TALKING POINTS FOR DCI ON REYKJAVIK GOALS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88B00443R000401920001-8
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 7, 2011
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 6, 1986
Content Type: 
MISC
File: 
Body: 
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401920001-8 -)t. T NIO/USSR 6 Oct 86 Talking Points for DCI on Reykjavik Goals Beyond INF and setting a summit date, the big issues at Reykjavik are: * On arms control: Space arms and their connection to START deductions * On regional issues: Afghanistan The minimum goal of the President should be to assert and defend his positions on these key issues. * His framework on space as presented in his 25 July letter, (superseding or "novating" the ABM Treaty) versus Gorbachev's framework ("strengthening" .the ABM Treaty). * On Afghanistan, the need for the USSR to withdraw and give upon imposing a Communist regime there (and elsewhere). The maximum reasonable goal the President could strive for is to get Gorbachev to agree to talk seriously and negotiate about: * The President's space framework * The possibility of a non-Communist regime in Afghanistan. Even if Gorbachev gave no more than a promise to talk seriously about these points--which he has studiously avoided--the President would get a big boost of SDI and the Soviet position in Afghanistan would be weakened. Yet both things are reasonable to ask for and,-if refusal caused the meeting to fail, ,the President would have the hig I h ground, not Gorbachev. SE6RET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/24: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401920001-8