CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITIES IN THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000100650005-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Continuing Development of
Chemical Weapons Capabilities
in the USSR
October 1983
NOT REFERRED. ON-FILE RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
c
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PREFACE
The U.S. has intensified its efforts to achieve a complete and
verifiable ban on chemical weapons and thus end the threat of
chemical warfare. However, our goal is not yet attained; the
threat remains.
This document was prepared in response to requests from members
of Congress, the press, and the Armed Forces for unclassified
information on the Soviet Union's chemical warfare
capabilities. This report does not address the use of such
weapons; evidence of Soviet involvement in the use of chemical
and toxin weapons is provided in two State Department Special
Reports, No. 98, "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan," March 22, 1982; and No. 104, "Chemical Warfare in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update," November 1982 and
in U.S. reports to the United Nations.
This report presents conclusions based on analyses of
information collected over many years. The illustrations in
this document are derived from various U.S. sources; while not
revealing of every detail, they are authentic.
The USSR's armed forces have undergone extensive modernization
and growth. Soviet chemical warfare capabilities have expanded
significantly as part of that effort. This report focuses on
the chemical weapons capabilities of the USSR and the
continuing and expanding chemical weapons activities we have
observed within the USSR from the late 1960s.
The Soviet Union continues to test, produce and stockpile
chemical weapons. Moreover, the Soviets have put in place the
doctrine, plans, personnel and equipment to support their use
of chemical weapons. Many analysts believe that this expansion
of chemical warfare capability could give the Soviets a
significant military advantage if used in a conventional
conflict. The continued testing of chemical weapons at
expanding test facilities, enlarged storage capacity for
chemical agents and weapons, and the existence of active
production facilities are among the indicators of unabated
Soviet chemical weapons activities. These factors, along with
the evidence of the use of chemical and toxin weapons by the
Soviet Union and its client forces in Afghanistan, Laos, and
Kampuchea (Cambodia), reflect the Soviet drive to strengthen
and improve their ability to wage chemical warfare.
The military value of chemical weapons includes the ability to
contaminate areas, and thus restrict or deny the use of these
areas to opposing forces. Chemical weapons can also be used to
inflict casualties or force the defender to operate in
protective gear and posture. Working or fighting in protective
gear--the mask, hood, and special suit, gloves and boots--can
be so debilitating that the protective posture can be as
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damaging to military operations as direct casualties. The
problems faced by an individual--heat stress and restriction of
movement, dexterity, vision, and communication--are compounded
when people must work or fight as a unit. Tasks which are
tough under "normal" battlefield circumstances, such as
repairing runways and other facilities, rescuing and treating
casualties, flying aircraft and defending against armored
attacks, become much more difficult in a chemically
contaminated environment. Chemical weapon use against rear
areas can seriously impair the defenders ability to support and
resupply combat operations.
Because of these effects, one-sided use of chemical weapons
could be decisive even if the defenders have extensive
protective equipment. On the other hand, when used by both
sides they probably would not be decisive and thus there should
be little incentive to use these weapons if faced with the
threat of retaliation.
Recognizing the effect that chemical weapons can have on
military operations, it has been U.S. policy since World War I
to maintain as a deterrent both protective capabilities and a
stockpile of chemical weapons. The current stockpile was
produced in the 1950s and 1960s. Further, it has long been
U.S. policy never to initiate chemical warfare. Also, the U.S.
does not and will not possess biological or toxin weapons.
RICHARD L. WAGNE
Assistant to the ' cretary
of Defense (Atomic Energy)
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I History ............................................1
II Chemical Warfare Agents ............................ 2
III Delivery and Dissemination Systems ................. 3
IV Targets ............................................ 7
V Chemical Weapons Testing, Production and
Storage Activities .................................. 8
Chemical Weapons Testing ...................... 8
Chemical Warfare Agent Production .............12
Chemical Weapons Depots .......................12
VI The Soviet Chemical Warfare Organization ........... 17
VII Conclusions ......................................... 20
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The Soviet Union's chemical weapons activities can be traced to
World War I. Of all the belligerents fighting in that war, the
Russians probably were the least prepared to conduct chemical
warfare. Russian industry lacked the capability to produce
significant quantities of chemical agent, their delivery means
were primitive, and the chemical protection training of the
individual Russian soldier was poor. As a consequence, the
Russians incurred more chemical warfare casualties and deaths
than any other nation. Of the approximately one half million
Russian casualties noted in Figure 1, more than 50,000 were
deaths.
