PRINCIPAL CRITICISMS OF PRESIDENT'S AID REQUEST TO THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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Principal Criticisms of President's Aid Request to the
Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance
The following are the key criticisms raised by the critics
of the President's aid request during the recent Congressional
debates. They are listed in order of frequency raised during the
debate. Attached herewith are the comment of Lee Hamilton during
the floor debates in which he covered the principal arguments of
the aid package opponents.
-- The Central American democracies do not support the aid
request. Specifically, Costa Rica President elect Oscar Arias
was quoted repeatedly for his pointed opposition to the aid
request. As a corrollary to the Arias statements, the critics
also noted that the $100 million would be better spent to support
the democratic countries in the region.
-- The President's plan undercuts the Contadora process and
does not give negotiations sponsored by latin American countries
an opportunity to succeed.
-- Since the passage of the Humanitarian Assistance package
last year, the President has failed to live up to his commitment
to seek a negotiated settlement in Central America.
-- $100 million is not enough money to topple the
Sandinistas but is enough to get the U.S. into trouble in the
region. Ultimately, the U.S. will become involved directly.
-- An offshoot of the above argument is that the U.S. has
already begun this process by planning for the use of U.S.
military trainers to train the resistance.
-- The Nicaraguan Democratic resistance does not have the
support of the Nicaraguan people. The leaders of the principal
resistance group UNO were not democratically elected.
-- $100 million is better spent in the U.S. At the time of
serious budget deficits, it is outrageous to think the U.S.
government would propose spending $100 for the resistance when
needy Americans are being asked to make due with less.
-- The most vitriolic and harsh criticism was devoted to the
comments of Buchanan that were considered to be an attack on the
patriotism of aid opponents.
-- After supporting the resistance for 5 years, it does not
control one town, city, or village in Nicaragua.
-- The resistance cannot win. The proposed program of
assistance will not lead to a victory by the resistance, but will
only lead to increased Cuban and Soviet assistance.
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-- U.S. public opinion is against support for the
resistance. Important U.S. church organizations are opposed to
the program: U.S. Catholic Conference, Jesuits, the Maryknolls,
the Episcopal Church, ect.
-- There are serious human rights problems in resistance
organizations. The flip side of the argument is that the
resistance military units are terrorists.
-- The members of the resistance are principally former
members of the Somoza National Guard. The few non-guard members
in the resistance are mere figure heads.
-- The Nicaraguan do not pose a real threat to the U.S. If
they are as dangerous as the President says then we ought to use
American troops and take care of the problem.
-- The money appropriated for humanitarian assistance is not
fully accounted for with the implication that some of it has been
diverted for private purposes.
-- Nicaragua is not a totalitarian regime. Seven different
political parties participated in the last election. The draft
constitution provides for basic freedoms.
-- Some members of the resistance are involved in drug
smuggling.
-- The Democratic resistance is not an effective fighting
force.
-- Funding the resistance is a new form of imperialism.
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a
March 19, 1986.
CONGRESSIONAL- RECORD' - HOUSE IF 1343
E
^
^
^
^
w
r
PAxerrA). The gentleman from Indi-
ana (Mr. HAMuroxl is recognized for 1
hour.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I
yield myself 10 minutes.
Mr.
I tition 540 t o Opposition House Joint Rlu
$100 million in economic and military
assistance to the Contras fighting the
Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
The President's requests seeks to ad-
dress the one aspect of U.S. policy
toward Central. America on which
there is not a consensus,
L ARRAg or ACaimuPr
the outseCh t that there are significant
and large areas of agreement between
the Congress and the President on
Central America:
Growing out of the Kissinger Com-
mission and its.important work. there
is an increasing consensus that the
United States has important interests
in Central America which need to be
both promoted and protected;
There is also a Consensus and wide
congressional support for economic
and security assistance for friendly
democratic states ? throughout the
region;
And- there is a realization that we
have a vital stake in helping our
neighbors address serious problems of
.economic and social deprivation.
There are also many large areas of
agreement on the serious and deterio-
rating situations in Nicaragua.
