HABIB VISIT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN, APRIL 22

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950021-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: April 24, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88BOO443ROO0401950021-3
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INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, XK, AR
SUBU: HABIB VISIT: MEETING
- APRIL 22
AMBASSADOR ORTIZ AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH PRESIDENT
ALFONSIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO. ALFONSIN SAID
THAT WHETHER OR NOT A TREATY WAS SIGNED BY JUNE 6
DEPENDED TO A GREAT EXTENT ON THE U.S. HE SAW MY LETTER
TO CONGRESSMAN SLATTERY AS OFFERING NEW HOPE." ALFONSIN
PROPOSED THAT WE ISSUE A MORE FORMAL DECLARATION OF OUR
INTENT TO HALT AID TO THE CONTRAS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH
THE SIGNING OF THE CONTADORA ACTA BY THE FIVE CENTRAL
AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS. HE SUGGESTED THIS COULD BE DONE
IN THE FORM OF A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER OR A USG STATEMENT
DIRECTED TO THE EIGHT CONTADORA AND SUPPORT GROUP
GOVERNMENTS. I RESPONDED THAT THIS SUGGESTION WAS NOT
INCONCEIVABLE" BUT WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION
IN WASHINGTON. I NOTED THAT WE WERE BEING ASKED TO MAKE
A PRE-COMMITMENT TO A TREATY TEXT WHICH WAS NOT COMPLETE
ALFONSIN APPEARED UNAWARE THAT SEVERAL KEY ISSUES STILL
HAD NOT BEEN RESOLVED IN THE CONTADORA NEGOTIATIONS.
BY THE END OF THE DISCUSSION, HE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THAT
MUCH WORK REMAINED. I WAS REASSURED BY HIS AGREEMENT
WITH OUR POSITION ON THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE,
SIMULTANEOUS AND VERIFIABLE ACCORD. THE GOA'S PRESS
STATEMENT ON OUR MEETING EXPLICITLY ENDORSED THESE
THREE CRITERIA. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
3. AMBASSADOR ORTIZ AND I MET FOR TWO HOURS ON APRIL 22
WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER CAPUTO.
VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ALCONADA AND NSC STAFF MEMBER
BURGHARDT ALSO PARTICIPATED. I BEGAN BY STATING THAT
MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO SEE IF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION WAS
POSSIBLE, TO SEE IF DIPLOMACY COULD BE ACCELERATED. WE
CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE CONTADORA PROCESS -- AS
ORIGINALLY DEFINED -- TO SEEK A COMPREHENSIVE, SIMUL-
~+rnn~~
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TANECUS AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT BASED ON ALL 21
OBJECTIVES. I STRESSED THAT IN OUR VIEW CONTADORA WAS
NOT DIVISIBLE INTO PIECEMEAL SETTLEMENTS. I ASKED THE
ARGENTINES FOR THEIR VIEWS ON WHERE THE PROCESS WAS
GOING AND WHETHER THE JUNE 6 DEADLINE HAD ANY REAL
MEANING. I NOTED OUR PERCEPTION THAT THE SANDINISTAS
WERE USING PROTRACTED CONTADORA NEGOTIATIONS AS A COVER
BEHIND WHICH THEY COULD CONSOLIDATE THEIR REVOLUTION.
THIS VIEW WAS SHARED BY THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CENTRAL
AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES. I EXPLAINED TO ALFONSIN THE CONTRA
AID SITUATION IN CONGRESS. WHILE NOTING THAT THE PURPOSE
OF MY VISIT DID NOT INCLUDE DEBATING HIM IN THAT SUBJECT.
RM ALFONSIN BEGAN BY RESPONDING TO MY QUESTION ABOUT
THE JUNE 6 DEADLINE. HE SAID TIMING DID NOT DEPEND
EXCLUSIVELY ON THE CONTADORA AND SUPPORT GROUP COUNTRIES.
A MAJOR PROPORTION DEPENDED ON THE U.S. IF THE U.S.
ACTED WITH INTELLIGENCE, THE PROCESS WOULD END ON JUNE 6.
AT THE PANAMA MEETING, THE SANDINISTAS SAID THEY WOULD
NOT SIGN A TREATY AS LONG AS THE U.S. SUPPORTED THE
CONTRAS. ALFONSIN SAID MY LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN SLATTERY
HAD GIVEN HIM NEW HOPE.
5. ALFONSIN SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD FIND SOME
WAY TO REITERATE THE POSITION OF MY LETTER, MAKING CLEAR
THAT IF THE CONTADORA ACTA IS SIGNED, AID TO THE CONTRAS
WILL SIMULTANEOUSLY END. ALFONSIN THOUGHT ONE POSSIBLE
VEHICLE WOULD BE A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE CONTADORA AND SUPPORT GROUP COUNTRIES.
THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO WAIT LESS THAN TWO MONTHS TO
SEE WHAT OCCURRED ON JUNE 6. THIS DECLARATION BY THE
U.S. WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE THE SITUATION AND BE
GREETED POSITIVELY THORUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA.
