U.S. AIDES SAY LOSS OF IRAN SITES CUTS TEST DATA ON SOVIET MISSILES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390021-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: April 25, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTIPG E APP D Approved For Rele1 0't SCIA-RDP88-01315R000400390021-6
ON i E 2 5 AI'FtU 1979
Cc' 1 5l LT
Q.T.S. Aides Say Loss of Iran Sites
Cuts Test Data can Soviet Missiles
By BERNARD WEINRAUB-?
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 24-- The loss of
two electronic listening posts In Iran, has
resulted in a setback to American efforts
to monitor the earliest stages of Soviet
missile development not directly related
to the strategic arms limitation treaty,
Defense Department officials said today.
Although the loss of the listening posts`
has focused attention on the verification
question, whether the United States has
the ability to adequately verify Soviet
compliance with the new treaty, defense
officials said that the issue was a "rela-
tively small".part of a major problem.
That problem is the loss of key monitor.
ing facilities near the`Soviet Union that
detected early testing and research and
development of Soviet missiles.
"These sites had certain advantages
over other means of collection, and the
loss certainly sets back. our ability to.
monitor Soviet missile developments,"'
said a defense official. "SALT is only one
part of a much bigger problem." '
. The posts gave "a distinct early fix" on
strategic research and development, an-
other official said. "We have other collec-
tion means but the data, so far, is not as
good."
U.S. Seeking Other Ways
To compensate for the loss of the Iran
monitoring stations, which were only 700
`miles from the Tyuratam missile test
range, the United States, has been explor-
ing ways to-:'use other radar listening
posts in Turkey, as well as surveillance
satellites in an orbital pattern keeping,
them stationary over the Black Sea. ? .
But the Turkish sites are farther from
the Soviet missile test areas and Soviet
electronic transmissions Tare- partly
blocked by trees and mountains.
At the same time,. stationary electronic
orbits, or spy sate e ;. o photograph
and monitor Soviet missile sites and
record electronic data transmitted from
missiles to tracking stations during tests,
are less powerful than ground listening
posts.
According to defense officials, the Iran
sites, called Takman I and Takman II
had the capability of "collecting the early.
stuff" of a missile's launching-data re-
lating to Its size, thrust and boost. . .
Defense officials said that the Adminis-
tration was exploring ways to "Improve
existing collection capability," such as'
spy satellites, and to intensify efforts to
develop as much Information as possible
from current intelligence data.
"The point Is to exploit these capabil-
ities, look harder at the data," one offi-
cial said..
'Political Considerations'.
Defense officials said that "political
considerations" had largely thwarted the
Administration from using countries
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan to col-
lect significant data about Soviet missile
.tests.
Several members of Congress have
suggested that the United States place
ground stations in China to monitor the
Soviet missile tests, but the Administra-
tion is reluctant. to do so. One reason is
that China insists that the United States
share information that may be collected.
Another is that State Department offi-
cials believe the use of China to collect
such data would be politically unwise be-
cause it would antagonize the Soviet
Union, + ,.
The Iran stations, equipped with.huge
antennas, intercepted radio signals emit-
ted by Soviet missiles during test firings,
and, gained, information` about the size
and' accuracy of Moscow's growing
strategic arsenal,.-.
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390021-6