LETTER TO HON. GEORGE H. BUSH FROM MARTIN G. CRAMER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000300630023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 10, 1977
• Content Type: LETTER

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Committee for a National Intelligence Museum
F.O. Bo:, 34682
Washington, D. C. 20034
Execurivo ft r w-y
Tanury.-LO, 1977
Hon. George H. Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
Dear Mr. Bush:
This letter is to enliet your supf)ort for a project to
establish a National Intelligence Museum in Washington. As
STAT discussed with of your staff, my associates and I
hope that, upon leaving your present assignment, you will con-
sider:
(1) Serving on the Advisory Board of the Museum, and event-
ually also of a Center on Intelligence and National Deci-
sions, which, hopefully, will be located at the site of the
TMfuseum;
(2) Assisting in the large grants phase of our fundraising
effort through endorsement of the project to potential
individual donors and foundations;
(3) Assistance in helping; us to gain access to other national
leaders whom we wish to ask to serve on the Advisory Board;
and
(?'-) Advice on Museum thrust and content.
I have discussed this project with many foriiier members of
the intelligence community. Among those who have endorsed the
concept and are assisting with our efforts to get the project
launched are Ray Cline and John Bross, both of whom are members
of the Committee which we have formed recently. Others who have
given favorable consideration in principle include Bill Colby,
William Casey, and Melvin Laird.
We plan to ask President Ford to be Honorary Chairman of
the Advisory Board, and Vice-President Rockefeller to be Chair-
man.
We also plan to approach all of the following about member-
ship on the Advisory Board of the Museum: Governor Connally;
Senator Buckley; Secretary Simon; Governor Reagan; Ambassador
McGhee; Ambassador Luce; Mr. Cherne; Secretary Rumsfeld; leMr. Ball;
Ambassador Shirley Temple Black; Senator Brock; Ambassador Bruce;
Ambassador Rush; Ir. Varner; Mr. Warncke; Mr. Ailes; Ambassador
Middendorff; mr. Ruckelshaus; Ambassador Irwin; Secretary
Richardson; Mr. Packard; M. Clement; Senator Taft; Julia Child;
Frank Lindsey; James Stewart; John Wayne; and Mr. MaCone.
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:'after our Advisory Board membership is partly filled we
plan to ask some Representatives and. Senators to also serve
(eg. Senator Mathias and Senator Nunn); but we do not plan to
ask any incumhe it officers of the Executive Branch to serve.
I am enclosing for you review, several descriptive items
on the Museum and the Center. All are subject to change as the
project develops.
We would add a few further specific commeriks on the project
for your consideration.
6? le have worked out relatively detailed cost estimates and
financial projections. We believe the Museum will, in a very f0w
years, be self-sustaining and be able to direct income from
ticket and book sales, riot only to maintenance and updating of
the Museum, but also activities of the Center, and, eventually,
;.rants to other nonprofit organizations whose activities servo
the purposes of the Museum and Center.
In ad6Ition, we have identified a number of very promising
sites in downtown Washington, where the tourists are; and the
legal work for incorporating the Museum and seeking non-prof it
:status from the IRS is being done by Covington and Burling on
a. pro bona publico basis. A basis is also being laid for :>ur
initial fundraising effort.
We should be very pleased to provide you with further
information about the project, either in person or by mail.
~:? ho-ne very much you will be Interested in this project;
and-16ok forward to discussiri, it with you in the near future.
#inoerely,
MCi. L't i n G. C r,.i y r
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AND CENTER ON INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL DECISIONS
PROPOSED ACTIVITIES:
1. Develop, establish 'and administer a National Historical Intelligence
Museum for public education.
2. Establish a series of National Prizes for the best writings on
intelligence and national decision-making in a democracy --
a. media coverage - print media - magazines and newspapers;
b. media coverage - electronic media;
c. media coverage - non-technical written materials, including
speeches or lectures prepared for presentation to public
affairs or educational organizations;
d. articles from learned journals or prepared for centers of
special study (university centers, think tanks, Council
on Foreign Relations, Foreign Policy);
e. full length books.
