strongman: "The revolu-
tion's moral imperative and historical character make it
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inevitable that the energies released here will 6c universal in
all Central 4mcrica."
"I +vcll r?emcmber the first time I heard the con andantes
discuss the export of the revolution." says Alfredo Cesar. "As
tllc person in charge of the economy. I had to report to them
on a regular basis. In the fall of 1980, 1 was at a meeting of
tI1C C'OII1aIida171L'S at their conference place, which had been
Somoza's bachelor pad. Aside from the ideological im-
perative. it was made very clear to me that the comandantes
felt they had to have friendly regimes in El Salvador, Hon-
duras. and Guatemala in order to secure sufficient markets
for Nicaraguan goods. We could always sell farther afield,
they said, but if we were to be a net exporter, it'was clear to
them that we had to have ready markets next door."
'I?hosc who dismiss the Sandinistas' extraterritorial-revolu-
tion rhetoric are deluding themselves. When Comandante
Baryai?do .Arco says "We will never give up supporting our
brothers in EI Salvador," he means it. And Sandinista defense
minister I-lumbcrto Ortega is equally serious when he says,
"Of course we are not ashamed to be helping EI Salvador. We
would like to help all revolutions."
In practice, such words have translated into supplying the
Salvadoran guerrillas with whatever they need. (And the
guerrilla high command operates from a headquarters in
~~lanagua.) ~?he Sandinistas never admit the shipment of arms
in so many words, but junta member Sergio Ramirez.made
the point to me quite clearly: "We are something like world
champions at moving contraband. We did it constantly during
our own revolution. Every Sandinista knows?how to do it. Our
government, as a government, is not engaged in this activity."
No wonder: If every~Sandinista knows how .to move arms,
then the government,.as a government, doesn't' have to do it.
By all accounts, the,actual arms flow from Nicaragua to the
Salvadoran guerrillas is today little more than a trickle. The
guerrillas, it seems, have all the weapons they need. Medicine
and money, however, are still required. (Thanks to a series of
brilliant kidnappings, the Salvadoran guerrillas almost never
hurt for funds in the 1970s. But. a bad financial decision-
investing in Mexican pesos rather than American dollars-
has recently depleted their bank balance. Ammunition, too,
is a constant necessity; there isn't a single factory in Central
America capable .of producing a bullet's brass casing. These
items are being sent from Nicaragua-as the Salvadoran
guerrillas have boasted-via a sophisticated network of light
planes. small boats, false-bottomed trucks, and even donkeys:
"A single donkey," says an American military adviser in EI
Salvador. "can carry enough arms to sustain. aten-man
guerrilla unit for a month."
No matter the exact extent of the Sandinistas' exports
today, they have made it very clear that they will help in EI
Salvador whenever necessary.
~~~' ~ ~ ~ ~
HE DEPARTMENT OF SAN VICENTE LIES 3S MILES EAST
of San Salvador. It is 480 square miles of sugar,
cotton; and coffee fincas. Viewed on a map, it looks
like the continent of South America. It is El Salva-
dor's richest province and one of the hardest hit?
during the four-year guerrilla war-a conflict that has cost the
country an estimated $600 million in damage to the economic
infrastructure and up to $1 billion in capital flight. Guerrilla
sabotage has left most towns in San Vicente without elec-
tricity or water ?for nearly three years. Communication be-
tween towns is a thing of the past. The telephone lines are hit
as regularly as the power poles.
If El Salvador's government is to win its war against the
guerrillas it must make San Vicente habitable-which is
exactly what it is finally trying to do. After months of wran-
gling, the Salvadoran government has finally adopted, a
"made in America" rural-pacification plan reminiscent of the
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coRns program in Vietnam-with one crucial difference. )n
Vietnam. pacification meant moving people from their vil-
lages to more easily defended "strategic hamlets." In 11
Sah-ador, the flow is the other way. The government is trying
to coax people out of their refugee camps and back to their
towns. "1'he army, meanwhile, is supposed to secure the
villages and train an indigenous civil-defense force that can
assume the army's role when it moves on. It is a slow process.
-I?he refugee camps offer food, shelter, electricity, water. and
security..The only thing the people have at home is what they
own, and most of that has likely been destroyed. "The Plan,"
as it is universally known, became effective June 10. Since
then, some 16.8 kilometers of roads have been repaired, and
40 of the 120 schools closed by the war have been reopened.
