LETTER TO MR. RUSSEL A . SWANEY FROM(Sanitized)

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CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8
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October 5, 2004
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May 4, 1978
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Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R0002000 4 May 1978 Mr. Russel A. Swaney President The Economic Club of Detroit 920 Free Press Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 Dear Mr. Swaney: Enclosed please find the edited transcript of Admiral Turner's remarks to the Detroit Economic Club. If there is anything else we can do for you, please don't hesitate to ask. Sincerely, 2 -/ Staff Assistant Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 :'CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 REMARKS ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DETROIT ECONOMIC CLUB 13 April 1978 Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am very pleased to be here in Detroit, the city so symbolic of the industrial might of our country. I am grateful that so many of you would take the time to show this interest in the intelligence activities of our country. Interestingly, one of the trends in those activities today is the more symbiotic relationship which is developing between American intelligence organizations and the American business community. In intelligence we are moving more and more to the study and analysis of international economic activities. It is a marked change in the process of intelligence and a very significant one; one that I hope will spill over to the benefit of the American business community. If we look back thirty years to when a central intelligence activity was first organized, the primary product of intelligence was information about Soviet military affairs. That was perceived as the principal threat to the country, so it became the principal concern of all our intelligence agencies. Look how that has changed. Today our country is interested and involved with many countries around the world, much, I suppose, as many of your businesses. The Soviet Union and its immediate satellites, while important, are but one of the areas in which we are interested. We have intercourse with most of the 150-some nations of the world, and that intercourse is related much more to political and economic matters than it is to the military. Accordingly, we have had to shift our focus from military concerns exclusively to encompass these other spheres as well. Let me not overstate the case to you. Our primary intelligence concern must continue to be the military posture of the Soviet Union because that continues to be our most serious threat. But beyond that, the intelligence community has had to expand its horizons, its capabilities, and its areas of technical expertise, to embrace the problems of international drug trafficking, international terrorism, energy concerns, and so on. It is a new and demanding challenge. It is one where we are qualified to contribute significantly and, in my opinion, are. It also relates directly to your concerns in the. business world because this change in focus encourages a second trend in American intelligence, a trend toward greater openness. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 As you would suspect, traditionally, intelligence services have operated with maximum secrecy and minimum disclosure. That may have been a good policy in the past; however, I do not think it is appropri- ate for the United States today. The American public has a right to know something of what we are doing and something of what we are producing. They have a right to see some return on their investment in intelligence activities. So, we are out speaking more, we are responding to the media more, participating more in academic and other symposia and conferences, and we are publishing more. Here, I think, is where the American business community can benefit directly. Today when we study some international aspect of our nation's policies, and develop an estimate or evaluation, we look at it carefully and ask ourselves how we might declassify it for public use. First we remove clues that could identify our sources. If we revealed our sources, we would vitate their future usefulness and perhaps endanger them as well. Secondly, we remove information whose value to the President or a principal policy maker derives primarily from its exclusivety; that is, they know something and others do not. Once we have removed these sensitive sections, if there is enough substance left to support the study's conclusions, we publish it on an unclassi- fied basis. We hope this will help the public identify important national issues and improve the quality of debate on those issues. Many of these studies will be of more interest to the business commu- nity than to the general public. Let me cite a few examples from over 100 unclassified studies we published in 1977. Just a year ago we published a study on the prospects for world energy. We did not predict that the world will run out of oil, that there will not be adequate reserves to carry us through the rest of this century or further; we did predict that the slope of the curve of demand for oil and all other forms of energy was rising more steeply than could any possible curve of supply. That sometime in the next eight to ten years, the world would want to consume more energy than it could obtain, principally because we will not be able to remove it from the ground rapidly enough to meet the demand. The basic conclu- sion, of course, is that if these events come to pass there may well be pressure on the price of energy. Last summer we published a study on Soviet economic prospects. In our view the Soviets have kept their economy growing for the last several decades by a policy of increasing infusions of labor and capital and, we believe, they are coming to the end of that line. If you look at the Soviet Union's demography you will find that in the 1980s, their labor force's rate of growth will decline--not the size of the labor force, but the rate of its growth. There were not enough babies born in the 1960s, so there will not be enough young adults Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 You would also be interested that we have published a study on international terrorism. I wish I could report to you in a more sanguine tone, but the conclusions of this study were not favorable. We see no prospect for a decline in international terrorism. Instead, over the last few