STORM OVER HAVANA: WHO WERE THE REAL HEROES?

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88-01350R000200630004-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 20, 2004
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 19, 1969
Content Type: 
NSPR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01350R000200630004-1.pdf135.49 KB
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The Washington ~~Poo~stt~ rook World Approved For Release 2004/10/131~IARDP88 00R00(L2 Storm over zdzromq: TI IRTEEN 1)AYS% A-Mcmoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. By Robert F. Kennedy. illustrated. Norton. 224 pp. $5.50. By John Kenneth Galbraith E Were STAlE IdCV''O 3 ?TAT major exception of Maxwell Taylor (who later and sadly succumbed to the advocates of sanguinary action on Vietnam and so blotted the end of a well-regarded ca- On Saturday, October 20, 1962, I had just arrived reer), were all for the easy heroics. So was one group such things not being of civilians who, like the generals, yearned to be known nd t l , ure a ec in London to give a possible in New Delhi, had gone to see a Peter Ustinov as men of hard-boiled, masculine decision. They urged . play. When I came out, the papers had big black head- not air raids on the missile sites but, for purposes of lines about a Chinese invasion of India and I made a scholarly gloss, a "surgical strike." There can, in his-' suitable mental note that another political ambassador + tort', have been few more appalling examples of the had been caught absent from his post at the moment self-deluding power of words. Those concerned knew of need. I wasn't especially surprised when, about three about air power, or should have. They knew, accord. the missile bin f b g om o'clock in the morning, the duty officer of the London ingly, that there was noway o Embassy awoke me with a message conveying the same sites without attacking all of the surrounding acreage thought in rather sardonic terms from President Ken- and missing, very likely, some of the missiles. The med- nedy and asking that I return forthwith to India. That ical counterpart of a surgical air strike would be an operation by a surgeon with cataracts wearing skiing John Kenneth Galbraith, professor of economics at mittens who, in moving to excise a lung cancer, was Harvard, and author of The New Industrial State, was fairly likely to make his first incision into the large U. S. Ambassador to India at the time of the Cuban intestine. missile crisis. On the other side were the men with enough moral I did. On arriving, I learned that it was the Russians courage to consider consequences - Robert Kennedy, in Cuba, not the Chinese in the Himalayas, that had Robert McNamara, George Ball, Adlai Stevenson and, induced the President's message. He wanted me to per- before all, the President himself. As one now reads this suade Nehru to react sympathetically and use his in-. -1 memorandum, it is almost impossible to. imagine anyone fluence accordingly. being on the other side - and those who were must now Though I did so, there could have been few Ameri- have a certain problem in explaining it to themselves. cans, in or out of office, who were less involved in the In particular, it was Adlai Stevenson who was willing crisis of the days following than 1. The Chinese were to trade some obsolete nuclear weapons in Turkey making great progress in the mountains. Someone had (which the President had already twice ordered re- to worry about an infinity of questions ranging from moved) for similar action by the Russians in Cuba. the military reaction of the Indians, to the foreign policy (It has since been said on ample authority that the of Bhutan, to how to keep under wraps our own cru- saders president would have removed these missiles if that had 1 fortunately not numerous), who saw in India's been necessary for a peaceful bargain. And they were involvement with China an exciting, new breakthrough taken out almost immediately after the missile crisis.) our communications bout this memorandum is Additionall thi hilli y, ng a ng The most c in the told War. system was monopolized by the Cuban crisis as was the the reflection it prompts on what would have happened attention of everyone in Washington. I knew only what if the men of moral courage had not been present - or the headlines told until long after the fact. if a President's disposition was not to uphold but over- When ? I had time to worry, it was, as always, about rule them. And it is disconcerting to consider bow the the peculiar dynamics of the Washington crisis meeting. political position of an Administration, one more mod- This has the truly terrible tendency always to favor the crate than its Republican opposition, was juxtaposed '-.most reckless position, for this is the position that re- to the survival of the country, even of mankind. I do quires the least moral courg. The man who the not know what insanity caused the Soviets to send the. ?~ th all we have and to hell with h the d f h win commendable r o g Let s move rn w mrssrles to Cuha an a C. s consequences" will get applause and he knows it. 'He boutthe deployment of this gadgetry in far seems personally brave and also thinks he is. In fact, he caution a less dangerous locations. But once they were there, the ars that in urging a more deliberate align urged f A-1---F h d K d , es . a e one voca an t action he a more cautious policy t caution, a close assessment of consequences, effort sued. Again we see t of view espec ecially if how frayed and perilous are the l e o enne y w is a cowar oliticalnceds of the policy, he will invite the disapprobation of his col- i political to take almost any risk to get them out. Temporizing leagues or will later be accused of advocating a policy would have been politically disastrous. Yet national of weakness. Normally, also, he is aided by his inability safety called for a very deliberate policy - for tempor to foresee, or even to imagine, the consequences the izing. In the full light of time, it doubtless called for a the man who calls s for, In contrast t Kennedy pur? th t h h d to understand the opposing porn + threads on which existence depends. Communist, and who proposes concessions must have, Rad o Kennedy, peence sedless to say, wrote obert great courage. is a real hero and rare. this memorandum himself and it is done with economy o I would ld w worried more in 1962 had I then kna ; of style and no slight narrative power. With all his with what classical precision these tendencies were wor other talent, he was a very good writer. This makes it ing themselves out in Washington. We know now from n l very sad that the publisher, no doubt in order to this fascinating m ~~,For Ffe~rease with thei Y or a ease 2004/10/13 :CIA-RDP88-013508000200630004-1 rr-?t th od as