AN EXCHANGE ON THE MISSILE CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200630002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 8, 1969
• Content Type: NSPR

Now York Ttoview of books
Approved For Release 2004/10/1@ { - 88-01350RO
" An. ] zcha t3'11. go on' 1. Po 1 J c io C: ioi:,, a
not plotting a surprise attack." The truth is they are readily available. "But why were
To the Editors: that the conclusion was a major point of photographs not made earlier?" Steel asks.
As one who on occasion has been an the memo, and the President's plans and I have a long analysis of that question in
? admirer of Ronald Steel's writings, I was I actions were based on the judgment that my book and teach some conclusions that
dismayed and saddened to read his review J the Soviets were not planning a surprise ? Steel should have found interesting. For
of Robert F. Kennedy's Thirteen Days. It I attack. To quote again from my book example (page 186): "It could reasonably
is ill-informed; there arc gross inaccuracies; (page 201), "The Soviets did not put be argued that the U-2 flight of October
and several quotations are so wrenched out missiles in Cuba with the intent of using 14 found the missiles at just about the
of context that the result is simply the them in a military sense any more than the, earliest possible date. . . I do believe that
- United States put Minutemen ICBM's in'? it could be reasonably so argued, but my
And his overall jud
t
f t
i
g
ru
te o
oppos
h.
ments and conclusions are sometimes not ? Montana with the Intent of using them." own conclusion .is that they could have
only questionable as scholarship, but naive And there are many more, either mis- been discovered at least two weeks earlier,
I and simplo-minded. ;quotations or straight Inaccuracies. It was but probably not much more. "Given the
On the questions of quotations out of not "shortly after assuming office" that vagaries of the weather, (page 190) it
context, consider the following. Steel Kennedy learned there was no missile gap, would have been a fantastic stroke of luck
writes: "What happened was nothing less but in late summer, 1961, following an If convincing photographs could have been
than a failure of intelligence, 'a failure,' in Intelligence breakthrough. And-it was not obtained before September 21 ... " The
Ililsman's words, 'not of rationalization, 1 from U-2 flights and Penkovsky that we decision to fly the U'2 was made on
but of imagination-a failure to probe and learned, as Steel. asserts. U-2 flights were October 4, and the subsequent delay was
speculate, to ask perceptive questions of never made over the Soviet Union after at the operational level Time was con-
; the data, rather than of explaining away May 1, 1960. And a moment of reflection'., turned in planning because of the SAM's;
cause of weallr
t b
t
'
e
there was postponemen
s job was would reveal -
the obvious.' on what Penkovsky
to the conclusions , how unlikely it is that lie would have Cr; and there was a disgraceful squabble
k
b
oo
,
But turn to my
, of my chapter, "The Intelligence Post- known. Since Kennedy did not know there between the Air Force and CIA as to who\
r- ..should fly the plane-all of which is fully
,,,,e,;, ??,~ until 1,A. .,,,?,
,,.- -
e
no
;expect to sec my final judgment, and what..
it ha bcould not have decided after the simply that Steel's misuse of quotes, his
do you rind? "Giv the Inherent dircum- Vienna meeting, as Steel would have it, to Inaccuracies, and his rhetorical questions
ties of esspioonage and and the special circum- let the Soviets know by way of Roswell' J leave the reader with an impression of
stances... it is probably something to be Gilpateic's speech. Gilpatric gave his speech' lmystery and possible conspiracy-yet the
d
'
proud of that the missiles were discovere
s questions
In October, and the facts are that the facts and the answers to Steel
as early as they were. In sum, Cuba in decision to make the speech was made In, are all laid out in a book he has read-or
k
d
b
e mar
e
1962, it seems to me, must
the days immediately preceding it. . j at least quotes from.
down as a victory for American intelli- , A
uotation from Steel: "Mean-
th
r
q
no
e
? 'y
I' A gence-and a victory of a ve .high order." while reports kept flowing in. from agents
Now that is just exactly the opposite of It is against this background of mis-
Where did inside Cuba that missiles much longer than ..quotation, inaccuracy, and suggestive rhet-
s my views are
what Steel sa
.