The people are beginning to notice.
San Lorenzo is a hillside farming and weaving town typical
of San Vicente's villages. It has been attacked countless times.
Grass grows in cobbled streets, and the adobe homes are
pockmarked by bullets and covered with guerrilla slogans. "lt
used to be so nice here," says one resident. "We used to have
a sugar mill, water, and electricity. The bus came four times
a day. Now we have to walk five miles to get one."
The army arrived to pacify San Lorenzo on July 9, only
hours after a guerrilla column had passed through. Reporters
who visited San Lorenzo in mid-luly found the people skep-
tical. "The soldiers are here because you are here," said
Olympia Campo Hernandez. "They will leave when you press
leave." When 1 spoke with Olympia three weeks later; she was
almost ecstatic. "The army is still here," she said. "They~send
a water truck every day. 1 can sell bread to the soldiers and
get money to buy flour. The townspeople are working on the
roads. Maybe we'll have electricity soon."
ON'T BET THE RENT. WHEN THE GUERRILLAS FLED THE
army's June advance, the government all but de-
clared the war won-just as it had last summer,
shortly before the military was so badly battered that'
the Reagan administration feared ,for. the ?ilnminent
collapse of the government. Among those with a keener
appreciation of guerrilla tactics (they typically regroup dur-
ing the summer rainy season), a more cautious attitude
prevails. "We expect them back," says Colonel Rinaldo
Golcher, head of "The Plan." When I spoke with him a few
weeks ago, Golcher seemed to agree with the guerrilla leader
who said, "At this stage we are like a snake that has swal-
lowed acalf. We are digesting."
Digesting or not, the guerrillas have already found time to
strike back. At about the time I was speaking with Golcher,
a construction crew repairing downed power lines was am-
bushed by a large guerrilla force. Thirty people were killed or
wounded (and in EI Salvador, where medical assistance is
hard to come by, half of those wounded will likely die). "They
know that San Vicente is the showcase for 'The Plan,' "says
Golcher. "They have to attack it to destroy our credibility."
Attack is easy. San Vicente City and many of the depart-
ment's towns are ringed around the Chichontepec volcano.
The volcano is guerrilla heaven. "We know they're up there,
but w.e can't get the army fo go after them," says an American
military adviser in El Salvador. "The army knows they'd suffer
greatly in the attempt." Instead, the soldiers wait. But they
don't stand still. In a significant change from last year, the
Salvadoran military is no longer anine-to-five outfit. The
troops even venture out from their heavily fortified garrisons,
something that rarely happened in the past.; Ten-man patrols
are now regularly seen in the fields, and espiritu is high.
American trainers of the new "hunter battalions" have con-
ferred black berets on elite units, and they are quite the rage.
Still, fewer than 40 percent of the soldiers re-enlist, and there
is little real pursuit in guerrilla territory, despite near-certain
knowledge of the enemy's whereabouts. In many respects, the
army's policy is still "search and evade." What "saves these
guys," says an American soldier advising on "The Plan," "is
SEPTEMBER 12, 1983INEW YORK 39
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is face not photographed, for security
reasons, an American military adviser in
E/ Salvador instructs a government soldier.
that the guerrillas aren't such good fighters, either. I've seen
tougher gangs .in Chicago. Every day 1 thank God that the
guerrillas here aren't the Vietcong. If they were, the country
would be gone by now."
ORE TROUBLESOME EVEN THAN THE MILITARY'S
questionable ability to withstand a new rebel of-
fensive is the quality of the civil-defense force the
army is supposed to leave behind as it moves from
one town to the next. There aren't enough rifles to
equip the units adequately, and there are no radios at all. In
Vietnam, the "strategic hamlets" had excellent communica-
tions gear. They could summon help in a hurry. That isn't
possible in EI Salvador. "We don't even have enough radios
for the regular army," says Colonel Golcher.
-The composition of the civil-defense units is an even bigger
problem. Many members admit to having been members of
the ultra-rightist death squads, whose philosophy is simple:
Better dead than arrested: It is also feared that too many civil-
defense commanders will turn out to be. psychopathic mini-
versions of Manuel 'Portillo.
