DEAR SIR:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400480002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 21, 1967
• Content Type: LETTER

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SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III, Inc.
A Non-Profit Educational Organ on
50 WEST 57TH STREET < NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019
SUITE 810 LT 1-7020
November 21st, 1967
REX STOUT
President
DR. ALBERT SIMARD
Secretary
ISIDORE LIPSCHUTZ
Treasurer
THOMAS CRAVEN
MRS. LOUIS S. GIMBEL, JR.
JULIUS L. GOLDSTEIN
WILLIAM HARLAN HALE
EMIL LENGYEL
WILLIAM J. LUYTEN
ERIC MANN
CHAT PATERSON
HARRY LOUIS SELDEN
JAMES H. SHELDON
Hon. Joseph C. Goodwin
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, U.C.
We enclose a brochure entitled "HOW STUPID DO
YOU THINK THE RUSSIANS ARE?" published by an organiza-
tion called Americans for Permanent Peace in the Middle
East.
W;LLIAM L. PIERRE VAN PAA SEN Although this publication was not issued by our
MAJ. M. WHEELER-NICHOLSON Society, it came to our attention and we believe it
MRS. BELLE MAYER PECK yf
ADVISORY COUNCIL
GEORGE BACKER
ALBERT Z. CARR
STUART CLOETE
RICHARD DE ROCHEMONT
WALTER D. EDMONDS
LIONEL GELBER
MARY B. GILSON
SHELDON GLUECK
FRANK E. KARELSEN, JR.
HAL LEHRMAN
MRS. DAVID ELLIS LIT
HERBERT MOORE
ADELE NATHAN
LOUIS NI ZER
LISA SERGIO
G. E. SHIPLER
CHARD POWERS SMITH
MRS. HJORDIS SWENSON
R. J. THOMAS
FRITZ VON UNRUH
CHICAGO
COURTENAY BARBER, JR.
MRS. ROBERT BIGGERT
J. J. ZMRHAL
LOS ANGELES
F. E. BROOKMAN
MAJ. JULIUS HOCHFELDER
SAN FRANCISCO
SIDNEY ROGER
ST. LOUIS
J. LIONBERGER DAVIS
raises many points in which you will be interested,
and we are therefore sending it to you.
The argument presented here, in very clear terms,
is that Russia and the United States are in direct con-
frontation in the Middle East; that if we do not intend
to abandon our interests there, we must insist even
more vigorously upon direct peace negotiations between
the Arabs and Israel; and that we must firmly state our
purpose to prevent Soviet domination, if the Russian
endeavor to become the controlling power in the area
is not to succeed.
Respectfully yours,
SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WORLD WAR III,Inc.
By.
f
By : /"/f / - ,rte.
..
-
Samar , Secretary
Rea Stout, President Albert
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 How Stupid Do You Thionk
The RUSSIANS Are'.
An examination of-the great danger to
American interests. in the Middle East
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Haw Stupid Do You Think
The RUSSIANS Are?
An examination of the great danger to
American interests in the Middle East
VICTOR M. RATNER
AMERICANS FOR PERMANENT PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
866 United Nations Plaza
New York 10017
d i : A 'VENUE
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NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022.
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Table of Contents
WHO IS FIGHTING WHOM IN THE MIDDLE EAST?
WHAT'S DIFFERENT THIS TIME?
Should We Care?
Strategic Considerations
WHO AND WHAT CAN BRING PEACE TO THE MIDDLE EAST? 15
How to Be a Friend 16
Israel 21
In Sum ...
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Who is Fighting Whom in the Middle East?
Premier Kosygin did not mince words at his UN press con-
ference, immediately following his meetings with President
10
Johnson. He flatly re-affirmed Russia's opposition to the Amer-
ican position on the Middle East; rejecting any suggestion that
the two super-powers work together to bring a durable peace
into the area.
Thus, he left bigger questions behind him than any he answered.
As The New York Times reported:
". . . Mr. Kosygin was a subject of considerable speculation.
Some say it is the Arabs who are not yet ready to accept or
even deal with Israel. Some suspect it is a divided Soviet
leadership. Some sense a fear of Communist China's charges
that the United States and the Soviet Union are in collusion
against the rest of the world. Some say it is a combination
of all these."
None of these speculations, however, accounts for the most
visible facts in the current crisis in the Middle East, nor suggests
answer to such questions as these:
i. Why have the Russians supplied the Arabs with over $3
billion worth of war-equipment in the past dozen years
(beginning in 1955 when they gave Nasser his first $$ioo,-
ooo,ooo worth)?