Because of the high losses suffered during World War I, the
Soviet leadership began to stress the importance of chemical
warfare. During the 1920's and 1930's, their industry was
modernized, chemical agent plants were constructed, and
research and development was undertaken on chemical weapons. A
chemical warfare organization and military chemical academies
were established, and preparedness for chemical warfare was
stressed throughout their forces.
By World War II, the Soviets had an extensive chemical
organization and a significant stockpile of chemical weapons.
At the end of the war, the Soviets captured and relocated to
the Soviet Union two German nerve agent production plants and
stocks of chemical agent. During the 1950's, Soviet chemical
institutes developed other nerve agents for use in chemical
weapons. Since World War II the Soviets chemical warfare pro-
gram has continued unabated.
HISTORICAL ASPECTS
Russia suffered almost half a million chemical warfare casualties during World War I.
First military chemical academies established in the 1920's.
At the end of World War II the Soviets captured and relocated two nerve agent plants to
the Soviet Union.
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CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
Some of the chemical warfare agents known to be in the Soviet
arsenal are listed in Figure 2.
Their research and development activities, usually headed by
military chemists, continue to explore new chemical agents and
combinations including ways to render the protective masks and
filtration systems of potential enemies ineffective.
A number of chemical agents, toxins, and combinations are being
used by the Soviets in Afghanistan and by their client forces
in Southeast Asia (Laos and Kampuchea). One group of agents
has been positively identified in the laboratory: toxic
substances (known as mycotoxins) produced by molds. Other
agents remain unidentified.
SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS
LETHAL AGENTS
Nerve agents (including sarin, soman, and a V-series agent)
Blister agents (including mustard, lewisite, and a mixture of the two)
Blood agent (hydrogen cyanide)
Choking agent (phosgene)
INCAPACITANTS
Not specifically identified, but an agent which causes unconsciousness for an hour or
more has been widely reported as being used in Afghanistan.
(Production and possession of toxin weapons are banned by the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention of 1972.)
Mycotoxins (Have been identified as being used in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan.)
NOTES
1. Protection from all of the above agents requires protective clothing and/or masks as
well as rapid treatment for any exposed individuals.
2. Both non-persistent and persistent agents are available. Non-persistent agents will
clear the target relatively quickly, while persistent agents will stay on target for hours to
days, depending on weather conditions, unless removed by decontamination.
Figure 2
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DELIVERY AND DISSEMINATION SYSTEMS
Almost all Soviet conventional weapon systems from mortars to
long-range tactical missiles have compatible chemical
ammunition or warheads.
Figure 3 lists the systems they have available for land, air,
and naval forces. The Soviets have developed the firing data
required to use chemical weapons in battle situations. This
includes the types and numbers of weapons required to attack
various targets under a variety of weather and combat
conditions. They continue today to explore and test systems
with improved dissemination, larger payload, increased range,
and better accuracy. This gives them greater target
flexibility' and deeper strike capability.
Photos of three chemical weapons delivery systems are shown in
Figures 4, 5, and 6. They have developed two types of chemical
weapons for their tactical missiles--bulk agent and small bomb-
lets which can be dispersed over the target.
SOVIET DELIVERY/DISSEMINATION SYSTEMS
Missiles
Artillery
Mines
Multiple rail and tube launched rockets
Fighter-bombers and attack helicopters with aerial bombs, rockets, and spray tanks
Figure a
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Figure 4. This surface-to-surface tactical missile (Known as a SCUD B) can deliver a chemical warhead, of about
1,100 lbs, 180 miles.
