AMERICA'S WHITE COLLAR MERCENARIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000300380003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 16, 1978
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

ARTICLE APPEARED INQUIRY i1AGAZINE
ON PA45L9pr9(ed For Release 20041141Qt6lIQ-X88-01315R000300380003-8
Our arms salespolicies
have created "commitments" that could
embroil us in another foreign war.
THESE ADVERTISE-
ments, placed in well-known
periodicals, are geared toward
a new kind of mercenary: a
soldier of fortune who sells his
technical abilities rather than.
combat skills, who wears a
suit and tie rather than com
bat fatigues, and who carries
an attache case rather than a
submachine gun-in other
words, a white-collar mercenary..
Unlike the mercenaries of old,
who usually worked for dis-
reputable governments or
renegade warlords, this new
breed of warriors usually
earlier (excluding Vietnam
War programs). Most experts
agree, moreover, that the num-
ber af_ Americans working
on such programs will in-
crease enormously over the
next `decade, as ambitious
Third World countries seek to
expand and modernize their
military arsenals.
The proliferation of white-
collar mercenaries is a direct
consequence of the boom
in military sales to newly
rich, developing countries. Al-
though many of these nations
-particularly the oil king-
doms of the Persian Gulf-possess the will and cash to be-
come modern military powers, they lack the trained per-
sonnel needed to maintain and operate all the new high-
technology arms they have acquired from the advanced na-
tions. Many Third World nations now require that any
major arms contract provide for the delivery of such
"back-up" services as training, logistics, and maintenance
along with the weaponry itself And since the need for such
"technical military services" tends to increase with the de-
gree of sophistication of the weapons involved, the growing
trade in high-technology arms has naturally led to a boom-
p
the Militarism and Duarmameat
were some 11,300 U.S. "civilian contract personnel" work-
in overseas in connection with military sales programs, or Project of the Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., and author of
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btary. general ststfi_referrabty us
works for established governments or, more often, for giant
multinational corporations engaged in the arms trade. In-
stead of spearheading coups or revolts, the new mercenaries
spend their workdays repairing missiles, programming
computers, or operating communications consoles. And
while these new mercenaries may lack the elan of their more
traditional brethren, they can pride themselves on taking
control over the war machines of some of the world's most
important new powers.
From all available indications, the number of white-
collar mercenaries deployed abroad is rising rapidly. Ac-
artment figures in early 1978 there
cordin to State De
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-Wh q?r7nsl?an5Rf 0A3003$OtoO3-8--ne anywhere in the
in,- demand for white-collar mercenaries.
As the world's leading supplier of modern arms, the Persian Gulf if insurgent forces seize control of any of the lit-
United States-is not surprisingly the principal source of toral sheikdoms, and such action could conceivably precipi-
technical military services. According to government tate retaliation by one of the radical Arab states. By the
figures, a total of 14,362 U.S. nationals were engaged in same token, Saudi Arabia's continuing support for the
tasks arising from the "implementation of sales and com- "front-line" Arab states could easily provoke Israeli repris-
mercial exports under the Arms Export Control Act" on als (directed, in particular, against Saudi air force in-
January 1, 1978. Of this number, 11,323 were civilians and stallations) in the event of a new Mideast conflict. Either of
another 3039 were U.S. military personnel assigned to mili- these scenarios-or others equally credible-would almost
tan- missions and technical assistance field teams. Most ex- inevitably produce significant American casualties. Under
perts, however, consider these figures to be extremely con- such circumstances, the President would be under enor-
servative, since they exclude many technicians working in mous pressure to take decisive action to protect the remain-
such military-related activities as highway and harbor con-% ing Americans and their families (who usually accompany
struction, telecommunications development, and air-traffic U.S. white-collar mercenaries on extended assignments
control. Indeed, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee abroad). And given the scale of the U.S. support apparatus
estimated in 1976 that there were at least 24,000 Americans, in some of these countries, any such rescue operation would I
in Iran alone, working on military-related projects, and surely require a major military effort. In this way we could
that the total would reach 50,000 to 60,000 by 1980. , be sucked into a major military conflict.that we otherwise
The sale of technical military services can be extremely could have avoided.
