GERALD FORD TAKES HIS STAND ON SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350076-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 76
• Publication Date: September 26, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R0004003500764'
ARTICLE APPE RED THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGE /11 ")-
26 September 1979
Gerald Ford
Takes His Stand'
On SALT
I wish io share some tifinWh-Oughts regarding
the SALT IL treaty and America's defense policies.
They constitute my first effort at comprehensive
public comment on these subjects since leaving
the White House in January 1977. I've been there.
The responsibilities are awesome. I have weighed
these words very carefully.
I have studied the treaty and its accompany-
ing documents in detail. I have been thoroughly
briefed by the administration and by those on
the other side. I have carefully followed the on-
going debate in the Senate committees. And
am deeply troubled. ,- -
Frankly, I am troubled less by the questions
in the treaty itself?although there are serious
questions?than I am by the air of unreality
that seems to accompany some of the debate.
Strategic arms control is of great importance to
the United States.: I supported the SALT talks in
Congress, encouraged them as vice president and
pursued them personally as president We need
the SALT process and a good SALT agreement
But neither the SALT talks nor any SALT treaty
Is an end in itself. It is not the kexto all wisdom.,It
is not a magic answer. Ratification Will not bring
utopia rejection Will not bring Armageddon. '
Just as SALT should never be considered in
Isolation from ,the rest of U.S.-Soviet relations,
neither should SALT have a higher ? priority
than our national defense program. We must be
certain of our strength before we can safely
consider SALT dtmits on it. Let's make certain,
we get the horse before the cart. It would be,
catastrophic to reverse the tWo. ? -
Anyone who, recommends a context for the,
national debate surely should follow his owned-
vice. So, before looking at the particulars of the,
treaty, let's look at the statusnf our defense pr '
gram. Let's try to answer the question: can
America be certain of her strength today and
during the next decade?
That examination requires a brief history of,
the evolution of U.S. military strategy in the nu-
clear age, starting with the initial concept in the
'50s?"massive retaliation."
The "massive retaliation" doctrine was based on
one simple' fact the United States possessed over
whelming strategic superiority. With it, th
cally, we could presumptively deter and
control any military conflict with the Soviet Union
through the threat faidaqeMiga Ipmnpirtelepa
where the United Stateivras-absolutely dominant
' Massive retaliation was a logical response to
' the frustrations of the early '50s:
?In Korea we had achieved our initial objec-
tives, but many people felt that we had become
, "bogged down" in a situation in which the Com-
=mist forces enjoyed a relative advantage.
?In Europe we had set NATO force goals
which, even if they had been met, would have
constituted a severe economic drain.
Even though the United States still enjoyed
substantial superiority in its ability to project con-
ventional forces to distant areas of conflict, Tons-
sive retaliation made good military sense. Put
simply, it was a strategy to deter 'limited" con-
flict such as Korea by threatening to respond at a
level where both sides knew we would prevail.
The principal problem of "massive retalia-
tion" was its lack of political credibility. A nu-
clear attack on the Soviet Union seemed so dis-
proportionate a response, and therefore so un-
likely a response, to a Soviet provocation at a
minor level of conflict that the doctrine of
"massive retaliation" could not be counted on to
deter local aggression.
So next came steps to add credibility to deter-
rence by adding flexibility to our military arse-
nal. While retaining absolute dominance in
strategic weapons, we deployed tactical nuclear.
weapons with the NATO forces. And then in the
early '60s, we moved to further improve the
credibility of the United States and NATO mili-
tary strategy, by "filling 1n,' with conventional
military capability, the lower steps of the escala-
tion ladder of military conflict. - -
We had moved from the concept of massive
retaliation to the concept of "flexible response"
under which deterrence of Soviet aggression
would rest, not just on the capacity to devastate
the Russian heartland, but to respond to Soviet
aggression at any level of conflict. At the conven-
tional level, U.S. forces were to be adequate to
deal with modest military incursions and to
make obvious the inevitability of a U.S. military
response to aggression. They were to be suffi-
cient to force a "pause" in the conflict in which
the Soviets would contemplate seriously the con-
sequences of continuing hostilities. Should the
U.S.S.R. nevertheless persist in its aggression, the
United States could then escalate the conflict to
the level of tactical nuclear warfare and, if nec-
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;ince the United States was unimi.lialactUildp*
nant at both these levels, the 'Rl?retlInloW was
:learly deterred from attack in the NATO area.
