STUDIES IN STATECRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200110008-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 28, 1967
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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Approved For Relea4 10*4/13 : CIAO JAW- 43ft Cfb
2 8 . JUL 1967
iStudies in Statecraft mars is described as "almost totally
TO MOVE A NATION by Roger Hits-' lacking in self-doubt," former CIA Di.
man. 602 pages. Doubleday. $6.95. rector John McCone as a man with "a
rough and ready sense of decency" that
Roger Hilsman, one of Merrill's Ma- redeems his "streak of the alley fighter."
rauders in Burma in World War II and The Trollope Ploy. As "case stud-
now, at 45, a professor of government ics," the author retells seven of Ken-
at Columbia University, was one of ncdy's major foreign policy crises, from ,
John Kennedy's academic activists. the Cuban missile confrontation tb Viet
From 1961 to 1963, he directed the Nam. There are no monumental disclo-
State Department's Bureau of Intelli- sures, but a great many small touches
gence and Research; from early 1963 based on firsthand observation. Hilsman
until soon after the assassination, he describes how Bobby Kennedy devised
was Assistant Secretary for Far East the "Trollope ploy" in the touchiest mo-
ern Affairs, then resigned under pres- . ments of the missile crisis. It was named
sure because of his anti-Administration I after "the recurrent scene in Anthony
stand on Viet Nam. This book is Hils- Trollope's novels in which the girl in-
man's contribution tQ the growing Ii- terprets a squeeze of her hand as a
brary of the Kennedy era. Cast in the proposal of marriage." When Moscow_
form of studies in statecraft, it attempts seemed to he stalling about pulling the,
-sometimes too. ambitiously-to be at missiles out of Cuba. the White Housel
once an exploration of political pro- decided to force Khrushchev's hand by'
cess, a history and a memoir. publicly ac epting an offer of a settle-,
The author argues that more asser- meet that ie had made only tentatively
tiveness and authority are needed in and in secret. Next day he announced
the State Department. Dean Rusk takes that his missiles would be removed.
his lumps as a "superb counselor [who] In a long analysis of Viet Nam pol-
could not bring himself to be an ad- icy, Hilsman asserts that soon after
vocate." Hilsman's criticism is less than.. Johnson became President. he foresaw
convincing, since it is based on his per- L.B.J. escalating the war in a way he
sonal conviction that the Secretary of could not support. His dissent turns on
State should be a public fighter for poli- whether guerrilla warfare should be
cies of his own making, rather than treated "as fundamentally a political
merely the principal foreign policy ad- problem or fundamentally a war." To
viser to the President-and claims that Hilsman, it is a political problem, which
I Kennedy wanted Rusk to function that the U.S. buildup and the bombing of
way. In fact, most strong U.S. Pres- North and South have exacerbated rath-
idents have always, and with good rea- er than helped to solve. Though he
son, preferred the Rusk to the Hilsman admits that no one can be sure, he
view of the Secretary's function. argues that Kennedy shared this view
Battle by Leak. Some of Hilsman's and would not have raised the military
criticisms of the policymaking process stakes as high as they are today.
are illuminating, such ar/his discussion To invoke Kennedy's hypothetical ac-
of leaks, the "first and most otatant lions is a questionable tactic; there is
signs of battle" within the Government. also much evidence that, however re-
He recounts how the crucial struggle ; luctantly, he would have been forced
over the 1957 Gaither Report on civil by events into much the same decisions
defense turned on whether to print 200 as Johnson. As to whether guerrilla
I secret copies of the report or only two. war is "fundamentally" a political or 1
Proponents of the report figured that if military problem, the only answer is
find-
President Eisenhower rejected the find- ;that it is both. The U.S. has never
ings, one of the 200 "secret" copies done so well on the political side as, ide-
car-
would surely be leaked to the press, car- ally, it should have. But Hilsman seems
rying the battle to the public. They to overestimate just how much could
were correct: the larger printing was have been accomplished in the circum-
made, the President did not accept the stances by political means alone, against
report, and within days the Washington a determined opponent who from the
Post had published the gist of it. start used both military and political
? Too often the author's theory is lost
in jargon or banality: "In a political pro- weapons in complete conjunction.
cess, finally, the relative power of the
different groups involved is as relevant
to the final decision as the appeal of
the goals they seek or the cogency and
wisdom of their arguments." In history
and memoir, which fortunately occupy
the bulk of the book, Hilsman is pun-
gent and direct in his appraisal of men
.and events. Defense Secretary' McNa-
?A4&10- C4-
Approved For Release 2004/10/13 : CIA-RDP88-0135OR000200110008-4