ARMS TREATY: HOW TO VERIFY MOSCOW'S COMPLIANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390122-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 122
• Publication Date: March 21, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Rele0+/I' SCIA-RDP88-01315R0004009612-
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:.. 1 By RICHARD BURT AC
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tion of highly sensitive information con-! the current round of the talks a special ef-
!;fort has been made to obtain Soviet
WASzI NGTON, March 20 n
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sur-
ning the operation of the KH
cer-' most ad- agreement to practices that would make
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building support fora
. vanced reconnaissance system. William it easier for Washington to monitor corn
treaty with the Russians, President Car- Hance.
ter told an audience at Cape Canaveral P. Kampiles, a former C.I.A. employee, , P
accord .. was convicted last year of selling atea . An example cited by officials is the
that the proposed the e United Std Stat tees s had rely manual detailing the functions of 1 ceilinaain the proposed treaty on missiles
on t: ust" and that t U
hoto hic satellites" rdin satellite to a Soviet agent in Athens. ![equipped [equipped with multiple warheads. While
p tpos gua , g they concede that there is no way to de-
against possible Soviet cheating. As a result, Congressional aides said C sect whether a missile is fitted for more
Mr. Carter's disclosure caused hardly that Mr. Jackson and other key senators, } than one nuclear charge, the officials re-
astir; through press reports, the public such as Howard H. Baker Jr., the Repub- t Port that Moscow leas agreed that once a
had known about American as well as lican minority leader, were examining ISnew missile is tested with multiple war-
Saviet spy satellites for more than a der- . the possibility of offering amendments to, heads all others of that type will be con-
ave. Nevertheless, Administration vffi- a completed accord that would require' heads all
to have that ability and will be
vials say Mr. Carter's reference to sur- Moscow to give the United States more sidered countedassucb under the truly.
veillance satellites, the first official ac- access to data about its strategic pro- Still, the proposed accord is much more
knowledgement by an American Presi- grams- i .
! romp1, the I ive than the 1972 armore
dent, followed a heated interagency de- One pos ;ible amendment, the aides 1 c that, epr, particularly in ]uniting missile
bate strongly is which urged the Defense White House to Department and avoid said, would prohibit concealment of radio
Central intelligence Agency . aides signals beamed from missiles to around modernization. Thus, critics maintain
without the Iranian stations , the Ad -
public public discussion of the satellites monitors are vital to during test determining the flights. The signals performance ministration will be unable to verity pro-
With a now Soviet' -American arms -characteristics of new rockets. posed limitations on increasing the size,
treaty nearly complete, officials this At present, the two sides have agreed accuracy and number of warheads on ex.
week pointed to Mr. Carter's comments to. a somewhat ambiguous provision on isting Soviet rockets.
of last October to underscore the Admin- telemetry that still permits Moscow to In a recent briefing for reporters, i-er- I
redicaraent in convincing the conceal some missile-test. information. ben Scoville Jr'., a former assistant di- f
fstration's p
public and the Senate that it can police . White House aides stoutly oppose any rector of the C.I.A. and a strong sup-
the provisions of the projected agree- effort to amend a new treaty and, to head porter of arms control, maintained that
rnent? off such a move, Administration arms the Iranian stations were not vital to verl-
In addition, officials are said to be dis- specialists have started to brief senators fying compliance. He said that listening
cussing whether the White House, for the on American verification techniques. stations in Turkey and the Aleutian Is-
sust time, should turn over to the public lands, together with new satellites, ships
and aircraft, could be used to collect cis-
such intelligence data as satellite photos Uncertainty Seems to Persist
of Soviet missile installations. But the Administration's problem goes sile telemetry and other test data.
rries 12egt .. beyond whether to turn over sensitive in- Margin forHrnurWIdens
W
L
o
aying
formation to the Senate and the public,
Although the C.I.A. strongly opposes for offlcialro acknowledge that even top in- 1, Administration aides agreed and said
this, other officials say the photos would telligence aides are uncertain that every steps were under way to upgrade ca-
help allay concern over the ability of the element of the nearly completed accord parity in the other areas. At the same :
United States to monitor Soviet missile can be absolutely verified. time, one aide closely involved with vsri-
developinents. This stands in contrast, to the Ameri- ( fication said that the new procedures
Whether the United States can, verity can-Soviet arms agreeents of 1972, would take months to ca M out and that,
Soviet compliance has become a possibly which restricted the deployment of anti- in the meantime, the,, Administrat on'S
decisive issue in the emerging. vials ballistic missiles and put a ceiling on margin for error in detecting the precise 1,
treaty debate. At the same time, officials land-based and sea-based offensive rock- abilities. Of Soviet missiles would. be t
maintain that. the ability of the United ets? In the 1972 accords, each side agreed roughlydouble what it had been before.
States to monitor an accord and collect not to interfere with the other's "national The.aide and other Government, ana-
other intelligence data rests to some, ex- technical means" of verification. This en- lysts agreed additionally with Senator
tent on its ability to+keen? surveillance tailed the use of satellites to count cis- Jackson's recent, argument that even if
techniques th Modena] " sties as they underwent deployment. For the Iranian stations had not been lost, the
After the loss in Iran last used month of el example, ` . land-based rockets were i proposed accord could still not be com-
te , counted as they were inserted in under- pletely verified. In particular, they con-
Soviet missile listening tests, official pssta vias re t report oni that
Sovie
the Administration's Predicament has ground silos while missile-carrying sub- firmed Mr. Jackson's doubts over the
grown ore . Although intelligence pared fmarinesor were launchdetected as they were pre- ability to police stereo-year ban in the
new accord on long-range cruise missiles
m acutelaunch..
gaides refuse to address the issue in detail, Despite this these achievements, ques- launched from the ground and sea.. .
be to , they insist that steps can th taken a rota- tions still arose over Moscow's compli- But a State Department official said
pensate for the loss of the Iranian stn- once with various provisions. These ques- that while in theory it might be possible
tions. tons included whether Moscow was , for- Moscow to evade some minor proof-
However, in a speech 'in Houston trying tohide the construction of new sub- lions of the accord, it would not be in the
earlier this month, Senator Henry M. ? marines, whether it was converting old Soviet interest to do so. He contended that
Jackson, Democrat of Washington, a ' radars for use with antiballistic missiles the United States was able, to police the
leading critic of. the. proposed accord, and whether under the 1972 accords Mos- accord in the areas where Soviet cheating
charged that. the loss of listening posts in cow was permitted to deploy a large new j could lead to a significant military ad-
Iran bad done "irreparable harm" to the missile, known as the SS-19. -"i vantage for Moscow.
C.I.A.'s ability to monitor Soviet compli- Neither the Ford nor the Carter Adrnin- I "In some marginal areas, the Soviets ,
ante. .:~ , istratlon over charged the Soviet Union t might be able to get away with a little
s IoSi! i ~~ t `t nldn't ang r much
p t
A r6vee4" dr F ?w:ea p v
The Selling or a f p i g Furthtermore; if we
n. a
Some senators are also safes to' be. co i- Moscow has stretched the meaning of the did catch them, it would probably meats I
a, T,~t ~t>:,rn Mast o*rr's. a>m t ttccpiisi 1972 agreements to their limits. the end of SALT: they would really
"
have verv little incentive to chest.