As we made these moves toward a flexible re-
pouse doctrine, the famed "missile gap" cc-
eurred. Suddenly, and for the first time, we
rhought that our absolute dominance in strate-
Ic nuclear weapons was imperiled by the ap-
narent intention of the U.S.S.R. to produce
iCBMs en masse. Because both our defense and
.fleterrence ultimately rested on that dominance
;a strategic weapons, we moved quickly to mod-
-rnize and diversify our strategic force?to
,nake it less vulnerable to the massive Soviet'
missile force we were told was their plan. The
,strategic posture we have today?the Triad and
tven the specific weapons systems, the ICBMs,
--trategic ballistic missile submarines, and bomb-
ers?was largely developed at that time.
The "missile gap" fears were based not on
what the Soviets were actually doing, but on
1;7bat we thought they were capable of doing.
Our response to the perceived threat ironically
proved far more helpful to American security
than our reaction to the actual Soviet program,
once we discovered it in the mid-'60s. They were
not building missiles at the rate we had feared
And so we assumed they desired only a modest
'strategic capability and, unfortunately, we re-
laxed. Our Minuteman ICBM program was halt-
"Ad well short of the numbers recommended by
our military leaders. The notion of targeting
their strategic arsenal was rejected in favor of a
concept of targeting Soviet. cities under a doc-
lxine of "assured destruction" designed to en-
courage the U.S.S.R. to do the same because it
would require only a small Soviet strategic
Force to achieve. - -
All in all, it was a formula bound to produce
elomplacency. You start off with total and ab-
solute superiority; then you get scared that the
-other side is going to catch up and surpass you,
;so you diversify and modernize; then you real-
ize the other side wasn't doing anywhere near
as much as you thought; and so, psychologically,
you believe that the overall result is continued
_iisured superiority. The complacency that fol-
lowed the awareness that there was no real nue;
5ile gap was the beginning of our problems
A separate but related factor which In-
nue/teed the policy process was the Vietnam
War. Aside from the psychological trauma of
Vietnam and its impact on U.S. foreign policy,
:he conflict had a dramatic negative effect on
:he several force structure decisions which had
:teen made in the early '808. The war naturally
-esulted in very high defense budgets, very
le of which was devoted to R & D or force mod-
?rnization, 'aside from Vietnam-related items.
Ells natural emphasis was underscored by the
lesire of the administration in the earlier years
5 f the conflict to conduct the war in a manner
!slculated to have the least visible and disrup-
I've domestic impact. The result was that du-
ng a period when Soviet force development
vas barreling forward, long-range strategic pro-
:rams in this country were inadequately
landed.
?
ettitthitroitYPPA: tworkspellnontstisikodbootranamer? There is, unfortunately,
the :war on force development and modernize- no easy, painless, inexpensive way. Since we can
tion continued even after U.S. involvement had no longer dominate the escalation ladder, we ,
ended. This occurred as a result of the unful- must have forces able to deal adequately with I
filled expectation that the end of the war would aggression at every level of conflict. In addition,
permit a "peace dividend," releasing large sums we need to modify our strategic employment
of money for domestic budget needs. The pres- doctrine. No president should be forced to
sures which this produced on the defense bud-
get in general and new strategic programs in
particular were extreme. The result was that
the defense budget continued to decline as a
proportion of the national budget and of the
gross national product. These difficulties rein-
forced both the tendency toward a relaxation of
military standards and a propensity to avoid
analysis of the evolving strategic balance and
the unpleasant choices it might reveal.
We got back on track in the raid-'70s. The Bl.
bomber program was fully funded. The decision!
was made to go forward with the MX missile. The
Trident submarine program was pushed forward.
Priority was given to our other strategic pro-
grams. And a major shipbuilding program was de-
signed and budgeted. Unfortunately, since the
election of 1978, the defense budgets have ac-
tually been proportionately reduced and the
weapons programs begun in earlier administra-
tions have been halted or slowed down.
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has never stopped
building. It was thought they would be satisfied
with a modest "assured destruction" capacity tar-
geted at our cities. They weren't. Then it was ra-
tionalized and assumed that psychologically they
needed to keep building until they felt they had
achieved strategic force equality and that then
they would stop. They didn't. Today's perilous pic-
ture is where we stand. -.