y
he find the quote he cites? He found it in SAM's were being delivered. . . " There oric that Steel's major conclusions must be
an earlier part of the chapter, in were in fact only two such reports, as is judged.
discussion not of American intelligence in I fully described in my book, which hardly One of these conclusions is that the
the Cuban crisis, but of a small sub-unit of ijustifies the suggestive phrase, "flowing." Kennedy administration was caught "flat-
CIA involved in shipping intelligence, and Still another quotation from Steel: footed" in the Cuban missile crisis, and
the "failure" I speak of was the failure of 1 "There were available (for diplomacyl not ~ that' the reason was that the administration
this tiny sub-unit to report to higher only the Soviet ambassador and the famous , I ..could never figure out why, the Russians
authority that two of the ships bringing "hot line" direct to the Kremlin, recently might find it advantageous to put missiles
arms to Cuba had exceptionally large 'installed with such fanfare. , . Yet the In Cuba." Yet the evidence on both counts
hatches and were riding high in the water, truth is that the "hot line" was installed Is in the exactly opposite direction. As
indicating space-consuming cargo. The sub- '-after the crisis, and partly as a result of it described above, a study of the data
unit had not reported these facts-which There are many more pieces of mis- 1. indicates that if the decision to fly the U-2
were suggestive, but not decisive-because information or inaccuracies, but one ore -that discovered the. missiles had been made..
these ships, one of which had been built in Will suffice. Steel says McCone "immedi two weeks earlier, it might have discovered
hoto- nothing at aIL This is not being caught
ntire isl
nd
d th
l
d
p
a
e e
y or
ere
Japan, were designed for the lumbering ! atc
trade; and since the Soviets were short on graphed." In fact, however, McCone had no "flat-footed." And there is other evidence.
ht it such power. The decision could be made In my book, for example, in discussing the
u
th
i
li
t
o
g
a
s
s
ships, the shipping spec
only natural that they should be using 'only by the President on the recommcnda- 1 failure of the shipping intelligence unit to
nificance in the !ties of a high level committee. McCone .'i report the fact, that two of the ships had
nd so saw no si
th
g
ese, a
reports. The part of the quote Steel left attended a meeting of such a committee at I?, large hatches (mentioned above), I wrote'
out was the crucial part: "The, fact that which there was discussion of the fact that (page 189): "All that these reports could
the shipping specialists did not call these a rhomboid-shaped area in Western Cuba ~-do, no matter how seriously they were
ecial attention of their had not been photographed for a month. taken, would be to increase sensitivity in
th
f
e sp
acts to
intelligence superiors was clearly a failure. The SAM's were most nearly operational In Washington to the possibility that the ,?
lization this part of Cuba, and the discussion . Soviets would put missiles in Cuba. But the
f
ti
ona
ra
But to it was a failure not o
centered on the risk to the U-2 of making ~i ? people In Washington, as even the public
... and so on.
A a surveillance flight, and the possible con- statements of the time show, were already
A gain, Steel quotes my description of a sequences if it were shot down. Never- sensitive to the point of nervousness.
Iheless, the full group decided to recom- President Kennedy made several public
Omemo, written the next day, , about mend to the President that a U-2 be flown, , statements warning the Soviets. lie Inst-.
Gromyko's meeting with the President, providing great care be taken in planning t tuted special security precautions con-
~whtch argued that the Soviets would as- te exac t~y' n3, to fl corning intelligence on offensive weapons.
'sumo from what was sAppirohtedn6GS'tt a egsgd, fi~t{fi t$riltQy RAf 8a 5GR00Ar2(iQfu3Q0A2-3n the subject in
and in earlier meetings with Dobrynin, that quotatlons, Steel also uses the technique of lively Congressional hearing that had even
Kennedy know about the missiles. Steel the grave question, Implying that the .the remotest eonnection_ with Cuba. And
STA
STAT