HABIB TRIP: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT SANGUINETTI AND FOREIGN MINISTER IGLESIAS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950022-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 25, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950022-2
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0 241848Z APR 86
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6734
INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
BT
RASILIA 04413
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: UY, PREL, XK
SUBJ: HABIB TRIP: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT
SANGUINETTI AND FOREIGN MINISTER IGLESIAS
2. SUMMARY. FOREIGN MINISTER IGLESIAS TOLD US THAT
URUGUAY'S POLICY TOWARD CENTRAL AMERICA AND
NICARAGUA IN PARTICULAR IS SUBJECT TO INTERNAL
POLITICAL FACTORS, SPECIFICALLY THE NEED TO
MAINTAIN NATIONAL UNITY WITH THE BLANCO PARTY,
MANY OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE SANDINISTA SYMPATHIZERS.
HE SAID THAT THE GOU SHARES OUR GOALS, BUT
DISAGREES WITH OUR METHODS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
THE .ONTADORA PROCESS IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN TO
SUCCEED. HE SAID THAT THE SANDINISTAS WERE MORE THAN
INTRANSIGENT, THEY WERE BEHAVING IRRATIONALLY AS
IF LOOKING FOR MARTYRDOM. HE PREFERS TO HAVE AN
AGREEMENT SIGNED ON JUNE 6, EVEN IF IT IS INCOMPLETE.
BELIEVING THAT THIS WILL PRODUCE A CLIMATE OF
CONFIDENCE NEEDED TO CONCLUDE THE REMAINING ISSUES.
URUGUAY WILL ALSO PARTICIPATE IN THE COSTA RICA-
NICARAGUA BORDER COMMISSION. I STRESSED THE NEED
TO AVOID THESE TYPES OF PIECEMEAL APPROACHES AND
WORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE, SIMULTANEOUS, AND
VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDES ALL 21 POINTS.
3. PRESIDENT SANGUINETTI REITERATED SOME OF THESE
POINTS AND ADDED THAT FOR ALL ITS SHORTCOMINGS,
CONTADORA HAD BEEN USEFUL IN PREVENTING A WIDER
WAR AND THE SANDINISTAS FROM DECLARING NICARAGUA
A COMMUNIST STATE. HE WAS DISAPPOINTED BY THE
NICARAGUANS' PERFORMANCE IN PANAMA, AND HE ASSURED
US THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CONCESSIONS JUST TO GET
NICARAGUA TO SIGN. END SUMMARY.
4. ON APRIL 23. AMBASSADOR WILKEY AND I MET WITH
PRESIDENT SANGUINETTI AND FOREIGN MINISTER
IGLESIAS TO DISCUSS CONTADORA AND NICARAGUA. IN
T
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THE FIRST OF THREE SESSIONS DURING THE DAY WITH
IGLESIAS, 1 EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY
MISSION WAS TO EXPLORE DIPLOMATIC MEANS TO ACHIEVE
PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT
OF THE RECENT PANAMA MEETING. THE (ONTADORA PROCESS
WAS ENTERING A CRITICAL PHASE, ANC WE WANTED TO HEAR
URUGUAY'S VIEWS ON rHE DI?ECTIC^N THE PROCESS WAS
MOVING AND ALSO ON WHAT NICARAGUA HAS DOING. I
EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. S..FPORTED THE CONTADORA
PROCESS AND WOULD ENDORSE AN AGREEMENT THAT
INCORPORATED ALL 21 POINTS OF THE 1983 DOCUMENT
OF OBuECTIVES AND WHICH WAS COMPREHENSIVE,
SIMULTANEOUS, AND VERIFIABLE.
