U.S. PLANS NEW WAY TO CHECK SOVIET MISSILE TESTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 29, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

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.S. Plans New Way to ec Soviet . fissile gists .
By RICHARD HURT
Special Co The New York Tfte s
WASHINGTON, June 28 - The Carter
Ac'.1?ninistration, concerned that Turkey
might not allow U-2 reconnaissance
planes over its territory, is preparing an
i alternative plan for verifying the new
strategic arms treaty with Moscow,
officials here said today. 1,
The plan, they said, c4lls for several
i:rnorovements to existih methods for
monitoring Soviet missile ttsts, including
the upgrading of an electronic' listening
post in Norway and the use of. a satellite
that is now programmed to collect other
information. ...-
Although ; the : officials` ?acknowledged
11 that the use of specially designed U-2R'
planes flying over Turkey offered the
best substitute for listening stations lost
is Iran early this year, they asserted that
the alternative improvements to other.
intelligence systems would enable the
Administration to insure that Moscow did
not exceed restrictions on missile rood-
ernizationcontained in the arms treaty.
A New satellite by 1983 ` .
They said that as early as 1983, the
United States would possess a new
satellite that could monitor almost all the
missile test data formerly obtained by
the monitoring sites in Iran.
State Department officials pointed to a,
statement yesterday by the Turkish
Foreign Ministry indicating that the U-2
might still be permitted to fly over the
country. Although a ranking Turkish
Army officer said earlier this week that
the flights could not be permitted "under
present circumstances," a Foreign
Ministry spokesman said the Govern-
ment had not reached a final decision.
Despite this, critics of the arms accord
on Capitol Hill maintained that, with or
without the surveillance flights, the
United States could not verify restric-
tions against increases in ,size and pay-
load of existing missiles.
Big Soviet Explosion Detected
The verification controversy h'eated' up
this week with reports that the. Soviet
Union conducted an underground nuclear
test last Saturday that might have
exceeded limits laid down in, an accord
Moscow signed in 1974 wi th Washington. .
The accord put a ceiling of 150 kilotons
on the size of such nuclear explosions.
Some American experts believe that the
latest Soviet test might have been twice
that size. One kiloton is equivalent to
1,000 tons of TNT.
Although it is unclear whether the
Soviet test exceeded the 150 kiloton limit,
officials said the Administration has
asked Moscow to explain the possible
infraction.
Meanwhile, officials said that plans
were under way at the Central Intelli-
gence_Agency and in the Peon to
collect missile test data previously ob-
tained by the stations in Iran by using a
satellite, code-named Chalet, and a large
radio intercept antenna in Norway.
Signals Can Be Intercepted
They said both the satellite and the
ground station in Norway could be
adjusted to pick up some of the radio
signals broadcast by Soviet missiles
during flight tests. The telemetry signal; 6
provide data on missile performance
characteristics and are thus considered
vital to verifying the treaty provisions
concerning modernization of weapons-
Earlier, officials said, the possibility :jt
building a monitoring station in Pakiacrn
similar to those lost in Iran, had been
considered by the Administration,' The
proposal was turned down after informal
contacts with Pakistani authorities indi-
cated that it would not be accepted.
A proposal for using. high-altitude
rockets launched from ships in the Indian
Ocean to monitor missile test signals was
also dismissed asPtechnically unfeasible,
theysaid -,
Critics Se4 Holes litDetevtion'"t
Congressional critics of the proposal to
rely on the Norwegian station and satel-
lites for verification contended that these
systems would only be able to pick up a
small fraction of the missile telemetry
obtained previously at the Iranian sites.
They said that a major function of the
Iran stations had been, to collect missile 1
data transmitted during the 'first 60
seconds of a test launch and that this data.
could-not be collected from Norway or
from existing systems in space.
Pentagon officials said-that for Moscow.
to build a new missile undetected, it
would have to shield 20 or so test launches
from American surveillance systems for
more than a year. They contended that {
modest improvements to existing reconZ
naissance capabilities ruled out the.
possibility of a large-scale covert pro.
gram of this sort:
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370003-8