HABIB VISIT: MEETING WITH COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT ELECT ARIAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950026-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 29, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950026-8
ALA/MC/N
INCOMING
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IMMEDIATE
00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
UTS2142
00 RUEHC RUEHLL
DE RUEHME #9107/01 1181821
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 281816Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1806
INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
BT
S EU R E r- MEXICO 09107
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: CS PREL XK
SUBJECT: HABIB VISIT: MEETING WIT, COSTA RICAN
PRESIDENT ELECT AR:AS
2. I TOLD ARIAS THAT THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT A CONTADORA
AGREEMENT THAT WAS COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIABLE, AND
SIMULTANEOUS. I TOLD HIM THAT IN MY TALKS WITH CENTRAL
AND SOUTH AMERICAN LEADERS, I HAD CONCLUDED THAT THIS
IS WHAT MOST OF THEM WANTED ALSO.
3. ARIAS SAID THAT HIS RECENT TRIP THROUGH SOUTH AMERICA
HAD CHANGED THE OPINIONS OF MANY ABOUT THE CHARACTER OF
THE SANDINISTA REGIME. NICARAGUA'S FRIENDS WERE RAPIDLY
LOSING PATIENCE. HE INTENDED TO USE HIS INAUGURATION >
TO PUT MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON THE SANDINISTAS. HE WAS /
DELIGHTED THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WAS TO HEAD THE U.S.
DELEGATION.
4. HE SAID THE PANAMA MEETING HAD BEEN VERY CONFUSING,
AND THAT NICARAGUA HAD IRRITATED EVERYONE WITH ITS
INTRANSIGENCE. NEGOTIATIONS ON THE UNRESOLVED ISSUES WOULD
PROBABLY START SOON, BUT IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT ALL THE
DETAILS COULD BE FINISHED BY JUNE 6. END SUMMARY.
5. AT A LUNCHEON HOSTED BY AMBASSADOR TAMES ON APRIL 26,
I HAD A WARM CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT ELECT OSCAR
ARIAS WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS BROTHER, MINISTER OF
THE. PRESIDENCY DESIGNATE RODRIGO ARIAS, FIRST VICE PRESI-
DENT ELECT JORGE MANUEL DENGO, AND FOREIGN MINISTER
DESIGNATE RODRIGO MADRIGAL NIETO. I EXPLAINED THAT
MY MISSION WAS TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBILITIES OF A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND DETERMINE
THE STATUS OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS FOLLOWING THE PANAMA
MEETING EARLIER IN THE MONTH. I SAID THAT THE U.S.
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SUPPORTED PEACE. NOT PROTRACTED CONFLICT, AND WOULD
WELCOME AN AGREEMENT THAT WAS COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIAELE.
AND SIMULTANEOUS. CONTADORA IS THE FRAMEWORK FOR SUCH AN
AGREEMENT. THE LATIN AMERICANS HAD ASKED THE U.S. TO
STAY OUT OF THE PROCESS AND WE HAD COMPLIED. NOW WE WERE
LOOKING FOR THEM TO PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE
TWENTY-ONE OBJECTIVES THEY SET IN 1983. THE PANAMA MEETING
HAD PROVIDED NEW MOMENTUM TO THE PROCESS, ALTHOUGH WE
WERE DISAPPOINTED BY THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NICARAGUANS.
WE WERE RAPIDLY APPROACHING THE JUNE 6 DATE SET FOR
CONCLUDING AGREEMENT, BUT THERE REMAINED MANY ISSUES TO
BE RESOLVED.
6. I TOLD ARIAS THAT IN MY TALKS WITH THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES, I HAD SEEN THAT THEY ALL WOULD LIKE
TO ACHIEVE A GOOD AGREEMENT. I HAD BEEN IMPRESSED THAT
THE DEMOCRACIES WERE WORKING TOGETHER AS NEVER BEFORE.
AMONG THE CONTADORA AND SUPPORT GROUPS, I FOUND THAT
MOST FELT THIS WAY, ALTHOUGH A FEW STILL SEEMED INCLINED
TO WANT TO SIGN ANY AGREEMENT SIMPLY TO SIGN SOMETHING.
I HAD TOLD THE LATIN AMERICANS THAT THE U.S. WOULD,
OF COURSE, RESERVE THE RIGHT TO JUDGE FOR ITSELF IF THE
FINAL AGREEMENT WAS ACCEPTABLE, BUT OUR VIEWS MATCHED
THOSE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICANS VERY CLOSELY. CERTAINLY,
WE WOULD NOT SUPPORT ANY AGREEMENT THAT THEY COULD NOT
ACCEPT. MY RECENT LETTER TO THREE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO DO ITS
PART TO COOPERATE WITH SUCH AN AGREEMENT.
7. ARIAS SAID THAT THIS TRACKED PERFECTLY WITH HIS OWN
APPROACH, AND HE SAID THAT THE TIMING OF MY TRIP WAS
EXCELLENT. IT HAD GIVEN THE LATIN AMERICANS SECURITY
THAT THE U.S. WAS SUPPORTING THEIR EFFORTS TO FIND A
PEACEFUL SOLUTION.