President Reagan spoke Sunday
night for a vast majority of Americans
in what he said about Nicaragua:
We all oppose what the President
awed Nicaragua's efforts to "subvert
and topple its democratic neighbors";
We also would oppose giving: an the
President said. "The Soviet Union a
beachhead in North America";
We all would oppose Nicaragua
threatening Mexico;
We all would oppose creating a situa-
tion where, as the President said. "des-
Perate- Latin peoples by begin fleeing northe to millions
the
cites of the southern- United States";
We all would oppose the creation of
what the President called "a second
Cuba. a second Libya on the doorsteps
of the United States";
We all would oppose Nicaragua's
effort, as the President said, "to spon-
sor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica.
Guatemala. and Honduras";
We all oppose the Sandinistas' ef-
forts to repress the Nicaraguan people
and establish totalitarian rule in Nica-
ragua; and
We would oppose the role of Nicam
gua in international drug trafficking
to which the President referred.
In short. the President spoke for
most of us when he addressed some of
our goals in Nicaragua and what we
want to avoid. We are all patriotic
Americans and we all share common
goals of Promoting democracy, human
rights and freedom and of opposing to-
talitarian rule of the right or left and
Soviet and Communist, efforts to ministration is to seek changes in
export revolution. Nicaragua through pressure and nego-
But the crux of the debate today in. tiations. the President talks about
not about goals we do share but about making the Sandinista "say uncle"
means to achieve those goals and it is and talks about "winning"; and
here that there are differences. This imprecision has characterized
The choice before us is not between
aid to the Contras and the triumph of
communism. ? If it were, the choice
would be easy, since we cannot allow
the triumph of communism in central
America. The choices before us in-
clude better alternatives to protect
U.S.interests.
In brief. we simply do not see that
the means the President has pursued
for 5 years, and which. he now seeks to
expand. have achieved. or have even
begun to achieve, the goals that we all
share. Indeed. we are impressed that
each of the goals is farther from us
today than it was 5 years ago:
The Soviet and Cuban military pres-
ence in Nicaragua has increased, from
600 to 800 Cubans in mid-1981 to some
3,000 Cuban and 300 Soviet and East-
ern bloc military advisers today,
On President Reagan's watch, by his
own admission. the Sandinistas have
strengthened their control in Nicara-
gua and the country has become a
Communist state, something it wasn't
in 1981;
The Sandinista have increased their
this administration's approach to
Nicaragua from the first, and it has
led to confused objectives and flawed
policy.
Second. the President has not
spoken with precision on his reasons
for funding the Contras:
The rationale has shifted from the
need' to interdict alleged arms ship-
ments to El Salvador. to pressuring
the Sandinistas to hold elections, to
giving the Contras a bargaining chip
in dealing with the Sandinistas. to
forcing the Sandinista to restructure
their government. to forcing the San-
dinista to negotiate with the Contra.
1. wg DISAORaZ wnea TIM PRRSmslrr's Assiss-
MElT OF Tai PRAZENT TE IRAT roam my
NICARAGUA TO UXTrXD STATUS VITAL INTER-
smTs
The President's assessment is exag-
gerated
The President has said: "If we don't
want to see the map of Central- Amer-
ica covered in a sea of red, eventually
lapping at our own borders. we must
act nbw.'
He has said: "If we abandon our
allies in freedom and allow the Com-
ate to those of their neighbors in the munists to establish a permanent
region; beachhead on the American mainland.
The Sandinistas continue, and ac- we will be living with the conse-
cording to the administration. are ex- quences for decades to come.";
panding the export of revolution He has said: "Nicaragua Is a foreign
throughout the region; policy question of supreme importance
The possibilities for democracy in which goes to the heart of our coun-
Nicaragua have worsened considerably try's freedom and future."; and
and political polarization and repres- He has said: "Nothing less that the
lion have increased; security of the United States is at
. The Contra war until now has made stake."
a negotiated settlement more remote These are not careful statements of
and has not forced the Sandinistas to policy. If the President means what he
negotiate; says. then he should have sent in the
The Contra war in its Present form- marines to Managua yesterday. our
is cau
i
s
ng the Sandinistas pain but ha
little`
ittle chance of overthrowing them or
forcing them to change their policies;
onlyc~cause more sthe military Pressure will
destruc-
tion. and the worsening of each of
these trends.
A. WT DISAORRR WITII Till PRIBm(-r's
nQRSClsi RIMTOaIC.
First, the President has not spoken
with precision on the goals of U.S.
policy.