3. Working with other interested organizations, establish a lecture
series on intelligence and national decision-making in a democracy
and related subjects. Examples might include:
a. The history of covert intelligence collection and other
covert activities, e.g., intelligence in the American
revolution;
b. military intelligence;
c. legislative oversight of intelligenc activities;
d. media treatment of intelligence actlYies;
e. counter-intelligence in a democracy;
f. judicial treatment of intelligence activities;
g. Presidential oversight of intelligence activities;
h. information and misinformation on espionage in books
and movies.
4. Host meetings and symposia ' covering these and other subjects,
and provide a site for organizational meetings for other non-profit
organizations interested in subjects of priority interest to the
Center.
5. Sponsor a film series on intelligence and related activities in
peace and war.
6. Publish a newsletter digest on meetings; papers and articles,
organizational activities of interest to students of intelligence and
national decision-making in the U.S.
7. Maintain a reading room and hospitality facility for scholars
visiting Washington who are undertaking research in the Library of
Congress and elsewhere on subjects of priority interest to the
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8. Provide information and services.to member organizations and
individuals, to the`extent staff permits.
9. Cooperate with research and other non-profit academically-oriented
associations in support of Center objectives. Such organizations
would include the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, the
Military Studies Section of the International Studies Association,
the National Military Intelligence Association, the Hoover Library
and Institution, the American Enterprise Institute, American
Historical Association, Organization of American Historians,
American Political Science Association and the military history
associations.
10. Assist organizations and individuals in the preparation of educa-
tional materials on intelligence and national decision-making for
both college and school level teaching, through bibliographic and
other advice. '
11. Encourage expanded consideration of intelligence and national
decision-making for inclusion in national meetings and other activi-
ties of learned and other national education, public service,
patriotic, veterans and youth organizations.
12. Develop a program for summer interns to assist with research on
intelligence and national decision-making and other Center activi-
ties, to be funded through a separate, later development effort.
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Project for a Nations i Intelligence vu.seum
In the Nation's C 3.;}ital
The intense recent criticism of our intelligence agencies,
some warranted, much unwarranted, has now continued for many months.
The impact of this criticism--and particularly, the exposure of
secret which has sometimes adoompanied these attache and critiques---
have been very destructive. The nature of the damage wrought has
been spelled out in recent articles b;~, former Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird in the '.leader's Digest and Lieutenant General Daniel
Gra.hf_.3ra, former Director of the lac ('ense Intelligence Agency in a
study of U. 3. strategy and the need for good intelligence.
In a democracy all agencies, including those which depend on
secrecy, can expect eublic criticism and can, on occasion be improved
by it. The kind of expceure, however, received recently by our
main f.orel,ggn ietel-ligence agency can only be damaging. America's
allies wonder whether their futures can be linked closely with
that of a country which hac done so much in recent years which has
crippled one of its principal national. security arms. Newspaper
accounts indicate that while these developments were taking place,
the KGf and. its a.'Llies continued business as usual.
How could this situation .ave come about? How, for that
matter, could. there have been so lit''le public involvement in the
arguments that have raged for several years over the place of
intelligence organizations and activities of the world's most
complicated and powerful democracy? Part of the answer lies,
surely, in the lark of knowled ;e and understending of intelligence
amon the American people.
It is almost incredible that, although our leaders and our
people are incr. easingly educated, they know very little :,bout
intelligence, its historical importance to our country, and partic-
ularly its role in the establishment of the United States; or its
present role in national decsion-making on defense and international
questions. Some very basic factors relating to intelligence, which
are too little understood by our people, are that:
Intelligence operations rep,'ssent a virtually universal
activity worldwide.
Intelligence collection, however,-- especially through
espionage---is also one of the most "national" activities,
varying greatly between free and totalitarian countries
both with regard to how they are conducted and how they
are viewed.