years there has been a marked increase in the number of international terrorist incidents involving United States citizens and business interests outside this country. A disappointing conclu- sion, but one that we have to face. We hope that these and other studies that we are publishing will be of value to you as citizens and to the American business community. We are making them available on that basis. Again, I do not want to overstate my case. We cannot open up completely. We cannot disclose all the information we collect nor all that we study. So much of what we do, so much of what we learn, is of value only if kept secret. But it is my opinion that by publishing as much as we can, we improve our ability to protect those few necessary secrets. Perhaps the principal reason we have such a difficult time keeping secrets is that we have too many of them. When you have too many secrets, people do not respect them. So by narrowing the corpus of classified informa- tion, I hope to engender greater respect for that which remains and at the same time be able to protect it better. The lack of respect for classified information is becoming a serious problem and typified by the number of people who decide unilaterally to release classified information. They write books, they give interviews, and they say things that do more harm often than they realize. They violate contracts they have signed with the government promising not to reveal classified information. I think we have come to the point in this country where the public should no longer be quite so willing to welcome these disclosures, often made in the guise of stopping those of us in the government from doing heinous things, but more often made for self-serving purposes. If their logic were taken to its extreme, each one of us 215 million Americans would be empowered to decide what secrets the country should keep and what secrets the country should release. And that would cause nothing less than chaos. The time has come to put more trust in elected and public officials or, at the very least, not presume a priori that public officials are only out to obscure the truth or cover up mistakes- I do not ask you to take us on faith or trust alone; a third trend in American intelligence is toward more oversight of intelligence activities. When you consider that we must keep a great many secrets, it should be obvious that we cannot have full public knowledge and oversight of our activities. How then can the average citizen be Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 assured that American intelligence agencies are only doing what they are authorized to do? Out of the crucible of three years of intense public criticism of intelligence, activities, a process of surrogate oversight has been forged. This surrogate process relies on several individuals and groups to be fully informed of what intelligence agencies are doing and act in the public's stead. Let me describe a couple of those surrogates to you. The first are the President and the Vice President, who today take a very active, intense interest in all intelligence activities. I report to the President weekly. They are kept well abreast of what we are doing and they give me complete and detailed guidance. On top of that, two years ago an Intelligence Oversight Board was established consisting of three distinguished Americans: former Senator Gore from Tennessee, former Governor Scranton of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Thomas Farmer, an attorney, of Washington, D.C. These three gentlemen oversee the legality and the propriety of intelligence activities. Anyone in the intelligence community, any citizen, may communicate with them directly, calling problems, abuses, or wrong- doing to their attention. They will investigate that complaint and report what they think should be done directly to the President. Beyond that, two committees have been created in the Congress to oversee the intelligence process, one in the Senate, another in the House of Representatives. These committees require me to testify regularly. I am completely forthright with them and keep them well informed. At the slightest indication of a problem, they ask us for an explanation and we provide it to their satisfaction. I think that these processes give much greater assurance than was possible in the past that we are not doing things that the American public would not support, or that are not in conformance with American foreign policy. I think there are adequate mechanisms here to which so-called whistle-blowers could go if they were sincere in their desire to reform. I would respect their whistle-blowing much more if they would try the authorized, established oversight procedures first, before taking it upon themselves to release information that could gravely damage this nation. To be honest with you, there are risks in oversight. There is the risk that the more people you tell, the greater the chance sensi- tive information will be leaked. There is the risk that the more people you must tell about intelligence operations, the more timid you Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 , CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 may become and the less willing you will be to take some risks which must be taken in the interest of our country. We must have enough oversight to ensure control, but not so much that we grow timid or can keep no secrets. We are working out a proper balance and ensuring that citizens' rights and our nation's values are protected on the one hand, and ensuring enough privacy of the intelligence process that it can be effective on the other. As a result of these several trends the intelligence process is being dramatically reshaped into a new and unique model of intell- igence, an American model of intelligence. Last January, the President directed a modest reorganization of intelligence activity. In many ways he went back to the spirit of the original National Security Act of 1947, which established a Director of Central Intelligence--separate from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency--to coordinate all of the intelligence activities of our nation. The President's order modestly strengthened the Director of Central Intelligence's authority over the budgets of all national intelligence organizations, and over their tasking. As Director of Central Intelligence, I am now empowered to direct the collection efforts of all intelligence agencies to ensure that they are being used to best advantage and as a team. We want neither to let anything drop between the