5. IGLESIAS SAID THAT URUGUAY WAS A DEMOCRATIC
COUNTRY, AND IN GENERAL THE GOU SOUGHT TO MAINTAIN
A POSITION OF NATIONAL UNITY ON FOREIGN POLICY
ISSUES. THE ISSUE OF NICARAGUA WAS PARTICULARLY
SENSITIVE BECAUSE MANY MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION
BLANCO PARTY -- INCLUDING SOME WHO HAD LIVED AND
WORKED IN EXILE WITH RADICAL GROUPS SUCH AS THE
SANDINISTAS -- WERE SYMPATHETIC TO NICARAGUA. THE
GOU MUST TAKE THE POSITION OF THESE PEOPLE INTO
ACCOUNT AS IT FORMS ITS POLICY. LAST YEAR THE
GOU SENSED THAT THE CONTADORA PROCESS WAS STALLING,
AND IT JOINED IN FORMING THE SUPPORT GROUP TO
REINVIGORATE THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT THE SITUATION WAS CONFUSING AND THAT NO ONE
HAD A CLEAR IDEA OF WHERE THE PROCESS WAS LEADING
OR WHETHER IT WOULD SUCCEED. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS
ESSENTIAL TO CONTINUE THE CONTADORA PROCESS, AS
THE ALTERNATIVES WERE A DISASTROUS WAR AND CONSOLIDA
TION OF THE SANDINISTA REGIME WITH EVERYONE GETTING
USED TO IT.
6. I NOTED THAT NICARAGUAN FOREIGN MINISTER
D'ESCOTO HAD BEEN INTRANSIGENT AND EVEN INSULTING
AT PANAMA. IGLESIAS RESPONDED THAT THE PANAMA
MEETING HAD BEEN FRUSTRATING AND CONFUSING. FIE
DOUBTED THAT D'ESCOTO'S ACTIONS WERE PART OF A
COHERENT MASTER PLAN. INSTEAD, HE ASCRIBED THEM
TO PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS. HE SUGGESTED THAT
D'ESCOTO AND OTHER DIPLOMATS SUCH AS VICE MINISTERS
TINOCO AND ASTORGA WERE ACTING INCREASINGLY
PASSIONATE AND IRRATIONAL, AS IF PREPARING TO
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SUBJ: HABIB TRIP: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT
BECOME MARTYRS. IN HIS VIEW, THE SANDINISTAS
HAD BECOME DISTRUSTFUL OF CONTADORA, AS THEY
BELIEVED THAT IT WAS FORCING CONCESSIONS FROM
THEM WITHOUT PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES.
CITING AN ARITCLE BY INTERIOR MINISTER SORGE, HE
PERCEIVED THAT SOME SANDINISTAS WERE ASKING WHY
THEY SHOULD NEGOTIATE WITH PEOPLE WHO WANTED THEM
TO OPEN THE SOCIETY AND DEVELOP A MODEL THAT THE
SANDINISTAS THEMSELVES DID NOT WANT.
7. I SAID THAT I DOUBTED THAT THE COMANDANTES
WERE REALLY IRRATIONAL AND SOUGHT MARTYRDOM. I
BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE USING THESE TACTICS TO
DEFEAT MEASLRES WHICH COULD BE EFFECTIVE IN
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FORCING INTERNAL CHANGE. THE SANDINSTAS ONLY
RESPONDED TO PRESSURE. POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC
PRESSURE WAS IMPORTANT, AND THE USG WAS PLEASED
TO SEE THE EXPANSION OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS,
AS NOW 12 LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES COULD BRING
PRESSURE TO BEAR ON NICARAGUA. THIS PRESSURE
IS IMPORTANT. NICARAGUA MUST DECIDE IF IT WISHES
TO GO THE WAY OF CUBA OR REJOIN THE REST OF LATIN
AMERICA. IF IT CHOOSES THE FORMER, IT CAN EXPECT
EVER-GROWING ARMED OPPOSITION. IF IT CHOOSES THE
LATTER, THE DOOR IS OPEN THROUGH THE CONTADORA
PROCESS. THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT A COMPREHENSIVE,
SIMULTANEOUS. AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT, AND SUCH
AN AGREEMENT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY RESOLVE THE CONTRA
ISSUE, SINCE THE CONTRAS ARE NICARAGUANS WHO WOULD
BE REPATRIATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION. MY RECENT LETTER TO THREE MEMBERS
OF CONGRESS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED THIS POINT. THE
AGREEMENT MUST BE A GOOD AGREEMENT, HOWEVER,
KEEPING IN MIND HOW THE SANDINISTAS VIOLATED THE
COMMITMENTS MADE IN 1979.