At virtually every level of military competi-
tion, the United States is either already inferior
to the Soviet Union or the balance is shifting
steadily against us. We are inferior and falling
farther behind in conventional force capability.
Our ability to project military power over long
distances is still superior to that of the Soviets,
but they are rapidly closing the gap. Our doml
nant position on the seas is vanishing. Our Na
is no longer a two-ocean powerhouse and th
Soviets continue to build a blue-water, powe
projecting fleet. In NATO, the increasing Sovie
advantage in conventional force capability lx ii
longer balanced by our current or proposed th
ater nuclear weapons. -
And, most critical of all for our national mili-
tary policy is the strategic nuclear superiority
on which we have relied since World War U to
rectify any force disparities at lower levels. The
strategic balance is clearly shifting against us,
especially as we look forward to a period of
great vulnerability for our entire ICBM force in
the early 1980s.
The question we started with was: can America
be certain of her strength today and-during-the
next decade? My answer, frankly, is no. -
It is an ominous picture. What should we do
about it? The essential first step is to recognize
that our military policy is increasingly out of
touch with reality. Strategic superioritY and es-
calation dominance are no longer available to
cover our conventional military shortfalls,
which are growing. This is the fact of our
present situation, a fact we have been all too un-
willing to face openly.
choose between the massive destruction of the
Soviet Union or surrender. That is an intoiera-
ble burden. It is an intolerable choice.
Broader options obviously demand a larger,
defense program. Our senior military leaders
can better set out the program details and pre-
cise dollar amounts essential to our needs, al-
though certain steps are obvious:
? ?We need an MX missile: ?
?We need a new strategic bomber.
?We need to accelerate the Trident program
as rapidly as our facilities will permit.
?We need an air defense at least sufficient to
prevent the Backfire bomber from counting on
a free-ride attack on the United States,
?We need to modernize and enhance our
strategic airlift capabilities, to enable us to pro-
ject our military power adequately wherever it
may be needed.
?We need additional funds to improve cane -
mand and control, for readiness training and
for conventional force modernization. -
?And we need assured funding for research
and development into the future.
- This list is not all-inclusive, but his certainly
expensive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have indi-
cated that a 5 percent real increase, in the de-,
fense budget for at least the next five years is a/
minimum figure. lam prepared to accept and
endorse that judgment Let me also point out
that I am not a latter-day convert to the kind of
defense program I have outlined. The spending
which I proposed when I was in office provided
for more than a 5 percent annual increase in
the defense budget. The present administra-
tion's budgets for the years 1978 to 1983 have
fallen behind my proposals by $66 billion in the
critical area of military procurement alone.
That difference in military hardware averages
out to over 21 percent a year.
Now, if we can't be certain of our strength
today and during the next decade, what should
we do about SALT and the SALT.0 treaty?
First, we simply must resist the temptation to
think of any SALT treaty as a substitute for
summoning the will and the money to make our
defense and deterrence forces truly effective.
To use SALT as an answer to our defense needs
Is the most dangerous kind of wishful thinking.
.Some may say, indeed some have said, that if
we're headed into a tough period militarily,
Isn't a treaty which limits the Soviet Union's ca-
pacity for expansion the best answer? Assuming
the Soviet Union fully abides by the treaty, it
can help, of course. But the best answer to
America's inadequate defense and deterrence
forces, with or without a treaty, is to spend the
funds necessary to make them adequate to the
new realities. That's not an argument against
the treaty; it is a plea from one who has shoul-
dered the responsibilities of the office, to assure ?
that America's president will have the military
tools essential to deter adventurism and to de-
fend our country?
C?497
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SALT can never, be a substOpleoatspesce
fainty of our strength.
Second, we should firmly reassert our corn-
mitment to the SALT process, but with realistic
expectations for that process.
SALT will not eliminate U.S.-Soviet competi-
tion. It certainly will not eliminate the threat of
nuclear war and surely cannot be expected to
reduce greatly the extent of destruction should
a war occur. It will not permit us to cut the de-
fense budget. Neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union is prepared to entrust its funda-
mental national security to any agreement, no
matter how carefully crafted.
What then can SALT do? In military terms,
SALT can document the competition that exists
and will continue.
? ?
SALT can improve the stability of the strate-
gic balance, making an unintended resort to
war less likely.
