YEARS OF CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01365R000100120004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 29, 1957
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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YEAR OF CRISIS
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A3i07i:CEEk$ CBS. News Invites! you to spend the next hour
with Edward R. 21iurrow and eight members of broadcastingts most distinguished
staff of news correspondents. This. is the ninth edition of YEARS OF CRISIS`
for which CBS News has once again called in its correspondents from, the
Important news centers of the world,. Here now is Edward R.Nurrow.
M UUROWs Each year for nine years, CBS correspondents
have come home at about this t to try to cast up a sort of national
balance sheet. Not even we - have always been right.. We sat. around here .
a couple of years ago discussing whether the title of this program, Years
of Crisis, was really appropriate. 'well, this year. it may be inadequatej
because we certainly have no shortage of crises. However, we will now
attempt to unleash a not too agonized reappraisal of where we stand as
the Raw Year is about.to begin. welcome home, gentlemen. I suggest-
that first of a119 You answer for me a very simple question briefly as
possible t and that is$; wbat in your area happened that was basic: that
was ,pivotal, in the course of the last year. Letts. start with Howard H.
Smite who was for ten: years our chief European correspondent!, and is
now stationed in i ashcan. Howard
MUM Well.: I Europe. in 1957 9 I'm afraid that
neutralism became a doctrin with a future.,
B iROW David S.choenbrun,,. based on Paris s. spends a lot
of time in north Africa,
SCHOENI iBTIt I think the initiative in NATO passed out of
Americats hands into the hands of our allies
POWs Alex &endrick, from London.
RICS3 in Britain,, Ed* we look like the second-class
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power that we have been saying the British look like.
1 U RO{, $ Winston Burdett, based on Rome, spends a' lot
Of. time in the tiddler East.
B' c 1 T: In the I ddle stp the Eisenhower Doctrine.
collided with Mu%shchev Doctrine.
MURROW: Ernie Leiser, from Vest Germany.
LEZSER: in mid-Europe, 1., this was the year that the
Soviets put a couple of satellites up into orbit a patio the rest of
their satellites back Into orbit.
MOW: Pete Kalischer, based on Tokyojust back frog
a trip through Southeast Asia.
IMISCn a1 is 1957, Ed, was the year that Asian astrologers`
cast their horoscopes by the light of two. Russian moons.
O s Dan Schorr, from 14oscow.
SCRORRI In Russia, . T. think this was the year when
a dangerous inferiority complex was replaced by a possibly more dangerous
superiority complex,
?M O Ja Eric Sevareid, chief of our Washington Bureau.
SEVAtt EID: , I thank this year Americans lost considerabl4
faith both in their fighting apparatus and in their high command..
ZRO is Well, gentlemen, this Is not a very optimistic
opening, I. would says but let to examine nova little how did it happen,
how did we get ourselves in this fix? Schoenbrun.
SCHOENBRtJNs The worldts balance of power changed very
drastically this year,. Russia. outflanked. us in the Middle East,. out-
produced us militariy,, and our country,, unfortunately, became vulnerable
to atomic. attack,
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Row,. as all of you gentlemen knows this situation
is -very different from that which existed when NATO was first created
beck in 19+9 and it -might -be worthwhile looking backwards a little
briefly to find out how we got here. Bade: then, tie bad an atomic
monopoly. and America etas the invulnerable fortress of democrady$ living
pretty :safely behind our wide ocean :moats. Then everything-began to
.change at about that, time Ve hay. a highly successful foreign, policy,
the. Truman Doctrine and the ,I arshal .plan,,, the Russians couldntt attack
they die t dare attack our allies because. of fear of Instant atomic ,
taliatio .and I tbink we probably Just fell asleep. awoke up pretty
rapidly howover9 Ed 3A the F-1111 .of .191f9., the Soviets exploded ,an atom
homt9 in 153 . ,hyd og bomb, and then this year for.the first. time
our one sake moats icau now 'be spanned by missiles and our skies
Sputniks. That whole s
that Amer .can leader
return. orIour protect
Cw~dwe, lose:t'
'e .l, ; probahl7 we ,
Vas tore mportant
tuatiot ' was -so Very ui-1:1wrwr&L ~~~- a... ,,.,....,~._-,.,: ,
of ATL ,hiCb wad grace w tingly . iv`en' to, us
one has ,now been challenged.
of t e Most,a
one
a .direct rest of that was :1 tom'
-f this. post-ca era. 'r?s de t : ise o er went
American statesman seeking secur ty, for our, count
3. too .fur .g es. a ent Wires; 2dy? a';wc re< wit
Vitt. CI (3 to parley with
A he Russians, owe..' gst=Test tale were not on the ages a of the T O
conference;, not at least lift theh :Amaric . p .an.. t was (arced : upo t ua.
we did not leadl V0. were led. ' d this happen tali I `think +
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chained or failed. to change with a. changing world. And l think the -man
who told us why it happened was president Eisenhower himself at that same
conference. He said we too been guilty of false habits of thought. We
thought that the free system was inherently stronger at all tunes, and
in all fields, to the Communist system. We thought we didn't have to
work or pay for freedom. Gentlemen, I would suggest that this 2s what
It Os brought us too the brink of the gravest throat to our freedom in
our history.
Ik~t3t~7s -Winston Burdett s how do you think we got Into
this fix?
DMIDMT, s.
Wells, Ed, I think that It, the past year has
proven anything in my area, the Middle East, "it is that something was
fundamentally wrong somewhere in our and-East policy. The Eisenhower
Doctrine has not worked ou . we want ahead on the premise that we could
sot up some kind of teric ; protectorate over the Piddle East by mili-
tary means t that we could ere anti-Communist allies. of the Arab States
and in this wa?y exclude the Russians from. the area.. We proposed to
extend the cold war to the Arab world and we Ignored both the inherent
weakness of the Arab States and the emotional backfire of Arab nationalis-o
'd asked the Arabs to .ins up on our s .des against the Russians, aid
effects tae told them that they could got economic aid from us if they
did. And this ants ont d them. And In practice, we conked them that
our only desire was 'to dominate the. instead Hof lotting the Russians
dominate them. In practice, I U we made one fa l mistake Or
oft- 3 regime took
failed to keep calm ak crisis. won die Syrian
over our 6th Fleet sailed out on ostentation maneuvers. A special,
envoy from Washington flew out an emergency mission. And this proved
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to the Arabs that we were more alarmed*'iy what happenod in Syria than
they were and they took this as a sign of fear and weakness. 'They took
it also as attempted interference in their affairs and eve& friendly
Arab governments had to come out and disavow us publicly on. the ground
that what happened in Syria was Siriats business*- Itts `true of course
that we face many psychological handicaps in the Arab world that the
Russians'dontt have to face. Israel is the overriding issue of Arab
nationalism and the Arabs look on us as Israel's champion. The worl...
word timporialist t which. both the Arabs and the Russians pin on us, still
has a high emotional content in that part of the world. 'But for this
reason, I think. we, Gantt go on under-estimating the Arab capacity for
violent emotional reactionso our b n of the Syrian crisis, certain-
lye convinced the Syrians that their deal with Russia was a great victory
-for Arab nationalism and independence and a' ,great defeat for noisy Western .
diplomacy.
the
Par eat
S~~QI7s Prom Pete .isoher9 as vie red from
how doe look?