cracks, nor duplicate effort, nor waste resources. Also, I have been given additional authority to ensure that the other half of intelligence--collection being only the first half of the job, the second half is analyzing, studying, drawing conclu- sions from the information which is collected is also well coordi- nated. Here one point is important. While I can coordinate the analysis of intelligence, I cannot direct people outside the Central Intelligence Agency on how to do that analysis or what conclusions to come to. Independent views must come forward from the Defense Department, the State Department, the Treasury, and others. No one is so smart as to be able to put all the pieces of the puzzle together exactly right. Opinions as to what a piece of information means will differ. You need those differing opinions coming forward so the decision makers will be aware of the strengths and the weak- nesses of an intelligence analysis. Finally, the President directed something new and important in establishing a committee of the National Security Council to oversee the entire intelligence operation and determine the priorities of our work. The point being that I should not establish priorities. I am Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 not a consumer of intelligence. This committee, composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Treasury, the National Security Advisor to the President, know what we need and can give me that overall guidance and direction. I sincerely believe that these new trends and a few others I have not had time to mention, are strengthening our capability. We are the best intelligence service in the world. I assure you that I am dedicated to maintaining us as the number one intelligence service in the world and doing so in ways that will only support and defend our democratic institutions. Thank you very much. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Q&A - DETROIT ECONOMIC CLUB Q: What is the relationship between a free society and undercover intelligence? How can we have a dependable intelligence system under present conditions of mass media exposures, political interference and disclosures, and threats of legal action against agents? A: There is an inherent contradiction between having an open and free democratic society and having to maintain a certain number of secrets in the process of conducting the international affairs of that society. Most of the nations of the world are not blessed with a society as open as ours. Because of that we need an intelligence capability to know what is going on in all societies whose actions have daily and direct impact on you and me, our taxes, our national policies and programs. We balance the need for secrecy by establishing the checks and counter-checks that I have mentioned to you today, to be sure that on the one hand you can maintain secrets, and on the other hand that no one abuses that privilege. I believe we are establishing a good balance today. I have also asked you today for a little understanding to permit that balance to stabilize. Those people who run to the press with national security information which should not be released should not necessarily be immediately acclaimed as heroes. Some of them are doing it out of patriotic motives; some of them are self-serving. The point is that we have now established procedures so they can voice their complaints within the system and with the proper safeguards for classified information. These procedures provide assurance to you that improper activities, if they exist, can be brought to the attention of oversight bodies and acted upon without compromising lives or expensive technical collection systems. Q: Are you satisfied that you still have the kind of authority and organization that can do a good job of intelligence world-wide? A: Yes, I definitely am. In part, because of the additions to my authority that the President has recently given me. In part, because in addition to the standard form of collecting intelli- gence that goes back as far as history--the human intelligence Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 agent, the spy--we have a pre-eminence in the world in what we call technical means of collecting intelligence. These capa- bilities have been burgeoning over recent years and providing us with vastly increased quantities of data. They have not outmoded the traditional human intelligence agent, they have in fact increased his importance. From a technical system, you generally learn what happened yesterday. When I produce that information to a policy maker, he wants to know why that happened and what will happen tomorrow. Finding out what people are thinking and what their plans are is the role of the intelligence agent. Both human and technical collection capabilities are indispensable. So today, the challenge to us, and it is an exciting one, is to bring this together in a complementary fashion to ensure that we will fill the gaps by technical means that cannot be filled by human agents and vice versa. It is a new form of production line for us and a very, very demanding one. Q: What is happening to covert action? A: What has gotten us into the most trouble in the past is what we call covert political action--interfering in the politics or other activities of foreign nations. This is not an intelligence activity. It is a political action. It has been assigned by the government as an adjunct to the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency ever since it was founded in 1947. It is the most controversial part of our activities and in recent years has been placed under very strict control. Before we can act in any other country, today we must gain approval of the National Security Council, obtain the signature of the President of the United States, and I must inform the appropriate committees of Congress of what we are doing. So we have two branches of the government involved in this as a check and a balance. There is just no way, without violating the law, that I can go charging off and direct interference in other countries' political activ- ities. I can assure you I have no desire to go to jail. Q: What is the internal attitude of the CIA concerning agents such as James Agee and others who have exposed CIA operations upon their leaving the Agency? A: We are all very disappointed with people who have assumed the responsibilities of working in intelligence agencies and then act irresponsibly when they leave. Mr. Agee has done very severe Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 damage to intelligence operations. He