SECRET AND NONSENSICAL

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88-01350R000200220006-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 15, 2007
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 13, 1972
Content Type: 
NSPR
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01350R000200220006-4.pdf95.31 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP88-01350R0002 ( T IE TIMES (LONDON) LITERARY SUPPLEME 13 October 1972 FOIAB3B ecret and nonsensical .- . ~ it. HARRIS SMITH 1 Eisenhower's Chief of Staff and, later, sulti--such a5 the fiasco at the By QSS Director of the Central Intelligence of Pigs, Agency. Mr Smith's 'villains include not 458pp. University of Calkfornia R. Harris Smith's OSS, however; only the Germans, Japanese and Press (IBLG). ?3.95? is evidence that Bedell Smith was Italians, but the British intelligence displaying his usual horse sense. The services, any official who seemed to General Walter Bedell Smith once picture of the OSS during and doubt the OSS's competence and its startled a postwar dinner party by immediately after the Second World right to order the political end of Suggesting the war might have been War is a depressing one. Its SUCCCS the war as'it saw fit, and, of course, won much earlier had the United sor, the CIA, has its faults. But the all "colonialists ", The style is an States diverted the time, money and. OSS, as depicted in this book, was a extraordinary mixture of, exaggera- inen expended on the Office of Strate- mixture of idealism, naivety, in- tion and parochiahism. gic Services "and the rest of that competence and intrigue seldom danin secret nonsense " to the regular matched in the annals of govern- Mr Smith writes that the British forces." tt was a singular speculation. meat in America or anywhere else. Army s took a respite of several tot r man who had been General months from the war against Hitler Mr Smith',; wide reading and to suppress the revolt " of the LAM- extensive research have not saved the EL.AS partisans in Greece. This was book from ingenuousness and error. the period when Second Army was lie begins by labelling his work fighting bitterly in North-West " the secret history " of the organi- Europe and the Eighth Army was zation, but there is little of note in it heavily engaged in Italy. that has not been written before and Perhaps the best chapter in the often much better, He gets things b I ' 11, t cirVoted to the O55 s it tl A erir Navy, oo. r, wrong. was ie m car o erations in Yugoslavia-best, be J not Inc Royal Navy, th.rt was responsible for landing General Pat- . cause it provides a fairly clear ton's forces in Morocco in 1942, picture of the bewildering situation The Purple Gang operated in Dc- that arose from the presence of two fruit, not Philadelphia. Stephen resistance movements and of the riaivcty of ?OSS officers. One of Bailey is not, nor has Ile been, these was confident that Tito " was " Pre Which ichi h Syracuse a chancellor. UnivUniversity planning no Communist revolution Which is s headed by Mr Smith s main problem seems for his. country turtly ". the hook is weakest to be his tendency to write about the' Surprisingly, it sinIl ,th the k OSS in China OSS and its operations in North when Africa, Europe and the Far East in during and after the war and with absolutes. Men and organizations American intelligence operaiions,in are heroic or dastardly, faithful or Algeria in 1942-43. In both cases Mr treasonable. The story is told in Smith tends to adopt the easy expla- blacks and whites, whereas the dirty, nation of what happened and a dangerous l;anlc played by the OSS somewhat austere attitude towards is best described in varying shades those officers whose standards dif- of grey. ,fered from his. Association with a m- York law firm or bank did not p 'lion's, the assumption was, then they a good, although incomplete, picture 11 Nor does Mr Smith pay enough attention to one of the more impor- necessarily sour an operator's judg- tant decisions taken at the outset. by 17ent. In retrospect the 055 prob General William " Wild Bill " Dono- ably got more from this type of man van, the founder and director of th, that it (lid from the wild-eyed left- OSS. I-fe was determine(] to consoli- overs from the Abraham Lincoln date within the organization all op- .Brigade in Spain. erations--eu;rionage, sabotage, assis- . There are some bright, spots ; how tance to guerrilla movements. ']'his often Winston Churchill cut through was an error. The OSS planned , the red tape to save a promising operations based on intelligence re- operation ; a good story about Gen- ports produced by the OSS. There oral Donovan and David Bruce in was little objective study of these' Normandy ; the gradual profession- reports ! if they were the organiza- alization of some members of OSS ; must be accurate. They often were of Allen Dulles, who is clubbed the not, and the operation failed. Oddly, master spy ". But these are not the CIA, despite the sorry record of sufficient to save?the book. The OSS its predecessor, has continued this imust. wait for a more objective and :....... iir-g,rnVaflotl, Willi"c7cj~hdssiirl;" `rc- sophisticated chronicler. Approved For Release 2007/02/16: CIA-RDP88-0135OR000200220006-4