Sergeant Manuel Portillo ran civil defense in the town of
Apastepeque, EI Salvador. He is gone now, but he is re,
membered as the man who shot or hacked to death at least
twenty townspeople during his tenure as"local militia com-
mander. The mayor of Apastepeque told the Miami Herald's
Sam Dillon that he didn't know why Portillo killed his vic-
tims-all of whom were clearly innocent of any wrongdoing:
"He would come by my office and say `I have such a desire
to kill someone today.' People in my office would say, when
he left, `I wonder who'll be next.' "
It turns out that Sergeant Portillo passed most days dead
drunk. And given the craziness that defines life in EI Salvador,
it is not surprising that many Apastepeque residents are most
upset about the palm trees their sergeant destroyed. It seems
that Portillo's office was on the town square and that when-
ever he had the urge for a coconut he'd simply shoot one
down. After a while the chlorophyll-producing fronds were
gone; Apastepeque now has a typically Latin central square
surrounded by dead palm trees.
Even those civil-defensemen who have a better check on
their emotions than Sergeant Portillo may be a problem. They
are being trained hastily in both military matters and "hu-
man-rights awareness," as an American official bureau-
cratically puts it. When one C.D. man was asked what
"human rights" meant to him, he hesitated:"Let me see now.
It's been along time since the training. Oh yeah. That's when
you have a man and a woman and you don't kill them."
Would that this fellow were aberrant. In fact, EI Salvador
is still a hellish place to live. The country is at war, but more
people die by murder than in combat. And most murders are
"tic-tae" jobs-the hip Salvadoran term for machete killings.
The murders are committed mostly by right-wing vigilantes,
and the number is up since last year. Yet only in EI Salvador
do you find people who say>"Yes, that's true, but they're better
at choosing their targets. Less wanton killing is taking place."
HE IUSTICE SYSTEM IN EL SALVADOR STILL STINKS.
Close to 40,000 people have been murdered in the
past four years. Only 200 people have been convicted.
Even George Shultz, by profession a supporter of EI
Salvador, is appalled. "You cannot get me to sit here
and defend what happens under the, judicial system in EI
Salvador," the American secretary of state told a , con-
gressional committee. "I won't do it."
Two weeks ago, a Salvadoran criminal court sentenced the
commander of acivil-defense unit to 30 years in prison for
murdering a seminary student. It was the first time a military
man-had been convicted of ahuman-rights violation since
1979. Most soldiers get off scot-free. The killer of the Ameri-
can nuns, well known in El Salvador, is still not convicted.
The oflicer responsible for murdering two American otTicials
in broad daylight at San Salvador's Sheraton Hotel in 1981 is
also known: He has red hair and a red mustache-extremely
rare in EI Salvador. For his lineup, he dyed his hair and
shaved off his mustache. The witnesses couldn't identify him,
and the court refused an appeal based on the soldier's altered
appearance. (Because of the war, the army has the power to
move on its own in such investigations. ASalvadoran colonel
was asked why the military couldn't correct the obvious
injustice in the Sheraton case. He explained that the army's
special powers could not be used for "common crimes, and
murder is a common crime in El Salvador.")
It never ends. The oflicer responsible for killing eighteen
innocent civilians has recently been promoted. His superior,
also, implicated, is beyond reach because he is a relative of a
member of the Supreme Court. "There used to be a time,"
said President Alvaro Magana to an American Embassy aide,
"when the president could call the Supreme Court and say
'Get him.' No more."
No more indeed. When I spoke with President Magana last
year, he made it very clear that his power was limited. When
I asked if the army should be subordinate to civilian authority,
a relatively simple question in my mind, Magana said he
could not answer.
With the help of then U.S. ambassador Deane Hinton, .
Magana was installed by the military as president in order to
thwart a genuine evil-Roberto d'Aubuisson. D'Aubuisson is
believed responsible for the 1980 murder of Archbishop
Oscar Romero. And he founded the White Warriors Union,
a death squad infamous for having once threatened to execute?
every Jesuit in El Salvador, in conformity with its slogan:
"Serve your country, kill a priest." D'Aubuisson is now
president of the Constituent Assembly, and he is a leading
candidate for the presidency when the next election is held,
in the spring of 1984.
The other top candidate is Jose Napoleon Duarte, who had
been denied the presidency by the army in 1972 and who
finally got the job in a compromise before the 1982 elections
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resulted in ?\lagana's installation. To d'Aubuisson and his
followers. Duat?te's support of reforms like land redistribution
makes him a Communist. Duarte has promised that if elected
he will get a handle on extralegal violence, and there are
those who seriously think the army would kick him out again
if he tried-even though such an act would surely mean the
end of American assistance to EI Salvador.