2. Why did the Russians, immediately after the Arab's recent
military fiasco, start shipping new planes and tanks into
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1?ngypt? Why are so many Russian "technicians" now openly
crowding the hotels of Cairo? Is it likely that the Russians
would "leave it to the Arabs" again to do the fighting; or
are they moving to convert Egypt into a tie facto Russian
base? And why?
%Vhv are the Russians insisting so strenously that Israel
must withdraw its troops first, without any consideration
of security-issues Whatsoever? Is it that they expect the Israeli
to meekly withdraw-or do they want to continue and sus-
tain the tensions, and hostilities? Why?
Is it not simple history that the Russians have long wanted
to move into the Middle East as a dominant power; and
that the United States is now the only power strong enough
to interfere with Russia's present drive to fulfill an age-old
dream.?
Since the United States has vital national interests in the
Middle East, both strategic and economic, can it afford to
permit aggressive Russian Power, policies and influences to
replace American power, policies and influences in the
Middle East?
6. Who can protect the interests of the United States in the
Middle East except the United States?
Ilow can this be done, without the use of force?
Analysis shows this can be done; but not by ignoring what the
Russians arc so plainly telling us.
We know they don't give up easily; but we also know they are
not stupid, and never stop counting the risks.
We suggest this is why they are so openly, now, rigidly rejecting
America's positions on the Middle East, including President
Johnson's proram for peace in the area; and so openly re-
r5
the Arabs.
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It is because they are very much concerned about American reac-
tions to their drive in the Middle East, and want to find out what
we will do-or fail to do-to counter-act it.
This is a classic return to their Cold War strategy; trying to
expand Communist interests and influences in other countries
by direct and indirect force. The West effectively defeated this
strategy in Western Europe and many other places. Now the
Russians have transferred it to the Middle East-where only the
United States has potential powers to stop their aggressions.
That is why they are now testing our alertness and reactions in the
Middle East. They have converted the situation into something
much larger, and far more important to the United States, than
any contentions between the Arabs and Israel. They have planned
long and hard to make it a confrontation between Russian and
American national interests in the region, for very high stakes
indeed.
And the real question we face today is:
How stupid do the Russians think the Americans are?
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What's Different This Time ?
Until the current crisis, Arab-Israel conflicts have been of little
real consequence to the vital interests of the United States. The
Arabs had already been defeated twice by Israel, with no sig-
nificant effect on our national interests, whatsoever.
Why should a third time make a difference?
Russia has now deeply committed herself to plans of her own
in the Middle East. Is it reasonable to think that Russia equipped
Nasser and other Arabs with so many Russian planes and tanks
"to help the Arabs"? Hardly. The planners in the Kremlin have
judged the time has come to actualize Russia's age-old dream
of domination in the Middle East. The British and French are
no longer major powers in the area. Only the United States
is left to stand in Russia's way. Why not, then, replace Amer-
ican power, policies and influences in this strategic area with
their own?
And what better way to do it than to inflame Arab passions and
prejudices against the United States; under cover of helping and
encouraging the Arabs to destroy Israel?*
Headlines only a few weeks old fade rapidly, but we must not
forget iviiat makes the current situation in the Middle East so
threatening to American interests is that the Russians had to
take two bad lickings in the "Instant War", not one.
* They counted on the Arab logic which says: "If you are not against Israel,
you are therefore our enemy!"
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It was a bad day in Moscow when Russia's $3 billion investment
in military equipment for the Arabs went up in smoke, so
quickly. Yet this was only a military defeat.
The Russians also suffered their worst beating in international
prestige, before all the world, since Kruschev's bluff was called
by President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis. Never before
had so many Russian planes and tanks been so ignominiously
destroyed.
It is this second defeat, the one of embarrassment, which calls
for the greatest caution on our part, in dealing with the Rus-
sians in the Middle East.
We can be sure they are not going to take such a blow to their
pride lightly.
Fortunately, we have very successfully met this kind of problem
with the Russians before; when they were determined to advance
what they considered to be their national interests over our own.
They were stopped time and time again, by our firmness, not
by force. For they never stop counting the risks.
We saw this happen in Berlin. When we made unequivocally
clear to the Russians that we would NOT let them push us
out of that city-no matter what they tried-they finally stopped
pushing. They were stopped by our firmness, not by force.