- Espionage is one of the uldest activities of ppeorples, long
befcre thcac were nations in the modern >ense.
-- Although Americans have long thought of intelli,.ernce and
related operations as somehow "un-American". American
national interests have been greatly influenced by them
from Revolutionaa,y times and through hot and cold wars
ever since the Republic was founded.
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-- Major national decisions depend on good information,
including intelligence. But having good information
does not always mean it will be used in a timely fashion--
or lead to wise decisions.
- As the world has become technology-centered, so has the
arena of intelligence and espionage---in the air and space
and the oceans, as well as on land. But it has always had
its technical side, from the first secret writing onward.
Nor are the specifics about intelligence, which bear upon our
national history or prospects, known by our people.
Beginning with George Washington's campaigns and Ben Franklin's
mission to enlist France as a secret ally of the revolting American
colonies, intelligence has played a very important part in the
country's past, which has barely found its way into the popular
education of Americans. Lives, resources, and. the well-being of
allies have all depended on good information, well used by our
national leaders, both in war-time and in time of often precarious
peace.
Confronted with a long list of battles and other events which
had a profound impact on the life of the nation or millions of its
people, even our highly informed voting public could not describe
the role intelligence played in these events. Yet from Trenton and
King's Mountain to the Bay of Pigs, the Cuba Missile Crisis, and
the wars in the Near East and East Asia, as well as in the wars
and confrontations over the fate of Europe, how intelligence was
gathered, analyzed, disseminated and used by us, our friends and
our adversaries, had very substantial influence on decisions--
good and bad---whi.ch affected us all.
Consider a few questions about such events, taken from a very
long list: What did happen before Pearl Harbor? Was the problem
lack of information, or poor dissemination, or poor analysis, or
all of these things?...What were the warnings which were disregarded.
by Stalin when Hitler's armies attacked the USSR, despite a pact
between Aaz.i Germany and Soviet Russia? Is it true he was given
the exact date of the massive attack, and still refused to believe
the intelligence available to him?...Did cryptographic breakthroughs
almost lose the Battle of the Atlantic for the British, when the
Nazis were breaking their naval codes? Lie behind Rommell's North
African victories? Lead to many strategic and tactical victories
by the British and Americans, because Hitler's exchanges with his
top commanders were being read by the Allies? And bring about the
death of one of Japan's top military commanders?...Or, if you prefer
some of the other secret activities allied with intelligence collec-
tion--what were the many ways the British successfully deceived
the Nazi leaders which were so important to the outcome of D-Day
and World War II generally?
Or, going back well before the Second World War: Can it be
proved that the early Chinese and other ancients conducted espionage
operations? Are Napoleon and Queen Elizabeth sort of the modern
parents of professional intelligence activities? How did the
British learn about the Zimmerman Note, inviting Mexico to join
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large influence on whether the U.S. would join the nations allied
against the Kaiser? For that matter, how much did the North know
about prospects for hostilities when the Civil War broke out?
And, how far into intelligence operations did General Washington
actually get?
Or, shifting to intelligence in the age of science and
technology: How many of our people could comment on the role of
technology in intelligence--beyond cryptography--over the years
and centuries? On the U-2? the Polaris? the SAMOS satellite?
How many would know that our intelligence people listened. to the
communications of hostile leaders from a tunnel under Berlin'?
How many of our younger citizens would know our Ambassador at the
UN displayed there a "bugged" eagle from our Embassy in Moscow?
Equally interesting is the subject which snakes up the third
main element of the information which will he conveyed in the Nations
Intelligence Museum--People. What a crowd the people--all real
people--who have been involved in intelligence and its allied acti-
vities make! Many are familiar from history; others, from the movie
or books... heroes. and villains, Who's Who in Espionage from England,
France, Nazi German, the Soviet Union, and Militarist Japan; and
the heroes of the Resistance, such as those who blew up the heavy
water plant in Norway or spirited the secrets of the V-weapons from
Poland.
