DIEM ASSASSINATION WAS A 'MONSTROUS BLUNDER'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200600001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 16, 1972
• Content Type: NSPR

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By S. L. A. Marshall, r e f e r r i n g to them as "barbecues."
'Brig. Gen
(ret.) Thus, in the summer of 1963, several of-
fW h
Times/Post News Service
IN HIS WELT. POLISH1'i P;IEMOIR,
"Swords and Plowshares," Gen. Max-
'well D. Taylor sees the murder of for-
.mer South Vietnamese President Ngo
Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh
Nhu, as a monstrous blunder in the
Vietnam War, bringing about political
c? o n f u s 1 o n that vastly prolonged the
struggle.
Though one might answer such a theo-
ry in the words of the French diplomat
.who said that it is an idle exercise in
history to speculate on what might have
happened had that which happened not
-happened, the Taylor opinion stays no
less weighty in the aftermath of the mil-
'itary coup and the killings. Taylor be-
came ambassador to Saigon and had to
cope with the consequent chaos.
.( As he correctly puts it;-the inexcusa=
ble mistake of all who c o n s pi r e?d to
;overthrow Diemwas that they had
,planned nothing better to replace him.
The, passions and attitudes of that
r
summer nine years ago almost inevita-
bly generated' a violent climax. Diem
was under heavy fire. He was being vi-
ciously assailed by the American press
in Saigon, who waged their vendetta be-
cause Diem scornedthenand they
,were being starved of news. ? .
Public opinion in the United States,
seeing Diem as a lesser evil,'vented its
rage against Nhu because of his oppress
'sion of the Buddhists led by Tri Quang,
;who was just another Vietnamese rack-
eteer in a saffron robe. The self-immo-
lation? of several Buddhist monks in pro-
test against Nhu's measures also served
to fire American emotion. Though Tay-
lor indicates that Tri Quang had con-
?-trived these sacrifices to topple Diem,
'Madame Nhu, already an object of
par-ticular loathing to the American press,
intensified the get-Diem movement by
facial statements came out o as tng-
ton that seemed clearly to signal that
the U.S. government would welcome the
ruination of Diem.
Gen. Taylor's freshly minted memoir
lifts the lid on that subject more than a
little. On Aug. 24, when he was chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there
came to his desk a U.S. State Depart-
ment action paper already cleared and
cabled to the embassy in Saigon. What
he read alarmed Taylor as it did other
defense principals.
The authors of the already cabled in-
struction were Undersecretary of State
W Averell Harriman Assistant Secre-
to form a cabal to gun' down Diem and
Nhu with the approval of the United,
States.
Inside official U.S. circles there was
no protest against the course so definite-
ly set forth. Some of those directly con-
cerned such as Taylor might in their
own minds question the wisdom of the
instruction or policy shift. But none said
clearly: "What we propose to do is im-
moral. It is beneath the dignity of the
United States that we as a government
would conspire to political assassina-
tion. My conscience won't take it. So I
will turn in my suit." One by one the
principals fell' in line with what had be-
come, if by default, White House policy.
In the end, the deed was done.
tary of State Roger H 31 s m a n and a Be it said in favor of the Vietnamese
White House staffer, Michael Forrestal: m i I i t a r y brass that they were more
They had cleared their paper with Un- loath to b e c o m e the executioners of
Diem and Nhu than were U.S. generals
dersecretary of.State George Ball while and diplomats.
'he was playing golf and with the late Taylor, however, in noting the luci-
President Kennedy via telephone, which dent, writes: "I know of no evidence of
signifies mainly that the clearers gave d i r e c t American participation in the
only passing attention to a major and coup and certainly of stone in the assas-
Significantly, the paper had not been -
cleared with Secretary of State Dean
Rusk, who was not anti-Diem, or the
Central Intelligence Agency or the De-
partment of nee:
The sense of the paper sent to the new
ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, was
that the United States would no longer
tolerate the presence of brother Nhu in
the Saigon government. Dien, however,
must be given a chance to. get rid of
Nhu. At the same time, Lodge was to in-
form key South Vietnamese generals
about this change in the U.S. position.:
Not only that, but if at any point the
generals decided to get rid of President
Diem, they were told the United States
would directly support their action.
So what was in essence this instruc-
tion to the ambassador? Only a twisted
mind would see it other than as a li-
cense for the South Vietnamese military
Approved For Release 2004/10/13 : CIA-RDP88-0135OR000200600001-7