ALISs Wells- whon we lost our military pre-eminences, 'FA#
our bases there became more of a liability than, an asset...' We're. not a
member of the faitfly in Asia,: we Ire an alien Occidental. nation., and our
leadership there has always been based primarily on power. W a beat the
3apacrese,.. scats' firrst team, during World Liar III; is kept a ?..~ an edge,
a military edge,; thereafter, and then we lost c ur atomic' nconopoly. And
the first big crack came, in our m'ilitary reputation, vfien we didn't -wain
the 'Korea war decisively.- This enormously etth nced Red China's reputa
tioxi and it put 'us in the position of not 'knowing exactly what to dos
We d .ft . ft lick .'em, we dldnrt join terns and we certainly pretended more
or less that they weren't there. Now, this was supposed to isolate our
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... isolate died China. from the. rest of the non-Communist. vor1d, but ac-
tnally,. all. it' did was isolate us. It made the., merican eagle look like
an
an ostrich.. Now, Asians.. .perf t .y wtUing to o along. ,.with
ae,long as It Wit' en. eagle. and it can 116k any" ng .ice`
eccentric eagle
the - Spnt t ,, the Ash.: decided that our
the side fut. mban
nL litary .ea ere p va lsbed..:
t :.. amt id it- 091 - Me vorkIng '. - the Par East
when you were not permitted to.. go to. Communist China?
s t much like ao1, mean IM
..
.
aat there. and watch, rur. colleagues from Australia ' and . .t and Canada
. and Japan go in and out 'and we kept our... noses .,.pressed to the. vi idow.
fin a AlrUhq", .let 0s fad. out from Dam Scot r. what
the view is from IosO:+ow.. ban...
SC ORR: 2hw vim, Eds from the top of the. Kre ft, when
I spent ac.mUch tip In. the past. yes , has "been zoxothat ; dim ciond :
tbo~ tbIng ha#- become clear 'The, Sputnik which has been mentioned.
before was :a symbolft. $:, exy great? symbol a , aatagh not, the ?coopplete .s
of what. happened - 2Eussias 4dealings with the, rorld this year. The
. , .,
sputnik and; of .:course
two :Sputniks., changed ._ : prbalance betwe is h sin the t d
.$tatas,. it slot., aotua at least in thei .: :acts but . eeftects
elsewhere as 3.. It bad sa effect on their -control of .tie satellites;
at the Erealin, Communist sift :oaf crone last month, to sputa* was:*
used as a symbol to cow: a satellites and, get then back Into orbit, as
Ernie Leiser .mentioned. That they,, In effect, itched;. their wagon .to
to satellite ' up In the s1 and used it to. cow their earthbound., satel-
lites . And, there fro o_theer. effects ..,IA. jother.areas... To the uncomitted .
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nations they took this satellite and said two are now ,the country to come
to for aid not the United Stites. t And even Internally it had very _ im?
portant effects, because in a .. ;.in a country ' like . Russia,, which had two
and here lcb rushchevts regime. had. a great many
purges in the past years
Other troubles. He was able to use the Sputnik. as a. great attention
distractor. He was able to tell, the people Edontt look dorm here where
we have troubles with crops, Stith our iridustria. reorganization and one
_ _ -. .a 1_W_ ~f.+.. _.~~ raw wtM Ml~efT .tf# 4~v
t7~ .
~aiiSNA
Dan, did the Sputniks distract. attention from
Marshal Lhukovtz removal?
1, in the first place* there was :considerably
wal
SCR?RRs
loss attention given toZhukov~t5 removal in Russia than in the United
States. But the second Spu , coming as it did the day after rZhukovts
complete ouster, completely erased,any.idea of Zhukov from the minds of
the. Russians even if they were disposed to discuss anything.quite as
dangerous as that In effects what arushchev has begun practicing is
something that we might call Sputvdiship. and he is, practised it very
successfully* That .was Russia. this past Year.
3R4Its 1.1,011, Eric Sevareid s as viewed from iiashington,
how do we find ourselves in this position and posture?
SEVJ Iga ells Ed, we all got obsessed with government
and lira not willing 'to blame government for everything that goes wrong
in a free democratic representative typo - of society.. But we have to
begin with goverent policy. It .seems to me that wetve soon over the
years here a kind of a gradual, .Most unconscious substitution of 'the
Word for the deed., now, we have. made rather bindin verbal commitments
all over this globe without really providing the flexible military
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policy that would sake there good in a pinch. .I think vefve suffered from
a paralysis s at the base v a paralysis, of both our milt terry structure and
organization and our strategic - tbimk .. reason 'of the Dulles massive
retalU#on doctrine wedded to the i on-'Uuuphrey economy-f1rst .p .cy.
I thinkpeople have quite obviously been lulled alMost' asleep aver the
years with endless assurances of peace and prosperity and a normalcy
which vo shall certainly not 'see in our generation. The ' strange thing.
is that the govern t seem to have lulled itself with the same kind
of wishful non;-t .nkl. After alp it was just this Spring that the
president as assuring us'- and VA sure he believed this .quite sincerely -
that ;1l~Z% had never been stra erg and this summer - that we could have
a perfectly adequate defense for the 43 3-bi ..on coiling. It was jest
this August that Secretary Wilson actuary reduced t e moneys. for M issue
development. A all this in the teeth of what seems to most of us' to
have boon very apparent Intelligence information available to t iein as'-
.to everybody else.. I have a feel. . there has boon a.- response here not
to objective facts e oizgh but too much to subjective illusions For'.
count
example, that public opinion. and the supply of money In this
are limed ceilinx; 'der. which .. tot-erne really -what Government.
does instead of the .4~k rawy` aroma. And maple more us tech m~,
nological lags, maybe considerable brew own, at least for.a time in
in the great art of leading a. great people.
11i BOU: ell gentlemen, we certainly have tot .a problem
but a whole covey on ,clutch of problerm. Letts See if we can define at
least one or two of them. ` ;ex Icertd irks you've spent the, last two or
three months studying the whole missile' and uaapons programs just how
serious is our technological lags'
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iD tZCKx 9 At `serious, Ed, as Dan. Sooorr made it
qutte plain, The two Soviet Sput iks were not accidental, they were
planned that way. They show t seionce and technology and perhaps
even in ther sysiti*s .ch bag up science and technology,
the Russians. are our equal in some respects and perhaps even ahead of use
Of course, in military terms - everybody'. should know by now - that the two
Soviet Sputniks moan that the Russians can. send a ballistic missile five
thousand miles from,their country to our country' in less than a half hour.