Some of the people who played major roles in the development
of intelligence will be very well known; and the names of others wil
have become known only well after their death and to a relatively
few people. All who receive this letter will have heard, of course,
of the Presidents who had the most direct involvement with intel-
ligence and related activities--Washington (as a military man
before becoming President), Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower (also as
a General), Kennedy, Nixon and Ford.
Almost everyone will have heard of Major Andre and Benedict
Arnold, and know that the British had a spy (a double agent of
sorts) working for Ben Franklin; but how many will have heard of
General Washington's head of intelligence, Benjamin Tallmadge, or
Robert Townsend, another unsung hero of American intelligence in
our War of Independence? or later, in the Civil War, of Rose
Greenhow?
All or most, will also have heard of two of the best known
figures of modern U.S. intelligence--General "Wild Bull" Donovan
and Allan Dulles, in particular. et how many of us know about
Herbert Yardley, the flawed genius of American cryptography who
broke the Japanese codes before World War II, or Colonel William
Friedman, another parent of modern American cryptography... or
remember who Francis Gary Powers of the U-2, or Captain Lloyd
Butcher of the Pueblo were? or know how important intelligence
was to Winston Churchill throughout his career? or to General
Rommel? or in the Rattle of Midway? or what Kim Philby, "Colonel
Abel", George Blake, Burgess and McClain, or Richard Sorge did for
the USSR; or "Cicero" for the Nazis; or Moe Berg, or Colonel Pen-
kovsky for the U.S. and Britain?
The Museum will thus fill a need in the three main areas which
it will describe--History; Technology; and "People", all si.ibjects
on which the American ase 2005/01%11 CIASF D P88-
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a lot mo r~pe'i'fl~?'solF,90 .
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The Committee is confident that the National Intelligence
Museum will attract a very large attendance. This assumption is
based on the widespread interest in the subject of the exhibits.
It is also based on the knowledge that museums have become a
very important part of the country's educational and entertainment
network. The annual attendance at Washington's institutions which
display exhibits is extremely impressive--up to 14 million visits
a year to parts of the Smithsonian Institution and over half a
million to the commercial wax museum. The FBI tour, movie and
small exhibit, draw half a million people a year, as does the
display at the more scholarly-focused National Archives.
We believe, therefore, that the Museum will reach a self-
sustaining basis in a relatively few years and will, over time,
reach a point where it will also fund a Center on Intelligence
and National Decisions to be sited at the Museum. Hopefully, it
will also gain enough revenues from memberships, and ticket and
book sales to assist other projects which strengthen education
on the role of intelligence in national decision-making.
A people as uninformed as ours about intelligence cannot
make decisions relating to the nation's intelligence programs
as well as if they understood the uses, limits, history, and
future of this vital activity. Such understanding is as necessary
to the well-being of the Republic as it was when our nation was
founded. The reasons for these statements are not hard to find:
- The U.S. faces another weapons superpower with worldwide
interests and a proclaimed objective of seeing free
political and economic systems pass into history.
- Questions on arms limitation agreements and the massive
budgetary questions on weapons systems which relate to
them must be faced continually. Arms limitation agreements,
moreover, continue to depend upon technologically-advanced
means of intelligence-collection.
- Nuclear capabilities have spread to many smaller countries;
and this spread is accompanied by the threat that nuclear
weapons might fall into the hands of other groups such as
terrorist forces engaged in national or regional struggles.
At the same time, terrorists, using conventional weapons,
pose a danger to the world's airways and to most regions
of the globe.
-? Governments change worldround with bewildering frequency.
"Successions" occur in nations large and small, resource-rich
or poor, important or unimportant strategically. Such
changes occur with or without warning, legally or illegally,
predicted or unpredicted. In aduition to attempting to
foresee them, it is a function of intelligence to evaluate
their impact, if any, on U.S. interests.