T IS HARD TO SAY IF THE GUERRILLAS ARE TRULY UN-
popular in EI Salvador-the campesinos smile at anyone
with a gun. But people on both the left and right agree
that by attacking the economy the guerrillas have lost
whatever widespread following they may once have had.
If the guerrillas really are losing support with the popula-
tion, the army may yet win. "This is war on the cheap," says
Colonel John Waghelstein, until recently the head of the U.S.
Military Group in El Salvador. "This is total war at the grass
roots. The key to success is popular support. In addition to it
being nice to have the people on your side, it yields intelli-
gence. And in a guerrilla war, three things matter most:
intelligence, intelligence, and intelligence."
It may seem surprising, but. even Ronald Reagan's
staunchest critics share his fear of an El Salvador ruled by the
guerrillas. Here is Congressman Steven Solarz, who delights
in beating up on the president's Central American policy: "I
have no doubt," Solarz told William F. Buckley Jr. in May,
" ..that if the government of EI Salvador collapsed and the
guerrillas came to power militarily, you would have in El
Salvador precisely the same kind of government you now
have in Nicaragua, and 1 think that's something we ought to
try to prevent." Solarz went on to explain why he favors a
"power sharing" agreement with the guerrillas, but he and his
like-minded colleagues are forgetting who really wields
power on the left. It is easy to look at the moderate democrats
who form the guerrillas' political front and to conclude that
they are responsible men who favor a pluralistic society. Such
a reading would be correct, but it ignores Mao's injunction:
Power grows out of the barrel of a gun. The moderates in the
guerrilla coalition aren't carrying guns.
HE GUERRILLAS WHO [IO HAVE THE GUNS HAVE MADE
their position clear. As to where the democrats would
be if the guerrillas won in EI Salvador, here is Joaqufn
Villalobos, currently the top military commander of
the guerrillas: "We are not advocates of the tradi-
tional concept of unity.... An ample criterion must prevail
so as to allow the revolutionary forces to win over the
democratic ones." In other words, if a moderate ever is
installed as president of EI Salvador, he will be as subservient
to the military of Joaquin Villalobos as Alvaro Magana is to
the present Salvadoran army.
What would aVillalobos-led government be like? Well,
says Josh Rodriguez Ruiz, a member of the rebels' directorate,
"there are parts of Ho Chi Minh, parts of Mao, parts of Kim
11 Sung [North Korea's premier) that appeal to us."
Would the Salvadoran guerrillas be content-with EI Salva-
dor? Not hardly. The late Cayetano Carpio spoke for all his
military comrades when, in 1980, he said, "The revolutionary
process in Central America is a single process. The triumphs
of one are the triumphs of the others. Guatemala will have its
hour. Honduras its. Costa Rica, too, will have its hour of
glory. The first note was heard in Nicaragua."
A few weeks ago in San Salvador, 3,000 peasants appeared
outside the Constituent Assembly to protest a gutting of the
land-reform program. They were denied permission to speak
with the legislators-at the very same time that the assembly
was approving a flowery constitutional provision guarantee-
ingthe right of free expression. Incongruities like these, to say
nothing of the daily murders, are commonplace in ~EI Salva-
dor-so it's tempting to give up on the current government.
But some progress is being made, so before doing so, it is wise
to consider the alternative.
HAT'S GOING TO HAPPEN?
]t seems as if every nation in the world has
a peace plan for Central America-and a
catchy name like "Contadora" to go along
with it. If there ever is a negotiated settle-
ment, it is possible that one of these initiatives will play a
role-but only because the major protagonists will have
concluded that such a convention fits their public-relations
requirements. In the end, it will be the people at risk and their
immediate sponsors who will resolve the conflict-one way or
the other.
Today, the key players all have good reasons to both talk
a~:d fight-which is why "stalemate" best describes the state
of play. Consider the antagonists' positions, beginning with
the Salvadoran guerrillas, whose leaders have been particu-
larly successful at feigning interest in negotiations.
Ruben Zamora is the chief spokesman for the Salvadoran
guerrillas. At one time, he was a Christian Democrat and an
aide to Jose Napoleon Duarte. Then, on the night of February
22, 1980, as 7.amora was meeting with Duarte in San Salva-
dor, aright-wing .death squad broke in. Zamora's brother
Mario was singled out, taken into a bathroom, and shot dead.