has destroyed careers of innocent people. For example, an individual might have worked for us for ten, fifteen, twenty years; worked at great personal sacrifice by being under cover. By that I mean he does not acknowledge, maybe to his family even, that he works for the Central Intelligence Agency. I can assure you that this is not done easily and is not done without sacrifice. For instance, this man may have climbed up in our organization and have a position of great responsibility, yet must pretend that he is working for somebody else in a position of much lesser importance. What do his children think of his stature? Why didn't father get promoted? Why didn't he advance like others, and so on. Yet after all these years of that sacrifice, Agee may have published this man's name in a book and subsequently endangered his life or, at the least, reduced his usefulness; hurt his career prospects, his ability to serve his country, to progress within the Central Intelligence Agency. I think it is most unfortunate. Does, or did the United States have some CIA contraption high in the mountains of Asia and if, in fact, there is a nuclear monitoring device on Indian territory, is such an unauthorized invasion of other countries' sovereignty considered justifiable practice by our intelligence agencies? A: One of the most difficult things about being in the intelligence business with this combination of openness and secrecy, is that often we cannot defend ourselves against accusations. If I comment on this particular alleged activity, then I am in a spot if I cannot comment on the next one. It just leaves one in a very vulnerable position. So we have to take a policy of never commenting on alleged or actual past or ongoing intelligence operations. I wish I could do better for you. Q: What is the CIA's position on the defection of the senior Soviet UN executive? A: This is a delicate diplomatic and political problem. It is entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State and I am not going to muck up the waters by commenting. Do you have a group of paramilitary people trained to go to the aid of Americans that might be held for.ransom abroad by a terrorist group? Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 A: No. But the President has directed the Secretary of Defense to establish such a capability. It is in being and will be very effective in due course. Your opinion of Panama Canal Treaties as they affect our military strength? A: One of the principles of being an intelligence officer is that you stay absolutely clear of policy. And that is really a very important point. If I ever become associated with a pro-Panama Canal Treaty or an anti-Panama Canal Treaty position, from then on any intelligence I might produce on this subject would be suspect. We must scrupulously keep ourselves clear of expressing opinions on policy matters to preserve the objectivity which is essential to 'good intelligence. Q: Do you agree with the "punishment" given Richard Helms and would you try to suppress the prosecution of CIA agents for illegal activities as recently happened with the former FBI director? A: The solution of the Helms case was one that worked out very well from my point of view. On the other hand, had he been prosecuted, it would have been necessary both for the prosecution and cer- tainly for the defense to disclose a great quantity of highly classified information. It would not have been fair not to have done so as the prosecution proceeded. It would have hurt our country's interest in many respects. On the other hand, the process through which Mr. Helms went was a poignant reminder to all of us in the government, and particularly in the intelligence world, that none of us stands above the law. The law of the United States of America is the governing factor in all of our activities and we have no license, no excuse for violating it in any respect. Nor do I have any intention of trying to exonerate anybody in our organization who violates the law. They know that and they have to live up to it. Q: Is there much possibility that the terrorism plaguing Europe and the Mideast could spread to the United States? A: There is always that possibility. But I think the country has a good record in anti-hijacking and anti-terrorism because of the precautions we have taken at our airports and elsewhere; because Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 of the attitude of our people in supporting the law enforcement agencies in that type of activity; and because we, being a free society where dissent can be voiced, do not have the same impetus to this kind of activity. But it is a danger, and it is one to which we all must be continually alert. We in the intelligence world, as I briefly mentioned, are expending a great deal of effort to keep track of international terrorist activities as best we can through our resources, through our liaison with other friendly intelligence agencies. I am proud to tell you that in a number of instances it has been our information that has thwarted some international terrorist plans--not in this country, but elsewhere. We think that is a valuable service and we intend to continue doing the best we can to help out here. Q: Pearl Harbor and the Bay of Pigs were tremendous fiascos of the intelligence collecting agencies. Can this happen again? A: The honest answer is yes. The other answer is that we are doing everything we can to prevent that. We are human. We are fallible. However, we are trying to ensure, as I brought out in my remarks, that differing views come forward on the trends or likely develop- ments in different world situations. If you suppress the minority view when it is well reasoned and set forth, you do a great disservice and invite the possibility of overlooking signals which could alert you to some potential problem such- as the Bay of Pigs or Pearl Harbor. In short, one of the real challenges in intelligence is constantly to question your hypotheses. Are you making the same assumption over and over again? For example, the Arabs will never increase the price of oil; the Arabs will never attack Israel; or the Japanese will never attack Pearl Harbor. However true an assumption may seem, you must constantly probe it. I cannot guarantee we won't make a mistake again, but I will guarantee we are trying our best to avoid it. Q: Do you think there are any Soviet agents in the audience reporting on you today? A: Is there a Soviet Counsul General in Detroit? I frequently find a Soviet representative at my talks. I mentioned the 100 or so unclassified publications. Any