For all these reasons, the American people need now, perhaps
more than ever, to support our intelligence activities because
they understand them and the need for them. The many means of
education and communication in this media-centered age, TV, newspaper
universities, and public affairs forums, are expanding their treat-
ment of this important subject. But an important educational instru-
ment is lacking. Unlike several smaller countries which have "Resis-
tance" or. "war" museums, the U.S. has no museum dedicated to educatin
and informing large numbers of our citizens on inteili,,ence and how
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. This gap has existed too long, The Committee for a National.
Intelligence huseum is working to eliminate it through establishing
this powerful educational device in the nation's capital.
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The Need for a National Intelligence Museum
as an Instrument for Public Education
Communication in the U. S. on intelligence and national decision-making
needs to be institutionalized and taken out of a polemic context. Pro-college
education does not try; undergraduate and even postgraduate higher education
covering the subjects roaches very few people. Efforts of government agencies
are limited., a1moab by de:finition,. Volunteer and other private efforts
are thus far. limited to the conventional media.
The papers which follow attempt to describe a new way of providing
comprehensive and lasting information to the US public on intelligence and its
uses. The institution to be used is a National Intelligence Museum.
The American is deluged by information through all of the mass media on
an incredible variety of subjects. Recently - as on some past occasions since
World War II - this deluge has included a heavy barrage of information and
opinion regarding intelligence and related secret activities, and, particularly, the
question of how best an intelligence apparatus might best be made to serve the
purposes of a rare type of country, a gigantic democracy.
The polemic discussions, and the national fever which underlay them in part,
seem to have diminished somewhat; but they spawned an interesting phenomenon,
which would appear to be more lasting... an attempt by organizations and individuals
with varying points of view on intelligence, and on the US intelligence community, to
put those viewpoints before an expanding public.
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These informational campaigns, together with the natural activities of the
media to cover intelligence-related subjects, led to a fairly large outpouring of
television programs, radio discussions, newspaper analyses and magazine coverage;
and several books will be forthcoming soon from distinguished alumni of the US
intelligence community.
Although it is sometimes hard to see, in the long run? this is probably all
to the good. The American public, including the informed public on current international
affairs and the smaller groups informed on defense matters and on the history of US
foreign policy decision-slaking, has paid too little attention to intelligence and its
importance to the nation.
Despite excellent documentaries, informative films, extensive newspaper
coverage, and intermittent debates in the Congress, even highly informed Americans
remain uninformed and naive about the role of intelligence and the making of national
decisions, including those with huge impact on the nation and its future. Wherever
an observer's views fall on the spectrum of opinion on the secret activities of the US
and other nations, he would probably agree there is not much understanding of them
in America.
instead of an understanding of the importance of timely dissemination of
information and continuing evaluation of trouble spots in terms of Pearl Harbor,
we are likely to find it explained in a one-line stereotyped sentence.
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31
educate on intelligence and its part ill the past, current and future national and
world scene. And, anyhow, such coverage is transient.
The museum is perhaps the most underestimated communication and
educational institution in North America. But the Smithsonian Institution and
the Toronto Museum of Science and Technology, for example, have demonstrated
what powerful tools for education and information they can be. Available, flexible,
and a fine site for the use of other media and face to face discussion, a,private
national intelligence museum would be a very useful addition to the necessary
effort to educate the U. S. public on intelligence and its uses.
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Martin Cramer, USIA, is calling and now
wants to come out to see me at 2:15 tomorrow
about the Agency's "new openness" per this
morning's Washington Post.
is promoting
in a yeer big way establishment of a"National
Intelligence Museum" at a downtown location
and has tried to enlist Mr. Bush as an advisor,
and other former DCI's to aid his promotion.
He also is in touch with various former
presidents, senators, and ambassadors. Cramer
has been r luctant to talk at the l
evel heretofore I guess he s
deride c he will not get in to you or Admiral
Turner, which I don't think he should.