8. I TOLD IGLESIAS THAT THERE WAS A CLEAR NEED
TO STRENGTHEN SOME PROVISIONS OF THE CURRENT DRAFT.
PARTICULARLY ON KEY ISSUES SUCH AS ARMS LEVELS
AND VERIFICATION. NICARAGUA COULD, FOR EXAMPLE,
SIGN THE AGREEMENT AND GET IMMEDIATE RELIEF FROM
THE CONTRAS. BUT IT COULD THEN REFUSE TO REDUCE
ITS ARMS LEVEL AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES COULD DO
NOTHING ABOUT IT. IGLESIAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
I HAD A POINT AND THAT THIS SITUATION COULD BE
REAL TROUBLE. HE ARGUED THAT THE CARABALLEDA
DECLARATION HAD SUPPORTED THE CONTADORA PROCESS,
BUT I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS FLAWED BECAUSE IT
LACKED THIS ELEMENT OF SIMULTANEITY AND WAS
THEREFORE IN FAVOR OF NICARAGUA. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT AT PUNTA DEL ESTE, IT HAD BEEN NECESSARY TO
CLARIFY THAT CARABALLEDA WAS TO HELP CONTADORA,
NOT REPLACE IT. I PROCEEDED TO POINT OUT
OTHER WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT DRAFT AGREEMENT,
SUCH AS THE PROVISIONS ON POLITICAL PLURALISM
AND THE NEED TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
STATUTE ON VERFICATION. IGLESIAS WAS GREATLY
INTERESTED IN LEARNING OUR VIEWS IN DETAIL. AND
1 OFFERED TO SEND A TEAM OF EXPERTS DOWN TO
REVIEW THE TEXT AT THE WORKING LEVEL. HE READILY
ACCEPTED.
9. IGLESIAS SAID THAT THE GOU AGREED WITH THE
U.S. GOALS IN NICARAGUA, BUT NOT OUR TACTICS.
URUGUAY WANTED PEACE AND A DEMOCRATIC NICARAGUA.
IT BELIEVED THAT MILITARY PRESSURE CREATED MORE
PROBLEMS, ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT
KNOW IF THE CONTADORA PROCESS WOULD SUCCEED. HIS
PLAN WAS TO HAVE THE CONTADORA AGREEMENT SIGNED ON
JUNE 6, EVEN THOUGH SOME ISSUES REMAINED UNRESOLVED
THIS ACT WOULD FORMALLY COMMIT NICARAGUA TO AN
AGREEMENT ON SECURITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. IT
WOULD CREATE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE IN WHICH THE
OUTSTANDING ISSUES COULD THEN BE RESOLVED. 1
WARNED HIM AGAINST ANY SUCH PIECEMEAL APPROACH,
PARTICULARLY ONE WHICH GAVE NICARAGUA WHAT IT
WANTED IMMEDIATELY AND PROVIDED NO GUARANTEE THAT
NICARAGUA WOULD NOT BACK OUT LATER. I STRESSED
THAT THE AGREEMENT MUST HAVE THE NECESSARY MECHANISMS
BUILT INTO IT AND A CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE
COMMITMENTS BEFORE IT IS SIGNED.
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EXDIS,CONTRA, EXDIS FOR CONTRA DISTRIBUTION
FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: UY, PREL, XK
SUBJ: HABIB TRIP: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT
10. I SAID THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICANS FEARED
NICARAGUA'S MILITARY MIGHT AND WANTED AN AGREEMENT.