one of you can write the Library of Congress and subscribe to our annual product of unclassified studies for $225.00. I would just let you know that the Soviet Union is spending $450.00 in that department. I just happened to look at the list the other day. But I am not giving Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 away secrets today. I am trying to be as open and forthright with you as I can and I am doing it sincerely in the interest of keeping the American public informed and, in that process, generating greater respect for what must be kept secret. I am working very hard in both directions--openness on the one hand, and tighter secrecy on the other. That which is secret must be kept secret. All,that possibly can be made available will be made available. I am so grateful to you for being here and wanting to hear about this today. It is your support that will determine the future of our intelligence activities in this country. I sincerely believe they. are more important to our country today in an era of near military parity; in an era of political and economic interdependence with so many other countries of the world, than they ever have been before when we had great superiority in all these fields. You need the leverage of good information to make right decisions, and we need your support in that activity. Thank you. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 The Economic Club of Detroit RUSSEL A. SWANEY PRESIDENT The Honorable Stansfield Turner Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Executive Registry AREA CODE 313 TELEPHONE 963-8384 April 18, 1978 First of all, we want to thank you for coming to Detroit and making such an excellent speech before The Economic Club of Detroit. Also, in accordance with our conversation, we are attach- ing transcript of your speech, together with the questions and answers. We would appreciate your editing the entire transcript and returning to us as soon as possible,so that we can put this into print and mail copies to~our entire membership. We are also sending Mr. Hudson a copy of the transcript so that he can edit his intro- duction and the questions. You will be interested in the enclosed tear sheets from our local papers concerning your speech. Thanks, again, and we are very glad to know that the Central Intelligence Agency is in such good hands. Sincerely, RAS:vc Enc1s. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 (The meeting was opened by President Russel A. Swaney, who presented Joseph L. Hudson, Jr., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The J. L. Hudson Company, as Presiding Officer.) JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: Thank you, Russ. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: I am pleased to have this opportunity to participate in today's Economic Club meeting. For those of us who spend our lives running retail businesses or doing other kinds of work which focus entirely on Detroit or the United States, the events which have been going on throughout the rest of the world in recent years are sometimes bewildering and confusing. It is difficult to understand on one hand the introduction of Soviet and Cuban troops and military supplies in Africa, while at the same time we are told that detente is upon us and that Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are moving forward. We know that the oil resources of the Middle East are key to our economy and yet many of us do not have the information to know what the military and political factors are which might lead to a peaceful Middle East environment which will protect local human rights as well as the United States' strategic position. Our speaker today must constantly deal with these complex issues and we are very grateful to him for taking the time to be with us, to address us, and to answer any questions that you may have after his formal remarks. Admiral Stansfield Turner was sworn in as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in March of 1977. In this position, he heads the foreign intelligence activities of the United States. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Admiral Turner is a native of Illinois who is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy Class of 1947. He also studied philosophy, politics and economics as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University. Following Oxford, he held a variety of naval assignments, including command of a mine sweeper, a destroyer, a guided missile frigate, the Carrier Task Group of the Sixth Fleet, and the United States Second Fleet and the NATO Atlantic Strike Fleet. His shore assignments have included being the Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, the Advanced Management Program at Harvard, the presidency of the Naval War College and Director of the Systems Analysis Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I am very pleased to introduce to you Admiral Stansfield Turner who will speak to us on the topic, "New Directions in Intelligence." Admiral Turner. (Applause) ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER: Thank you very much, Joe. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: I am really very pleased to be here in Detroit, this city so symbolic of the industrial might of our country. I'm very grateful that so many of you would take the time to show this interest in the intelligence activities of our country. Interestingly, one of the trends in those activities today, I believe, is developing a more symbiotic relationship between the American intelligence organizations and the American business community. That trend is that we are moving more and more in intelligence to the study, the analysis of international economic activities. It is a marked change in our process of intelligence but a very impoktant and significant one, and one that I hope will spill over to the benefit of the American business community. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 .3.. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 If I may look back 30 years to when we first in this country organized a central intelligence activity, at that time the primary product of intelligence was information about Soviet military activity. That was the principal threat to the country. It was the principal concern of all of our intelligence agencies. Look how in the last 30 years that has changed, much, I assume, as your businesses have changed in their inter- national concerns and aspects. Today our country is of course quite interested, quite involved with so many more countries than just the Soviet Union and its immediate satellites. We have intercourse with most of the 150-some nations of this world. And that intercourse is much more in political and economic matters than it is in military. Accordingly, we have had to begin to shift our focus from just military concerns to much more in these other spheres. Now let me not overstate the case to you. Our primary, our number one intelligence concern must continue to be the military posture of the Soviet Union. That continues to be our number one threat. But on top of that today we in the intelligence community have had to expand our horizons, have had to expand our capabilities, our areas of technical expertise, into these spheres of international economics, international politics, the prevention of international drug traffic, the prevention of international terrorism, and so on. It's an exciting, a new and a demanding challenge to us. It's one that I believe is called for; is one that I think we are doing an excellent job in. It relates to you in the business world because of another trend in American intelligence today and that's the trend toward greater openness. As you would suspect, traditionally intelligence organizations have ope rated under maximum secrecy and minimum disclosure. That may have been a good policy in the past. I don't happen to think it's effective or appro- priate in the United States today. The American public has a right to know Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 -4- Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 something of what we are doing and something of what we are producing. They have a right to see something of the return on their investment in our intelligence activities. And so today we are out speaking more, we are responding to the media more, we are participating more in academic and other symposia an conferences. And we are publishing more. And here, I think, is where there is a direct benefit and spillover to the American business community. Today when we develop an estimate, an evaluation, a study of some international aspect of our nation's policies, we carefully look at it and we say, "Does that label . . . " -- you know, we label it SECRET, or TOP SECRET, or DESTROY BEFORE READING; whatever it may be -- "Does it really have to have that label on it, or, can we take out of it two things: the first is information that would reveal how we obtained the data in the study; what was our source -- because if we reveal that, you can well expect that we won't be able to get anything from that source again; or, secondly, take out of it material that is valuable to our President, to our principal policymakers, because they have an exclusive on it. They know it and other people do not." And if we take those things out which would hurt the national interest to publish, is there enough of substance left to be of value to the American public. And if there is, we publish it on an unclassified basis. We hope this is going to help the public interest and improve the quality of public debate on important national issues. But we also think sharing it with the business community will be of particular value because many of these will be of more interest to people like yourselves than they will be perhaps to the general public. Let me cite a few examples of the over 100 unclassified studies we published in 1977. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 -5- Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Just a year ago we published one on the prospects for the world energy situation. We were not predicting that the world was going to run out of oil, that there wouldn't be enough reserves to carry us through the rest of this century or further on. We were simply predicting that the slope of the curve of demand for oil and all other forms of energy was rising more steeply, in our opinion, than could any possible curve of supply of energy, and that sometime in the next eight to ten years the world as a whole was going to want to consume more energy than it was going to be possible to obtain, principally because we couldn't get it out of the ground in the form of oil in this time frame -_ not in the indefinite future, but in the next eight to ten years -- as rapidly as we would need to, to meet this demand. The basic conclusion is, of course, that there may well be an increase or a pressure on the price of energy if these events do succeed in this way. Shortly after that, last summer we published another study about the Soviet economic prospects and we said that in our view the Soviets have kept their. economy growing for the last several decades by a policy of increasing infusions of labor and capital, and that we believe they are coming to the end of that line. If you look at the Soviet Union's demography today, you'll find that in the 1980's there's no question about it, the rate of growth of their labor force is going to decline. Not the size of the labor force, the rate of growth. There just weren't those babies born in the 1960's so they cannot continue to infuse increasing quantities of labor. And as they look around for more capital to infuse, they're having to reach further and further into places like Siberia. And we happen to think, they also are going to have a particular problem with their oil supply. We believe in the next three or four years they will peak out for production and decline sharply. Again, this is not a longterm forecast, this is be- cause p Srove Jigve or Rer iease sm l /111/01 : e CIA RDP88 013158000200430001 gnd they are going _6_ Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 to reach a point where they'll hit diminishing returns before they can bring vast new quantities that are available to them in reserves onto the production line. So the combination of these factors means that, not having ready access to more labor or to inexpensive capital, they're going to have some very difficult economic decisions to face. Now they may overcome some of these problems one way or another. They can reduce their emphasis on the military and take manpower out of that. They could do a number of other things. They can stop selling as much oil as they do to the Eastern European countries, and so on. But we feel that those will be difficult decisions; we don't know how they will manage them. Some of the solutions would make them go contrary to their basic economic philosophy and some of those difficult economic decisions may just happen to confront them at a time of an important change of their leadership, which appears as likely to happen sometime in the next few years. So it may be