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Figure 5. M-8/HIP E Attack Helicoptor - Can carry up to 1,650 ibs of chemical munitions on each wing.
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Figure 6. Multiround rocket launcher, (BM-21),122-mm.
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THE TARGETS FOR SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS
The Soviets have developed the doctrine and plans for the use
of chemical weapons including the targets to be attacked
(Figure 7), and Soviet tacticians have standardized the
procedures required. If a Soviet Commander determines that a
particular battle situation is suited to the employment of
chemical weapons, he can conduct strikes against any or all of
the targets shown (once the approval to use chemical weapons
has been given by the highest Soviet authority). He can select
persistent agents or non-persistent agents as well as a variety
of delivery systems. He will know the level of contamination
he can place on the target. Should his own forces have to
cross the contaminated areas, he will have specially trained
troop support available for advice, reconnaissance, and
decontamination. The scope and versatility of the Soviet
chemical weapons arsenal provide the Commander the means to
attack and contaminate a full range of targets.
TARGETS FOR SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Nuclear delivery means
Airfields
Naval bases and seaports
Command and control facilities
Storage depots
Supply routes
Troop concentrations
Artillery and armor
Amphibious/heliborne landing forces
Ships at sea
We have no evidence to suggest that the Soviets are concerned about civilian casualties
resulting from their use of chemical weapons. Evidence from Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan shows that civilians have been specific targets of chemical weapons.
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SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS
TESTING, PRODUCTION, AND
STORAGE ACTIVITIES
Since the late 1960's{the Soviets have continued to test,
produce and stockpile chemical weapons. What we have observed
over the past 15 years is not what we would expect of a nation
that was maintaining a status quo. Although the Soviets have
claimed they are pursuing only a defense against chemical
weapons, the size and scope of their activities demonstrate a
formidable, capability to carry out offensive chemical
operations.
SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS TESTING
The Shikhany Chemical Warfare Proving Ground is one of the
Soviets' primary chemical weapons test areas. It was
established in the mid-1920's, and a number of chemical weapons
tests were conducted in the late 1920's and 1930's. World War
II reconnaissance photography confirmed that Shikhany was an
active chemical weapons test facility. Since that time it has
grown in size and sophistication and today continues to be a
highly active chemical weapons testing facility. Figure 8
indicates 1.ts location in the Soviet Union.
Since the late 1970's, the Soviets have constructed several new
chemical agent/weapon test facilities at Shikhany and
construction is continuing. The sampling devices used to
determine he efficiency of chemical weapons are arranged in
grids which have a circular or rectangular pattern. These
distinctive grids measure the agent concentration and how well
it was dispersed. The shape of the grid and complexity of its
pattern depend on the kind of weapon (bomb, artillery, rocket,
etc.) and the type of agent being tested.
One of the
Figure 9.
dispersing
new grids is of a circular design and is shown in
It is used to test the efficiency of a munition in
effective concentrations of chemical agent.
Figure 10 shows an example of a chemical weapons test at
Shikhany. iThe impact craters were caused by an exploding
chemical munition. The sampling devices are positioned
downwind to measure concentration of the agent released. All
testing ofithis kind is done under predetermined wind and
temperature conditions. A test similar to the one shown in
Figure 10 was conducted at Shikhany in early 1980 shortly after
the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and such tests are continuing.
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SHIKHANY CHEMICAL PROVING GROUND USSR
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AGENT RELEASE
TOWER
Figure 9. Chemical agent weapon test grid.
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RECTANGULAR GRID
Figure 10. Chemical agent weapon test grid.
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CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT PRODUCTION
At the end of World War II, the Soviets captured from the
Germans large stockpiles of chemical agents, as well as the
technology` and equipment to make the nerve agents tabun and
sarin. Two German nerve agent production plants were
dismantled and removed to the Soviet Union where they were
reassembled. The captured CW agent plant at Volgograd is
depicted in Figure 11. The Soviets have continued to develop
production capabilities based on this early design and have
built agent manufacturing facilities in various locations
around the', Soviet Union.
