INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM CONCEPT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000300630010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: June 30, 1972
• Content Type: MF

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ILLEGIB
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT: Intelligence Museum Concept
effort would involve documents, photographs, hardware and
other materiel, vehicles and miscellaneous memorabilia, all
henceforth called "historical material."
ianal development, before the material finally vanishes. This
I material which is important to the history of CIA's opera-
out a museum, is to identify, and tag for non-destruction,
2. The task we must undertake then, well before we talk
The attached concept paper by STAT
identifies a set of principles connected with the establish-
ment of an historical museum which I would like to recommend
to you. They are:
1. Some offices - Communications is an example - have
taken an historical view and already have begun to preserve
technical gear which in its day raised the technology of
communication to a higher plateau, or gear which has been
used in notable operational cases. Other offices with less
sense of history have, no such program, and already may have
lost or destroyed material which played a significant role
in CIA's history, then became outmoded and was discarded.
~y exhibiting in a museum. For this reason we see the museum
3. Exhibition - the concept of a museum - is a
by-produ ~ o _,preservation. At least initially em iasis
sh ould be given to the primary task of identifying historical
material in order . to arrange or i s preerv on, rather
than to the luxurv of _exhibx,;t t This sequence show d
he p de: ect a natural concern that the security of a sensi-
tive device, even an outmoded one, machined into one or
another piece of intelligence collection may be threatened
as evolving slowly, and perhaps at several security levels.
4. The basic museum as we visualize it would not be a
static collection. Instead.it would be a series of displays
using declassified historical material which would be
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rotated in and out of the conservancy collection. (The
forthcoming exhibit of Cuban Missile Crisis photographs and
hardware is a good example of endlessly interesting material
h' hl classified but now can be shown in
which once was ig J
this way.) A possible adjunct to the basic museum collection
would be a small museum which we understand the DCI wants
near his office, in which he could show Agency achievements
Other additions to the basic museum
rs
it
i
o
s
to selected v
. STAT would be the small s-pecialized museums which already exist.
uc satellite museums in our opinion ou co ,
should not be superseded by a central museum. In fact we
would expect these satellite museums to provide exhibits to
the central museum, and to whatever small classified museum
is created for the DCI.
5. No central repository need be established .f or all
material which is designated as historical. Offices which
have the space and interest in housing their own histori-
cal material (Commo, OTR, and TSD are examples) may wish
to retain custody of it, so long as all items which have
been accorded historical material status are recognized as
being under the ultimate control of the central Agency
collection. Nevertheless, at least one storage site will
the historical material from
for
~
have~.
to be
offices which lack storage space of their own.
have
a
t
y
m
is a possible site. Special storage arrangemen
to be made from time to time for especially sensitive items.
In summary we see the problem as the following:
l
P17.J
a. Identifying, cataloguing and preservig
documents, photographs, hardware and other materiel,
vehicles and miscellaneous memorabilia which have
been significant in the development of CIA and its
operations;
b. Arranging for their progressive declassifi-
cation, on terms agreed to by whichever directorate
used the material operationally; and
c. Exhibiting the material when exhibition
would have a salutary effect on employee morale,
on training, or on special problems the DCI
identifies.
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We believe that a one-shot exhibit such as the Cuban Missile
e
lli
genc
Crisis can be arranged under the aegis of the Inte
Museum Committee, as is being done, but that the larger
problem needs the attention of a separate commission which
will attend not just to the last but to all three of the
foregoing functions. Furthermore, we think it important
to find a senior officer to chair the historical material
commission and actively to head the program, whom the
4.,-.,4 ..
-F hi stori ca
o
imaterial items which in some cases may be politically
sensitive as dell as highly classified. Our guess is that
i#her the commission` chairman or alternatively a curator
working under his guidance will have to be employed full-
time.
6. If you agree that the foregoing principles are a
reasonable basis for further action I suggest that they be
distributed to the deputy directors for comment, and for.,
their recommendations of candidates to take the commission
chairmanship and get the pro
Chairman,.Fine Arts Commission
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