CAPITOL STUFF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400130060-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: July 30, 1964
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2005/01/1fa-RDP88-01FQ0400p69,'I ~, 7l c
JUL 3 0 1964
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By MICHAEL O'NEILL
Washin ;ton, July 2J-The decision of the 'Organizaj .
tion of American States to crack down om Cuba is noL
only a victory for t resident Johnson. It also is evidence
of a significant change of attitude in Latin American.
Not so long ago, maily of the most important nations south
of the border were strictly ho-huinmish about the Castro threat:.- -- . .. -
They regarded this country's concern as an unfortunate excess, Johnson recognized this threatened spiritual defection of the'
probably related to domestic Latins and moved almost immediately to head it off. In his first
business session with anJ y forcign dignitaries-just four daJs after the
politics. ,
But when the foreign ministers .cssassination-he called hemispherc :enders to a "family gathering"'
in a militant new mood. This The P esidnt's first major ac.t.ron in the foreign field was to
caught even the State Depart- order an overhaul of the whole manarennent of hemisphere problems,
meat's experts by surprise. Most installing his own man, Thomas Mann, as assistant Secretary of
of the statesmen were eager to State for inter-American affairs and top coordinator for the alliance.
hit the Castro regime hard-and
so:ue were even Bung-ho about it. Called ir, fi e Ambassauors ?
The result was that the U.S. Johnson met with the amt*assadors to Latin America later in I
c ;rot mare than it expected. The lIa) ch and then called them io the Whit-c TIouse again May 11 to
0 A 5 didn't just rr.co)>rvreud new give. them a progress repot t and pep tall: on the alliance. In be-
u) t.ionsc It called .for a ~1{rcrc- Wi. tween times, he was pepperin:_ Tom Mann with instructions.
clarnry break'in diplomatic rela- Chere was some initial (unnblin; in the handlin; of the Panama
tions and a cutoff of trade and ; `c b # crisii, mainly because some, of th President's top aids were still:
sea communications. It also orni; ting on the old Kemiecly wave length and hadn't tuned in on
brcuuled subversion as an act of ?' n the I.BJ signal. This apparently caused some psychological reverses
a ~ression which might warrant aror-'d the hemisphere.
collective counteraction, even the `~a a But Johnson kept his personal diplomacy rolling. During the
use of. armed force. , fast week in July-on the eve of the OAS meeting'-he called the
Many Complex factors con- Latin American ambassadors to the N[ hi4e Iiouse in small groups
tri )uted to the new mood reflect- rc 6 a on three different clays. And he let them talk about their problems-,
cd ):r the OAS action. One of the y hove to increase hemisphere exports, how to coordinate trade poll-'
nio,st important of these, perhaps, c Gies, how to improve the alliance.
leas the recent overthrow of the ? II Johnson didn't l;ress anyone regarding Cuba. Ile emphasized
leftist-dominated Brazilian gov- Thomas Mann America's determination to help the hemisphere. But he warned
crenumt of Joao Goulart. The LBJ's man for Latin America that the Latins would have to do the alliance job themselves. Ile
new rulers, headed by President particularly exhorted them to put more of their own private money
1-lumbcrto Castelo Branco, are strongly pro-U.S. and anti Comnnu-?; into the effort.
vats t. And Brazil threw its considerable weight behind mandatory; ts45 icn Sfill /5: Will It V~lork?
sanctions.
:
Other elements contributing to.the growing support for Cuba's It's too soon to say how successful Johnson's personal diplomacy,:
isolation were the flagrant Castro attempt to destroy Venezuela. will be. The problems of the hemisphere are so staggering-so
a general decline in popular infatuation with Castroism throughout; r:Lterly complex, so entangled in the coils of dead history, so in-
Latin America, and Secretary of State Rusk's personal negotiating! tr:c, table-that no one is tempted to be optimistic.
skill The Alliance for Progress urgently needed reorganization and
~ccovered From Their Visgivings r'a~et:eratior. wheat Johnson came to power. He has done what is i
necessary, but only time will tell whether the alliance will now
In the background, however, was stilt another factor which i,c'.c,,;rlc well, or even work. In the final analysis, it will rise or fall e)r
the least discussed but in some ways the most significant, lt' fhe performance of the Latins themselves. And their record is less
is the way that the Latins have recovered from the deep misgivings Lbac, prornising. I
tI1csy developed about U.S. policy at the time of President Kennedy's 1L B1.rt, ploti,rats say the special attention Johnson'has given to the
{ennccly's dest.h was a shock because it immediatel raised the ,": "u