THEY DID NOT WANT TO MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS TO
NICARAGUA, HOWEVER. THEY FELT THAT THE CONTADORA
COUNTRIES HAD NOT ALWAYS TAKEN THEIR VIEWS INTO
ACCOUNT. IGLESIAS AGREED, NOTING THAT HE HAD TOLD
HIS COLLEAGUES THE SAME THING.
11. IGLESIAS INQUIRED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE CONTRA
BILL, I EXPLAINED THAT THE DEMOCRATS HAD USED
PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES TO BLOCK IT, BUT THE
ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED IT CAN WIN IN A STRAIGHT
UP-OR-DOWN VOTE. IT WAS UNCLEAR IF THIS WOULD
HAPPEN BEFORE JUNE 6, BUT THE SENATE BILL CALLS
FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND AS MY LETTER POINTS OUT,\
IF THERE IS A VIABLE CONTADORA AGREEMENT, THE
CONTRA ISSUE CAN BE RESOLVED.
12. ON RECONCILIATION IN NICARAGUA, IGLESIAS SAID
HE AGREED WITH A DIALOGUE WITH THE CIVIC OPPOSITION,
BUT NOT THE ARMED RESISTANCE. I SAID THAT THIS
WAS AN IMPORTANT POINT, AND I REMINDED HIM OF THE
RECENT 6-PARTY PROPOSAL FOR A CEASE FIRE AND
AMNESTY AND NOTED THAT CONTRAS WERE ALSO NICARAGUANS
WHO WOULD NEED TO BE PART OF THE RECONCILIATION
CALLED FOR IN CONTADORA.
13. IGLESIAS ASKED ABOUT THE LEADERSHIP AND SIZE
OF THE ARMED RESISTANCE. I TOLD THEM THAT IT
CONTAINED A MIXTURE OF EX-SANDINISTAS, EX-
NATIONAL GUARDSMEN, AND MOSTLY PEOPLE WHO WERE
NEITHER. MANY OF ITS POLITICAL LEADERS SUCH AS
CRUZ AND ROBELO HAD BEEN LEADERS OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT. DESPITE A CUT-OFF
OF U.S. MILITARY AID SINCE 1984, IT HAD CONTINUED
TO GROW. IT WOULD GROW MUCH MORE EFFECTIVE IF
THE AID BILL WERE PASSED. WE LATER PROVIDED
IGLESIAS SOME OF OUR WRITTEN MATERIAL ON THE
RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP.
14. CONCERNING THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA BORDER
COMMISSION, IGLESIAS SAID THAT COSTA RICA HAD ASKED FOR
URUGUAY'S HELP, AND THE GOU FELT OBLIGED TO AGREE. THE
PLAN CALLED FOR A 10-20 MEMBER CIVIL COMMISSION OF
OBSERVERS. I WARNED THAT THIS WAS EXACTLY THE PIECE-
MEAL APPROACH WE SHOULD AVOID. DUARTE AND AZCONA WERE
AGAINST IT.
15. IGLESIAS ASKED ABOUT OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIETS
CONCERNING NICARAGUA. I SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WISHED
TO WEAKEN US WHEREVER POSSIBLE, AND NICARAGUA HAD
ALREADY BEEN A GAIN FOR THEM, SINCE IT WAS GIVING
THEM A BEACHHEAD ON THE AMERICAN MAINLAND FOR STIRRING
UP ANTI-ADMINISTRATION SENTIMENTS AND PROMOTING
SUBVERSION. IGLESIAS AGREED THAT THERE WAS AN EAST-WEST
DIMENSION TO THE NICARAGUAN PROBLEM.
16. LATER IN THE DAY, WE MET WITH PRESIDENT SANGUINETTI
WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY IGLESIAS. MANY OF THE POINTS
MADE IN THE EARLIER MEETING WERE AGAIN RAISED.