Giving chemical warfare capabilities a high priority, the large
modern Soviet chemical industry has the capability to produce
toxic chemical warfare agents at manufacturing rates sufficient
to meet military needs. The industry has had an agent
production;,, program since the late 1920's and today can supply a
variety of, chemical agents such as blister, choking, blood and
nerve gases.
i
Today there are research institutes in the Soviet Union that
are actively engaged in developing the theoretical foundations
for producing chemical warfare agents of even greater lethality
and designing the equipment necessary to make them.
SOVIET CH
ICAL WEAPONS DEPOTS
I
Chemical agents produced over the past five decades are stored
in a network of military depots located across the Soviet Union
(Figure 12). These depots contain agents in bulk containers
and agent-filled munitions, as well as gas masks, protective
suits, decontamination solutions, and decontamination vehicles.
These depots support operational forces and report to the
Headquarters of the Soviet Chemical Troops, in the Ministry of
Defense.
Figure 13 shows the typical configuration of a major Soviet
chemical warfare storage depot. These depots are highly secure
military installations. Many depots have rail lines allowing
for the rapid mobilization of chemical warfare materials.
Since the ate 1960's, the amount of agents, weapons, and
material in' storage at these depots has increased
significantly, and this build up continues. A graphic
representation of the increase characteristic of most of these
areas is shown in Figure 14.
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MOM
aK NO 75K
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Figure 13. Representative of Soviet chemical depots.
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INCREASE OF MATERIAL IN STORAGE SINCE 1968
Figure 14. Typical expansion and increased storage capacity for chemical weapons since the late 1960s.
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THE SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION
The continuing chemical weapons activities include a large
well-trained chemical warfare organization directed by the
Headquarters Chemical Troops in the Ministry of Defense. This
chemical warfare organization is headed by a three-star General
and numbers more than 80,000 officers and enlisted men. When
staffed during a war, the size will double. Their primary
responsibilities include the following:
- Advisors to the front commanders for chemical weapons and
tactics for their use
- Research and development programs for weapons and
protection
- Production and storage of chemical weapons and protective
materiel testing and evaluation
- Training of all forces for chemical employment and
survival
- Decontamination and reconnaissance
- Operating the chemical academies (college equivalent)
This corps of specialists also has about 30,000 special
vehicles for decontamination and reconnaissance and has
developed more than 200 areas for teaching and training all
forces on how to protect themselves and clean up following
combat where chemical weapons have been used (Figure 15). This
training includes the use of actual chemical agents. Also, the
Soviets installed protective filtration systems in combat and
combat support vehicles and ships. Figure 16 shows a main
battle tank known to have a filtration system.
Continuing activities include the development, testing and
evaluation of new chemical agents and weapon systems,
protective antidotes against chemical agent poisoning, new
suits and gas masks, decontaminating solutions and new vehicles
with filtration systems.
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FigLre 15. T-72 Main Battle Tank - A Soviet decontamination training exercise.
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Figure 16. T-80 Main Battle Tank - Is the most modern Soviet tank - Among It's features is a filtration system
that protects the crew against the effects of chemical weapons.
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CONCLUSIONS
Our conclusions based on reliable information are as follows:
- Chemical weapons-related activities continue unabated in
1983.
- The Soviet Union has a military doctrine that envisages
the use of chemical warfare and acknowledges its value.
- The Soviet Union possesses a considerable variety of
lethal and non-lethal agents, including nerve, blister,
choking, and blood. Toxins are also part of their
inventory.
- The Soviet Union possesses a variety of means to deliver
chemical agents including bombs, spray tanks, tactical
missiles, artillery and mortar projectiles, rockets, and
mines.
- The ',Soviet Union can produce very large quantities of
chemical agent for chemical weapons.
- The Soviet Union has large and well-trained chemical
warfare forces.
- The Soviet Union has an active and still expanding
chemical proving ground.
- The Soviet Union provides extensive chemical protection
for their forces.
- The Soviet Union provides intensive chemical warfare
training for their forces which includes the use of actual
chemical agents.
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