That's what radicalized Ruben Zamora.
.I ran into Zamora in the San Jose, Costa Rica, airport. He
s part of "The Plan,"an ef/ort to wln the
support of the people, the Salvadoran
government has been passing out food.
was working a crossword puzzle as he waited to ny to
Colombia for his oft postponed meeting with Richard Stone,
Ronald Reagan's special Central American envoy. As usual,
Zamora was impeccably dressed. He is probably the only man
in all of Latin America who regularly wears three-piece suits.
I asked if the peace negotiations with the United States would
be going anywhere, or if they were simply cosmetic. Zamora,
who loves to affect American gestures,; closed his right fist
and shook his arm vigorously up and down, mimicking
masturbation. I asked if the guerrillas would participate in
next year's elections in EI Salvador. "No way, man," said
Zamora. "We'd lose."
Left to their own devices, the Salvadoran guerrillas would
simply continue their war. They don't want to negotiate,
because they don't believe "The Plan" can work and because
they have yet to lose a battle to the Salvadoran army. They
fear elections not simply because they would lose but because
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an electoral +vipeout could relegate them to international-
outlaw status: they could forfeit the recognition of countries
like Mexico and France, and their yearly draw of approx-
imately S2 million from American sympathizers would surely
dwindle. So the guerrillas' personal position is clear. The
question is whether their patrons will permit them to con-
tinue to fight.
The Nicaraguan Sandinistas are the Salvadoran guerrillas'
closest patron. Normally they wouldn't be inclined to stop
anything. But American pressure on the Sandinistas appears
to be working: Daniel Ortega's anniversary address was posi-
tively conciliatory. It is not that the Sandinistas fear a contra
victory. They don't. Nor are they afraid that a worsening
economic situation will spark an internal revolt-at least not
in the short term. Only the outright hostility of the Roman
Catholic church could topple the regime -from within.
Nicaragua is over 90 percent Roman Catholic, and through-
out the country, people say they will not "choose against
God." The church's disaffection is well known: "The revolu-
tion has brought some good things," says Managua
archbishop Obando y Bravo, "but it has filled the hearts of
men with hate." Still, the church has yet to take on the
Sandinistas directly, and a scientific measure of disenchant-
ment is impossible. Three years ago, on the day after a
published poll showed that 70 percent of the people wanted
elections, the Sandinistas ruled that no further opinion
surveys could be undertaken without government permission.
HAT THE SANDINISTAS d0 FEAR RIGHT NOW IS AN
American invasion. They have it all worked out in
their heads: Honduras, acting as America's agent,
precipitates a war with Nicaragua, and the
marines come to the rescue. The Sandinistas have
no illusion about war with the United States. They know they
would lose-but only temporarily. America wouldn't occupy
Nicaragua for long, and the Sandinistas would melt into the
mountains-there to prepare again to remove whatever pup-
pet government the United States installs in Managua. Even-
tually they would stage a comeback, but the whole affair
would be uncomfortable=to say the least.
The Sandinistas really anil.truly.believe that Ronald Rea-
gan will invade their country. In a word, they believe the
president is mad. "Miguel d'Escoto [the Nicaraguan foreign
minister] has been reading Seymour Hersh's book on Kissin-
ger," said Rita Delia Casco when I was in Managua. "He was
very impressed, especially with the part about i\'ixon pretend-
ing to be mad, pretending to be capable of dropping a
hydrogen bomb on Hanoi in order to get concessions. The
Vietnamese didn't believe him, because they knew he really
wasn't mad. But Reagan is, you know. He really is." "What he
says about us is worthy o.f a madman," says Father Ernesto
Cardenal, the Sandinista minister of culture. "He may end up
in an insane asylum."
Barricada's Carlos Fernando Chamorro doesn't think Rea-
gan is mad, but he has an equally skewed notion of politics
north of the border. "It's very simple," he says. "Reagan needs
a foreign-policy success to complement what he's done with
the economy in order to ensure his re-election. He'll go to war
against us, and the American people will rally round., Every-
thing fits the picture: The Kissinger report has been post-
poned till February-which coincides with the end of the
rainy season and the coming of perfect weather for the
[American] carriers' planes to ily against us."