8. ARIAS SAID THAT HE HAD GONE TO THE CONTADORA AND
SUPPORT GROUPS TO CHANGE THE OPINIONS OF THOSE-WHO WERE
TOO PRO-SANDINISTA. HE BELIEVED THAT HE HAD HAD AN IMPACT,
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 MEXICO 09107
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: CS PREL XK
SUBJECT: HABIB VISIT: MEETING WITH COSTA RICAN
AND NOW MANY OF THE LATIN AMERICANS COULD BETTER UNDER-
STAND COSTA RICA'S DISLIKE OF THE SANDINISTAS. FOR
EXAMPLE, HE HAD MET WITH PERUVIAN PRESIDENT GARCIA FOR
THREE HOURS AND MADE A VISIBLE IMPRESSION ON HIM. I
REMARKED THAT I HAD TALKED WITH GARCIA JUST THE DAY
BEFORE, AND I AGREED THAT ARIAS HAD INDEED HAD AN IMPACT.
ARIAS BELIEVED THAT THE SUPPORT FOR THE SANDINISTAS
IN LATIN AMERICA WAS DRYING UP, AND THEIR FORMER SUPPORTERS
WERE RAPIDLY BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH SANDINISTA
INTOLERANCE. THE CURRENT ROUND OF CONTADORA ACTIVITIES
MAY BE THEIR WAY OF GIVING THE SANDINISTAS ONE LAST
CHANCE; IF THE SANDINISTAS DO NOT TAKE IT, THEY WILL
BE ISOLATED IN LATIN AMERICA. THE CONTADORA AND SUPPORT
GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE PARTICULARLY UPSET BY
SANDINISTA INTRANSIGENCE AT PANAMA. FOREIGN MINISTER
D'ESCOTO HAD BEEN INFLEXIBLE AND HAD TO CONTACT MANAGUA
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EVERY HALF HOUR FOR INSTRUCTIONS. HE HAD GRATUITOUSLY
INSULTED THE COLOMBIANS WHO HAD BEEN WORKING HARD TO
ACCOMMODATE NICARAGUA. ARIAS BELIEVED THAT AN OPPORTUNITY
WAS DEVELOPING FOR THE GENERALLY MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD
DEMOCRACIES OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA TO BEGIN TO
WORK TOGETHER AS NEVER BEFORE.
9. ARIAS WAS EXPECTING TEN OR TWELVE LATIN AMERICAN
PRESIDENTS TO ATTEND HIS INAUGURATION. THIS WOULD SEND A
STRONG MESSAGE OF LATIN SUPPORT FOR COSTA RICA TO THE
SANDINISTAS. HE PLANNED TO USE THE OCCASION TO MOUNT
MAXIMUM PRESSURE ON NICARAGUA. HE PLANNED A TWO HOUR
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENTS TO DISCUSS CENTRAL AMERICA.
DURING HIS INAUGURAL ADDRESS, HE INTENDED TO MAKE A
STRONG STATEMENT ABOUT DEMOCRATIZATION IN NICARAGUA.
THE ATTENDING PRESIDENTS WOULD BE INVITED TO SIGN A
DECLARATION OF SAN JOSE WHICH WOULD ENUNCIATE DEMOCRATIC
PRINCIPLES FOR ALL LATIN AMERICA. ARIAS WOULD UNVEIL
HIS CALENDAR FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN NICARAGUA. WHILE
THE OTHER PRESIDENTS WOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DIRECTLY
ENDORSE THE CALENDAR, THE DECLARATION OF SAN JOSE WOULD
"RECOGNIZE WITH INTEREST" THE CALENDAR AND THUS ALLOW
THEM TO SUPPORT IT INDIRECTLY. ARIAS WOULD MAKE SPECIFIC
PROPOSALS FOR NICARAGUA'S NEW CONSTITUTION AND FOR A
SERIES OF DATES BY WHICH CERTAIN THINGS SHOULD OCCUR.
THE SCHEDULE WOULD BE ARRANGED SO THAT SPECIFIC CONCESSIONS
WOULD BE REWARDED WITH SPECIFIC BENEFITS. I ASKED IF
HE INTENDED TO LINK THESE PROPOSALS TO CONTADORA, AND
HE INDICATED THAT THAT WAS A POSSIBILITY. HE CONFIRMED
THAT DANIEL ORTEGA HAD NOT BEEN INVITED, AND SERGIO
RAMIREZ PROBABLY WOULD BE REPRESENTING NICARAGUA.
10. ARIAS WAS DELIGHTED THAT VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD
BE HEADING THE U.S. DELEGATION. HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD
GIVE ANOTHER STRONG SIGNAL OF U.S. COMMITMENT TO COSTA
RICAN DEMOCRACY.
11. DENGO REMARKED THAT INITIALLY CONTADORA HAD HAD NO
PURPOSE. IT NOW HAD ACQUIRED A PURPOSE, HOWEVER. IT
WAS TO DEFINE THE GOALS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THESE WERE
THE GOALS OF DEMOCRACY VERSUS THE GOALS OF TOTALITARIANISM.