They can, put a hydrogen warhead on this missile and -it can cause wide-
spread death anad destruction. Now. it's true, that they eau rt do this
accurately enough yet - and our experts tell us that the Soviet 1C
is not yet operational.. But the potential ls.. there. And stratogy is
`measured in terms of potential. And strategically, possession of the
ICBM by the Russians would cancel out our, strategic advantage, that is,
our advantage up to this point,. our long distance Air Force., SAC. low,
it's true that the Russians have a long distance air force too, their
SAC,. but with. our varni system and our defense system we would have
some protection against an attack by their long distance air force, if
they. attacked us with. missile's we wouldn't have that protection. . Now,
it's also true that the missiles without a defense -. wo can retaliate
with SAC still. We can bp=i up inter-continental missiles the way they
are doing, and the way are doing and we may also able to develop
anti. nissi l e missiless. But this doesn't remove that potential I was
talking about, the potential that they have of mac g a direct strike:
against our cities..
II.RROY=J'a isn't it true also,. ;, .+ z, that they lead us in
intermediate range missiles?
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K i 1RICZCo Yes y they do - in two respects s, because they
are also building ,submarines which will be able to fire missiles and
theca subanriaes caa come rather close to our shores and they can bring
American cities under attack from short range distances , rather-than from
long. range distances.
SCIICL:;3t s they can also.caAcol out , with . their
IF its our European - bases (inter.3 :...
ezaatly - what Ed said,. they are ahead
i34 ICI~s 2Jel:10
0T. us . intermdiate range misal es as well and'.. thhis. gives them the po-
tential of attacking : the . cities - of Western. Europe 1', the cities. of our...
allies, as. wel3. as our. owa .cities: _
SCh MIM t That is what made them so nervous,; at.;. the; Paris
su=it- conference and so reluctant to give us,: lance$ one # t i l
protect them, and also give them an out i9. necessary. The votes in the
.alliance, If they read its -6-V, in -effects. one for all a all.-: for, one.
We have not yet sought it out; some of thou -are:.
E,RCW$ _ wel, zentl e: ens . let Is .104. briefly at V20.
3miaediate and crucial .hazards that confroht: us,; the. things that represent
an i of late danger. ; en ric `
I1 3RICKt Tad .f iomthe military port .Qf e a$ hazards
are very si.m l a.. essay s the wards ; .+a f sudden dca't h and with no pl e
to 1a . lev = a ase even._ th ugh it is fautast o to . conaai 0 Of Such a
a surprise attack by the Russia -cannot be ruled out. b=.
thing
military pl.aimdrs. - L''t~ea7-.mil itary ' must have tbat? as one of ..the-
p?ssib.lities on his -drafting board. The possibility : of .adventurism,
let us san`` ..the - eSIin' mmy:zot-,be.& politleai factor, bat it .ces
tainl mgt be rec once .::as: a military factor.ora possible:' military
actor . shoe . tile second - ype of., suddc t` eath,. .8:'~...' s * ac-h
u3 . 3.O
CidE3n death . at3 3 bp vi3,1 push the vron;.button. put.
war. And Xhen tber tS the. possibility' that one of.cur allies a ht
inadvert: tl:~ o o tend start a.-scrape some There that would in-
.
volve us it Thdba axe. the 3;.. -zards that weface*
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vio d from )TOSCO i?
Chf'p
Dan, Schorr, what's the immediate danger as
Well' 1. would tenrl to discount the Immediate
danger oZ calculated surprise attackthat Alex mentioned* but I go
,
along with him on the possibility of ad aturis in Russia, but only
under certain cond.c tion.. Looms At it. from the Soviet internal point
of view, I think three is a possibility of adventurism arising if the
squeeze i s put too he 'ily on. the.. Present rush regime s if they tre
put into the kind of a corne where they feel it necessary to take certain chances as a diversion. I thInk. one small e ple of that etas- the trumped.
up crisis over Syria. and Turkeys which happened to .come aroun& a time
they ..,re having trout a over tlrarshal 2$ukov. I think that kind of
danger does.. .st nd.porhaps we milt have to. do something about it.
MMMO Sevaroid, what is the mediate danger as. yrou
view it from Washington'
SJVA ,ID: Wall9 I: think the great th . is that this
govorx eat may not ham . grasped and may not help the people to grasp
the full ' l plicatIohs of this profound crisis, wh.tch IS o to Co on
for a long time. . I think there is another. speeific t' ing.,:.Ed., relating
to economies. I don't Mow if there rU be an economic depression in
this country at all tut tie cool. do things that would produrae overseas
some of the effects of 4depression, that is, that cs cerns. this
net, Congress more then the0ministration. ule might even put ; up eouo
tariff so We. may considerably cut the amo t mid scope of foreign aid
spending and toch c ` lae .p and so. on. This could have rather serious
e 9f acts and this would? split. the. present f oroign policy down the idle.
Thszrn_ 1.1,-t oar tdtnoos. Ed.. at a House sub-committee last week on this
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subject who said ii' we do this .tthis. is liko asskUkg one Siamese twin. to
play the :1oonli.ght Bonin: on a ukelele 'V; 3e the other does a Jai .house
rock with Xeri yn: I on: oe. t f'an' oan't .r., you can't do it that way.
~.EJ3.~S'iL/DiF 9
from the Far Fist?
DISC :
dental war, the
or in a divided
that wexl lose
lischor, what f s. the
-l6i-
diate hazard. viewed
he immediate heard, ' of course, is t acci-
advehturism which night occur say in the Formosa straits
1ores. But I think really the groat hazard , is the fact
the L co teed nations like Japan and India to com-
munism, we do we could lose the whole shooting match with a whimper
not a bang. India would tip the scales, I thnk, out of sheer numbers,.
36o imlllion people, Sap ,. cause it's Cot. the biggest Industrial
o nplex in the Var lasts and when you've got that tied up with Siberia
and China you have a very formidable complex indeed. And Japan is
particularly vulnerable because it's _ an. export-or-die race for
survival* if we raise tariffs,; If .we cut do,= 3apants free world
markot through a recessions Japan must look elsewhere for trade. And
I say that we very possibly we can create the biggest .itai.ed economic
and political crisis-. in Zap= by creating that kind of a crisis.
21RQWWs
LEIS z
Loiser, what is the view In. Germany?
Well, Japan's not the only places. Ed, where a
depression could bring catastrophe. hermans .ate seriously worried
about a danger of a. depression d they think that the principa. likely
source of that danger might be the United States. A depression here
would infect all of the European. economies. The democracy In West
Germany has boon growing surprisingly strongly in the ... with its roots
An the fertile soil of prosperity. But if the economy tent bust, I t
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that all threats. . about the future. of democracy in west Germany would have
{'to be off.
-
ard?