6. I EXPLAINED THAT MY LETTER WAS INTENDED TO ANSWER
THOSE WHO DOUBT THAT THE U.S. WOULD ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS
UNDER A CONTADORA TREATY. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THE
LETTER. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE CONTADORA
TREATY OBVIOUSLY WOULD REQUIRE US TO STOP SUPPORT FOR THE
CONTRAS. THE TREATY WOULD END AID TO ALL INSURGENT
FORCES.
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 MONTEVIDEO 02429
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, XK, AR
SUBJ: HABIB VISIT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN,
7. CAPUTO SAID THE INTENTIONS OF THE SANDINISTAS WERE
NOT CLEAR TO EITHER LATIN GOVERNMENTS OR LATIN PUBLIC
OPINION. NICARAGUA MAINTAINS THAT IT CANNOT SIGN WHILE
THE U.S. CARRIES OUT VARIOUS ACTIONS. THIS POSITION
SEEMS REASONABLE TO MUCH OF LATIN PUBLIC OPINION. BUT
IT IS NOT CLEAR 'WHETHER NICARAGUA WANTS A TREATY OR EVEN
WHETHER IT WANTS AN END TO U.S. AID TO THE CONTRAS. THE
SITUATION MUST BE CLARIFIED FOR THE LATIN PUBLIC. IF
THE U.S. DECLARES THAT ALL AID TO THE CONTRAS CEASES AT
THE MOMENT A TREATY IS SIGNED OR WHEN ITS MECHANISMS
GO INTO EFFECT, THE SANDINISTAS WILL BE FORCED TO MAKE
THEIR POISTION CLEAR. THE EIGHT COUNTRIES WOULD GO TO
THE SANDINISTIAS AND SAY, NOW WHAT?" THE ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT THEN WOULD BE LIBERATED FROM THE PRESSURE OF
ITS OWN PUBLIC OPINION. ALFONSIN ADDED THAT IF NICARAGUA
STILL REFUSED TO SIGN, AFTER THE U.S. MADE SUCH A
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DECLARATION, ALL LATIN AMERICA WOULD BE RESENTFUL AND
WOULD "TURN ITS BACK ON THEM." IF NICARAGUA DID SIGN,
AND THEN FAILED TO COMPLY, LATIN AMERICA WOULD CONSIDER
ITSELF BETRAYED. IN EITHER CASE, THE U.S. WOULD NOT
LOSE BY MAKING THE REQUESTED DECLARATION.
8. I REPLIED THAT A U.S. DECLARATION THAT WE WOULD HALT
AID TO THE CONTRAS PRIOR TO ANY TREATY -- AS A
PRECONDITION -- WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. PRESIDENT
REAGAN WOULD NEVER AGREE TO SUCH A DECLARATION. I
SUSPECTED THAT IF WE MADE THE DECLARATION ALFONSIN AND
CAPUTO HAD SUGGESTED, THE SANDINISTAS WOULD RESPOND THAT
WE MUST CUT OFF THE AID TO CONTRAS IN ADVANCE. CAPUTO
SAID THAT WOULD NOT BE AN ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE. A
SANDINISTA REFUSAL WOULD CHANGE THE ENTIRE SITUATION.
THE U.S. COULD NO LONGER BE PORTRAYED AS AN OBSTACLE.
9. BURGHARDT AND I EXPLAINED THAT THE DECLARATION THEY
WERE REQUESTING WOULD REITERATE A COMMITMENT WE HAD ALREADY
MADE IN OTHER FORMS. THE SENATE VERSION OF THE CONTRA
AID BILL, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION SUPPORTED, STIPULATED
THAT CONTRA AID WOULD END IF A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION IS
ACHIEVED. AT MANZANILLO, WE HAD MADE THE SAME POINT MANY
TIMES AND THE SANDINISTAS APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND IT.
10. ALFONSIN SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IN THE U.S.
SIMPLY REITERATING ITS POSITION. A REITERATION AT THIS
SPECIAL. POLITICAL MOMENT WOULD HAVE A DRAMATIC AND
POSITIVE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION THROUGHOUT LATIN
AMERICA AND EUROPE. THERE WOULD BE GREAT PRESSURE ON
MANAGUA. I NOTED THAT THERE WAS ONE PROBLEM: WE WOULD
BE MAKING A CONCESSION, A PRE-COMMITMENT, BEFORE WE KNEW
WHAT KIND OF A TREATY WE WOULD GET. THE TREATY WAS STILL
INCOMPLETE. THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF PAST EPISODES --
BEFORE THE SUPPORT GROUP GOT INVOLVED -- IN WHICH THE
FOUR CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES CAME UNDER GREAT
PRESSURE FROM SOME COUNTRIES TO MAKE UNBALANCED
CONCESSIONS. I NOTED THAT ONE CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENT
HAD TOLD ME HE FEARED THAT THE SUPPORT GROUP WAS IN A
RUSH TO GET ANY KIND OF AGREEMENT. THE ARGENTINES, OF
COURSE, PROTESTED THAT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.