Chamorro possesses the ideologue's most perverse quality:
a near-total capacity fot delusion, a blindness that is serving'
Ronald Reagan well. The president certainly could use a
foreign-policy success, but he would likely be driven from
oflice if he went to war in Central America. What he would
welcome, however, is a cave-in by the Sandinistas without a
single American shot having been fired. He would like to win
the war without fighting it. And, that is exactly what might
happen-all because the Sandinistas believe that an actor
who played opposite a chimpanzee in a Hollywood movie
must certainly be capable of ordering the American fleet to
do something more than simply steam in circles off the
Nicaraguan coast. (If further proof of the Sandinistas' para-
noia about Reagan is desired, read the interview they gave to
Playboy this month.)
HE SANDINISTAS IN NICARAGUA AND THE GUERRILLAS
in EI Salvador have the same sponsors: Cuba and the
Soviet Union. Havana and Moscow may not share the
Sandinistas' belief in Ronald Reagan's insanity, but
they seem equally eager to avoid an American in-
vasion. Soviet president Yuri Andropov has already dropped
a hint in Der Spiegel that he understands about spheres of
influence-just as he hopes the United States understands
about Afghanistan. The Russians are strapped economically,
and Andropov needs to preserve his trading links with the
United States-a business that has flourished in the face of
Ronald Reagan's rhetoric because, es George Will has writ-
ten, the administration "loves commerce more than it loathes
communism." The Soviets already subsidize Cuba to the tune
of $3 billion to $4 billion a year. One Western Hemisphere
economy in the toilet is enough. So the Soviets appear to have
drawn the line: They have said repeatedly that their support
for the Sandinistas is "political" rather than economic or
military.
Fidel Castro helped found the F.S.L.N. in 1961. Tomas
Borge was his emissary to the Middle East during the 1970s.
Cuba was instrumental in the Sandinistas' victory over
Somoza. But Castro has been less bellicose than usual, and
there are credible reports of his displeasure with the San-
dinistas. The latest indication came in Castro's own an-
niversary speech, on July 26. Conspicuously absent was a
pledge to send Cuban soldiers to respond if the United States
intervenes directly in Nicaragua.
If there ever is warfare between Nicaragua and America,
efore foining up with the contras, Alfonso
Robe o-then aSandinista official-got
some pointers /rom Fidel Castro.
Castro will have two choices. He can stay aloof-and lose face
with revolutionaries around the world, who will wonder how
he can send soldiers to Africa while abandoning his closest
comrades. Or he can join .in-and risk having the United
States take out both Nicaragua and Cuba. Either way, he
would lose. Hence his caution.
If Castro wants the Sandinistas to retreat, it is not diflicult
to construct his argument: "Let's back down for now, boys.
Let's consolidate what we have. It's taken twenty years, but
now there are ~+vo of us in America's backyard. History is on
our side. We can wait. There is nothing in the dialectic that
says we have to take over the world tomorrow. I myself acted
too fast in the 1960s when I attempted to destabilize Vene-
zuela. There's nothing wrong with tactical retreat. And don't
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worry--America's hysteria will die down before long. We
may even luck out completely and get a wimp like Carter in
the White House, and then we'll be rolling again."
Castro godfathered the Salvadoran guerrillas as he did the
Sandinistas. The unity that now exists among the five guerrilla
groups was engineered by Castro in Havana. He would make
the same argument to Joaquin Villalobos in El Salvador that
he would make to Tomas Borge in Nicaragua. And no matter
how many guns the guerrillas have, they still need outside
support. if their sponsors tell them to wait, they'll wait.
HAT ABOUTTHE UNITED STATES? WHAT IS RONALD
Reagan's real objective? Will the administration
use its apparent leverage to conclude a nego-
tiated settlement?
In the beginning, before the issue of Central
America reached its current feverish pitch, the president's
goal seemed simple: He would not permit El Salvador to fall
to Communism. This straightforward policy was articulated
to the Sandinistas by former assistant secretary of state
Thomas Enders in August of 1981.. The deal was simple, and
today it has a name: It is called "symmetry." Its crux was (and
is) a trade: The United States would stop the contras threaten-
ing Nicaragua if the Sandinistas (and, by implication, the
Cubans) called off the Salvadoran guerrillas. For dessert,
Enders promised a massive infusion of economic aid to
Nicaragua, assistance that would have greatly helped solidify
the regime. Stupidly, because they didn't perceive .a contra
threat and wouldn't believe Alfredo Cesar's dire economic
predictions, the Sandinistas refused.