SCHO }, WN
. ---On4 . saw :at the. Paris
co er a togbther `:that;::is the.` state of Ift4firzhlp *Vtbe +'e tern
orla is = e treme1j precariou c ? T ? -health _ of tho.: erican President, of
cou se ,, .i a principal e
he!s, '-I.. thinks..:$ ;
.is - not': :3kely .1o g;r
is ice : and: . arms the could wreck
ter the German. Chancellor
e . 38-yr -old F.r c
ire : ro.. a cue of :regime
,fl and-, suo
is . : 3a 9 Frwee. f f An
cou .d...'brinr; ato t .a :;
~eouD
or:. a sf - 9. : emi
donut, hold -ame: tag. I don It . . 3t.ts .gong to: happQn
BLDG "# owevex . l is::possible. d that #-d the s@aond a a e . var in
.,gax: as rrh :ch ading its z e tbr..ougbout -North Africa vh ch
might won." p, rovolee' as anti.-Christ aus: ; t e$ erh 'bloc from
nel :asti to :Gibr tar -
And
,what is . the:;mmediatc `ad
Sr. oat u :mat. Is, -your: view-:of .the mediate
19-ar9.QA gar-- ? Cr .slit. that
ewnd . fro?
..` thsr.` .sr$:oiate 3ards
almost ven step t a`t w :. u ss r e fdaster di] 1oma
ao st. calamities a scot .d ine hap ie
,toad ' me . e entl "that the two
w uld . the death, o usscin and .a re riai of :' Arab .Xi ::
dispute .o`V`eT, the Gulf of - qua. soi alone holds ordau together
his -death would bD dg.. down ..the Sro=; e : n: ` o o ri nt o t o
co~a~try: ;, rows, no-bod ass s. lei yen ,ar tthot = r the E t alp_ . or th Saudi
Arabians are o:3.i`i tv rt t to .close: e ' Baba .Cxm .to ,I r t 1. B t v
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Y itS or CRISIS 2 l2I29/57
do .mow that neither Nasser or King Saud has forgotten that issue. It'
they revive it . will be cast again right in the middle. of. an Arab-
Israeli dispute. There's al we s the Yard ?'of new outbreaks on the-
borders of Israel.. I there is serious trouble, even trouble short of
war, oa the Israeli border szlthU Jordan, it will not.. be long before
Jordan slides into .ohaos..- Bassein would find itpolitica .l t impossible
to keep the yrian, Aram from rushing to his aid In the' " of Arab
sanity. - d in that e ens it s ens certain that the i would not
get out again. Foal , there- is the danger that if ,Jordan fails,. Via.
'w1.].3_ thou ' becox e the base of c pc ati ens tdr the ,nti=,and the Syria=
.
against their next target, ,.Iraq.
Not . a ve phasing prospect, : 1s it?Howard
Smith=, what is the' mediate ward as you view it?
S e- fell. with some reluctanc : I must recall that
before we got' into the Sputnik cloud vie were suffering-from a...black` eye
called Little Rock. . The ugly photographs of ite mo is beating up negroes
appeared on .the:.front pag
-of. almost- every newspaper on:earth . and I doe- t.
this the pre: s abroad was very fair to ..us. I don't, thin ? . they noted t#
fact that in fact we 4ve de a great deal of progress' on this probe
and I think i~,e still are. Thy. Just noticed that the i ob did this,.
is a world which 'we have to ,court for our own surv .va , and a world which
is two--lairds colored,..' I donf t thy: : we can. Gifford any' more Little: Docks..
Ifi mraou a hell* g o atlemen, 'we Ive draw up something of "a ..
list of our liabilities and a rather formidable ono it is, too:: 'hich
certainly ieavos no roe for coeplaconcy but after an our posture is
not ? prone,, ',e have very considerable ,sots axe.i think it might be
useful At this pciat to try to total up a few of the assets. Why don't
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S t E1~ : T. think that one of our liabilities is still
our greatest asset and that is. 1 ATC. X MO is still the richest, strohgesto
voluntary coalition of free nations in the world and that's' an enormous
asset if we can hold :it. NATO- conducts some two-thirds of.the world is
trade. Its mines produce more coal than the rest of the world together.
its furnaces pour more. steel. Uafortunato2yg, the rest of t ire worid: the
Communist world, is using more and More of its steel to build -schools.
Andg for example-* although Russia has half as much steel is the ` E:ted
States it is turning out twice as many, scientists, That's a very real
danger to us. I the that our basic health Is. sound. I think our
assets are very great. The problem is brow do we make the best use. of
them.
fief ws iCalisaher.
KALISC t Welll s I think Japan, the innate conservatism
of Japan in Asia is one of our biggest assets, because they've got a
high standard of living $ which we helped them get s and they want to
keep it. Surprisingly enough,,' our big asset in India is prime Minister
Nehru. Iow,g Americans often feel that Nehru is splitting hairs when
the Indian should be out splitting .logs. But he is a working democrat
taho wants to make a modified form of socialism work. I think we have
an asset in South Vietnmg which is a little country, but Symbolically
twenty-two yletnamese offered to man the first American space rocket
once we got it up. Ands finally. I think a''ve. got an asset In. the
fact that Chinas Red China, Is feeling the pinch of paying .for the
Soviet technical aid program.
HURROW:
in the Middle Bast?
D ETTs
Winston Burdett, what are our assets as viewed
delis Bdg I think we have one big Immediate
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YEARS OF CRISIS: 12/29/57
asset in the fiddle. Bast, the 't;ted Nations s. and that means two things t
the personal diplomacy of Dag mmarsk old and the Mited Nations Emergency
Force, i ch stands guard at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba and in the Gaza
Strip. I think that very few people realized last month that for a f
days at least, we were at the edge of something eery deep d ri tg the
latest border dispute bet en ' Israel' and ordare. Dag 13 mmsrs old flew
out there himsslf and by mat - ipivmats on-the-scene thought must have
been, some kind of wizardry- he cleared rep the tot e. US t-9 an inval.uabl e
tenti oa given th-e 3ab done- Eby the
a to
asset. Jo, there is very ? ittle t
tliprgehey Force. A Year ago, :.I re aber, the Israelis were saying
dieted, it would ' be unabl+- to eurb Egyptian raids across 'the border into
Israel. And many diplomats and zany correspondents, including me, Mere
almost e,ua pessimistic.. So, I this it's worth recording, a year
that vo. were wrong an that the force .has r th ry i o lldr. :
that's been sent on it.
~C& t Of course, it doesn f t have enough dollars for
its support at the .moment because some nations have refused .to pay the
appropriations. Dan Schorr, as Viewed from Moscow, what assets do we
have?