I propose to see him to hear him out, unless
you object, and discuss the proposed visitors
program in a very general way.
Regarding the museum, there is a much better
idea, on the back burner, to establish an Agency
exhibit here in the building (or at the Smith-
sonian as Mr. Colby considered) to portray on an
unclassified basis some of the memorabilia of
Intelligence. favors this idea and
feels it could a one in ouse. Mr. Blake
is worried about space an Mr. Gambino about
security but neither oppose it outright. I
believe this is worth exploring a little further
in light of our outreach and visitors ro rams.
If you agree I will take up with Iland
report in a week or two. We can discuss further
at your convenience.
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Project for a National. "Cntelll~;cnce Iiureum
In the Nation's S Apital
The intense recent erltlcism of our intelligence agencies,
some warranted, much unwarranted, has now continued for many-months.
The impact of this criticism--and particularly, the exposure of
secrets which has sometlrae.s accompanied these attache and critiques--
;e tirrou ht has
f the dam
.
have been very destructive. The nature o
been spelled out in recent articles `b_y-former Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird. In the Reader's Digest =d-'Lieutenant General Daniel .
Graham, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in a
e need for goad
d t
CflCe
l
study of U. S. strategy an
e~>encl on
h
~those
In a democracy all agencies, including
ti~
secrecy, can expect Dublic criticism and can,-on occasion be improved
received recently by our
er
-
,
howev
by it. The kind of exposure;_.
main foreign intelligence' agenov can only be. damaging. A.ruerica's
cad be linked closely with
tures
f
i
.
u
r
allies wonder whether the
that of a country which hasp done so. muc~i in decent years which has
rm 141-
a
t
aecur
.
y
s
crippled one of its principal national
accounts indicate that while these dev.e-lop:ients were taking place,
the KGB and its allies continued business 8.s usual.
How could this situation have come .bout? How, for that
matter, could, there have been so little public involvement in the'
arguments that have raged for several.years.over_tie place of
intelligence organizations and activitiea,-of the world's most
Pare of the' 'answer lies,
complicated and powerful democracy?
surely, in the lack of knowledge and 'understanding of intelligence
among the American people.
It is almost incredible that, although our leaders and our
people are increasingly educated, they know very little about
Intelligence, Its historical importance to our country, and p
ula.rly its role in the establishment of the United' States; or. ito
present role in national decision--making Ion defec.ee and international
questions. Some very basic factors relating-to inteiligence,.which
are too little understood by pur people, are that;
-> Intelligence operations repregent a virtually universal
activity worldwide.
Intelligence collection, however,-'- especially through
espionage--is also one of the most "national" activities,
varying greatly between free'and totalitarian countries
both with regard to how they are conducted and how they
are viewed.
- Espionage is one of the oldest activities of peoples, long
before there were nations in the modern sense.
- Although Americans have long thought of intelli~_; nce and
related operations as somehow "un-American". American
national interests have been greatly influenced by them
from Revolutionary times and throus:h hot and cold wars
ever since the Republic was founded..
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-- Major national decisions depend on good information,
including intelligence. But having good information
does not always mean it will be used in a timely fashion--
or lead to wise decisions.
As the world has become. technology-centered, so has the
arena of intelligence and espionage--in the air and space
and the oceans, as well as on :land. But it has always had
its technical side, from the:-first ecret writing onward.
Nor are the specifics about intelligence, which bear upon our
national history or prospects, known by our people.
Beginning with George Washington's campaigns and Ben Franklin's
mission to enlist France as a secret ally of-the revolting American
colonies, intelligence has`. played a very'important'part in the
country's past, which has barely.found its way into the popular
education of Americans. Lives, resources, and"the well-being of
allies have all depended on good informati.ori., well used by our
national leaders, both in war-time .and in_.time of often precarious
peace.