a difficult time to take these tough decisions. You might also be interested that we've published a study on inter- national terrorism and I wish I could report in a more sanguine tone to you. But the conclusions of this study were not favorable. They saw no prospect for the decline of international terrorism. And they saw over the last few years a marked increase in the number of international terrorist incidents that involved United States citizens or business interests outside this country. A disappointing conclusion but one that we have to face up to. Now we hope that these and other studies that we are publishing will be of value to you as citizens and of value to the American business community and we're making them available on that basis. At the same Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 -7- Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 time again, I do not want to overstate the case. We cannot in any way disclose all that we study, all that we collect in the way of intelligence, so much of what we do, so much of what we learn simply must 'be kept secret in the national interest. But it is my opinion that we are helping to protect those necessary secrets about how we collect information and about information that is of unique value to our decision makers by publishing as much as we can in an unclassified form. Perhaps the principal problem we have today with keeping secrets is that we have too many of them. And when you have too many, people do not respect them. So by narrowing the corpus of classified information I hope to engender greater respect for that which remains and protect it much better. The lack of respect today is typified for instance by the number of people who have decided to take it upon themselves unilaterally to release what could well be classified secretive information. They write stories, they write books, they give interviews, they say things they should not say, often violating contracts with us to be sure that they don't release information of a classified nature. I think we have come to the point in this country where the public should no longer be quite so willing to welcome these disclosures which are often made in the guise or in the name of stopping those of us in the government from doing heinous things that we are accused of doing. I think that if we carry this trend to its logical extreme, you have to say that each one of the 215 million Americans in this country is empowered to decide what secrets the country should have and what secrets the country should release. And that could be nothing but chaos in the long run. The time has come to put some more faith and trust in the elected public officials and not start at least from the presumption that we're only out Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-0131500200430001-8 -8- Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 to obscure things and cover up our mistakes, Now I'm not really going to ask you just to take us on faith or trust because a third trend in American intelligence today protects the citizen of this country in many ways. It's a trend toward greater oversight. Now when you consider that I've pointed out that we must keep a great many secrets, it's clear that we cannot have full public oversight of our activities. Instead, out of the crucible of three years of intense public criticism of some past abuses in the intelligence world, we have today forged a process of surrogate public oversight of our intelligence mechanism. Let me describe a couple of those surrogates for you. The first is the President and the Vice President, who today take a very active, intense interest in our intelligence activities. I report to the President weekly. He is well abreast of what we are doing and gives me complete guidance. But on top of that, two years ago we established an Intelligence Oversight Board -- three distinguished Americans: former Senator Gore from your near-neighboring state of Tennessee; former Governor Scranton of Pennsylvania; and a Mr. Tom Farmer of Washington, D. C. These three gentlemen report only to the President of the United States. Their only function is to oversee the legality, the propriety of our intelligence activities. Anyone in the intelligence community, any public citizen may communicate with them and say, "Look, I think something's going wrong.'' Or, "I think some information ought to be published that isn't being published. " They will consider that complaint and report to the President what they think should be done about it. It's a good release valve. But on top of that, in the Congress we have created two committees-- one in the Senate, one in the House of Representatives -- also to oversee the intelligence process. These committees do a superb job of that. They have me up there regularl We're ver forthright with them. We keep Approved For Release 2004111/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R01J0200430001-8 1 - Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDDP88-01315R000200430001-8 them well informed. But at the slightest indication of some problem, some question as to what we're doing, they ask us for a report and we come up and explain it. I think that these processes today give much greater assurance than existed in the past that we are not off running things on our own, doing things in the intelligence world that the American public would not support, or that are not in conformance with American foreign policy. I think here are mechanisms to which those people called whistle blowers have an opportunity to go, and I would respect their whistle-blowing much more if they would try the authorized, the established oversight procedures first before they take t/upon themselves to release information that should be kept private. Out of this oversight process, I want to be honest with you, we are encountering risks. There is the risk that as you tell more and more people about your intelligence process, there will be more and more leaks. There is the risk that as you recognize that you're going to have to tell people about things, you may get timid and not undertake risks that you should take in the interest of our country. We must be careful that we don't have so much oversight that we have intelligence by timidity, and lack of intelligence by virtue of too many leaks. I think we are working out a proper balance between this, in protecting the citizens of this country on the one hand through good oversight in insuring that our intelligence activities are in consonance with our national objectives and aims, and on the other hand, preserving enough privacy of the intelligence process that it can go on in an effective manner as is so necessary for our country's security. As a result of these several trends that I've mentioned to you ?.