lucrative. According to the Defense Security Assistance Even if we are not drawn into such a conflict, these pro-
Agency, between February 1975 andJuly 1977 U.S. sales of grams could produce significant strains in U.S. relations
technical military services under the Foreign Military Sales with certain foreign governments. Yet, while no responsible
(FMS) program amounted to an impressive S2.45 billion. official would dispute the fact that the deployment of 25,000
Since this figure excludes sales under the Commercial Sales or even 5000 U.S. servicemen in a Third World country'
program (i.e., direct sales by U.S. corporations, as distinct represents a major U.S. commitment to that country's gov-
from sales by the U.S. government of equipment from its ernment, top U.S. leaders often talk and act as if the de-'
own stockpiles), which account for about 25 percent of the ployment of that many white-collar mercenaries had no
overseas job slots, the total value of such sales must exceed significant foreign policy implications. As we have seen,
S3 billion. And since most Third World governments are however, U.S. contract personnel often perform critical mil-
acquiring arms faster than they are improving the quality of 'ParY functions in the host country's military apparatus, and
domestic technical education, the demand for such services thus these projects are viewed by the government involved
is sure to rise in the years ahead. as constituting a major U.S. military commitment. It fol-
EXCERPT: low5;-therefore, that any problems or upheavals arising
from that commitment-whether or not the Americans in-
In an unusual transaction that bypassed normal U.S. volved wore U.S. military uniforms-would have a major
arms sales channels, the Iranian government has also hired' impact on U.S. relations with that government.
Rockwell International to design, install, and manage an The Senate Foreign Relations Committee explicitly ac-
elaborate electronic intelligence-gathering. system. This knowledged this in its study of U.S. arms sales to Iran:
project, known as Ibex, will use specially equipped U.S. "The U.S., having sold sophisticated arms in large quan-
tities to Iran, has assumed a growing and significant `com-
Ec-130 aircraft to pick up electronic signals from foreign
military agencies and relay them to special processing sta- mitment' to Iran in terms of supporting that equipment--
tions on the ground, where the signals will be recorded, de- an unstated but nevertheless real obligation to train Ira-
coded, and analyzed. According to Aviation Week, Rockwell nians and to provide logistical support for the lifetime of the
"has recruited a special Ibex sta among t e former equipment." Thus the United States could not, according
Central Intelli ence Agency and National Security A enc to the study, "abandon, substantially diminish, or even re-
personnel, who are training about 100 Iranians" in sop is- direct its arms programs without precipitating a major
ticated cryptographic skills. Other U.S personnel will be crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations." Moreover, with so many
assigned to the "secure, restricted-access, windowless facili- Americans working for the shah, our failure to recall U. S.
ties" being constructed to house Ibex. paraphernalia in technicians from their posts in the event of an Iranian at-
Iran. Although the Rockwell contract calls for Iranian per- ' tack on any of its neighbors would be perceived by all con-
sonnet to take full responsibility for operation of these facili- cerned as an "implicit endorsement of their action," lead-
ties at some point in the future, most analysts believe that it ing, conceivably, to reprisals against the United States; if,
will be a long time before enough Iranians can be provided on the other hand, these personnel did walk off their jobs in
with the necessary skills. such a crisis, they "could become, in a sense, hostages" of
the shah. Either way, U.S. foreign policy would suffer.
_
HESE PROJECTS, WHICH PLACE AMERICAN EXCERPT :
personnel in what are obviously sensitive military.
positions, pose profound risks for American foreign-
policy. Perhaps the greatest danger is that such op-
erations will lead to inadvertent U.S. military in-
volvement in local conflict abroad. Since these
technicians perform critical tasks at the very nerve
centers of the host country's war machine, they are certain
to be among the first targets in any attack on these coun-
tries. True, the probability of a conventional war involving
these countries is gglptdyg cvpleglm2pp4Xdtt1 Q1f : CIA-RDP88-01315R000300380003-8
imaginable situations that could trigger such a conflict.