SCHOfl1 s ' I think, Ed, the greatest asset that vie have in
Russia is the growing desire of the Soviet people for somethixigm that I
would call normalcy .except that it !;- not normal, at least for some
of a dec. ent or betterlife may. Forty years after the revolution, I
think the flames of fanaticism have d :aped down and they people are. dust
In, a state where they want something a little better and a little re-
la tion. ..I think they ,ould-like to be As we are accused of being
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that the . would be' powerless 'far Gaza, it would not be. able, el .pTe~
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IM5 Q1' CRISIS t W 291W
..- complacent.. The 'd .fie .'theme' chance at oomplaeeno -.too. ; ~I.. .
this represents' a _ pressure ,exp. the reg .. .lt's one of: t ,reasons . Y
us c eat ee .s. so ae hat ov.,er-co tted_ . .his prc es .of aid . to _ t om-
committed countries his promises ` vf.. .. t+ a ell t s >1 be is
been or ed o proms e: Ste. a td tc ? a poop e ? re
represents a e s e or reduction. of. the. ex- w
operate as rectll as it Vol" -in s count hh seat o po r .
remathe a .' tr a t ul2 far ro the peop3:a9 b4,,-21L-'w
.
d 'eet ` , t,ls , '
the people . "ar 't
AAd one iii` t$1e ..;r- it t : 3' !:
sfl numh ter Aamb : re.
There t$ . ? s. of uea
tlon*And, the. ` at on ' Its taken to m &e Sputniks b also
produced lot of . think. as the pecpl. t the aren It pushed
arm p c quite so ea more. 'ion feel it.. Ton feel it YOU t m"1
ro . Bsas.
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MURHOW3 Are you suggesting that there might be a revu-
lutlan of the Sputnik makers sometime?
SCii 35Rt Wells I don't vent to pwith the word revo-
lution' I vouldn't want to suggest that this .,... Russia in going. to co up
in flames of revolution or counter-revolution very soon, I think in the
terms which you mean- .its revolution as a kind of a mental and spiritual
revolution - yea$ I. this that the Sputnik makers don't.like the (omnunist
t3:m .
gobbledygook , I think they 'vill rebel In their o rt Way in
MiTRR?3Ws Leiser, what are our assets as viewed from
Germany?
WISER: Wells, in Central. Europe Ed.? a very strong asset
is a Germany at least a West Germany that for the first time in this
century is not seeki military or political adventure. The Russians may
as Dan has Just said be looking for a better life - *the West Germans have
got it and they -want to keep it, They, have a standard of living that is
now beginning to approximate ours and they like it. They have an economic
way of life that is now beginning to approximate ours and they like it.
They are not in a mood to tinker recklesely with events.
Mt RRt3ir.~, NondrIek, what are our assets as viewed from
London?
XENDRICS. From miss a mod?
Missile land, a,iright.
K i~IDRIG` I'm with Dave Schoenbrir In believing that
a liability and even a hazard can also be an asset. Now, allmJLle warfare
is still in the future and potentially Soviet missile might could cancel
out 'our SAC force, but right now, we still possess the power of deterrents.
We have airbases at home.and overseas, we have allies, we have a long
distance airforce. we have carrier fleets - and all these, I think serve
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to remind the Russians, that whatever war may do to us, it wobid be
suicidal for them. Iota, this. is a grim and a most horrible assets but. it=s:
still an asset even though it may only be temporary.
dpi: Dan Schorr, . is there much-wide spread fear of
war in the Soviet Union, would you say?
SC ORR: There is a great deal of fear of war in the
Soviet Union. It goes Up. and down,- It reached a new peak lust. around the
time. of the Tur .i.sh-Syrian crisis, , they are constantly being told that
the Russian Government doesn't want var but constantly being told also that
we do, and they always interpret that in terms of the Intentions of their
own. Government.
ii3Rtttls Eric Sev.areid, why donf t you sum up our assets
as vies ted: from Washington.
SE TAREID: Well Est, we .. since time and space our coequal
so the scientists tell us, that with the lose of the, protecting oceans we
have lost the asset of time, but thatts about all., I think.. This country
is by no mean a push over. We, have everything else if we use It., Wetve
got the greatest industrial plant in the world and the greatest industrial
leaders. We have a. wonderful pool of scientists and engineers. if their
energies are channeled. We have unlimited money though us act as though-
we rre almost broke halt the time and I thin. we have a world record of
generosity and good will toward other parts of the world and of non
ressi?n, that honest men cannot really doubt. We have a President
.that people will still most willingly folly -- if he can summon the
personal strength and the personal will to give them the lead. We have
a great deal.
DUI%; Well gentlemen,,. ve have now at least tried to
lay out in gonoral terns. our liabilities and our assets.. i'ov, 'lette go
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to the simple problem, csomethis, must be, done. What should _ ve Aoi
Iendr.cs~
I' rn rtiCiit Ed*,, I think the first thing to do and I dontt
mean the only thing, but, the first thug to do is to catch up with the
Russians in missiles. This m not share the fact .that the Russians
still have or Iqi hate the abi to bring. our titles under their missiles
but it might at least. give us :a stalemate in this field of intercontinental
missiles certainly it ould do such to restore our confidence and our
psychology of leadership-?..., And even though we started give years behind the
Russians in the big misc.iiee, a lot of people here believe that we can
catch up faith them in tiro or t ao and a half years, provided of Bourse}
they dons t step up their pace to much.
Row, another thing me . must do is remember that
missilee test Is also a test of nerves and we should. not magnify the
natural misfires and normal failures that you got In testing. Thirdly,
a think ie should lift the veil of atomic secrecy that still exists
between this country and our allies, because only in. this vay can 'we
further Instead of hindering muclear progress anrd anyway we doni t have
secrets from the Russians.
But, most of all, I think that we have to change
the climate in this country. .I think we have to stop being,
intellectual, Vo tve got. to 'recognize that an egg ... that an egghead may
be a .better investment. then a blockhead., Rot ever, I vonldutt put all our egg
heads in one basket (AUG .i) a basket of science, I tthink they should
be spread around In the general field of education.
REOW: Dan Schorr,. "hat do you think sae must do?
SCHORR.- Well.,,. I've boon listening to Ales Kendrick, and
I'll admit that Its somovhhat depressed. i ct so much by 'what he has said,
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W ViliViVi M-W -77 A/I -I
ae by the emphasis that It* seems to . Indies.... Of eouraa Wd /e to 'try *.9.
< sad your lucky, ; ...although, .14 c> tt
(voice in background) ,. A
knout maybe before these missiles:.start. to fly it mould be luckier.' to be
in loscoss Of conrsei a have tto tr~w. to catch up vIt-it leia In the field
of .missiles. that sort of goes almost , without sating, but even if. vs doi :
arsd assume tie can in proper times dim: not, juste surer whore that ;leavest`
us and I think that it, omits one oppartunit7 tha there is to ID A some
kind of it better more real solution than just catWljAg 'Up and then
keeping pace .in means .of destruction;: You remember a yt" ago we discuss44.-
just after the Hungarian rebellions the possibilities ttat., existed then
for some kind of_ a deal. with Russit to use a crude term, They seemed to
be, ready then for disengagement and had offered- us some kin$ : of . a zone ...
deueutra.zed zone in Europe extending five hundred miles both sides of
the Elba.. They were then off balance and I think the terms for such a .
deal were pretty good. NowA they've subdued Uungary..again,.. now they have
:
their Sputnike up in the sky and the terms are less goods, but I still think
there are possibilities. for dealing with the. Russians and for getting eo .