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SANGUINETTI SAID THAT RECENTLY HE HAD DISCUSSED THE
N:CARAG'JAN PROBLEM WITH THE PRESIDENTS OF PERU,
VENEZUELA, AND COSTA RICA, AND NO ONE HAD A FIRM ANSWER.
URUGUAY HAD SENT A LETTER TO NICARAGUA ASKING IT TO
INCREASE ITS COMMITMENT TO CONTADORA; THE RESPONSE HAD
BEEN "MORE OR LESS SATISFACTORY" SO THE PROCESS WAS
MOVING AHEAD. SANGUINETTI SAID THAT IF IT WERE NOT
FOR CONTADORA, NICARAGUA WOULD HAVE DECLARED ITSELF
COMMUNIST AND THE SOVIETS WOULD BE THERE IN FORCE.
THEN, THE ONLY U.S. OPTIONS WOULD BE WAR OR ACCEPTING
NICARAGUA.
17. SANGUINETTI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. FELT
THAT IT HAD SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE REGION, BUT HE
COULD NOT CONDONE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE CONTRAS. HE
BELIEVED IT WAS A TWO-EDGE SWORD: IT COMPLICATED
SANDINISTA CONSOLIDATION; BUT IT ALSO MADE ORTEGA A
NATIONAL HERO. HE FEARED THAT IF THE CONFLICT ESCALATED
INTO A FULL WAR, IT COULD LAST FOR YEARS. I EXPLAINED
THAT OUR POLICY WAS TO PRESSURE THE SANDINISTAS AND
COMPEL THEM TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT THAT IS COMPREHENSIVE,
SIMULTANEOUS, AND VERIFIABLE. THE SANDINISTAS ARE
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TRYING TO WAIT THE U.S. OUT, AND THE PANAMA DECISION
TO SET A TIMETABLE AND RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WAS MOST
HELPFUL. THE U.S. WAS DISAPPOINTED IN NICARAGUA'S
RESPONSE. SANGUINETTI ADDED THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED
IN NICARAGUA ALSO. ,v
18. SANGUINETTI TOLD US THT THE NICARAGUAN DELEGATION
TOTHE ARIAS INAUGURATION WOULD BE LED BY VICE PRESIDENT
RAMIREZ. HE SAID THAT THE COSTA RICANS DID NOT WANT
ORTEGA, AS HIS PRESENCE WOULD CAUSE A DISTURBANCE.
19. I SAID THAT NICARAGUA IS OUT OF STEP WITH ITS
DEMOCRATIC NEIGHBORS, AND IT IS THE THREAT IN THE
REGION. THE DEMOCRACIES ARE WORKING TOGETHER TO
GET AN AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH OF COURSE WE WOULD JUDGE FOR
OURSELVES IF ANY AGREEMENT MET OUR CRITERIA, WE
GENERALLY SHARED THE VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICANS.
WE WOULD NOT SUPPORT AN AGREEMENT THAT THEY COULD NOT
ACCEPT. THEY DOUBT THAT NICARAGUA WILL ACTUALLY SIGN AN
AGREEMENT. SANGUINETTI COMMENTED THAT MANY IN LATIN
AMERICA ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THIS ALSO. I CAUTIONED AGAIN
ABOUT MAKING CONCESSIONS TO NICARAGUA JUST TO GET THE
SANDINISTAS TO SIGN. HE SAID NOT TO WORRY. I ALSO
SAID THAT NICARAGUA SHOULD NOT BE DEMANDING PRECONDITIONS
FROM THE U.S. OUR POSITION IS ON THE RECORD AND
RESTATED IN MY LETTER.
20. THE REMAINDER OF THE DISCUSSION CONCERNED THE
SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AS SANGUINETTA DEPART-
FOR THE REGION ON APRIL 25.
21. DURING DINNER AT AMBASSADOR WILKEY'S RESIDENCE, WE
COVERED MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND WITH IGLESIAS AND MEMBERS
OF THE COLORADO AND BLANCO PARTIES.
WATSON
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