11. CAPUTO SAID WE COULD RELY ON THE CORE FOUR TO PROTECT
THEIR OWN INTERETS AND PREVENT AN INCOMPLETE TREATY. I
SAID WE HAD A GREAT IDENTIFY OF VIEWS WITH THE CORE FOUR,
BUT WE ALSO HAD OUR OWN INTERESTS AND VIEWS. BY MAKING
THE DECLARATION WHICH ALFONSIN HAD REQUESTED, WE WOULD
LEAVE IT TO OTHERS TO DECIDE OUR SECURITY INTERESTS. I
NOTED THAT ALFONSIN HAD EARLIER VOLUNTEERED HIS
RECOGNITION THAT LEGITIMATE U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS WOULD
HAVE TO BE TAKEN ACCOUNT OF.
12. I STRESSED THAT WE HAD AN IMPORTANT COMMITMENT TO THE
NICARAGUAN PEOPLE AS WELL AS TO THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
DEMOCRACIES. WE COULD NOT LET THEM DOWN, ABANDON THEM
TO A POSSIBLE -- BUT STILL UNDEFINED SOLUTION.
BURGHARDT AND I COMMENTED THAT IT WAS STILL VERY UNCLEAR
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN A TREATY WAS SIGNED. MANY QUESTIONS
NEEDED TO BE ANSWERED: WOULD THERE BE A CEASEFIRE? WHAT
ELSE WOULD HAPPEN ON THE DAY OF THE SIGNATURE? WHAT
HAPPENED BETWEEN SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION?
13. I CONCLUDED THIS TOPIC BY SAYING I COULD NOT GIVE
AN ANSWER THAT NIGHT. THE IDEA OF A NEW DECLARATION TO
THE EIGHT COUNTRIES WAS NOT INCONCEIVABLE. CAPUTO ASKED
IF THERE WOULD BE ANY VALUE IN THE GOA CONSULTING WITH
THE OTHER SEVEN COUNTRIES TO SEE IF THEY WOULD WELCOME
SUCH A DECLARATION. ALFONSIN AND I AGREED THAT THIS WOULD
NOT BE NECESSARY.
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 MONTEVIDEO 02429
EXDIS/'CONTRA. FOR EXDIS/CONTRA DISTRIBUTION
E.O. 12356: OECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, XK, AR
SUBJ: HABIB VISIT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ALFONSIN,
CONTADORA: UNRESOLVED ISSUES:
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14. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, IT WAS APPARENT
THAT ALFONSIN BELIEVED THAT A DRAFT TREATY WAS READY TO
SIGN, WITH NO POINTS REMAINING TO BE NEGOTIATED. WE
MADE IT CLEAR THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE CENTRAL AMERICANS
CONSIDERED THE TREATY COMPLETE. WORK REMAINED ON ARMS
REDUCTION, EXERCISES AND THE VERIFICATION STATUTE. WE
EXPLAINED THAT THE LATEST CONTADORA RECOMMENDATION ON
ARMS REDUCTION, WHICH WOULD SUSPEND ALL OTHER SECURITY
PROVISIONS IF AGREEMENT WAS NOT REACHED IN NINETY DAYS
ON ARMS AND FORCE LEVELS, WAS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT
WOULD RESULT IN HALTING AID TO THE CONTRAS WHILE GETTING
NOTHING IN RETURN. WE URGED AN EARLY CONVENING OF
PLENIPOTENTIARY MEETINGS TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES.
15. I TOLD ALFONSIN THAT WE WERE SUSPICIOUS THAT THE
SANDINISTAS WERE ADOPTING THE CLASSIC COMMUNIST
NEGOTIATING TACTIC OF TAKING AN INTRANSIGENT POSITION
IN ORDER TO EXTRACT MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS. THE CORE FOUR
WOULD NOT PLAY THIS GAME. THEY WOULD NOT ACCEPT HALF
MEASURES. AS NEIGHBORS OF NICARAGUA, THEY FEARED THE
SANDINISTA THREAT IN A WAY WHICH ARGENTINA DID NOT. BY
THE END OF THIS DISCUSSION, THE ARGENTINES APPEARED TO
ACCEPT THE NEED FOR FURTHER WORK ON THE TREATY. ALCONADA
ASKED US TO SHARE WITH HIM OUR SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE
DRAFT ACTA; WE PROMISED TO DO SO.
CONTADORA: POLITICAL ISSUES:
---------------------------
16. I NOTED THAT THE TREATY DRAFT STILL DID NOT SPECIFY
HOW THE POLITICAL COMMITMENTS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED. THE
SANDINISTAS MAINTAINED THAT THEY WOULD DECIDE THEIR
CONSTITUTION, WHETHER OPEN MASSES WERE PERMITTED, WHETHER
THE PRESS COULD BE FREE, ETC. THE ACTA CONTAINED CLEAR
GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR AN OPEN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. BUT IT NEEDED TO BE CAREFULLY
CONSTRUCTED SO THAT IT SPECIFIED WHAT THE SANDINISTAS
HAD TO DO. I SAID WE TOOK A POSITIVE VIEW OF THE
POLITICAL TIMETABLE PROPOSED BY PRESIDENT-ELECT ARIAS.
IT COULD ASSURE THAT THE POLITICAL PROCESS WAS MORE
THAN GENERALITIES.
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