kind of disengagement: in Central Europe.' The reason I think sot..: that the
pressures are still strong. in Russia. I think they need very badly dis-
.armament agreement,, I think this vas indicated by the way only this past.
week K,hruchehev announced a out in the armed forces manpower based on
nothing more substantial then NATO's-statement that we didn't want to
use force - a statement that NATO had made many many times before. I
would like to see those opportunities explored. If not,...., I don't. gnow
what's going to happen. ' But even after wesva explored those opportunities
anal assuming = which I do not assume,- that we could got some kind of
disengagements then we really go in for the .long haul race - the big
competitive co-oxistance--.and there it seems to met we have to catch up
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YFMG, oV CRISIS; 12f29f57 .-26-
v.ith Htssla in- t~2ot : fiel$a of :ecicnce and education -where at the.'.momea
rk `faced
t re, , .J =t _vant to make one. _biefrema
than a ahead. And,.
on , obsorvatioic = rocctiy ,in talking to the .Fiet professors ate' :ceaxce
students.., Coming home,
emphauis, on the, price
and it seems to fIZO
i th. them, lmi pit ,and stem . to
Soviet.scienti ts that t1o . fey
Vell off they are perso
them is they have
t
cation that they getto'
isn t; `t # a n point, The main point for
the laboratorlea the facilities :and the opportunity.
to do the kind off. xab they love to do mad . that this work is valued
their .gooiety..
in
SOHO fl a N: - An4 they have a. static lu thOL.r satiety..
SCH~I s . yet it is~- otatue a sense o ,... of role of
funotion which everybody` values, partly this is tbi berme science
to a kin mt a whofiy) lard in ' a :Conatutist state, but I think science . can
. - c
scfoEI't
SCWPIRI
to. being a scientist
ore st 'ea : ah le .p~res~erv othex . e ?q~ tiff s:
YjOutd -s: they were pro- egghead in other vordst
yes- they.are. pro-egghead.
I sva and . .t 'that port: Of .incentive
in u eia is the disincentive-. of being as ythin else.
in Bussia.. (LL G )
SCH?RH$
it taut the whole
SI:
awe : to - ins that ;mar' rieane. Put ...to much
atta ched to cats up with. ssia #n .science. ;
'There some truth In that p but .1, don't think
Smith that do you think 'e must do and urgently?
'ire certainly in agreement with those vha
think' that our diplomacy, ;ought. to. be such more affirmative inhere it has
been negative and shout be more -supple . wh its been rigid. In fact
,t
I don't think we tre. going to keep, our alliance Vith us unless . , it becomes
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111WRS U1" M QiQ; ...mayG7I If - . . .. j..
more affJ.rmative :and supple, but Navin, sa14...that l woa14-.k . to; agree . ith.
t .O
0 malt,
Alex ndri . that our . top prior ty:. s be tang those a weap ns.
respect to getting , 4:4, agreement .Itve covered. 81?s every 4isarfio~
ament conference. ttere:`i s. bey. and .:1 think itrs going ,to be extremely
difficult w :thout those ea .. s:.. ? r: fiery comp . sated t , Cm.
pursue.: it a. ll the
SHIM:
Pie
he. t x>lg. t t s t disarm t. ru t
against and atop at 1 . *e .east 'fiat Ru l -hat OW built, in. adVantagge
over us ? she .... 4116 call launch a :.surpri `. attack on us whereat > cannot
launch surer a attack on Thssia. sig. can keep secret all the mace-.--
nents Jt to .es to prepare a.su~pr:i , attack but we aanft,. ? hey would read..
about nts, in alt .cur now apers and bear it on the :radio and possibly
s ac a lithe of It on tel evislon, so . it:,s very hard for us. to do it. Now
any dissa r t agreement . a. a good degree of Inspection. of each,
aoutttry to m .. sure. the agroeaent.Is being kept and if Russia agreed to:...
that she could no longer: lawh these surprise attacks. She could love, her
greatest a4vatage~:
S.CHf RR:
U. 1 could interrupt, you for one minute here. 1
thin. as long as we concentrate on this question of inspection, the possibli-
ity- of a disarrmament -agreement- is going to be.very-'slim Indeed,-. .Tha kind.
of inspection we VMt 11 .n.; k cf Inspect on that. ..Ru"Ians. won't let
with the uod gro launchi pads
Russians do in their m eountry. an
and ... and the .miss iI i on submarines, It dues teem. to me that this question.
of inspection is~ getting .n bit outdate.
MOW:
chsnce.
SCUQRH.a
Well theca. You are: swing that there is no. real
I .... what the Russians ,want is .a lot of things,
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-28-
vhith I dons t hope that we wi 1 give the but 'l do think the approach to
the problem instoad? of an overall. disarm nt agreement with in pection. ~,
instead of`.txying to decide to avoid surprise attacks, in a clineh,, is to
try and break out of . the,.'. clinch .. to try. to 4JM:engage, to try. to.....
S 'r I ?t It takes two : to try nn4.breakout of a clinch.
$CRORR? lea.' (several speaking aim .taneous l)
KALISC R: Once you hays inspection,, Dan.,, how do you kn
that any agreement Is: Ion to be kept?.
SCRORR: You can start with m partial agreement in an we%
of Europe where you can inspect# but an overall disarmament agreement, with
Inspection in Russia 1 lust unpalatable to :that regime ss long as It Is*
Communist and Itm afraid itte,.going to remain. Communist for still a little
time.
XMQYdt Lel ser# what ... what do you think we ought to
do as viewed from Germany?
IS s Well, Fd,,, our European allies emphatically
think that we should start to negotiate a start nova. Their attitude
seems to bet dontt lust stand there .. say something,, Wells if. veta'e to
say anything axed find, out what the Russians rest ansuers are! I think
that we're going to have to any It quietly behind closed doors,,.. using the-
techniques of' old f hioned diplomacy.,.1 think uotve had enough of
Summit meetings, beating of the propaganda drums and the clinking of the
martini glasses. I think perhaps an example offers Itself in ghat
happened v hen Russia's . lik and America t a Jessup go togatber and, settled
the Berlin blockade - an agreement by the way that has stuck.
3RIC~t (inter.) What do you mean that the Russians
wanted to settle the Berlin blockade,. how do you know that they really
want to engage in disengement?
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,Y: 1* S: Qle tiTi?Li3' 1+D t ...- 4:71 If .. .
I4I MUCK.
IISE!
SCHOD.
Well' : they prpposed it.
(several speakirg :e..3 ultaneousl )
we Can only find .out by negotiating,
: g a used to 'bpi V enna as : thee. ies laps
are
substance of negotiat-ion.
dorm t t agd.. ,settie aU
tc3 . t t
Uhf, =V 5ta 't . mcd
taa issues: t# at ' d vide 'perhaps we take ,one
on c .so a tautp : a as sue a. slat vel `...:s 'issua"9 pis disc s .
pos lbi tg of o tYzd awL oaf: troops. or at least our a' om3:c weapons.
to t. no and find out o `far the Sov .at :ass: prepared tai itudras
tY~e .r capons. s g? this - :s an- areas h'' the tussia :te3gbt
milling to permit p'ection.
