HABIB TRIP: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT LUCINCHI, APRIL 21

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950019-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: April 23, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950019-6
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, VE, XK, NU
SUBJECT: HABIB TRIP: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT LUSINCHI,
APRIL 21
2. SUMMARY: CHARGE FLOWER AND I HAD A GOOD,
THOUGH GENERAL, DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT LUSINCHI
AND FOREIGN MINISTER CONSALVI APRIL 21. THE MOST
INTERESTING POINT TO EMERGE FROM THE VENEZUELAN
SIDE WAS CONSALVI'S ASSERTION THAT, FOLLOWING THE
CONTADORA MEETING IN PANAMA, LATIN AND EUROPEAN
POLITICAL PRESSURE HAD SUCCEEDED DRAMATICALLY IN
BACKING THE SANDINISTAS OFF THEIR INTRANSIGENT
POSITION. THE SANDINISTAS ARE NOW WILLING TO SIGN
ON JUNE 6, CONSALVI SAID (LUSINCHI WAS NOT SO SURE).
I POINTED OUT THAT IT IS A COMMUNIST TACTIC TO
ADOPT EXTREME POSITIONS TO WIN CONCESSIONS FOR
DROPPING THEM. I TOLD THE VENEZUELANS EMPHATICALLY
-- AND REPEATED IT TWICE -- THAT IN TAKING ON THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS, THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES
HAD ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY NOT JUST TO GET ANY
AGREEMENT, BUT TO GET A GOOD AGREEMENT. I EXPRESSED
OUR CONCERN THAT, TO GET AN AGREEMENT, CONCESSIONS
MIGHT BE MADE TO NICARAGUA THAT WOULD RENDER A TREATY
UNWORKABLE. THE CENTRAL AMERICANS, I NOTED, HAVE
THE SAME CONCERNS. I SAID THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE
REACHING A POSSIBLY FINAL STAGE. THE UNITED STATES
IS BEING ASKED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. BUT WE ARE NOT
BEING TOLD WHAT WE MIGHT GET IN RETURN, WHAT TEXT
IS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION, OR WHAT PROPOSALS
ARE ON THE TABLE. TAKING THE POINT, LUSINCHI AND
CONSALVI WERE BOTH RECEPTIVE TO MY SUGGESTION TO
IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS AT THE STAFF LEVEL. END
SUMMARI'.
3. AFTER INTRODUCTORY REMARKS -- ON THE NEED TO
COMBINE PRESSURE WITH A DIPLOMATIC OPTION AND THE
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RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES TO PRO-
DUCE AN AGREEMENT THAT IS COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIABLE
AND SIMULTANEOUS -- I ASKED PRESIDENT LUSINCHI TO
ASSESS WHERE CONTAOORA IS GOING AFTER THE APRIL 5-7
MEETING IN PANAMA. IN RESPONSE, LUSINCHI SPOKE
GENERALLY OF CONTADORA OBJECTIVES. HE SAID GETTING
NICARAGUA TO SIGN IS THE FOCUS OF EFFORTS NOW (HE
SUSPECTS THE SANDINISTAS WILL ULTIMATELY REFUSE)
AND NOTED THAT ~~ONTADORA COULD NOT BE PROLONGED
INDEFINITELY. AT THE PRESIDENT'S INVITATION,
CONSALVI THEN SPOKE OF THE PANAMA MEETING AND
AFTERMATH IN TERMS THAT CONTRAST SHARPLY WITH WHAT
WE WERE HEARING JUST AFTER THE MEETING. IN THE
DAYS AFTER PANAMA, CONSALVI SAID, THE CONTADORA AND
SOME EUROPEAN (E.G., SPAIN) COUNTRIES PUT ENORMOUS
POLITICAL PRESSURE ON NICARAGUA TO CHANGE ITS POSI-
TION. THAT PRESSURE HAD SUCCEEDED DRAMATICALLY,
CONSALVI CLAIMED. NICARAGUA IS NOW WILLING TO SIGN.
THAT WILLINGNESS IS SOLID EVIDENCE, CONSALVI INDICATED,
THAT CONTAOORA'S PREMISE THAT THE LATINS CAN PRESSURE
NICARAGUA SUCCESSFULLY IS VALID. CONSALVI WENT ON
TO SAY THAT CONTADORA VIEWS SIGNATURE OF AN AGREEMENT
NOT AS AN END BUT AS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW PHASE
IN WHICH THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES WOULD FOLLOW UP
ENERGETICALLY TO ENSURE NICARAGUAN COMPLIANCE WITH
TREATY COMMITMENTS.