We saw this happen in Cuba. When we made unequivocally
clear to the Russians that we would NOT let them have their
way-no matter what they tried-they accepted our ultimatum
and withdrew. They were stopped by our firmness, not by force.
The Russians are not stupid, and when they see we mean it,
they accept and respect our position, however reluctantly.
Can it be any different in the Middle East?
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Clearly, Russia badly wants to win dominance there: in the most
valuable, most strategic area left in the world, where the Rus-
sians have not yet accepted the idea of "co-existence" with the
United States and other Free World Powers.
just as clearly, it would be grossly against America's interests
to allow Russia, through Arab satellites, to dominate the region's
vast oil resources or strategic land-bridges and waterways, either
directly or indirectly.
To take this position is not to hold out a fist of aggression to
the Russians, but to hold up a firm hand of warning, which is
a very different thing.
It is to make absolutely clear to them that we consider the Middle
East our area of vital national interest; that we cannot, therefore,
allow them to use military intervention in the Arab-Israel con-
flict to upset our interests in the Middle East, or replace our
powers, policies and influences there; that we will have to check-
mate them at this because we must-because we will NOT sur-
render any important national interest to the Russians, anywhere.
This is precisely the position we took in Berlin and at Cuba-
to discover that ONLY THEN will the Russians accept our
position peacefully.
And ONLY THEN can we expect the Russians to accept as a
reality that-whatever they may try against our interests in the
Middle East-it can never be worth its cost to them.
This is no more than to expect that President Johnson's Peace
Program for the Middle East calls for a clear warning to Russia
to refrain from military intervention in the area. Let them, in-
stead, compete with us legitimately in political, social and
economic efforts to improve conditions in the area. Let them
compete with us in arriving at a stable peace instead of further-
ing war in the area, with cynical disregard of the needs of the
very people they purport to be helping-when it is these people
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who most need a time of peace, to advance their own human,
social and economic progress.
History has thrust on us the decisive role, for who else will
bring peace into the area, unless we stand firm with the Russians?
Kosygin threw an ill-concealed challenge to the United States
when he said (at his UN Press Conference):
". . . at present the troops of the opposing sides confront
each other, and naturally that gives rise to the possibility
that war can be resumed at any moment."
What kind of war, and by whom? Are the Arabs, after their
third and most decisive defeat by Israel, so soon in a position
to fight again? Does Israel, so much in need of peace, want war?
This is a Russian statement, at a time when Russian war-equip-
ment is again moving into Cairo, with the Russian Chief of
Staff there, and multitudes of Russian "technicians". Who, then,
is threatening the renewal of war but Russia, herself?
And the great danger is that Russian personnel may mount the
Russian equipment next time (under one subterfuge or another);
for who can expect the Russians to repeat the mistake of ex-
pecting the Arabs alone to defeat Israel.
What does the United States to then-let Russian military per-
sonnel win Russian victories in the Middle East?
It is not hard to anticipate what is most likely to happen should
the Russian/Arab Axis win, the next time.
Russia would then have the decisive vote on what to do about
American and Allied oil interests in the Middle East.
The Arab nations are deeply divided, with avowed enmities
toward one another. With Russian support, what could keep
her principal Arab satellites from taking our, and nationalizing
this oil; losing it entirely for the Western oil companies.
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Western Europe, which depends on this oil, would then be at
the mercy of Russian Political Policies as to when this oil would
flow to the West, and when it would be cut-off.
Should We Care?
It might be well to look a little more closely at the nature of
our own vital interests in the Middle East, for they are sub-
stantially of two different kinds: economic and strategic.
Our economic interests are overwhelmingly in the oil of the
area: 70 Q of the known oil reserves of the world. The United
States is not directly dependent on this oil, although the Free
World in Europe is. But it was major American and Allied oil
companies who discovered it, produce it, transport it, and sell
it, involving extremely heavy investments of money, talent, time
and effort.
Nothing of yesterday's "colonialism" is involved in this. Private
oil companies pay massive royalties and taxes on the oil, to every
country in which they operate. In doing so, they have created
more wealth for these countries than they have ever known
before (over $700,ooo,ooo annually, at current estimates). They
have created the greatest economic assets these countries have.
with potentials of billions of dollars of income in years to come.
Such oil incomes can only be provided by the West in the fore-
seeable future (Russia has its own supplies of oil); and it is
fair to say that the Arab's need for our money is greater than
our need for their oil.
