APPEARANCE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM SEMINAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000502130003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 26, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligcncc Council
NIC 04480-86
26 September 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism
SUBJECT: Appearance at the International Conference on Terrorism
Seminar
1. Action Requested: None. ZYte following is background information for
your consideration on how to .respond to questions that may be posed to you at
the Columbia University School of Journalism-seminar on Saturday. As a
participant in the "dry-run" of this seminar on 10 September at Columbia
University, I believe the.. majority of the questions-can be fielded without
difficulty. It is likely, however,_that some of the questions will involve
sensitive policy and covert action issues that you will not-t-o-~be able to
answer with any degree of candor.
2. Background. The hypothetical situation that will be presented to you
is that an aircraft from the country of Tiberus is hijacked and diverted to
the Middle East country of Cedaron, a small country devasted by-civil war and
lacking a centralized government. About 55 Americans are among the 100
passengers on board this aircraft. The other nationals on the airliner
include 25 citizens of Tiberus as well as nationals from the United Kingdom,
France, Canada, and several other countries: The terrorist group responsible
for the hijacking is called "Brothers Loyal Unto Death" or BLUR. ~e group
demands the release of members of their group held in Tiberus. Except for the
fact that a foreign flag carrier is hijacked, this hypothetical terrorist
incident is very reminiscent of the hijacking of ZWA 847 to Lebanon in June
1985.
3. trough "Socratic dialogue", the moderator takes the assembled panel
through the decision making processes within the US Government as senior
officials grapple with this crisis, explores the role and moral
responsibilities of the electronic and print news media, and examines the
interaction between the United States and other countries--especially Tiberus.
4. ZYte areas that may turn out to be the most sensitive during this
exercise are the following:
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6. Attached is some background information that you may wish to draw on
during the seminar. Z4zey are not particularly original, but I believe there
are some fundamental misunderstandings and misconceptions about the -
international terrorist threat. The seminar provides you with a forum to try
to put terrorism in a proper prospective for the American public. Your
comments will, of course, be carefully scrutinized by foreign audiences a~
well.
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International Z+errorism: Issues
Definitions: As Morrie Leibman points out, terrorism is not a new
phenomenon, but we tend to become confused about what international terrorism
really means. Modern terrorism is different; it has taken on a truly
international character and has become the tactic of ideological extremists
and radical states. As a consequence, it threatens the political foundation
on which our democratic system is based and undercuts the system of political,
economic, and military relationships upon which the United States and its
allies depend to preserve and promote basic human freedoms. We must, however,
avoid confusing the terms-like "freedom fighter" with that of "terrorist".
freedom fighter or a revolutionary traditionally belongs to a group that for
reasons--justified or not--is endeavoring to overthrow by military. means. an
established government. 7~e long established rules of such conflicts are to
attack the military personnel and facilities of the government', to establish
bases of operation, to hold territory, and to win popular support.
A terrorist, on the other hand, engages in premediated, politically
motivated violence against noncombatant targets. He normally is a member of a
subnational group or a clandestine state agent. He frequently crosses
international boundaries to conduct .attacks against innocents. He has no
intention of holding territory or winning over the populace; his goal, by
striking at innocents, is to disrupt, discredit, and traumatize existing
political and social structures. Zhe actions of terrorists worldwide are
gradually debasing international law and Western democratic values. Zfie
media, academicians, and others frequently express sympathy for such
individuals, alluding to the "root causes" that lead them to commit acts of
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desperation. Regardless of the cause, however, there can be no justification
for the wanton killing of innocents who are in no way responsible for the
plight of the terrorist. We must remember that groups who perpetrate these
acts are usually supported by radical and totalitarian states whose principal
objectives are to undermine Western democracies as well as non-aligned or
pro-Western governments in the bird World--with little or no concern about
root causes of political violence.
State-Sponsored Terrorism: A principal reason why international terrorism
continues to flourish is state sponsors. Middle Eastern terrorist groups in
particular are backed by impressive material and financial support-from Syria.:
and Libya. Through the careful use of surrogates, these radical states have
been able to project power and reap foreign policy benefits with minimum cost
and risk. Libyan leader Qadhafi, for example, has aspired to play a leading
role on the world stage as leader of a new Arab order vehemently opposed to
the United States, but he is constrained by the boundaries of a relatively
small and weak state. Sponsorship of terrorism allows him to carry out his
ambitions far beyond Libya's national borders. Without the active involvement
of Libya and Syria, the problem of Middle Eastern terrorism would not be
nearly as serious. In fact, the involvement of the governments in Damascus
and Tripoli in recruiting, indoctrinating, training, arming, and facilitating
the movement of terrorists from place to place has created an
institutionalized quality to Middle Eastern terrorism that is largely absent
in other parts of the world.
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Standing behind Syria and Libya is another state sponsor of terrorism--the
USSR. The Soviets view terrorism as a basic, legitimate tool of political
struggle to be applied or sponsored in those settings where its use will
benefit the USSR.- As a result, the Soviets have no moral compunctions about
supporting foreign insurgent and terrorist groups; the primary consideration
is whether the activities of these groups further Soviet interests.
The Soviets support terrorists by promoting an environment of violence.
They arm, supply, and train personnel belonging to insurgent/terrorist groups
with the knowledge that they will commit terrorist acts in attempting to
overthrow governments that are either nonaligned or pro-Western. We have
identified Soviet Bloc support of terrorist and insurgent groups in about 13
countries. Zfie Soviets and their East European partners provide.a wide range
of material assistance to groups in these countries, including the provision
of arms and paramilitary training. We know as a fact that personnel from
numerous foreign extremist groups have undergone military and paramilitary
training in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We know of several training
camps in the Soviet Union where insurgents and terrorists. are being trained
this very day. The camps are run by the Soviet military as well as by the KGB
and GRU.
