ENCODED SOVIET MISSILE DATA SEEN A THREAT BY SOME HERE

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400003-4
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 9, 2004
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 21, 1978
Content Type: 
NSPR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400003-4.pdf187.8 KB
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Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R00040e40006a-4 on page `.: ~, Missi n , THE WASHINGTON POST C to q l tcL' k ~ 21 December 1978 C r,4 l? vs 7 2 Wiz, By Walter Pincus " . ". `? Washiaaton Perot stair writer . _ % hen a Soviet test intercontinental ballistic missile is fired from the Tyu- ratam launch site in:: Centsa1 Asia, It sends backs to Soviet scientists on the ground a.. constant. stream : of elec. troni reports, on ,how=.the weapon. is functioning. P. `speed,. pr This, informatioaes. sure; temperature and otherfactors, is calIedtelemetr7 rla thevcase of a test malfunction, telemetry:'helps Soviet scientists determine what 'went wrong. From: electronic??.listening posts to the : south of : T stain--in : Turkey and more recently('Iiarii=U.S. intelli- . gence.units kisten::in:?andrecord that. same Soviet missile..telemetry_ The lis-: tening aids U.S._analysts in determin: of the warheads.: *. fl ? ~-#~~~ ;; But last= June; America:f. analysts lemetry was being transmitted In code: CIA. Director Stansfieid Turner; for example;.- insisted ;thatr they: encoding had to stop or h a waaiild t be able to testify at future:. congressional- ,hear. Ings that the Soviets were.liviugup to the provisions : of? the control treaty being negotiates.: hetween?,_the4 United States and. the Soviet ;Union.. r' ,.In Geneva-. toda7, _,5, ov% Foreigm, - nisterAtidre 'A:-Groingko'am eor meet to discuss- the .final :detail of a SALT .11% accord-'. one of thi details: barring either side- from- encoding its, test missile telemetry::-.*- ? .i cludes^a, provision requiring: each er's-,'national technical. means" of; lice telligence.gathering=suclu asd:':eIee. sion-is ambiguous and does not state,. :whether encoding of telemetry' constt;; Jr. (D-Ohio) for more than a Year. had. argued that adequate verification'-was. Glenn pressed'' the administration. to negotiate a clear.underktanding that there-would be no further telemetry; Intercepted teleatetzy is-6-ily one-of" many, highly classified intelligence ac- tivities that allow the United States to keep track of the. Soviet submarine. and... -: land-based ICBM ' missiles, bomber deployments and their strate- gieweapons research programs. Before that SS18 missile launch last IJUne,:,-- U_&11'electronic Interceptions already had provided. advance notice that: the, test would. take-. place.. ' ?. - A y:l l.5. 'satellite, . which. hovers -: in spacer"orbit continuousiyr over the' In-I, dian; Ocean,:`has Infrared. sensors that pick up heat emissions from the earth. When, :?.then,,:.SS18 test..missi.le "was l3.bnehed;;? the U.S. satellite detected -within,, seconds of liftoff: Z.she infrared satellite sensor can fol- 1W. the, missile as its first stage car- afes itrabovee the clouds, but loses itt before it,laaves the atmosphere:-' In- space; the Soviet. missile Is fol- Yowed;?by'ipawrtfu] ground-based..-a-++' day.. Faciiities:1n Diyarbakir, Turkey, rwereused'untll July 1975, when that! country's-e government closed down; U.S. intell Bence-operations:.pendingi resolution of -U.S. military assistance, programst` :> '.Thereafter,', a` ,temporary 'radar in. ,stallation was reportedly' built in Iran :& follow Soviet' ICBM test-flights as they,''went across, central-Asia. toward an impact zone on. the.. Kamchatka Peninsulanorth of Japan,: or into the North, Pacific...-...,,, :. _. , ... , ? , . : . :During the initial launch and as the missile's upper stage travels in-space, the telemetry' monitoring. takes place. With a missile. containing multiple, Independently targeted. ' reentry-vehi. Iles (M By telemetry:'cairAndicate.' when,: each??'Warhead Is released.. The ground- based. radar `In.:Iran. also rec 'ords that operation. . V rAt:.Shemya`,.'Air: Force Base in `the Aleutian Islands oft.:=Alaska;. the United States has a large. phased-ar tay radar that. watches the Soviet war- heads as they reenter the earth's at? inosphere and.. hit the. ground" at Kamchatka, 5500 miles away.. I The ? Shemya facility, according to the . authoritative "Jane's. Weapons Systems," can see something. the size of a basketball 2,000 miles away, track 100 object simultaneously and record detailed Information on up to 20 tar= gets- The United States: has also,, built a phased-array radar arther south In f ]j Pacif! ?1$C& Vtlt~r% t radar unit' is aboard a specially? de= Signed ? ship to follow those longer' rangy ? ghntt that!' n"r1 in the U. -, .,missile tests is. only"one,, part. of-the- SALT verification program. U.S. satellites capable of taking ex- tremely detailed photographs from 100 miles and up' regularly cover the'. Soviet Union.. They are used. to keep track of long :term- weapons building- programs--- such as.-missile; submarine construc- tion and construction -of land-erased -ICBM sites. -Iloreihan high-realolutioa. photogra phy,".however, ,is transmitted back by 'these satellites." Some satellites.. turn ,colors into 'electrical signals..- and. , then digital data. When reconstructed; they are as-' .signed to different colors.. Such a sysa tern makes camouflaged sites easier to 'discover, since paint gives off a differ. : ent.. signal than the- natural. trees,. leaves or grass it is supposed to repre sent. 1.. . Reco satellites also have - Infrared sensors, and some are. equip. ,.pod to pick up radioactive material. Newer' satellites- can beam their In- .formation back to earth. directly by rn- dio after turning developed film into, -electronic impulses-. The older method Is . also still. used-dropping exposed film from space in: a capsule that is recovered by aircraft Since the early 197t1s;.the~C> b chaired a SALT .verification- comrtsi tee made up senior- intelitgeneeran lyrts from the agency, State and De4 .fense departments. Using all the'ia ligence collection- activities,; this'grou ,has attempted. to keep,: trabir'.oV phases of.-the Soviet.`strategic'- :gram.: t >, The 1972~ SALT' ?- agreement.--Itke the one now being:: negotiated-pro- bibited deliberate concealment and, terference'? with-'national technic means.of verification, such as elec tronic_and.!other collection- systems ? : Soviet ,-encoding of- teleroet shortlyafter the ? 1972 agreement was publicized in the United States as ,& violation- of SALT L. The Soviets d vied -that,'saying that the hidden in- formation was not; relevant to tber agreement. Thereafter, however, they halted the encoding, and resumed i only sporadically -overthe next sit years. The June incident, however,,' co vinced U.S. negotiators that the agree. WOM r language to de- 315 what is meant .. . ; by interference. According to informed sources, that ncm Ao4inii??i....-...:17 ____ _.-