C/BANGKOK MEMO DATED 5 JUNE 1986 PLUS ATTACHMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief, Monitoring Operations Division
Chief, Field Engineering Division
THROUGH: Chief, Engineering Support Group
Chief, Operations Group
FROM: Chief, Field Support Branch, Field Engineering Division
SUBJECT: C/Bangkok Memo Dated 5 June 1986 plus Attachments
1. It is important to recognize that the conclusion Chief, Bangkok
Bureau refers to in the first paragraph of the referenced memo may be
accurate but is definitely not complete. The choice of sites three and four
was elected so that the major ROSETS would not have blind spots in their
coverage. Any decision to build additional antennas is subject to the same
restrictions e.g., soil conditions, the need for retaining walls, and the .
coverage required, taking into account viewing angle blockage.
2. In the last paragraph of the attachment to this memo entitled
"Satellite Recordings", reference is made to MOD pressing ESG for equipment
to breakout time division multiplex signals. To the best of my knowledge,
no one in your organization is "pressing" for this capability nor have they
identified any signal in this format that is of operational interest. FYI,
on our own initiative, we have begun an investigation of various demodu-
lators to deal with infrequently employed modulation formats. We have
elected to focus on those signals, in this category, which appear most
frequently but can divert this effort to focus on signals that have been
identified as important to FBIS, as in the case of the Soviet Pressfax.
Distribution:
1 - AC/MOD
t-r- C/FED
1 - C/ESG
1 - C/OPS
1 - Chrono
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Chief/MOD
FROM: C/Bangkok Bureau STAT
SUBJECT:
Additional ROSETs for Bangkbk or Okinawa Bureau
REF: Minutes of MOD Meeting with
22 April 1986
C/Okinawa Bureau,
1. I would like to correct a few misconceptions concerning the placement
of additional ROSETs for Bangkok Bureau. Four possible sites were considered
at Bang Ping for the two 13-meter dishes which were recently completed. Sites
1 and 2 were rejected because building and tower interferred with the primary
look-angle of the dishes and because the lead-in cables would have to be longer
than from sites 3 and 4, not because of soil conditions. Soil testing was done
only at sites 3 and 4. The conclusion was that with the proper foundation the
ROSETs could be built at these locations. The firm did not make any soil tests
at other locations near the building since they concluded that the soil conditiions
were the same. In other words, with the proper foundation a ROSET could have been
built anywhere near the building.
2. The total cost for the foundation and breakwall of each 13-meter ROSET
amounted to approximately $40,000, a mere fraction of the total ROSET cost.
3. We believe that ample space exists just to the south of the Bang Ping
building for the construction of additional satellite dishes. If these dishes
were in the 8 to 9 meter range the foundation costs would also be-proportionally
less. In addition, we believe that these dishes can be built under the existing
agreement with the Thai Government and additional authorizations are unnecessary.
4. In my view the construction of additional ROSETs should be based on
operational requirements not on the relative conditions of the soil. If we
are to use such comparative measures I would only need to mention the current
cost of Thai labor versus Japanese labor. If it is determined by all. concerned
that Bangkok needs additional ROSETs to handle its assigned coverage, I can
assure you that we will find room for them at Bang Ping.
cc: C/Ops
C/ESG
C/Okinawa Bureau
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
CONFIDENTIAL
STAT
OKINAWA BURE..U, 22 April (Kline)
Staff Cruisers -- Kline noted that Deputy Chief Gilbertson has
prepared an Advance Work Plan for staff cruiser He noted
Dan is doing very well, and just needs more experience and training.
MOD noted it would like to keep a cruiser in Bangkok. Kline inquired
about the designation of a "regional cruiser" and his location. MOD
noted that this should be the most competent and experienced cruiser
in the region, and Okinawa would be the best place for him. At the
end of cruiser tour his replacement will be determined
on the basis of experience and he compares with Shirey. MOD noted
that Bangkok Bureau wanted to send Stiglitz on TDY's, and Kline
concurred. MOD pointed out that Dan should continue to work shifts
and do HF cruising and supervise, so that he can continue to learn
from his 2-year PCS assignment. Kline noted he is progressing and the
bureau has had no problems with his performance. MOD noted that
cruising messages from Okinawa seem to have "dried up" recently, and
urged that more messages be filed on cruising observations. MOD also
inquired why an associate editor always signs off on Dan's messages.
Kline noted that the desk editor is supposed to review all outgoing
messages, but he said on his return he would point out that it is not
necessary for the editor to sign off on cruising messages. MOD
stressed that Dan should have a good background in cruising on the
10-meter dish at Okinawa before he attempts a TDY to Bangkok and works
with the bigger 13-meter dishes there.