4r i
11-ustou bat do u tni a ust o
u' 'S3L: Lit :L.3*" -J3 WANP
.fast .:.l.f. sae cam? .
U TT
the jf4,' 44-
St "must' go to acb evJng: or At rate tx7JLIV to uat . vs a ttlement
of t ?M eat single ` obl~m ~- tote fl ab- sr to 3 :pct. _ ere b
prof o ins'tab3 . i ;. i tk e ` fiddle t a. long . u that con 'lict goon on
s this b.ilit ' . e .~c -- be o rest in the
and- as long as: there, i tr
i u' tQU s o .; fan t .t It cold be
BUE1 TT Well, iue can t' get . -t so
without 'doing come unpop 'things
s~.ttled~; ~'
temezit csrtaln'
.think. It 'u5.11 take tip and that ..
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YEARS Or, CRISIS; 12/29/57
a: year will not be os7iough?. But cart a , :we:.,a;i11 get as There ? if .tee, go opt
treaties this. os the :untouchable pro em, :we've got to -take a start anda:
try The end purpose of ate cettloment of course, must be to. get full Arab.
. ? . '
here to stay. : ,
recog xition that Israel Is . they :laraeli's
face up to t ie fact thatfY they. bear a : major res ponsib ity, for then . .
hundred and ' ozitye'seVen: thousand ,,or b re ees.. fihey have ta made
uuoconditio . offer to take the a ees back. rrw I do not :believe that
such an offer.` ould Bost :Israel r. great dead. `the refugee t lid other.
Arabs have coma to realize .espeeially s e the Israeli ?i s on: of
Egypt that Israel is strong and cannot be c e4--out, I thin 'that only only.., a
mall. portion: f' them even those who owned property in Palestine. V"14
cant to return to Israel, in order. to become second-class Israel citizens.
Most of them would probably accept compention w>.ch w3..v to be.
provided and would be V Uling. to seek a neat life els?eiahere.
XEIRICKa .. ; . I ask you someti ng.. MY don't. the Arab
states take back the A ab refugees since they're the ones who- caused them
to be :refugees in the first place.
ZTa ether they caused them to be refugees In :'the
1 my
first place Ale .. s is a matter of great h storical dispute. I' think ".
self s that the Arabs and the. Israel.' a slam a responsibi .. 'y there. They
r etuate their
to
do not take them : f4 a polt3cax. 'reas>v-a.e : Fe p
rieva ca 'against Israel and thereby to perpetuate their ,argument ,against
them.
SCROEIBRUNt Alright Wiinson,, uhy $on t theses Drabstates nee. .
some of their billions anc billions of dollars of oil money to, do eomieti
about taring care of Arab referees TAY does Israel have to put pall thz
money? .
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but he i s a broke billionaire:. U.9 s alwaya running out of funds.
5G ?E E You should be so broker (LAUGH ).
BIRDETT Buts. I think secondly ac part of. a general
settlerient,~, Israel nix4t ~, give i l _ not a great deal. of land but
enough to return to Arai rule the. Arab vi llaaea and-:fa ms aloes the borders
also to s the .absurdity of Arab con nttiea being -split do the
and
middle by a demarcat ou:: 3.ne,
Bonet you this that. any Israeli "Government
XWOWL
that accepted that proposes. vould.:he out o office ho s'? .
BUIMDETTs o I believe the opposite Ed, I believe that
such territorial concessions. are a political necessity. I believe- that
no Arab Government could risk a settlement that 40-'.not involve suck
concessions, I believe: that an loraell Government could.. There V0414
be a crisis in Israel,-. the Government might falls but I dealt believe that
this would affect the ult.imats, stability of. Government :Itself .in, Israel-,,
whereas :I believe it Mould follow: it would lead. to a ., r. a:. aeries, of
breakdowns In the Arab . 'states:, ,
RIC 1 all, Winston.... your saying ,. ? . your gaylmg~
-the "same thing that Dan : says;., that it only takes one to usclinch.,
BRETT: There is a difference..... there* Is a" ,great
difference... Ah9 the. Arabs are asking various things of . the Israeli I al,
various relatively sm 1? practical concessions..,.. I tank they. io l d -settle..
For. Israel is asking only one thing of the Arabs'_ and that Is, peace .sin
her borders and full' Arab : recognition... Tats,, she would have to'. get out
of any settlement. She could not be asked to,: make these oacr.ificet, in
order to get. an impermanent -settlement and in order for this; settlement
to be accepted. as permanents there woiuld ' have to be. absolute guaranteed
of Arab-Israeli borders, In the first " tance by, the. United. States and'
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certainly also _b the.. United Nationso Xov,:.I donut oinh to imply,. I think
it would be absurd arid? dishonest to .imply that there, are: .no political, risks
involVe4 In aeektng. 'a. settle ae It of this k14,,-' I think there are, risks, there
are great risks, for, maple, badly handled: ' .thiswhole project could . set
off now. discentiona a tc ng the ,Arab . -statee ::. ,ch of : hicb is .and: toareadq
to j p on its neighbor with. accusations of. saw-out to . srael I think
also, that there wou :4.,bee: stiff resistance and possibly. serious :pol.itical
repercussions in Israel 11, think though that Israel soil, stand
up tot se arepercuss3or .1414. the.. essential political fact' here, is that.
the United states is the::ianly country - -in a. position. to bring pressure and
.to induc the Israel
poe t ons9
NMI low:. Of coursed the *unsians are also in. a position
to encourage the Arabs in their ambition to. 'wipe Israel off the ..map..
R3iAB .T This is true, and-all the more. reason it seems
to me that ve should try to ,meet this problem before the Russiax try to.
+pleit it.
1~URRA~a~s
Far Fast's
alsaher:, that do you tom.. me, should do the
$ALISCHERs 1 dU =lie the got, to do., something that I 'think
tie the got
is a thousand times. harder then. the crash missies program....
to revamp our thinking .entirely in. regard-to -about -half the wor14 a
population meybo more, .;t he semi-colonial and colonial and former., colonial.
peonlee. while we're',.staring hypnotized at Russia across Western Europe,'.
we ire being out f.l3nked.:.i,n Asia In Africa wen . In. the South Pacific. Nov..
the present A 'roasian, Conference Is .a. sort. of thing that points this. up.. '
The Indonesians have. a. dispute with. the Butcht they asked uss to mediate
we refused' now$ they tre, - getting the sort of. support . that they want, from
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1i RS OF CRISIS, . 12/29/5 -44-
the Communist. countries.
SG iOs not yet. They lust asked for it..