But we need the stable conditions of peace and of legitimate
commerce to continue producing and increasing this wealth
for the Arab nations; which our millions in investments have
made possible-and which we have every right to protect from
the plotting of the Russians, or of anyone else.
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Strategic Considerations
Our national security is, of course, also related to this oil. One
only has to consider what a devastating blow it could be to the
West to allow such an enormous military and industrial resource
to fall into control of enemy hands.
However, long before oil was involved and wholly apart from
it, the geography of the Middle East has made it of vital signifi-
cance to the security of the Free World. Here is the cross-roads
of the world, the gateway to Africa, the back-door to Asia.
That is why this region has always been one of the great military
prizes of history, fought over in innumerable wars.
A great prize worth fighting over is worth defending, too. And
the issue we now directly face is: Which is it going to be, the
United States or Russia, who is to be dominant "big power"
in the Middle East, in our generation?
Call it power-politics if you will, but the United States does not
dare let any possible opponent interfere seriously with our in-
terests and policies in the Middle East; not until the world
becomes far more peaceful than it yet is.
Isn't this reason enough to take a firm stand against Russia's
aggressive activities in the area; where she is now testing our will,
and will not stop until she is stopped either by our firmness or
by our force?
We need make no apology before the tribunal of the world for
taking such a position.
We have brought more resources to the peoples of the area,
with which to advance their own progress, than they have ever
had before.
We want peace in the area, instead of war, to continue doing so.
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We would welcome the Russians there, if they come as peaceful
competitors in the development of the area, whether politically,
socially or economically. We have no fears of peaceful competi-
tion with the Russians on any front: in politics, in expansion
of trade, in bringing social progress to under-developed areas.
We believe in peaceful competition outside our borders as
within them.
And there remains much to be done to reduce the indigenous
poverty, now weighing so heavily on so many millions of people
in the Middle East; a task for which the modern technologies of
great nations are needed.
This is a far cry, however, from allowing the Russians to try by
aggressive force, direct or indirect, to endanger or upset our
own interests in the Middle East.
Our answer to them must be an unyielding, effective imple-
mented insistence on establishing peace in the area; which they
do not want, but is essential to our own interests, the Free
World's, and to the peoples of the Middle East themselves.
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Who and What Can Bring Peace to the Middle East?
20 years of Arab-Israel tensions have demonstrated that the mere
cessation of hostilities and recurrent armistices do not lead to
peace in the Middle East.
They have demonstrated that the conditions for peace are no
different there than anywhere else in the world. There can be
no peace until the contending jrarties agree to a peace.
Is this beyond achievement in the Middle East?
Only if the Arabs are to be treated as a unique people, susceptible
to none of the rules of war or international law or economics.
It is true that Russian mischief-making hasn't made the task of
getting a peace in the Middle East any easier. Badly defeated
as they may have been in their initial efforts to move into the
Middle East under Arab cover--derailed by the Israeli military
defeat of the Arabs-the Russians accomplished (and continue
to accomplish) one important thing in their favor.
The Arabs are now far more angry at the United States, and
hostile to American interests, than they were before the current
crisis began.
Russia insists on forcing the contrast between herself "as the
great friend of the Arabs", and ourselves as the "opponent" of
Arab dreams, illegal and immoral as these dreams may be.
This is a serious problem, not only in the interests of peace in
the area, but in our own national interests. Yet it lessens in no
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way our obligations to our own national interests to do every-
thing in our power to rebuild stable, expanding, friendly rela-
tionships with the Arabs.
We must examine, therefore, the question of what we can do
to help the Arabs most to strengthen their own national interests,
and so help them to advance to the brilliant future within their
reach.
It may be that at this time we can only do a minimum.
But let us make sure what this minimum is.
How To Be A Friend
Can we, out of deepest friendship for the Arabs, try to do any-
thing for them along the lines of what the Russians are now
doing "as their friend"?
One might well ask: just how friendly were the Russians, in
fact, to give so many planes and tanks to the Arabs? Events have
shown this was no more a friendly act than handing over an
automatic pistol to a child. Was it an action of friendship to
lead the Arabs into the worst military humiliation of their
history?
And is this any less true, whatever the Arabs themselves may
think and say about it?
This poses the basic issue we face in dealing with the Arabs:
Out of deepest friendship for them, how much should we guide
American policies and actions in the Middle East in terms of
what the Arabs say or what they actually need?
