SOVIETS GET POINT OF TECHNICAL STATUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350089-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: September 12, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R00046~G31 b0&9--6- S d'/ i .J -A
Air T ICLE. APPEARED
ON PAGE J~
Jack Anderson
American negotiators at the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT ID talks
in Geneva noticed a curious thing at the
close of each day's sessions in the
eighth-ficor conference room: The
freshly sharpened pencils placed on the
table by the American team at the start
of the meeting had all disappeared.
The mystery was easily solved: The
Russians were taking the pencils. And
the explanation for this petty theft was
equally simple. When asked why he had
lilted the two "U.S. Government" pen-
cils sticking out of his pocket, a Soviet
negotiator told his American questioner
in a matter-of-fact tone: "Ours don't
work very well. The lead is no good, and
we don't have erasers."
The purloined pencils were in them-
selves obviously small potatoes. "Better
Leads Than Reds"' is hardly a trium-
phant U.S. slogan possibility for a con-
ference involving limitations on weap-
ons that could blow up the world. But
the pencils illustrated an underlying
fact about SALT that's often over-
looked. The United States enjoys a tech-
nological superiority over the Soviet
Up-ion in virtually every sphere, large or
small. and the Russians are keenly
aware of it.
Whether it's pencils, chewing gum,
blue jeans, automobiles or nuclear missi-
les, the Soviets are invariably playing
catch-up to U.S. technical genius. When
national or ideological pride cannot
deter a Soviet official from pilfering
pencils, it is clear the Russians' inferior-
ity complex is deeply ingrained.
They have an almost superstitious re-
spect for our technolgy, an American
negotiator told our associate Dale Van
Atta.
Some of the U.S. advantages that be-
TI-IE WASI-IINGTON POST
12 September 1979
came evident at the SALT talks, particu-
larly our satellite information-gathering
capabilities, cannot be.detailed for obvi-
ous security reaons. But others can be
disclosed in a general way.
The Russians' nuclear submarines, for
example, are noisy rattletraps when
matched against the practically silent
U.S. subs. Our computerized radar sys-
tems make the Soviets' look like an ox
cart compared to a Lincoln Continental,
one source told us.
A knowledgeable Senate aide noted
that the Russians' best sea-launched mis-
siles are about as sophisticated as the
U.S. models now rusting in the Brooklyn
Navy Yard junked long ago when
technological advances made them ob-
solete.
Even though the Soviets have concen-
trated their scientific talent on military
matters' for decades, they still find
themselves in the same position as the
Red Queen in "Alice Through the Look-
ing-Glass" - running hard just hoping
to stay in the same relative position. For
instance, in 19xO the United States
worked out a way to arm its Minuteman
III missiles with more than one warhead
- MIRVs - each capable of hitting a
different target. It took the Soviets five
years to "MIRV" their land-based missi-
les.
In 1971, we perfectgd MIRV missiles
for our nuclear submarines. The Rus~
sians spent eight years closing that gap.
A _ tpp.secret Central Intelligence
Agency report on SALT lays out the
- Soviets' viiewpoint this way: "The Soviets
unquestionably continue to have enor-
mous respect for the technical and in-
dustrial strength of the U.S. They have
witnessed the U.S. mobilize this strength
to great effect in the past. Today the
U.S. is pursuing force modernization
programs of which the Soviets are vo-
cally and, we believe, genuinely fear-
ful."
When the Russians contemplate our
technological and production capability
in areas covered by the SALT agree-
ments, "it could frighten them enor-
mously," the CIA report concludes.
The Russians' lag in skills that are
taken for granted in the United States,
while obviously known to the Soviets
themselves, is. revealed only occasionally
to our intelligence agencies. For ex-
ample, when a top Soviet pilot flew his
MIG jet to Japan several years ago to de-
fect, American interrogators were as-
tonished to learn that he had been
taught only a few primitive fighter-
plane tactics. He couldn't even drive a
car.
And when the SALT agreement was
finally agreed on at the Vienna summit
and each side withdrew to prepare its
own copy of the treaty, the American
team produced its version quickly, using
high-speed word-processing machines
that corrected errors almost instan-
teously. The Americans then sat around
for hours waiting for the Russians to
prepare their copy on manually oper-
ated machines, with painstaking correc-
tions of every typing error. The correct
manuscript was then fed into 1950s-vin-
tage duplicating machines.
The Russians do, of course, eventually
catch up in areas that are regarded as
vital - more important than pencils
with good lead and erasers. But part of
the. Soviets' hardnosed attitude in the
SALT negotiations stems from their
basic insecurity, their feeling that they I
are and always will be technoogically
inferior.
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350089-6