Confronted with a long list of battles and other events which
had a profound impact on the life of -the .'nation or millions of its
people, even our highly' informed voting.'piiblic could not describe
the role intelligence played in these-events. Yet from Trenton and
King's Mountain to the Bay of Pigs, the Cuba Missile Cri.sis,.and
the wars in the Near East and East As.ia,'_as* well as in the wars
and confrontations over the fate of Europe, how intelligence was
gathered, analyzed, disseminated and'=used by us, our friends and
our adversaries, had very substantial influence on decisions--.
good and bad--which affected us all.'
Consider a few questions about such events,'taken from a very.,
long list: What did happen before `Pearl. Harbor? -'Was the problem
lack of information, or poor dissemination, or`-poor_ analysis, ,or
all of these things?...What were the warnings which were disregarded
by Stalin when Hitler's. armies attacked the USSR, despite a pact
between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia? Is it true he was given
the exact date of the massive attack,,-,anc1 still refused to believe
the intelligence available'to.him?...Did cryptographic breakthroughs
almost lose the Battle of the Atlantic .for-the British, when the
Nazis were'breaking their naval codes?. Lie behind Rozmnell's North
African victories? Lead to many strategic and tactical victories
by the British and Americans, because Hitler's exchanges with his
top commanders were being read by the Allies? And bring about the
death of one of Japan's top military commanders? ...Or, if you prefer
some of the other secret activities allied with intelligence collec-
tion--what were the many ways the British successfully deceived
the Nazi leaders which were sQ important to the outcome of D-Day
and World War II generally? {
Or, going back well before the Second World War: Can it be
proved that the early Chinese and other ancients conducted espionage
operations? Are Napoleon and Queen Elizabeth sort of the modern
parents of professional intelligence activities? How did the
British learn about the Zimmerman Note, inviting Mexico to join
Imperial Germany against the U.S. in World War I, a discovery of very;
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The Committee is confident that the National Intelligence
Museum will attract a very large attendance. This assumption is
based on the widespread interest in the subject of the exhibits.
It is also based on the knowledge that museums have become a
very important part of the country's educational and entertainment
network. The annual attendance at Washington's-institutions which
display exhibits is extremely impressive--up to 14 million visits
a year to parts of the Smithsonian'Institution and over half a
million to the commercial wax museum., The FBI tour, movie and
small exhibit, draw half a million.. people a.. year, as does the.
display at the more scholarly--focused-National Archives.
We believe, therefore, that the Museum will reach a self-
sustaining basis in a relatively few years and will, over time,
reach a point where it will also fund a Center on Intelligence
and National Decisions to be. sited at the Museum. Hopefully, it
will also gain enough revenues. from memberships, and ticket and
book sales to assist other .projects which' strengthen education
on the role of intelligence in national decision-making.
A people as uninformed as ours abou,t._;iitelligence cannot
make decisions relating to the nation' s=-int-e-1ligenc'e-programs
as well as if they understood the uses-;'limits, history, and
future of this vital activity. Such understanding is as necessary
to the well-being of the Republic as-it was-.when our nation was
founded. The reasons for these statements are xrot hard to find:
The U.S. faces another weapons superpower with worldwide
interests and a proclaimed objective of seeing free
political and economic systems pass into history.
- Questions on arms limitation agreements and the massive
budgetary questions on weapons systems which relate'to
them must be faced continually. Arms limitation agreements,
moreover, continue to depend upon tec.hno'logically-advanced
means of intelligence-collection.
Nuclear capabilities have spread..to many smaller countries;
and this spread is accompanied by-.the threat that nuclear
weapons might fall into the hands of-other groups such as
terrorist forces engaged in national or regional struggles...
At the same time, terrorists,.: using conventional weapons,
pose a danger to the world's..-airways and to most regions
of "the globe.
Governments change worldround with bewildering frequency.