I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CLEARLY DEFINING THESE TERMS
AND MAKING THEM AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT.
IT WAS CENTRAL TO THE WHOLE CONTADORA PROCESS THAT THE
SANDINISTAS BE COMMITTED TO CHANGE THE WAY IN WHICH
THEY TREATED THEIR OWN PEOPLE.
12. ARIAS SAID THAT THE SITUATION IN PANAMA HAD BEEN
CONFUSING TO EVERYONE. THE FRUSTRATION WITH THE
NICARAGUANS HAD LED CAPUTO TO ASK D'ESCOTO IF NICARAGUA
REALLY WANTED PEACE OR WANTED WAR. HE BELIEVED THAT
PANAMA WOULD SOON CONTACT THE PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS
TO ARRANGE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REMAINING TWO ISSUES.
I NOTED THAT THERE ACTUALLY WERE MANY PARTS LEFT UNSETTLED
AND WONDERED IF THE JUNE 6 DEADLINE WAS FEASIBLE.
MADRIGAL SAID THAT CHANGES WOULD BE MADE ON TWO OF THE
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FROM HABIE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: CS PREL XK
SUBJECT: 14AEIB VISIT: MEETING WITH COSTA RICAN
CHAPTERS BY THEN. BUT THE WORK ON FINALIZING THE LANGUAGE
AND INSERTING SPECIFIC FACTS WOULD GO BEYOND THAT DATE.
I ADVISED THEM TO BE VERY SPECIFIC, INCLUDING PROVISIONS
FOR SUCH THINGS AS CEASE FIRES AND AMNESTIES.
13. ARIAS ASKED ME WHAT THE CENTRAL AMERICANS SHOULD DO
IF NICARAGUA REFUSED TO SIGN. I SAID THAT THEY SHOULD
PROCEED AND LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN TO NICARAGUA. THE
SANDINISTAS WOULD FIND THEMSELVES ISOLATED, UNDER PRESSURE,
AND THE CENTRAL AMERICANS SHOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR
NICARAGUA TO REINTEGRATE INTO LATIN AMERICA IF IT CHOSE
TO DO SO. IT WOULD BE RETURNING ON THE CENTRAL AMERICANS'
TERMS, HOWEVER. IF NICARAGUA SIGNED THE AGREEMENT AND
THEN VIOLATED IT, IT WOULD BE UP TO THE CONTADORA AND
SUPPORT GROUPS, AS GUARANTORS, TO SEE THAT NICARAGUA
COMPLIED. THEY HAD ACCEPTED THIS RESPONSIBILITY, AND WE
AND THE CENTRAL AMERICANS EXPECT THEM TO FULFILL IT.
I ADDED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD SOON CBTAIN HIS AID
FOR THE ARMED OPPOSITION. HOW HE USED IT WOULD DEPEND
ON NICARAGUA. DENGO SAID THAT THESE ALTERNATIVES SHOULD
BE EXPLAINED TO ORTEGA AT ESQUIPULAS.
14. I ASKED IF THERE WERE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES IN THE
SANDINISTA LEADERSHIP ABOUT THE GOALS OF THE REVOLUTION.
I EXPLAINED THAT IN SOUTH AMERICA, SOME PEOPLE TRIED
TO TELL ME THAT NOT ALL WERE COMMUNISTS. ARIAS AND HIS
COLLEAGUES ASSURED ME THAT THERE WERE NO SUCH IDEOLOGICAL
SPLITS AMONG THOSE WHO CONTROL THE FSLN. (MADRIGAN SAID
THAT ORTEGA WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT HAVANA AND MOSCOW ABOUT
EVEN GOING TO WAR.)
15. I INQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
RESISTANCE UNDER A CONTADORA TREATY, NOTING THAT THEY
WERE ALL NICARAGUANS. MADRIGAL SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT
BE POSSIBLE TO BRING ALL OF THE RESISTANCE INTO A
DIALOGUE. SOME OF ITS POLITICAL LEADERS COULD PARTICIPATE,
SUCH AS CRUZ, BUT NOT CALERO OR BERMUDEZ. DENGO REMARKED
THAT WITHIN THE RESISTANCE, THERE WAS A DEMOCRATIC CORE,
BUT THEY WERE MIXED UP WITH ALL THESE OTHERS (WHO DENGO
CLEARLY DID NOT LIKE).
16. THE REMAINING DISCUSSION DEALT WITH COSTA RICA'S
ECONOMY. ARIAS WAS CONCERNED THAT THE PERCEPTION OF
INSTABILITY IN THE REGION CAUSED BY NICARAGUA WAS
ADVERSELY AFFECTING HIS NATION'S ECONOMY. HE WANTED TO
RESOLVE THE CRISIS SO THAT FOREIGN INVESTORS WOULD REGAIN
CONFIDENCE. HE WAS INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING THE ECONOMY
IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, AND LOOKED TO PROGRAMS SUCH AS
THE CBI TO PROVIDE NEEDED CAPITAL. BUSBY
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