SALT may be able to channel the directions
of strategic weapons development, thus lessen-
ing the chances that a critically destabilizing
breakthrough will occur. It may enable us to
avoid some defense expenditures which other-
wise might be necessary to achieve a satisfac-
tory strategic balance. And in a perilous rivalry,
SALT does perform a service by providing , a
process of dialogue. '
Compared to some extravagant claims and ex-
pectations, these are modest benefits, but they
are nonetheless significant and well worth our
continued serious efforts. Greater expectations
are not realistic. And SALT can perform these
services only if we do not ask that it also try to
regain at the negotiating table what we- have
unilaterally given up by not strengthening and
modernizing our defense programs. '
Just as supporters who claim too much for
the treaty should not let their euphoria or their
rhetoric get the best of them, opponents who al-
lege toe-little for the treaty should not forget
the fundamental point that there is progress in
a responsible process.
Third, let us in the future realize what in re-
cent years we seem to have forgotten?that
SALT negotiations, like all negotiations, to be
.successful, are best undertaken from strength.
The current administralion le fond at implying
that the current treaty Is the product of a contin-
uing negotiating ,process begun with SALT
under the Nixon administration and furthered
through the Vladivostok accord under the Ford
administration. They rates the critical point. ?
The truth is that we negotiated a real break-
through at Vladivostorwith the mutual accept*
mice of the principle of equivalenceaBut we negte
tiated the Vladivostok accord in the fall expecte-
lion of a significantly stronger American strategic
posture than what was actually in effect or
programmed when this SALT II treaty, was signed.
e
ettittgef2beffer111112etkirfirRIN439-431'13
first set forth at Vladivostok. But that agreement
was reached against a backdrop of a defense pro-
gram which included such elements as deploy-
ment of our MX missile in 1983, deployment of
the 131 bomber commencing this year with a pro-
duction rate of four, per month, a strong land-,
sea- and air-based cruise missile program, an ac-
celerated Trident program with the first boat to
be deployed this year, and a determination to stop
and reverse the decline in the share of our na-
tonal income being allocated to defense. At the
time of Vladivostok, our verification facilities in
Iran were secure; and the Soviet Union at that
time was not embarked on or supporting geo-
political adventures in such places as Ethiopia,
South Yemen and Afghanistan. The Vladivostok
accord did not solve all the problems confronting
us., But ft was an agreement based on equality,
flexibility and on the certainty of America's
strength into the future.? , -
Dealing from strength, our goal was the rapid
conclusion of a SALT II agreement, thereby ene
abling us in SALT HI negotiations to deal with
remaining intractable issues, such as mutual
strategic force reductioni. J -
When the strategic force commitments in place
at the time of Vladivostok were cut back in 1977,
the certainty of our future military strength was
also cut back, and America's negotiating posture
for both SALT Hand SALT III was weakened.
Fourth, there are a number of specific problem
areas in the treaty which should be recognized
and hopefully corrected by Soviet agreement or
by Senate understandings or reservations
. There are useful elements in the treaty. It does
put a cap on some elements of strategic force
quantitative competition. The upper limit on num-
bers of MIRVs per missile is especially worthwhile.
On the other hand, I am concerned at the pro-
tocol casting a long shadow over the SALT 111 ne-
gotiations and at the pressures we will certainly,
face to continue restrictions on cruise missiles
beyond the term of the protocol. I disagree with
the asymmetric treatment by which peripheral
systems such as cruise missiles are included in the
treaty while the Backfire bomber? is dealt with
only in a separate Soviet aside. ,
There are two aspects of the verification issue
which trouble me. The mannered resolution of
the issues relating to the encryption of missile
telemetry at a minimum invites dispute about,
what is and what is not essential fOr treaty veri-
fication-1 am also 'disturbed by the so-called
"new types" article purporting to limit both
sides to one new ICBM. The title apeTears to be a,
tnisnomer at best. The treaty permits the broad-
est kind of missile modernization to be carried
out without hindrance, Both because there is no
baseline agreement on the dimensions defined
and because-the tolerances allowed are too nar-
row, we cannot adequately verify compliance
with this article. While it apparently does con-
strain changes in MIRV size and numbers, as
well as propellant types, the article at the very
best can be expected to result in disputes over
conformity with its provisions. At the worst, it
could permit the-Soviet Union to deploy five es-
sentially new raissiles.