Sometimes the President speaks of
negotiations. and sometimes he speaks
of military victory. Be said Sunday
night: "We have sought-and stW
seek-a negotiated peace and a demo-
cratic future in a free Nicaragua";
He also said last week: "There are
over 20,000 freedom fighters who are
desperately waiting for everything
from shoes to ammunition. And when
they get them they'll move. And when
they move, they'll win.";
While his diplomats say over and
over again that the policy of the ad-
vital and supreme United States inter-
ests are at stake in Nicaragua, then
why are we trying to fund a ragtag
group of ineffective and untrained
Peasants to Protect them? The $100
million will not achieve our purposes if
the threat is what the President de-
scribes.
The fact is that Nicaragua repre-
sents a different kind of threat to
United States interests than the Presi-.
dent states. Central America is not
covered in a sea of red. The trend is in
the other direction, as Guatemala.
Costa Rica, El Salvador. and Honduras
have conducted free elections and help
Peaceful transitions of Government.
The President himself is fond of
making this point, and he cannot have
it both ways; and
national importance; lt~is issue of
dirt
poor country with scarce human and
material resources. It does not today
represent a serious threat to the secu-
rity of She United States. It Possesses
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I~ 1346 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 19, 1986 t
Evidence suggests only lukewarm Mr.. LAGIOMARSINO. Mr. Chalr- But I want to make very clear where 1
will
United
yield? flora p States support for the Coma. mum Mr. HYDE. I entlem yield to the gentleman I Nstand ow, if you are looking for, an excuse rocess: don D
Cont?dora is a backburner policy from California.. to pacify the trendy left. they are easy
priority compared to efforts to weaken Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I thank the to find. I just warn you. though, if you
and oust the Sandinista government: gentleman for yielding. use one of these excuses, most of the
The President's March 16. 1986 Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask people advocating them thought any-
speech to the American people never the gentleman from Indiana- body but the Shah would be an im-
mentioned the Contadora process. and Mr. HYDE. Just tell what you have provement in Iran. and they also
emphasized instead a diplomatic ap- in your hand thought Reaganomics would not work. i
proach which requires the Sandinistas Mr. LAGOMARSINO. All right, I either. So you be careful with some. of
to relinquish power.
Ambassador Shlaudeman. former wilI l have in hand here a document k ow, No. 1: Why are we so con- _
United States Special Envoy for Cen- which I have shown, the gentleman in eerned about a little country of 3 mil-
tral America, met with the Nicaraguan the well. which shows specifically lion people? That is what my friend
Ambassador just twice in the past year where a Latin American official says from Indiana, for whom my respect is
and in that time did not meet any privately that the United States deep and profound and enduring. said.
high Nicaraguan officials: should support the Contras although "How can they be a threat to us?"
The United States has yet tp make he cannot say it publicly. If the gentle- I do not know how much the gentle-
public comments on Cont?dora's third man would like to see this, I will show man knows about cancer. but, there is
draft treaty completed 6 months ago: it to him. a little brown mole called a melanoma.
The United States has not detailed Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman. will and it starts very small but it soon me-
its criticisms of the Contadora treaty the gentleman yield? tantasizes. and pretty soon it can bring
draft; Mr. HYDE I yield to the gentleman fleet I suggest to you that Costa
The United States conti$ues to from Indiana. Rica-you can n practically spit In treject the immediate goal of a Conta- Mr. HAMILTON. I have heard re- RicaRica-yCal from Costa itcIn the
a
dora treaty: To end armed conflict in peatedly from high officials of our very important. strategic place. and a
Central America and to accept the-ex- Government that leaders in Central you think the Sandinista Communists.
e
faience of the Government of Nicara- and Latin America- a surrogate of a Soviet surrogate
gun if Nicaragua alters it s foreign poll- Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman. I am p, are going to be indifferent t
t n be her neighbors,
cies and begins to improve its domestic going to recapture my time because I spreading revolution
record. am limited. This dialog is useful. but really haven't been paying saes,
This is the heart of the bargain in a show the gentleman the document. He you tion.
Contadora Treaty. Is chairman of the House Intelligence -Now, the Contras can't win." Can
coact osross Committee. the ow, hed win? Can the Sohn
Mr. Chairman. one premise of the- I would like to open my remarks Sann democratic resistance that has to
proponents of this legislation is that if with three quotes from these wonder- Sfight the Khmer Rounc, as well to
you do not support military assistance, ful people in Managua. Let us try For- fight the Vietnamese. win? How much
United States policy will fIn my eign Minister Father Miguel D'Escoto: ferrito Vi the Mu. win? H control
Contras the proponents what unding the andI fooran k~nowl foedgeable or.. dominate? What big or little cities?
