JACK ANDERSON UPROAR OVER THE BACKFIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360018-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: August 12, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

L t Approyec1.F.or Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R0004003 d01A.-at n
L Tiii POST
C i iAG 12 Art usr 1979 C i?CJ f r _c._"I t~
Jack Alldp/,Soll
Uproar Over the B
.Af er ad the legitimate obstacles had
ben overcome, a bogus i=ssue almost ob-
tri:cted the, SALT U agreement and came
clew to spoiling President Carter's first
::: tiny with Sov et leader Brezhnev.
On the eve of the historic Vienna sunt-
rr:it meeting, Sen. Henry Jackson (D-
`Xash.), the Senate's leading SALT critic,
tmbl.icly accused the president of appeas-
ing the Soviets on. arms limitation. Jack-
son went so far. as. to compare Carter to
Neville Chamberlain,. the umbrella-toting
British prime minister whose appease-
ment of Adolf Hitler: at Munich in 19
Las become the historical cliche for
`,veakness.in dealing with dictatorships.
The president was so abashed by this
odious comparison t!tat. when he ar-
rived in Vienna in a light drizzle, he ac-
tually spurned the offer of a brolly-
Chamberlain's symbol of dishonor 41
roars ago. "I'd rather drown than carry
an umbrella," Carter hissed to an aide.
The president's determination not to
appear like Chamberlain nearly aborted
the negotiations. The sticking point came
over the Backfire Bomber, the name the
Western allies have given to the Soviets'
` I)- ,A bomber, which was first de-
ployed. in 1974 after five years of testing.
Carter asked the Soviets to confirm
how many of the bombers they were
producing each year, but Soviet For-
eign Minister Andrei Gromyko cut him
off brusquely. "No answer is required
to that question," he growled.
The treaty presented for si ning, it
was true, contained no mention of the
Backfire Bomber; but the Soviets had
agreed to supply a separatestatement
pledging to limit production of the plane.
So the next day Carter coldly demanded
the promised statement. That led to a
tense confrontation between Secretary
-of State Vance and the surly Gromyko.
At last Brezhnev, with an air of sweet
reasonableness, spoke out: "Thirty, it's 30
a year. There! Another Soviet conces-
sion." The summit continued.
Yet that was not to be the end of the
Backfire Bomber controversy. SALT
critics now profess to be horrified that
the plane was not included in the
treaty. But we have concluded from
our own examination of top-secret pa-
pers that this is a spurious issue. Not
only is the Backfire Bomber covered in
a separate agreement, but it is hope-
Vii,-i ~/_ C?,kcl r=,~~
;ice. ~iq ~~~? w ft ftck) VGi .
1-1
lessly in?erior to our own FB111A.,
avhich is not limited by any agreement.
In other words, the Backfire Bomber
is simply not -.vorrh arguing about. It is
strictly a red herring intended to con-
fuse the public. And _.et, in the mysteri-
ous ways of Washington, this bomber,
irrelevant though it is. has become a se-
rious issue with a life of its own. It must
now be dealt with as it it were a nt:ittrr
of some importance. -
There was conD-isioa at first over tlta
range of the Backfire Bomber. A top CIA
source told Our z sceiate Dale Van Arta
that the United States obtained smuggle,!
photographs of the plane. An analysis of
the photographs provided many teciulical
facts about the pl:ures, except its range.
That left the crucial question unan-
swered. Was this a new strategic
weapon? In other words, could it fly,
unrefueled, all the way to the United
States, unleash its bombs and land in a .
third country, such as Cuba?
The Defense Intelligence Agency ven-
tured a hesitant " es." Its first calcula-
tions suggested that the Backfire Bomber
had a range of 6,'_'t)) miles at high altitude.
The S.M,'r negotiators, therefore, begattt
demanding that it be included in the
count of strategic weapons.
That seems to have mystified the Hus-
siarls. A top set ret Cireport discloses
that Vadint Chulitsir, the chief Soviet
SALT delegate, complained to -friends
that the Backfire ihotnbrr issue was
"aril- created to block nogutiatit>,s
"lie C1:A has tw'.v Concluded that the
liotirber poses Ito ;,;eat tltrear to the
"Uttitetl State-S. Though With lung-3.tr] e
nhodifications it conk! reach tar ets iu
11th country, it would take up to 1i) hours
'tu get hrre--far to,) long to he of any sig-
TLificance in a ptLSh?btittoll w'ar. It is i'aSen-
ti:r.lly a rnrtl.ituu rape bomber, intended
for ttiissiurts other Than an interco,itiijell-
Tod "first strike" against the United State.
In contrast w our comparable
FBI11As, which are in a state of con-
stant alert in the Northeastern United
States, the Soviets keep their Backfire
Bomber in limbo as an adjunct of their
conventional forces. They are nowhere-
near striking distance of this country;
their crews are not on alert; and they j
are not trained for strategic missions.
The FB11 As, of course, aren't covered
by any treaty liautation, But according
to the ton-secret CL-\ report, the ,.e.u
Chuiitsi.v "to bring the current [SAL.I
n ' otiattuns to a conclusion" ak,ceor,;n d
separate agreement limning the (urt-
iru;ersi i : ackfire Bomber.
Yet SALT critics purport to be itt-
Currsel at its Cxclusiou fruut the aru:s-
liinitatiuri treaty. The Y: orgy arty for its,
Part, has . flown itself willuli to Use tha
phony tlav:ftre iioriber issue as a huc!;-
urtary bargainin chip. In closed Senate
testimony List January, UC,L. Iticitarrl 111.
Ellis. the Strategic Air Command chicf,
:t- ed fur funds to improve the already
updated Versions of the Fi311L-1s. 'this
pruera:rt. he said, "would effectively off-
Srt the omission of the Backfire from
SALT 11."
In addition to the i BCIIAs. thew nited
States has nearly 3.0X1 other aircraft
with nuclear capability within striking
distance of t(te Soviet Union from air- i
craft carriers on land bases.
Yet the uproar over the Backfire
Bomber continues and will keep raising
clouds of exhaust. The thing to remem-
ber" when you get right down to it, is
that a backfire is nothing but hot air,
C VDU Ul~~/..)
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360018-3