The Soviets also supply arms to states that practice and sponsor
terrorism, especially Libya and Syria--without restricting the end use of
these weapons. Both have supplied arms to terrorists and radical insurgent
groups from the Soviet stockpile. ZY-ere is no evidence that Moscow has
discouraged the disbursement of weapons to these groups.
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There has been no change in Soviet behavior, despite recent rhetoric by
Moscow deploring terrorist actions.
Moscow is supporting terrorism where its interests are served. We also know
that Palestinian terrorist groups are permitted to use Eastern Europe for
illicit commercial operations, arms deals, and staging attacks in the West.
We know that the leaders of well-known Middle Eastern European terrorist
groups continue to travel to and deal with East Communist states. These East
European regimes act in some cases as Soviet surrogates in making arrangements
with these groups. We have no reason to expect any change_in Soviet policy.
Moscow will continue to support these extremist groups and. radical states.
.The cost to the Soviet Bloc of providing such support is slight whether in
terms of money, reputation, influence, or risk.. Those who profess to see a
change in Soviet behavior should review Soviet coinduct during the recent.
confrontation between the United States and Libya. A review of that record
demonstrates clearly that the Gorbachev regime is just like its predecessors
when it comes to actions, as opposed to words.
Counterterrorist Cooperation Among Developed Countries: International
terrorism is a complex, intractable problem that must be attacked across a
broad spectrum- politically, economically, militarily, and covertly.
Politically, more can and should be done among like-minded states to
combat terrorism. It is imperative that the United States along with its
allies and other friendly states take actions jointly against terrorist groups
and states that support them. Even though much is being done constructively
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bilaterally, this should not preclude the adaption of significant multilateral
initiatives and measures against perpetrators of terrorism and their foreign
sponsors. Nor should any effort be spared in the strengthening of existing
counterterrorist conventions.
Terrorist violence in Western Europe, cooperation there among-indigenous
terrorist groups, and the "spillover" of Middle Eastern violence have resulted
in broader counterterrorist discussions and cooperative measures among West
European states. West European governments recognize the utility of
formalized working-level contacts fostered by multilateral groupings. The
European Economic Community's newly founded permanent working-group on
terrorism and abuse of diplomatic immunity reflects the strengthened European
resolve to combat international terrorism. The emergency meeting of the Trevi
Group in London on Thursday underscores that multilateral actions are possible
if there is resolve by like-minded states. In addition, one of the most
encouraging signs that democratic states are determined to confront terrorism
occurred at the Summit Seven in Tokyo in May where international terrorism was
cited as one of the highest priorities and Libya was condemned outright.
Multilateral cooperation to reduce or punish terrorist activity has
resulted in eight international agreements since 1968, including the European
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Strasbourg Convention) and the
Summit Seven's Bonn Declaration on aircraft hijacking. Even these efforts
have met at times with mixed success, the overall results have been positive.
(A list of existing international conventions and declarations on
combatting terrorism is attached.)
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ANNEX D
International Conventions and Declarations
1. Tlie Tokyo Convention (Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft)
entered into force in December 1969, calls for states to
make every effort to restore control of a hijacked
aircraft to its lawful commander and to arrange for
the prompt onward passage of the aircraft,?passengers,
cargo, and crew.
2. Tl:e Hague Convention (Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft) entered
into force in October 1971, requires adhering .states
either to extradite skyjackers or to submit them to local
prosecution.
3. The Montreal Convention (Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against tl~e Safety of
Civil Aviation) entered into force in January 1973,
extends The Hague Convention's extradite-or-prose-
cute provisions to acts committed on tl~e ground
against civil aircraft in service and against associated
ground facilities.
4. The UN Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents entered
into force in February 1977, applies t}ie extradite-or-
prosecute formula to acts committed against protected
persons (chiefly diplomats and people ~vl~o have been
granted political asylum) and their premises and
vehicles.
5. T1re Strasbourg Convention (European Convern
lion on tl~e Suppression of Terrorism) is an agreement
drafted in Strasbourg (at the initiative of France and
West Germany) in November 1976 by the Council of
Europe and signed in January 1977 by all members of
the Council except Ireland and Malta. It entered into
force in August 1978. The convention declares that-
regardless of the motivation-certain violent crimes,
including kidnaping, hijacking, bombing, and attacks
against .internationally protected persons, are not sub-
ject to the "political offense exception" that might
otherwise prevent extradition of the perpetrators; if
extradition is denied for some other legal reason, the
denying country must prosecute under its own laws.
6. The Bonn Economic Summit Declaration on
Hijacking of July 1978 asserted that the participating
countries (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and West Germac~y)
would halt all air traffic with any country harboring a
Hijacker or refusing to return the aircraft and passen-
gers. This was the first effort to put teeth into the
antiskyjacking conventions; previously there had been
no way to punish countries that violated the provisions
of these conventions.
7. The Venice Economic Summit Declaration on
the Protection of Diplomats of June 1980 is a denun-
ciation by the Summit Seven of terrorist or criminal
actions against diplomatic or consular personnel or
premises in contravention of the norms of internation-
al la~v and practice. Tl~e summit governments further
resolve to provide "support and assistance" in situa-
tions involving the seizure of diplomatic or consular
establis}iments or personnel.
This information {s Unclassified.
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