4. IN EXCHANGES THAT FOLLOWED, I EXPRESSED STRONG
DOUBT THAT LATIN PRESSURE HAD CHANGED THE NICARAGUAN
POSITIONS OR THAT THE NICARAGUAN POSITION HAD IN
FACT CHANGED. AS I HAD WITH THE CENTRAL AMERICANS,
I SAID IT IS AN OLD COMMUNIST TACTIC TO ADOPT
INTRANSIGENT POSITIONS IN ORDER TO WRING CONCESSIONS
IN EXCHANGE FOR DROPPING THEM. I SAID WE ARE CON-
CERNED THAT CONTADORA WILL MAKE UNWISE CONCESSIONS
TO GET NICARAGUA TO SIGN. SECURITY PROVISIONS MAY
BE WATERED DOWN, PIECEMEAL APPROACHES ADOPTED OR
WEAK VERIFICATION PROCEDURES LEFT UNSTRENGTHENED
AND UNDEFINED. I NOTED THAT NICARAGUA DOES NOT
APPEAR TO US TO HAVE DROPPED ITS PRECONDITIONS FOR
SIGNING ("U.S. AGGRESSION MUST CEASE"). THESE
ALLEGED NICARAGUAN STATEMENTS ABOUT READINESS TO
SIGN MIGHT BE COUPLED TO THEIR DEMANDS ON THE U.S.
TO END AID TO THE CONTRAS PRIOR TO THE SANDINISTAS
RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS IN CONTADORA. I NOTED THAT
THIS ATTITUDE WAS CONSISTENT ALSO WITH THE UN-
ACCEPTABLE PROPOSALS OF THE SANDINISTAS TO NEGO-
TIATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BILATERALLY WITH THE
U.S. AND ADDED THAT WE HAD NOT CHANGED OUR VIEW
THAT WE WOULD MEET BILATERALLY WHEN THE SANDINISTAS
MEET WITH THEIR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL OPPOSITION.
MAKING THE SAME POINT DIFFERENTLY, I SAID THAT
NICARAGUA HAS ADOPTED A PRECONDITION FOR SIGNING
THAT IS UNACHIEVABLE EXCEPT IN THE CONTEXT OF
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION. WE THEREFORE HAVE DOUBTS
THAT NICARAGUA IS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH.
5. REFERRING TO MY CONVERSATIONS IN CENTRAL AMERICA,
I SAID THAT OUR DOUBTS ARE SHARED BY THE DEMOCRACIES
THERE. OUR CONCERNS ARE HEIGHTENED BECAUSE CONTADORA
IS ENTERING WHAT APPEARS TO BE A FINAL PHASE AND THE
U.S. IS IN EFFECT BEING ASKED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS
WITHOUT BEING TOLD WHAT WE MIGHT GET IN RETURN, WHAT
TEXT IS THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS OR THE NATURE OF
NEW PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. BOTH LUSINCHI AND CONSALVI
SEEMED TO TAKE THIS POINT AND RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO
THE IDEA OF HOLDING DETAILED, STAFF-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS
ON THE STATUS OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT. AFTER AN
INTERLUDE, I MADE SOME OF THE SAME POINTS AGAIN,
SECRET
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PARTICULARLY THAT, IN TAKING ON THE CENTRAL AMERICAN
CRISIS, THE LATINS ASSUMED A SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY
TO PRODUCE AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT.
6. LUSINCHI TOOK ALL THIS IN GOOD GRACE. HE SAID
U.S. AND VENEZUELAN VIEWS COINCIDE AND THAT HE VIEWED
THE FACT OF MY APPOINTMENT, LETTER (TO DEMOCRATIC
CONGRESSMEN)'AND VISIT AS POSITIVE AND REASSURING.
CONSALVI ALLOWED THAT VERIFICATION ISSUES ARE IMPLICIT
IN SECURITY ISSUES STILL TO BE NEGOTIATED AND AGREED
THAT THE MOMENT HAS ARRIVED WHEN A CONTADORA TEXT
MUST BE MADE MORE PRECISE.
SOLUTION. FLOWER
END OF MESSAGE
IN DESULTORY OBSERVATIONS PROMPTED BY HIS VISITS
TO URUGUAY AND ARGENTINA, LUSINCHI SAID SOUTHERN
CONE VIEWS ON CENTRAL AMERICA ARE "LESS EUROPEAN"
(I.E., MORE REALISTIC) THAN THEY USED TO BE. (HE
ONCE COMPLAINED TO AMB. SHLAUDEMAN OF THE "TERRIBLE
DILETTANTISM" OF THE SOUTH AMERICANS TO THE SOUTH
OF VENEZUELA.) HE SPOKE APPROVINGLY OF CAPUTO,
IGLESIAS (,THE BEST KNOWN TO THE VENEZUELANS) AND
SODRE. THE TWO CONTADORA GROUPS ARE NOW COMPLETELY
INTEGRATED, HE NOTED. IN A RUNDOWN ON CENTRAL
AMERICAN PERSONALITIES, LUSINCHI ALSO PRAISED THE
CURRENT LEADERSHIP IN THE DEMOCRACIES AND AGREED
WITH ME THAT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES HAD
TO BE LISTENED TO AND SUPPORTED. RETURNING TO
THIS THEME LATER, HE SAID THAT VENEZUELA SUPPORTS
THE (WILSONIAN) CONCEPT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
THROUGH DEMOCRACY, NOT THE (SANDINISTA) IDEA THAT
SELF-DETERMINATION IS A RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE TO
DO WHATEVER YOU WANT WITHIN YOUR BORDERS. HE AGAIN
RETURNED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF MY VISIT AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES BEING PERCEIVED
THROUGHOUT LATIN AMERICA AS SUPPORTING A PEACEFUL
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/29: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950019-6