CCPC STUDY ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00365R000200030003-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 21, 1981
• Content Type: MF

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP88B00365R000200030003-1
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7 AUG 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, CRITICAL COLLECTION
PROBLEMS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: CCPC Study on Technology Transfer (
1. (U) Reference is made to your memorandum, 5 August 1981,
DCl/ICS 81-6253, subject as above.
2. (U) The following information responds to the points in paragraph 2
of reference:
a. (S/NOFORN) Extent of analytical and collection effort - Although
time did not permit a canvass of Army's overseas intelligence analytical
efforts, we estimate that our analytical effort is between two and three
man-years. About half of this effort is devoted to technology transfer
considerations in the context of larger studies on foreign technology.
The other half is devoted to COMEX/COCOM opinions. As an example,
so far in 1981, the Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) has
processed 214 CO/v1EX opinion requests and rendered 190 gain/loss
assessments. Beginning about two years ago, we have been including the
following questions in relevant collection requirements:
(1) (U) What are the technological deficiencies of the communist
countries being reported on?
(2) (U) What technology, equipment or information are they
likely to try to obtain2
(3) (U) What technology, equipment or information have he
obtained in the past? From whom or via whom? When?
(4) (U) How well will the communist country be able to assimilate
and use the technology, equipment or information?
(5) (U) What impact will (or has) this technology, equipment or
information have (or had) on their military capabilities?
We note that only recently have solid results begun to be seen from the
resulting collection efforts; probably a reasonable lag time for new collection
CLASSIFIED BY:s
ETT
REVIEW ON:
WARNING NOTICE, SENSITIVE
ROT WARNING To FOREIGN NATTrimare INTELLIGENCE SOURcEs Imp-n-1(111Q
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SECRET
Nero
27 AUG 1981
SUBSECT: CCPC Study on Technology Transfer (II)
initiatives. We cannot estimate the amount of collection effort expended,
since it is largely integrated into the overall Defense technical intelligence
collection program.
b. (U) Types of information being used - In addition to the results of
the collection requirements noted above, there is an increased effort to
review all intelligence reporting to include open source literature for
technology transfer implications.
c. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Collection elements involved - The emphasis
is on HUMLNT collection resources under Army control from both the positive
and counterintelligence aspects. Counterintelligence is particularly good
means to determine the efforts of hostile intelligence services directed
against US research, development1 test and evaluation activities. Others
would include those collection activities selected by DIA to respond to Army's
requirements. e.g. # the Defense Attache System.
d. (C) Analysts opinion concerning adequacy of information - Generally,
our analysts see an improvement in the quality of technology transfer data
being reported. This largely results from their own initiatives in directing
the collection systems. As the process of reporting and analyst feedback
continues, there should be further gains although this is a slow process
dependent in someways on the priorities of the analytical/collection activities
involved.
e. (S/NOFORN) Key information gaps - Two information gaps are
**toned for which there may be reasonable solutions. First, with regard
to Warsaw Pact visitors, students and commercial, there is no effective
feedback from their hosts regarding their areas of interests and emphasis.
Feedback of this sort could be very helpful in satisfying the requirements
previously stated. In the same vein, our analysts are not receiving informa-
tion on all COCOM cases, both by the US and by other COCOM members.
License disposition and details would be very helpful in keeping track of
transfers made and those planned. Since dual use technologies represent a
particularly significant impact from a Defense point of view, concentration
on this point could yield extremely important insights.
f. (S) Options for improvement and recornmendatIons First, there
should be a statement of goals that the US Government wishes to achieve
with re said to techtu)logp transfer. These goals should then be considered
In light of the operating mechanisms that control the legal export of techno-
logy both by law, e.g.. Army Export Control Act, and by functional responsi
Witty, e.g.. State Department Office of Munitions Control. We should also
consider the adequacy of counterintelligence resources to protect illegal
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CEPDr7
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP88B00365R000200030003-1
DAMI-CIS
SUBJECT: CCPC Study on Technology Transfer (U)
transfers. The intelligence analytical, collection and counterintelligence
resources can be given priority tasking to determine our current state of
technology loss, that is, a damage assessment and to determine where
future foreign collection efforts are likely to concentrate by type technology,
by collection method and by most probable target. It is then necessary to
orient our law, our controlling agencies and our limited protective resources
toward keeping our technologies of national significance within confines of
sharing that are acceptable to the US and our interests in strong allies.
27 AUG 1991
MERRILL T. KELLY
Special Assistant to the ACSI
(Human Systems)
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