Contras overestimate Person' will o, whmilitary as- also
e being in Leningrad is a kind of-pllgrimage But nobody says we should not help
sist and underestimate One feels that one. has cc . a to a holy them. That is a liberal cause. You see.
what creative reative diplaplomacy can achieve. land ... if the freedom fighters are eight time 540 A Coda for House esoly Rhe issue . That was December 1981. - zones away from this hemisphere.
Th today will not resolve the . How about Interior Minister Tomas they deserve support. But the closer
simply too divided nd the this . are Borge: you get, the more tepid becomes their
Central too div America policy tto s aspect sp sustain o the of We say to our. brother Arafat that Nicara- enthusiasm for helping freedom fight-
proposed military policy.. A policy gua is his land and the PIA cause is the ers.
which is not sustainable cannot suc- cause of the Sandinistas. Let me quote from one of my heroes
ceed. July 22. 1980. in foreign policy. STLrlfxtt Souxz.
A vote against House Joint Resolu- How about Interior Minister Tomas Now, he supported $5 million to the
tion 540 is a vote to concentrate Borge again. He is very quotable: democratic resistance in Cambodia.
United. States energies and policy on- Our-friendship with Libya is eternal ? ? ?. Now, let me read what he says on
those many aspects of Central Amer- Libya Is a people which, in accord with our whether or not they can win and
ica policy on whid'h there is a consen- experience, has developed solidarity without whether it is worth. it. I quote Mr.
sus. building on that consensus in frontiers. Sol.Axz:
order to isolate and contain Nicaragua. That was September 1. 1984. There Is no -way the non-Communist re-
working together with the, democra- I do not expect- this debate to sistance is ever going to force Vietnam out.
Gies of Central and Latin America who change a single vote. I feel. as Simon That is clearly impossible. But what is possi-
oppose -Nicaragua's policies but also Bolivar once said. "Plowing in the ble is that an increasingly effective resist-
oppose the Contra war. sea.,. - ante by increasing the price Vietnam has to
Mr. Chairman. we cannot pursue a But this question is so important. pay for their occupation of Cambodia might
Some things must be said for the induce the Vietnamese to agree to a political
unilateral of Contra. war and d thereby promoting
trying the to record, not just for historians to look settlement.
Contra,
make Central America at, but 1, suggest our grandchildren Not bad logic. And I give it to you wha
ver
use you ch racy if those same democracies e safe for democ- do not some years from now might want to of it in oour own emiapheo~ n to make
support United States policy. know which side of the. - barricades
I urge a vote against House joint their grandfather or their grandmoth- The Contras are one element-of a
Resolution 540. - er was on. because, make no mistake, triad-military pressure. economic
the barricades are in place, and they pressure. and diplomatic pressure.
0 1315 , are a little too high to straddle. Those are the three elements that got
Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman. I Now,. the liberal clergy, the trendy Somoza out, and those three elements
yield 11 minutes to the gentleman vicars. the networking . nuns. the as. combined will get the Sandinistas out.
from Illinois (Mr. HYDsl. sorted concerned citizens have done or get them to the negotiating table
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given per- their job very well. and there will be doing what is necessary for their sur-
mission to revise and extend his re- rejoicing tonight when the red lights vival, but we will not have that if we
marks.) flash on this board. I am sure. eliminate the military leg of the triad.
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HOUSE H 1346
March I9, 1986 CONGRESSIONA3. RECORD - norms]
Resuming of trade
o. as arsraesa the I trade including
wzm TM POcvrsssorr or, nowt to those if gosa laeoitab4 dot es the resume
treatment tMFN status). the res-
a~ :ors o* aaavs sacnvaa IT USA" that direction t c nett trade tr of benefits under the general.
ws All aaorscrn~s ozM an ovs ~~~ ealation cannot achieve its coals. references and the ra-
rsr. A gauss vs. srsnrsai Isod system of p
C Y Indeed obsession. . fir. Chairmam the choice before toration of Nicaragua's sugar quota:
with Nicaragua represents a grow dis- members today is mold othe f bnarrow Supporting tlOn o multilateral and bilater-
tortion
are neglecting United d S tates$O funding the Contras and the triumph and
s 'Supporting Nicaraguan participation Central lotions. We are neglecting therarm cOD, p orities of communism in develoP? a regional development organion
trot We are neglecting There is a third lacy toward in
in the hemisphere. of ing a more balanced Po Lion.