Robt14068ggIrglis6e bottom line, even If the
questions about the treaty are adequately an- ,
swered, I am opposed to the ratification of the
treaty until and unless we can once again be
certain of our strength. That means that our
necessary strategic force improvements should
be clearly in process. It means that the overall
necessary defense spending increases should be
unequivocally included in this year's budget,
next year's, and each succeeding year of the
five-year plan. It means clear policies should be
established by the administration and backed
by the Congress in statutory authorizations and,
by the necessary appropriations. These require-
ments undoubtedly, will mean that a final vote
on ratification would not happen until well into
next year. But the delay will be proved worth-
while if ultimate ratification occurs at a time!
when we are certain of our strength again.
Let me emphasize the point Some suggest
they- are for the- treaty on. the assumption that
the necessary defense spending decisions will
be mcide. That is not my position My position is
that I am against the treaty unless the neces-
sary defense spending decisions have been
made and have been written- into taw. I don't
believe vague, short-term or revocable assur-
ances are enough; we must be certain of our
strength before we-accept limits on it.
In very practical terms, only if the Soviets
know there is an unacceptable penalty for viola.
tons can they, be expected to abide by the pro-
visions of SALT II and stay on the safe side of
any uncertainties and ambiguities?and be pre-
pared to negotiate seriously on SALT ilL The
Soviets will not be persuaded either by exprese
sions of goodwill or by pleas for restraint if they
believe in their conventional and strategic supe- ?
riority. They must be convinced by, reality that
we have other options Only then will SALT 11
be a viable instrument' arid only then will there
by any hope of real progress in SALT M. *
Many, will ask how we can call for a stronger
defense program while we face raging inflation,
rising unemployment, a recession, a severe en-
ergy crisis and a host of pressing domestic prob.
lems. The question is reasonable. I do not claim
the answer will be easy. But lam not speaking
out now from the comfortable vantage point of a
sidelines observer. During my term of office, I
did increase the defense budget--by 5.8 percent
in real terms in FY77 alone, even after substan-
tial congressional cuteal did get under way a sub,
stantial five-year shipbuilding prograra?provid-
ing almost twice the number of ships in the CUP
'rent program?to ensure our naval, predomi-
nance in the'years ahead. rdid have under way
an MX missile and a Bt bomber program is well
as other. force -improvement packages. And, I
was doing this while helping reduce infla.tion
from 12.5 percent 'to 4.8 percent It can be done.
We can afford it; what we cannot afford are
self-defeating "guns or butter" arguments -
Let me close with a deep personal concern. My
greatest fear for this country is that the obvious
danger signals for our economic security will
blind our leadershiei or our people to the more
subtle danger signals for our national security.
COeVilivoto
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The anger signa dr our economy
around us. The experts ?cite the high inflation
ates, the high unemployment rates and the high
interest rates. The people don't need the experts to
tell them they have problems. They live every day.1
with the costs of energy and food and housing. A
clear and present economic danger is obvious.
These pressing economic concerns may keep
many Americans from recognizing the impor-
tance of the SALT and defense debate. There is
no everyday statistical equivalent in the na-
tional security, area to the cost-of-living index.
The erosion of .a nation's defenses is not obvious
at the supermarket. The priority of our defense
budget seems a distant concern in the gas lines.
We certainly delft need any more problems.
We all would like to wish them away.
But neither Washington's preoccupation with
politics nor our people's preoccupation with the
high price of everything must be permitted to ob-
scure a clear and. present danger to our national
security. -
The decisions we make On our defense budget
and the SALT treaty are as important as any deci-
sions America has ever had to make. The necessity
for economic and: energy security is inseparable
from a commitmenttqnational military security.
Without the deterrence of an adequate range
Of military reiources,. our diplomacy, can be
hamstrung in the face, Of Soviet adventurism-
which potentially further challenges our world-
wide energy supply lines.
Without a revitalized, diversified and secure
strategic capability, our allies cannot recover
their confidence. in our overall leadership
which is a' precondition to recovering their con-
fidence in our dollar.
Without the psychological confidence based on
the certainty of our strength, no American presi-
dent can be certain to deter the kind of conflict
that makes economic security irrelevant.
Let rue repeat: the necessity for economic and
energy security is inseparable from a commit-
ment to national military security. A bold Amer-
ica today is the only sure road to a secure anctoi
thriving America tomorrow.
"lam opposed to the
ratification of the
treaty until and unless
we can once again be
certain of our strength.
,My position is that
Jam against the. treaty
unless the necessary
defense spending
decisions have been
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