ROSET -- MOD confirmed Okinawa's plans for use of the new ROSET dish,
which is the former PESOS dish used by MOD.- The smaller dish will be
used primarily for Soviet TV coverage, which will free the existing
larger dish for cruising tasks and possible PRC pressfax coverage.
MOD noted the bureau should check reception of known transmissions
with the smaller dish to determine its limits. Kline noted that the
smaller dish would be used as a backstop for the.- larger dish when it
is down for repairs 2-19 May 1986. He. noted that the addition of the
smaller dish does not represent a major expansion of ROSET
capabilities. He suggested that additional Far East ROSETs be placed
in Okinawa instead of. Bangkok, as there is room in the bureau compound
and the foundation work would-be much simpler than in the loose soil
of the Bangkok remote site at. Bang Ping. He noted that ESG is
-considering this option.
Satellite Cruising -- MOD requested that Shirey backstop Bangkok's
cruising observations, which would give MOD a -better understanding of
the satellite footprints and coverage possibilities. MOD sent a
message to Okinawa requesting this.--.- MOD noted that more data is
needed to make plans for satellite coverage sharing. MOD pointed out
that Bangkok is conducting a comprehensive cruising survey before any
coverage decisions are made. Okinawa Bureau should take advantage of
its 24-hour operations to cruise satellite transmissions when Bangkok
Bureau is closed. At present MOD does not believe much is available
on ' Ku band in the Far East.
STAT
STAT
STAT
' nMR1r1nri,-r, t t
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
CONFIDENTIAL
Philippines -- Kline summarized the results of the December cruising
survey from Cebu. He was accompanied on the survey by staff cruiser
Shirey and Hong Kong monitor Escota. He noted that at Cebu they were
able to hear government regional and southern opposition stations very
well, but reception of Radio Veritas was poor. However he noted that
during the survey they were not sure if they had the correct
frequencies for Radio Veritas. He believes that with a better antenna
at Cebu reception of the Mindanao and Negros stations might be
better. Kline noted that he had made calls from Cebu and Clark AFB to
both Okinawa and Hong Kong and they were, good quality international
connections. He said that while Clark AFB is a good operating site,
the reception of the southern regional stations is not as good as it
was at Cebu. The USIS office at Cebu was very enthusiastic about the
remote operation, and Cebu base also expressed its willingness to help
operate the site. MOD summarized the current status of the remote
operation. State has sent a Roger channel message about the plans for
the remote site, and FBIS is waiting for a response. USIS in
Washington was somewhat reticent about the operation, and said it did
not want FBIS' ent in their Cebu operation. A message was also
sent to the MOD said that when it received official STAT
authorization e operation it would inform the bureau. Kline
commented that he was in favor of a USIS operation, but operating out
of the consulate would also be fine. The local USIS representative,
Van Svengsouk, is a radio buff and was very helpful and interested in
the remote operation. was also very
supportive. The bureau pans to use p 2001 receivers
and a phone patch for the remote operation. Kline pointed out that
FBIS has to be very careful and cautious with any operation, as our
presence is a touchy issue for the Philippine Government.
Cities Tapes -- MOD noted that the Japanese Cities tapes were very
well received by consumers. Kline mentioned that some TV programs are
broadcast in both English and Japanese. MOD- asked him to look into
recording the English audio to the news, if it was broadcast, and send
it back with the Cities tapes. 'Kline said he would pursue.the matter.
Emergency Coverage -- MOD noted that the emergency coverage plans
present a worst-case scenario which the bureau should use as a
starting point for any emergency coverage, depending on the
circumstances of the emergency.
Cruiser Trainees -- MOD noted that cruiser trainees would be sent to
Panama Bureau until a senior cruiser was back in Okinawa.
Satellite recordings -- MOD noted it is pressing ESG for equipment
capable of breaking out time division multiplexed signals, and
suggested the local technicians at Okinawa might be able to check into
these signals received by ROSET.t MOD will send a message to.Okinawa
asking the bureau to check into these signals. Kline was also urged
to drop MOD copies of messages on data recordings being sent to ESG
for analysis. MOD also pointed out the importance of checking for
programming changes on Soviet satellites. This would give FBIS an
indication of transmissions which have been shifted to Raduga
satellites, which we are currently unable to monitor.
cc: C/Ops, C/OW, C/BK, C/HK
STAT
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/12 : CIA-RDP88-01418R000200110025-3