THE CASE OF THE MISSING URANIUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400060003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400060003-2
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY t v~ 4J A
ARTICLE pt'PE- April 1979 r' -N
ON YAGE_R~~ -
majority of Americans now accept the use of
nuclear reactors to generate electricity. Im-
plicit in their decision is the assumption that
by David Burnham
CtA t. 3 i) t+('f (u.
~
(
`
75 "_4t
How and why did 200 pounds of highly
enriched uranium vanish from a small
processing plant in Pennsylvania? Why were
federal agencies reluctant to press their
investigations? And how was the theft
related to Israel's simultaneous development
of nuclear weapons?
nuclear power is safe: reactors will not cough up huge
clouds of radioactivity; wastes produced during the
burning of uranium will not poison the air and water of
future generations; and nuclear materials that can be
fashioned into atomic bombs will not be allowed to fall
into the hands of terrorist gangs or unstable nations.
As a reporter in Washington during the last few
years, I began to wonder about the third part of the
assumption, the idea that nuclear materials are ade-
quately protected. In December 1974, 1 asked the
Atomic Energy Commission exactly how many pounds
of bomb-grade material-highly enriched uranium
and plutonium-had disappeared from safekeeping.
Three and a half years later, after I had brought an
action under the Freedom of Information Act and after
the matter had been deliberated by the National Secu-
rity Council, 'the State Department, and the Justice
Department, the government finally answered my
question. As of the end of 1976, taking into account all
of the nuclear facilities in the United States, 8000
pounds of highly enriched uranium and plutorziurrt?
F "~~3E
could not be accounted for-enough, in theory, to
make hundreds of clandestine atomic weapons.
Where had the 8000 pounds gone? How was such a
loss possible? What about all the assurances that
nuclear power is safe? The officials who announced the
cumulative total of what they call MUF (material
unaccounted for) contended they had no evidence that
a significant amount of it had been stolen. The MUF,
they explained, almost certainly was stuck in the pipes
of the processing machines, was "lost'" through faulty
bookkeeping procedures, or had been accidentally
thrown away with radioactive trash such as scrap metal
and wiping rags.
Despite the assurances of government and industry
scientists committed to the broad use of atomic power,
however, the Central Intelligence Agency and several
congressional committees are convinced that, in at
least one instance, a foreign government probably
obtained from an American plant, illegally, enough
highly enriched uranium to arm itself with nuclear
bombs.
The single case of what may be the world's most
important theft in'the last two decades involves Israel
and a company called the Nuclear Materials and
Equipment Corporation. The case has now generated
at least ten separate investigations by such groups as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, the General Accountirg Office, the
Atomic Energy Commission, and four congressional
committees. Several of the investigations are still
under way.
The mystery surrounding NUMEC and how the
Atomic Energy Commission and the FBI reacted when
they learned the company's managers were unable to
account. for about 200 pounds of highly enriched urani-
Approved 'For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400060003-2