Given what the Arabs say, no one can suggest this is an easy
choice-although it may not be nearly as difficult to resolve as
some think, once Ave make up our minds to do what we can
do about it.
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In any event, what alternative do we have?
Can it help the Arabs in any way to continue to indulge them
(as so much of the world does) in their refusals to face the facts
of modern history, and the facts of their military defeats?
Are they to be the only people in the world to lose wars yet
refuse peace; to seek protections from a neighbor yet not offer
any; to interfere with basic rights of other nations and religions,
yet not be called to account?
Beyond question, the Arabs are a great and ancient people. It
is also true that, as nations go, they are still in their adolescence,
having won their own sovereignty only a few decades ago.
It should not be altogether a surprise, under these conditions,
that the Arabs, as nations go, are caught up in some of the
paradoxes found so often in adolescence, everywhere:
Great dreams . . . without yet having the skills or resources
to achieve them.
Great storms of emotion . . . when the outer world cannot
conform itself to their demands.
Great sensitivities ... which insistently turn their back on
common-sense.
It is no way unfriendly to the Arabs to suggest that precisely
such great dreams, emotions and sensitivities have colored the
events in the Middle East for the past two decades.
And the issue we face, as friends of the Arabs, as well as in our
own interests, is:
How can the Arabs best be helped from continuing to hurt them-
selves and their future by clinging to these unrealistic dreams,
emotions and sensitivities?
The basic answer is suggested by what we know every responsible
person does, when someone for whom we have love or friendship
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-whether child, adolescent or adult-insists on behaving in de-
fiance of reality.
We do not take at face-value what such a person is saying, for that
defies reality, too. Instead, we act as gently-yet as firmly as possible
-to bring the person back to reality; and we do so, essentially,
to keep him from hurting himself.
Out of deepest friendship for the Arabs, isn't something like this
now called for on our part?
Granted that the Arabs are emotionally -refusing to face the great
events of modern history; wherein many dozens of "new nations"
(including themselves) have been created out of the holocausts
of two great World Wars-one of these many new nations being
their neighbor-, Israel.
Granted also that the Arabs are insisting (with more passion than
logic) that, if the United States is not against Israel, we must
therefore be "their enemy."
What alternative do we have, or do the Arabs propose, to the
reality that the legal existence of their neighbor, like their own,
has been established, not by the United States, but by the world
community, attested by common Arab-Israel membership in the
United Nations?
Put another way:
What alternative do the Arabs propose to being either at war
or at peace with their neighbor?
The relevance of this is demonstrated by recent events.
Egypt justified to the world community its closing of the
Gulf of Akaba, to all ships destined for Israel, on the grounds
of "being at war" with Israel.
Subsequently, Egypt and its friends appealed to the UN
to condemn Israel "as the aggressor", for refusing to accept
this and accepting the Arab challenge to war.
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Setting aside all politicad passions and oratory ...
What definition of war can be allowed in which only one
side is to be permitted to engage in acts of war, by its own
definition?
It is this issue of "war or peace" which suggests what the minimum
goal of the United States should now be for the Middle East:
as an act of friendship for the Arabs, not of enmity; to help
them, not to hurt them.
Surely the time as come for the United States to insist firmly with
the Arabs, out of genuine friendship for the Arabs, that they
must accept the minimum requirement for ending wars in the
Middle East.
This is to insist that the Arabs enter into peace-treaty discussions
with Israel.
What else makes sense? What is the opposite of war, if not peace?
There are legitimate issues of contention between the Arabs and
their neighbor. But these are "insurmountable" only in a state
of war. They can readily be resolved, however, as the conditions
for peace-even as far tougher issues between other belligerents
have been resolved, in our time-'life.
The tragedies of war can be stopped by only one thing.
That is peace.
And the conditions for peace in the Middle East have already
been boldly and clearly called for by President Johnson, in his
Five-Point Program. What the United States must do, now, is
to implement that program.
There is no reason to think that an Arab-Israel peace conference
is not practical and feasible, if the United States really insists
on it; not only in words, but in our practical, realistic dealings
with each of the Arab nations; in which every arm of the United
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States government, and the private interests most concerned in
the Middle East, fulfill with their actions the policy-goals of the
United States.
"Partial firmness" cannot do the trick with the Arabs. But they
are in the final analysis, dependent on the economics of the
Western Powers for their own welfare; and if we make all our
economic assistance to them dependent on their acceptance of
the "first step" to peace in the Middle East-and mean it!-we
can look forward to their taking this "first step", before very long.
