'C-CUBED' PROBLEMS FACE U.S. BATTLE PREPAREDNESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380003-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 31, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380003-7 -
TILE WASIIIi'GTON STAR (GRPE;E 1,
31 May 1979
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By Henry S. Bradsher designated decision-makers and;
% _ishitonStarStaff Writer back to the weapons systems.
In addition to the hardware.
joint Chiefs of Staff have there is the business of organiz-!
named a lieutenant general to try ing the command structure in a
to improve control of U.S. weap- more efficient way. There is a
c:;s, an area that senior military widespread feeling among mili-':
and civilian officials believe tary and civilian students of the
would be a major weakness in any subject that this country is not
confrontation with the Soviet very well organized for the sud-'
Lesion. den, extreme strains of a nuclear,
While Pentagon attention and war.
public discussion focus on weap- Some specialists think that in.
ans systems such as a new MX ; case of nuclear war the Soviets
missile, there has been little would attack the U.S. command,'.
attention to problems of com- control and' communications sys-i
nfanding, controlling and cam- tem at the same time they at-
mtlnicating with U.S. strategic tacked Minuteman missile silos
systems. and other retaliatory weapons.;
These are what the military Other specialists argue that the C-,
calls "C cubed" problems. Intelli cubed system would be second'
gerce is a fourth aspef the priority.
ov ra i sualect. In any event, the Carter admin-1
Tae -subject has surfaced pert istration is now concerned abouti
cdtca.l;~ in the past uarq ter-cen the need to deny the Kremlin a!
t?. ry to cause concern in me e- capability of knocking out the
Pease and intelligence American ability to follow a care
communities then been ignored' fully directed, .veil organized war
and virtually forgotten again. conditions of nu
'tiow officials in the White House clear policy exchanges even in cto blind if not
t
as well as the Pentagon consider clear - to bl
destroy the nation's leadership'i
C-cubed improvements more ur- and reduce a war to spasmodic.{
gent as a result of the loss of U.S. reactions.. l
superiority in strategic weapons.
This sense of urgency has been THE ABILITY TO maintain
growing fora year or two. So far it,, tight control of reactions is part-'
has produced no?significant im- of the job pf presenting a credible..
provements, however. Officials deterrence capability to the
say that organizational problems Soviet Union, senior officials feel.
within the armed forces will limit But they- recognize that this is a
any effects of putting a general' highly emotional subject..
fr om the Joint Chiefs on the sub- It means moving U.S.. doctrine
jest. beyond thinking about simply
THE GENERAL is Hillman Dick- launching missiles on warning of t
inson, who has been the com- attack to a more complex capabil-i
manding general of the Army's ity of calibrating responses to at-,
Communications Research and tacks over a longer period. It
Development Command. He is means, in short, going from mas-
beinggiven athird star to become sive retaliation as the limit of
the Joint Chiefs' director for com- public thinking about a nuclear I
rand, control and communica-1 war to the idea of a "war-fighting
tions systems. He is scheduled to capability." -
take over within the next few The administration is sensitive
weeks. about that term. It can readily be
The most obvious aspect of his attacked by critics who contend
new subject is hardware. This that the Pentagon wants to plan
would include such tasks as mak- for the use of its nuclear weapons
ir.~ sure that reconnaissance and rather than just hold them as a
early warning satellites can con- counterattack threat. Officials
tinue to provide intelligence to f deny such an accusation.
military analysts in underground They say that, in order to avoid {
needs well-protected commanders
from the president clown, clear
control lines, and communica.
tions that are tough and redun-
dant enough to endure attack.
The Soviets know a great deal'
about the way U.S. military com-
munications wQr;t. Openly pub-,
lished material makes it possible'
to determine the key points -
many belonging to AT&T in the'
civilian communications system;
- whose destruction would have
far-reaching effects. Under-'.
ground presidential command-,
centers such as Mount Weather in:
the countryside west of Washing
ton have been publicly identified.
SPECIALISTS ON Soviet mili-'
tary doctrine say the apparent
reason the Kremlin has kept some_':
of its huge 25-megaton missile `?
warheads, while improved mis-
sile accuracy has made it possible
to reduce the nuclear yield
needed to destroy such targets as
minuteman missile silos, is to dig
out such command centers.
In contrast to Soviet knowledge ,
of U.S. vulnerable points, the
Pentagon knows little of the Sovi-
ets' C-cubed system.-What ? is
`known shows that it is hardened
to withstand attack. The Kremlin
devotes a lot of attention and
money to the subject.
The Carter administration's
attention began shortly after the:
president's inauguration with a
surprise test of how long it takes;
to evacuate the president from:{
the White House to a safer place
outside the city. The abrupt heli-
copter evacuation of President
Carter was reported at the time,,
but the thinking behind it has
been little recognized.
A number of officials in the;
West Wing have worried ever
since about the president's vul-
nerability. They recognize, how-
ever, that the requirements' of
openness in running a democracy
make it impossible to impose a '
system tight enough to eliminate
all worry..
ONTINUED
bunkers despite enem~~(t attempts in ft b a r t wave of
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