Today. the debt crisis. Problems Nicaragua. a. sass
impact of falling oil United States Policy toward Niesra-
prates are matters of does not take positive
poverty and the of extraordinary im_ sus should have three essential cots- If Nicaragua we and ositiv ?
policy in carrots and steps to do these things
p for II S. get pun and containment. Oand the negott- goals neighbors want. there are also
Amerieri ce cL yet. these vital al issues s get atidks, aContadra steps we can take in concert with our
little who. following of ? lead of our P1551 at ins per- policy should Who. are fixated the lead of our Presi- k. First. II ea icaras a and contain friends our alliesapan Western
s
deUn and Cu the t for Contra war: seek. to isolate t c Nicaragua nt Poll- EuroM Nicaragua's largest
United States s support for the new the harmful ful effects of its P~ Do now. to cut their trade with
partners
es in the region- des.
and fragile democracies tern
Union toe N
a:
developing Soviet (}et our allies to cooperate with us in
B
portant razil. Arsentina for . United States Uruguay. (3~s Policy atemmar than D~yWe~g should from prevent the-
is. and several others-is far more its and its an offensive military ?nDabil- stopping all bilateral amistance and
a ~ ~ -the Sandinistas which ity in Central America that directly blocking multilateral assistance
a war against to
theme enot support. The threatens. the United States.'S cap The Nicaragua:
Contra war Places ia strain on what ity that does not currently exisL impose tougher United States eco-
, if nec- nomic sanctions. Including an assets
- f nomic and a prohibition on financial
should be close ties in a community hemi- United States should state clearly
democracies in the western stern hemi- intent to remove such a threat. ree7ech lending or
sasses by military action: ns such as bank
MY S tste in those in olvingattravel ic to Nicaragua:
and ~We would do well to remember the We should protect the
here; she and significant of Nicaragua in territorial Integrity nod by Break diplomatic relations;
the life of Latin Ameri Central America that is threats Work with our Latin American
ca. Nicaragua acting in conformance with allies. especially our Central American
rePnts less than 1 percent of the Nicaragua, tion of neighbors. to isolate Nicaragua in re-
population and less than one-half of 1 the carter of the the Innt
ican States and the or-Ameri- o .
percent of the GNP of L gional atta America. a. Amer charter
rs, to . flier with our
Tree cost to MexiCo alone of falling oil can Treaty of Reciprocal a~ if stepstaken eVtoler, can e only be ef-strong regio
prices in the post few weeks exceeds We should Puma festive Such sanctions
of more policy of providing economic and mili- friends and allies. Unilateral ions
Nicaragua's (SNP by a factor Md"nce to the democracies of have not and will not be over iso united States companies Honduras. Costa Rica. El Salvador. Allied cooperation will not be forth-
Guatemala to provide their people coming unless the UStates is
have bigger annual sales than NIs Sub- pursuing negotiations United o behalf of
gun's (SNP. The United States is ob with an opportunity for better lives purls our allies an legitimate.