Moreover, we can count on the support of our major Western
Allies in this; for such a "first step" of agreeing to discuss a
peace-treaty is the minimum requirement for peace in the region.
Surely, if we can be firm with the Russians whenever our vital
national interests require it; and if the United States could have
acted so firmly to resolve the war between India and Pakistan
not very long ago (with no less historic tensions on both sides),
why should we not be as firm as we can be-which is a good (teal
-to resolve the state of war in the Middle East?
Moreover, who else will do it, if we don't?
It is true this calls for a new level of firmness with the Arabs
than has been shown before.
We can see why, as hindsight puts a new interpretation on some
of the events of the past 20 years.
Nobody in the world community made a strong issue of it, when
Egypt closed the Such Canal only to Israel shipping, "as an act
of war" against its neighbor.
Nobody made a strong issue of it, when Jordan illegally barred
the sacred places of Old Jerusalem only to Jews (and Israeli
Christians and Israeli Moslems).
Could such hostile Arab acts conceivably lead to peace in the
Middle East? We have seen they have not.
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When the world community consented to overlook these hostile,
illegal, immoral Arab actions, what other effect could this have
had but encourage the Arabs, over the years, to feed on their
dreams of destroying a member-nation of the UN?
And which is the greater act of friendship: To encourage the
Arabs, directly or indirectly in their continuing hostilities? Or
to be firm that they must accept the facts of modern history
with everyone else, and accept their neighbor in peace?
Many have commented on the responsibilities of power.
This is an occasion for their use.
The United States must now play its full and unique part in
getting the Arab nations, as friends not as opponents, to put
an end to the state of belligerency in the Middle East; to choose
peace, in their own interests, no less than in our interests, and
the world's interest.
Israel
This analysis should not suggest to anyone that it makes out
any special brief for Israel.
The interests of the United States and Israel happen to coincide,
at this time, because both nations, large and small, require a
stabilized, enduring peace in the Middle East for their own
national interests; even as the Arabs also need a time of peace
to advance their own progress.
We have been trying to look at the facts as they are.
As we've said, Arab-Israel contentions in themselves make little
real difference to the national interests of the United States.
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It is Russia that makes the difference in the Middle East; con-
verting the situation into a Russian vs. American confrontation
of major, long-term consequences.
The best way the United States can now protect its vital national
interests in the area is to achieve an end to the continuing state
of belligerency between the Arabs and Israel; which not only
plays directly into Russia's hands, but also gravely threatens the
stability our economic interests require in the Middle East.
Furthermore, our basic friendship for the Arabs asks that we
try hard and effectively to ge them out of their 20-year cycle of
illegal dreams and military defeasts, which has diverted their
best energies from advancing their own progress.
Devout as they are in their Moslem religion, the Arabs do not
really want to become pawns of Russian Communism-but they
need peace to keep them from doing so.
Thus, all issues join on the basic issue of achieving a stable, just,
Arab-Israel peace in the Middle East.
None of this relates to any special commitment the United States
has to Israel. In fact, we have no comitments to Israel which
we do not also have to each of the Arab nations.
We have much to say to Israel directly about the contributions
that country must make to stabilizing affairs in the Middle East.
There remain complex issues of settling borders, of a decent
solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem, of an adequate
machinery for handling grievances and insuring the peace, until
it has firmly taken hold.
Yet, can the minimum requirement for even the beginnings of
a lasting peace be any less than having the contending parties
express their willingness to enter into peace-treaty discussions?
Israel has done this. What remains for us is to induce the Arabs
to do so, also.
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Unless the United States undertakes to do this-making it a firm
condition of every help we can and want to give the Arabs-who
else will? Which is another way of saying that only the United
States can protect the interests of the United States in the
Middle East.
In Sum...
We want and need peace in the Middle East.
Only the United States has both the reason and the power to
insist that all parties must take the first steps toward actual peace.
This may call for a new level of firmness with the Arabs than
we have yet tried, to induce them to participate in a peace-treaty;
but what alternative do we, or they, have?
If we are not firm now, we face all the risks of still greater
troubles in the Middle East, at far greater risks and costs to our
national security and business interests.
Which, then, is better:
Firmness with the Russians and the Arab now; or having to
defend by force, at some later date, what we could never afford
to surrender?
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MARSTIN PREss I.t