Today, as the president ratchets up the military show of
force. something new has been added to the equation. Ronald
Reagan now says that there can never be peace in Central
America as long as the Sandinistas are in power in Managua.
Even a promise to confine their activities to their own country
is not enough. The Sandinistas have to go.
But it could all be a .great bluff-and it probably is. If
Reagan is really willing to settle-for symmetry (with verifica-
tion and all the trimmings), if he is willing to build on Daniel
Ortega's partial capitulation, then he is pursuing that ambi-
tion properly: He is hiding his true position while playing to
his strength-his warmonger, madman image.
The critics are wrong: Pressure can moderate the San-
dinistas' behavior, even internal pressure. Last year, for exam-
ple, when the church protested the Sandinistas' curtailment
of Holy Week observances, the regime backed down.
If firmness can force conciliation, why not keep it up? Send
two, four, ten fleets to the area; have the entire United States
Army participate in war games in Honduras, not just 5,000
troops. Keep it up till the Sandinistas cry uncle.
ERE SYMMETRY HAS ITS PROBLEMS. IN EL SALVADOR;
the danger is that the United States will go home.
If Americans no longer perceive a. guerrilla threat
to the Salvadoran government, there will be strong
congressional agitation to get out.~And then there
will be no leverage on the government to reform. By its
involvement, the United States has accepted no small respon- `
sibility for EI Salvador's future. To leave would be to abandon
that nation to a depth of evil not known to this point even in
EI Salvador. And then, when the guerrillas return to fight next
time, they will meet little resistance-and will deserve a free
ride. (The same is true of the region as a whole. As usual, the
United States is reacting late to an area's problems, and
reacting at all only because it fears Communist expansion. If
a cease-fire is negotiated, Congress will want to send scarce
resources to other trouble spots. By walking away from
Central America, the United States would only hasten the
region's "loss" farther down the line.)
In Nicaragua, symmetry would save many lives-but the
Sandinistas would be confirmed in power. Ronald Reagan
would be abandoning his principles-but he would be follow-
ell equipped for "monsoon warfare," the
contras spend most of their time setting
up ambushes and lighting rust.
ing a long tradition. For no matter how much the United
States may prefer democracy, American governments have
always been (shortsightedly) 'content with political order,
even when that order is the product of dictatorship.
The mere mention of symmetry leaves men like Alfonso
Robelo and Adolfo Calero apoplectic. Reagan's speech to
them would be like Castro's from the opposite end of the
ideological spectrum: "Look, fellas, this symmetry thing can
get me through the next election. After that, while I'm not
now giving you carte blanche, I'm sure you'll be able to get
back in gear. And that's because the Communists won't be
able to keep themselves down. They'll start violating the
symmetry agreement before long."
It is possible, however, that Ronald Reagan is serious about
actually ousting the Sandinistas and that an American
diplomat in Managua reelected the president's real feelings
when he told Newsweek's Beth Nissen that the "only thing the
Sandinistas [could do to please the White House] is shoot
themselves." If this in fact is Ronald Reagan's true position,
then he will play a different game-but one that still avoids
the direct involvement of American forces. "The dirty little
secret," says an American involved in planning the adminis-
tration's Central American policy, "is that we wouldn't even
go to war over Honduras. Over Costa Rica, which is a real
democracy, yes. But not Honduras. And the beauty of it is we
can say just that till we're blue in the face and the, Sandinistas
won't believe us."
All of which means that the Central American crisis will
play out in one of two ways. Either symmetry will be con-
structed because everyone decides it is in his best (short-term)
interest, or the situation will proceed as it has for the past few
years: The contras will continue their harassment, with in-
creased C.I.A. support, and the Salvadoran guerrillas will
keep fighting, with intermittent success. In this scenario-the
"Nothing Changes" scenario-every side can continue to
dream of victory. The wars will slog on-tests of will, with
each side remembering that the turning point in guerrilla
combat often comes when least expected and without ex-
planation. Since "Nothing Changes" is a scenario of hope
(and one that accords with the White ~-louse's reading of
domestic politics), it is closer to the way people feel and think
in real life: Everyone believes he will succeed if he just keeps
at it. I'd bet that nothing will change.
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