"Successions" occur in-nations Large and small, resource-rich
or poor, important or unimportant strategically. Such
changes occur with. or without warning, legally or illegally,
predicted or unpredicted. In addition to attempting to'
foresee them, it is a function of intelligence to evaluate
heir impact, if any, on U.S.
`
i`e`se eons, the Ame zr can people need now, perhaps
For all ~
more than ever, to support our intelligence activities because
they'understand them and the need for them. The many means of
education and communication in this media-centered age, TV, newspaper:.
universities, and public affairs forums, are expanding their treat-
ment of this important subject. But an important educational instru-
ment is lacking. Unlike several smaller countries which have "Resis-
tance" or "war" museums, the U.S. has no museum dedicated to educating
and or904
R}~ ''o59cfl/~PlurCl~i?d?b~134ko1~?'~e and how
it serves the defense of our free institutions.
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This gap has existed too long, The Committee for a National
Intelligence Museum is working to eliminate it through establishing
this powerful educational device in the nation's capital.
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The Need for a National Intelligence Museum
as an Instrument for Public Education
Communication in the U. S. on intelligence and national decision-making
needs to be institutionalized and taken out of a polemic context. Pre-college
education does not try; undergraduate and even postgraduate higher education
covering the subjects reaches very few people. Efforts of government agencies
are limited, fragmented and often ineffective. Volunteer and other private efforts
are thus far limited to the conventional media.
The papers which follow attempt to describe a new way of providing
comprehensive and lasting information to the US public on intelligence and its
uses. The institution to be used is a National Intelligence Museum.
The American is deluged by information through all of the mass media on
an incredible variety of subjects. Recently - as on some past occasions since
World War U. - this deluge has included a heavy barrage of information and
opinion regarding intelligence and related secret activities, and, particularly, the
question of how best an intelligence apparatus might best be made to serve the
purposes cf a rare type of country, a gigantic democracy.
The polemic discussions, and the national fever which underlay them in part,
seem.to have diminished somewhat; but they spawned an interesting phenomenon,
which would appear to be more lasting... an attempt by organizations and individuals
with varying points of view on intelligence, and on the US intelligence community, to
put those viewpoints before an expanding public.
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These informational campaigns, together with the natural activities of the
media to cover intelligence-related subjects, led to a fairly large outpouring of
television programs, radio discussions, newspaper analyses and magazine coverage;
and several books will be forthcoming soon from distinguished alumni of the US
intelligence community.
Although it is sometimes hard to see, in the long run.,, this is probably all
to the good. The American public, including the informed public on current international
affairs and the smaller groups informed on defense matters and on the history of US
foreign policy decision-making, has paid too little attention to intelligence and its
importance to the nation.
Despite excellent documentaries, informative films, extensive newspaper
coverage, and intermittent debates in the Congress, even highly informed Americans
remain uninformed and naive about the role of intelligence and the making of national
decisions, including those with huge impact on the nation and its future. Wherever
an observer's views fall on the spectrum of opinion on the secret activities of the US
and other nations, he would probably agree there is not much understanding of them
in America.
Instead of an understanding of the importance of timely dissemination of
information and continuing evaluation of trouble spots in terms of Pearl Harbor,
we are likely to find it explained in a one-line stereotyped sentence. The intelligence
aspects of the national experience in Vietnam was buried in reams of polemic or
journalistic paper, and had to be extracted by an interested citizen from the Pentagon
Pagers and elsewhere. Newspaper coverage which dwells on the colorful Glomar
craft or past talk of possible political assassinations does little to inform and
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3.
educate on intelligence and its part in the past, current and future national and
world scene. And, anyhow, such coverage is transient.
The museum is perhaps the most underestimated communication and
educational institution in North America. But the Smithsonian Institution and
the Toronto Museum of Science and Technology, for example, have demonstrated
what powerful tools for education and information .they can be. Available, flexible,
and a fine site for the use of other media and face to face discussion, a private
national intelligence museum would be a very useful addition to the necessary
effort to educate the U. S. public on intelligence and its uses.
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