sessed with a small. Poor. and vulnerld and to enable them to resist any at- g Third. a pesivi of negotimi t with
ble State that many Americans would tempt by Nicaragua to threaten or de- offers a better means of
be e hard-pressed to find on a map. stabilize them: States interests
tog's st We should provide consistent diplo- Nicaragua row Unitede United States
a. ~. V OR soars **ss=' matic support on behalf of the obssef r an not Policy TAM LM K e~ r$I ee sauOOr1 runs so VISI 1 ant of human rights. and suPPO should Pure
The a policy of strong ACcOMM e rat a rroa or OUR . la r e sup-
freely-elected Political institutions sup-
,l record suggests that he thelarse recognition port for the Contadora negotiations region, in and economic throughout the i
fact that subversion feeds on re- and bilateral talks with Nicaragua in
scale Soviet military did not begin of the support of Contadors. as the Conta-
unt l right Nfteragua ression: and don governments have requested.-
start the Contra the united Stater PWe should offer diplomatic and Po` are two started When ontra war to December litical Support to the domestic. demo- dui negotiating caveats concerning It
i98L Wethe United States stem et cratic opponents of the Sandinista n~otiaiat anPosture- d the Contra
its aid to. the Contras. the government. toward war pirst. n cotiati be Pursued sont a-d Cu hnion an8~ dinista& ba What steps wiuPll the their aid to United end. United be based on a-longwar effort
will make no con-
States do if the Soviets and Cubans re- term strategy of carrots and sticks to The Sandinistas the c oa-
spored to this $100 million PST The wean that country from the Cubans r of they are o w them
,ration has not addressed that and Soviets: through military Pressure*, o e*, -
question. A. ~O'm The United States cannot fund the
of Un have r
discussed tes military shy It Nicaragua takes Positive steps. Contras whose Purpose it is to over-
Mab members
possibi lity of United States In the such as agreeing to a ceasefire, remov- throw the Sandinistas and claim to
it
intervention in Nicaragua presence in throw the persuade others claim to
stopping its material sue- support, and. a persuade others settlement
future. A vote for the Presiden's re- intif the foreign
quest today will lift restrictions on Nicaragua. Insurgencies. agreeing ' to does with the Sandininegotiated stat. United States
CIA participation in the Contra war Port of of the Contras thus States
and bring American military advisors, reduce the size of its armed forces. funding
onto the scene in Central America respecting human rights. or making
toward national 1econcilia- mines the negotiating Process-
Conta-
where they will train the Contras We progress n nego ons and in the the sb-
will then have an American military mote m. thea~ted States sh should tie ~~oess cannot hearted United States
presence with the Contras. to take simultaneous steps
The President has said that he does prestepo~ Appropriate steps might In- support:
Rhetoric alone Is- no measure of
not plan to send United States troops
Suspending U.S. military exercises in United States
President. Nicaragua. and -I take e him m the clude* support for Contadora
word. But and announced goals of
preesident. and the President's commit. the region:
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CORD - HOUSE March 19, 1988
H 1344 CONGRESSIONAL RE ernoreat: it to not lateral U.S. . policies cannot achieve Sandi not a single advanced. sophisticated or risin that it diplomatic l- "coem s ~~ ,~s TACTIC
Surpg IL Ws 'a Pinsm
at. have led nowhem or Parftw nz~~ on nor'
President does need to make fives have VVUAII D " To MA= UMM" WMU "M clew sssoans
clear that we will accept no Soviet D. ws nn.asa weans DAOes IT sun Nor woaam AM p$'i? leo-UL-ArraoAcK swim= It K" xM. bases, and no weapons to Intimidate zz is
o recent D
the United Staten. woa~ f the
the region. The United States will not
tin Amer. ?l he lesson more
permit the establishment in Nicaragua 112 IA vre have unilaterally
democratic It government
of Soviet or other hostile military is the world tried ? a Pressure the Sandinistas-im and no democracy weapons that directly introduction
hreaten other auDPor~ IIB? United policy on a whether from aid to the Contras. IIS.
The States Ia'embs ed military' mm or an nthey
countries is Latin America or the crusade of support for the Con- ' m more boYcott-the
United State. The Soviets w regressive
must have lonely , p olicy. bye. have become and the more remote na-
no doubt that that kind of conduct
iced what its aLemporary gains s have grown-and such will not not be tolerated. by the United cannot be sustained over time and United States military pressure has
t In, the end wee relaxation and reform to
States. w leas s bate. anOO Governments repreenttng not ca but rePr Oa? The admin-
a ss SWAUM IT aM, leaf wont Thirteen 85 percent of the popu~on of Nicaragua support for a 5-year war
n's also driven the
MATIc The President has a diplomatic over Latin America support COntad?!f and 1xt1aLio h
of seeking to pressure the negotiated settlement of conflict in against Nices into the Soviet
strategy into a dialog wit h the Con- a Sandinillt" Sandinlstas
America No Latin GOVert? the have
??ht United States has said it will Central publicly supports United States embrace. at only nationa ndl that would
tras.