LISCHER2 Well, -they've asked for- it, but you..... Ve21t
NA -
they've gotten moral support and this is exactly what. President Snkarnp
said to a visiting Gengressman in Jakarta (inters No, but. president
Sukarno asked our Congressman Sa * he ~saidty. al don t just nt,-,American,
military and economie aid,... I was h American politic: W,e and that, is
what he. is getting from,- the Communist countries. Verve also got todo
something else. We've also got to : admit that our China policy is bank-
rapt. I don't think tiers is a General in the pentagon' rho honestly
believes that Chiang$Kai-seek has a China mandarin's once of fighting
his way back to the mainland or that he 1,d be able to remain on Formosa
unless we kept hinn there. I don't: thL; there is a diplomat in the Far
East that thinks that our policy of nonrecognition in seven years of
economic sanctions Is going to- bring down the :or mun :st Government. l
think,rtetve got to admit what vetne got to do what our major allies
in Europe and Asia have admitted and do - and that iet recognize the
peiking regime for what it Is the unfriendly,, but existing Government
of mainland China. We should recognize the Chiang regime for what It ist.
the friendly and existing Government of Formosa, and then I think, possibly,
we might try something -rather unorthodox likes. offering farm products ais
to Red China the next time there is a flood---or famine. They ... If they
,accepted, it would mean that Ruse.ia could not or would not helps if they
refused, it would mean that they would have to explain this to their own
people. In either. ease, ve td get out from behind this wall we tre building
around China which is really a.wall we're building around ourselves.
M.'tROW: Schoenbruns, what do you think is urgent to be
accomplished?
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11EARS Or cR15.5s /r=7/ 7< . "44w
SCH~EF3Rs Wells. I think we might begin bat trying . to corrcaot
those false habits of thought that.the President talked about. If our free
system is not. inherently stronger then the Communist s yctem, then it
follows logically that me .must work harder, pay more taxes and have more
respect for learning. I think to, we should give up some of our on self. .
deluding myths, for example, the illusion: that Russia s3- .going to come
unstuffed because of internal pressures., Dan Schorr hams told us that Russia
is likely to evolve, but..fo revolution in sight. If thatts sos wethe got
to start living with the Idea that Russia. is going to be around for a very
long time, that the competition is not going to end,. it's going to-grow
more intense, .1 think that's by our allies have asked us to negotiate.
Not necessarily a global- settlement FA,, personaly, I don't believe that
disarmament can be brought about over night, I -am more .inclined to agree
with those of my colleagues who said, that we ought to try to have a
series of disentaloments at the pressure points, in the Middle East,
in Middle Europe - In any specific area or on any specific- issue, where
we can sack the chances of agreements through ni r1 al diplomatic channels",
And, finally Ed, if .I may say. so very briefly, I think we've got to be
true to our own faith. %ire cannot support colonial powers, without weaken ng
the moral posture of u hat we call the tree World.' And,,. when Mr. Dulles
tells the American people as he did recently, that our ties of-friendship
with Spain are symbolic of the links intihe 1?ree World,. 1 think he t s mis-
using the word Free World. Let us by all moans .have alliances with Spain
and with 'S egos lavia, . let t s admit,. however, that they are alliances of
mutual self- interest. 6. not of mutual .ideology,. let's not misabuee and
abuse that precious word ? 'reedont.. president E'isenhover said,. that this
is a time for greatness.. I would suggest It is also a time for facing up
to the full truth.
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MURROWS
3i TR It
to put it ,Very, briefly, f :arm assuming
that a control .of space .over. thie _ l .anm' assuming that the world leader.-
sb.ip and the , very fund ntal :scienti is revolution it At std, a reuo=
lation is going : to, cite s life enormously.: Therefore, I believe.
.135..
1?ric 'Sevarei d p what $a you. think. we .Rust do?
bave to:. "try: -tc.. go all out.;
e ~. whe her :sag a it or . n?t,.. some -Government
scattered and somewhat. m.sused~ cientiets Zed en neers...:: Surely . we've
got toget at this shodkingly delayed problem.,of an obsolescent educational
system, ate may even needs bigger Army for more,, flexible military ,policy.
Ink
around the world. 7f this means higher taxes, then so be:it. I th
most of us would rather be broke then dead though sometimes . the. Government
seems. to have some doubts- about it.
iRJW
well gentlemen, -vould any . of you like to. sun. up
some better control:.: of our -rather
this discussion. (LUGRT).
SEThB l D:
WToul4: you?
Well.,. I''ll try and if you have. disagreement at
.any point. by all me:a speak up.
It saes .to me .there are :certain things upon
which you gentlemen are complete agreement. First of all,, you all agree
that our lack of leadership- Ss showing. 'That some of our illusions have. been
shattered and that marw of -our .allies. have become disillusioned.: 'You agree
that our allies are determined,,.one9 to talk with the Russians and two,
perhaps to do business. with them.. That they are not .impressed with our
belief -avidly heidi,that. the Russians are going 'to collapse from internal
pressures. You also appear to believe that If we persist in our self right-
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Y ~ OD' CRISIS 12/29157 36.,
eons, inflczible policy' ':,atoms. bomb- with bomb . missile wi't. a ~aissii ~
threat Vith threat, that. then .thi~a ,meas3 able . course, we; ln:'to.bis country
y- a great..CofTijnG Tiil L JjUAJ WI J WJ646 UAW . vvaa-Wv
Kamehatia with the rest :.-of the world either whited Agaainst us. or wholly
... r
tit ue. must. somehow
It sea as that you also aurae
.
Sndif event to V Ur Eater
lik
-new, but to act ;s--new~
d isenthrall our el es learn not .,only to tk
and 1. ;have al s? the impression that `none of you believe,y , that death.: in
defense of a balanced budget is a proper war ,for free man to die. You all
seem to feet that the :President posed the question properly in Paris then
he :said, "'hat VIII.. us pay In freedom for freedom.,10, but., that. he has not
made, mach progress in moving that q ostion. You' a cast , 'what
yet
I would' call a rather _ominot s balance sheet, yet coateho , I find your dis-
course rather optimiotie. NOW Of ycu sug eots, that ha mane. having devised.
.
a ,method of 'destroying humanity will now proceed to use it. Tonne of you
mention the Shraee preventive war. Several of you stressed the fact,
that the free world is :richly f.endlo aed with men, 'metal, machines ate: Mon.
and that ibat is required. is a call to sacrifice, which according'. to
Severeid, would be promptly answored by the people of this country. Dan
Schorr certainly made it abundantly clear,, that the Russians have. their
ova problema frequently .well Cancealedt. but they are certainly not nine
feet tall. Most of you, I have the feeling 'although you didnt t Sky Ito.
have rather the souse that this Is. the -bett- of all possible 'times to be
alive,. because never before have the. stakes been so high Never before
have. the actions andthe decisions. of this country been so important.
And, I think you also most of you had. the f eeling ,. that if w.e spend to
much time debating the past .taco may lose the. future...
Thank you very much geutlemea and good health
And good neris. Good 'rht, and Good luck..
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ANNOUNC :
as azm . ropoz'; , or
This.:. hac been the nth edition of . or. CRISIS,
. urrr ~. d otbe~ 8 ' corz,640 z ent from
the ,octant zees center
of then or14. directed Don : nevlttl
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