to the resume discussions with the Sandinis- funding of the Contra war effort and turned
e not. sim not
tax when these talks begin. the Contadora governments have help the
ork b d strategy has not and will asked the United States to resume bi? cam lde. . the row fund _ and 9"
Thy not work because it requires the San- with Nlcasagus~: to policies and ort-
not share as to relinquish power- They oU will lateral European Community and or altering Sundials
Japan are on record firmly in support entatloa: Vogul" discontent
not sDower. They will not negoti- The
ate their own xurvivaL They will not of Contadora. Neither the Europe There Is wing the Sandinist" but with do so with a gun Pointed at heir Community nor Japan support United in Nicaragua been Incapable of
of the Contras. the Contras that discontent. The
g
heaft
Leadee~the region are becoming capitalizin on
The president says his utoward States
on the U.S. role in the Contras have no credible Political pro-
peace is ..directed on more outspoken gram and no Muss them following is Nica-ra-
achi million
achieving Dent based ec the Conta? Contra war: pica enable to challenge the
dora document of ati ves and a president-elect Arias of Coats gun
to- reconciliation in Nicar"If I were Mr. Banana. I gua.? Yet the President's diplomatic c wo uld ag that money to us '. eetheyb
democratic the oammunition lack efforts emphasize-not the Contadora IM Salvador. Honduras. and Costa ? Rim Lh significant sup-
APPrOeCh-but a flawed bilateral sD' for economic aid and not military aid but that
they have no preach to negotiations: You won't get a port among the people of Nlcaragus?
tration wants to the Contras.... mores MM rass:a WS Policy
~? r. ws mAam TM bsaaces or yam U.
Every time the sdrnitils negotiation with the anti-SandinistAS
Congress to provide more aid to the giving more money ton the Contras"'. ewers If asst, cowrs"
Contras. It Proclaims its commitment ~In his inaugural WAflOSAt nrsIL eLk l ~reeedd u hick to
They are 1P
to negotiations-but that commitment Cerezo of GuatemaL stated his prOPPO- esident
disappears niter the aid is granted. sition ito "the conflicts of the super- states
The President has had 5 years to nego- powers which have chosen to Play Out 1 The president accurately
bate-but no Progress has been es Vie' the Proxy war-in our region-that much of his criticism of the Sandinista
In 1983. the administration is their own.: But he is absolutely blind
chudi- they do not dare play government-,
that it would encourage president getancur of Columbia: "I to the faultof the Contras:
and negotiations between the e Contras think that an Initiative such as the re- We have provided to date some $100
not
and the Sandinistas. if Congress go' for $100 million take i by Pr we million ioa control a to the single town Contras. or They village. They
proved more Contra aid: quest a tiation,??: ever before.
In January 19~? the Reagan, attain- dent - can get R yore is through wrong.... egocontrol less territory than
wt broke off its bilateral talks Foreign Minister Caputo of Argent- They stay primarily in safe haven in
with the he Sandinistas: of the $3'1 m8' na spoke on behalf of all the Conta- Honduras:
In June 1985. as part at their recent meeting Some of their leaders have demo-
'llon Contra aid package. the President dots ministers think the- but they are com-
ant reflects cmtic d dprimarily by former Somoza
again agreed to encourage s church- with Secretary Shultz: "we
dialog and a region- the on pr do draft
mediated internal the predominant thinking throughout en: national, al Contadora settlement: and m, attacking civilian i
This time, the President new ape- That dAdoocument. it should be remem- d They have waged war lar bevy against
pointed Philip Habib 'as his for the cessation of suD?
ciai emissary to Central. America. and bared. calls forces which operate c It ny owor ffi er cial& v but not Sandinsta
claims that a .,new., diplomatic effort In port the oregiion. That Includes the Con- military units:
will be made-to force the SandinistaTheir tactics of terror and human
to negotiate with the Contras. Our friends in Central America rights abuses have been repeatedly
The administration is simply using U.S. military intervention as a rights documented abuses independent grouts:
a negotiator is more threat than the ez-
policy. wsupport for more destabilizing Ls government The record of both sides in Nicara-of the gua leaves much to be desired. Surely
order to win congressional standing
no business sup-
its latlOn Its commitment t, h wever in Ni ecsrssus: ~
otiatioaa remains suspect. The Contra war frustrates efforts the United States has There are simply
no aPrCeciable is ell- porting the Contras.
so long as it can make ?~g too many questions about the Contras
progress toward even the start of ne- sential regional
Preserving and settlement ~ promo es relating herence to to their democracy. Political military viability. ad Pe!-
ions and so long as it favors an democracies in the area. EuropeLt respect for human rights.
approach to negotiations which has well as Latin American allies see the -
approbeenandmrem;ains ini t flawed.
The administration has stated re- necessity of a negotiated settlement as formance.
peatedly, that it will settle for nothing the to a only lengthy and possible u practical isle war. Uni- in them.
less than a wholesale "restructuring"
Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950008-8