~ which I believe are dramatically reshaping the intelligence process in this countAri rovetsPo?WAease1Q06b4ff'170 IC _RDP _6'13qgRUUU700 d0 1?-Sel of intelligence, a new and unique model of intelligence -- last January the President of the Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA- b9 8-01315R000200430001-8 United States directed a modest reorganization of our intelligence activities. And he did so by trying to go back in many ways to the original Intelligence Act of 1947 which established a Director of Central Intelligence to coordi- nate all of the intelligence activities of our nation. I hold this position. Its a separate position from my role as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. And in January the President modestly strengthened the authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence, giving him authority over the budgets of all of our national intelligence organizations; giving him authority to do what I call tasking -- directing the agencies of intelligence that collect information to be sure that we are using them to best advantage and we are using them in a teamwork fashion; not helter skelter; not letting things drop between the cracks; not duplicating and spending additional or unnecessary resources; arid, finally, additional authority to insure that the other half of intelligence besides collecting information -- the half which is analyzing it, studying it, drawing conclusions from it -- is also well coordinated. But here I'd like to make one point. While I can coordinate the intelligence analysis, I cannot direct people outside of the Central Intelligence Agency on how to do that analysis. We want independent views coming forward from the Defense Department, the State Department, the Treasury and others, because no one is so anart in intelligence as to be able to put all the pieces of the puzzle together exactly right. And you need different opinions coming forward so the decision makers will be able to judge what the strengths and the weaknesses of an intelligence analysis are. And, finally, the President directed something new and important in establishing a committee of the National Security Council which oversees the entire intelligence operation and gives me my marching orders as to what the priorities are by which we should be working ..< the point being that IApprove door Releasel70~4h]1 Rflt6Ti4-4BP8>I3' 3 ` 0B0i '453'6'~b91 8 of intelligence; Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RJP88-01315R000200430001-8 and this committee is composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the National Security Council Adviser to the President -- the people who know what we need and can tell me and give me that overall guidance and direction. I sincerely believe that these new trends that I've described to you, and a few others I haven't had time for, and these new orders of the President, are strengthening our capabilities in the intelligence field, and I do believe we are the best intelligence service in the world. And at the same time, they are also strengthening the assurances to this country that we are performing our functions in ways that will protect the rights of individuals and the values of American society. I assure you that I am dedicated to maintaining us as the number one intelligence service in the world and doing so in ways that will only support and defend our wonderful democratic institutions. Thank you very much. (Applause) JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: Thank you, Admiral Turner, for that exposition on our intelligence activities. As laymen it certainly impresses upon us the enormity of the task; but I think, more importantly, the sensitivity of the Administration through this effort. We have a number of questions and I'll try to group a .few which I think fall under similar headings. The first is: (Reading Question) "WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A FREE SOCIETY AND UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE? And related to that: (Reading Question) "HOW CAN WE HAVE A DEPENDABLE INTELLI- GENCE SYSTEM UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS OF MASS MEDIA EXPOSURES, POLITICAL INTERFERENCE AND DISCLOSURES AND THREATS OF LK6f-4ACJR4/gG6W'88-01315R000200430001-8 _12- Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: There is an inherent contradiction between having an open and free democratic society and having to maintain a certain number of secrets in the process of conducting the international affairs of that society there's no question about it. The world is such today that most of the nations of the world are not blessed by the wonderful openness of our society, and we must be able to maintain an intelligence capability to know what's going on in some of those other societies whose actions have such daily and direct import on you and me, our taxes, our national policies and programs. You reconcile the need for secrecy in a democratic society by establishing the checks and counter checks that I've mentioned to you today, to be sure that on the one hand you can maintain the secrets, and on the other hand that no one abuses that privilege. We have to have them, but we have to have enough oversight, enough checks to be sure that it is not abused. I believe we are achieving that balance today. I believe what I've asked you for today is also a little understanding; that people who run to the press with things that should not be released should not necessarily be acclaimed as heroes right off the bat. Some of them are doing it out of great patriotism and motives; some of them are doing it in a self-serving way. But we have now established procedures for them to voice their complaints, to release their information, which gives the people of this country some check, some assurance that it's not being done to the detriment of our national interests. I hope they will use that and that we will all encourage them to use that. JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question) "ARE YOU SATIS- FIED THAT YOU STILL HAVE THE KIND OF AUTHORITY AND ORGANIZATION THAT CAN DO A GOOD JOB OF INTELLIGENCE WORLDWIDE? " Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-R6088-01315R000200430001-8 ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: Yes, I definitely am; in part because the additions to my authority that the President has recently given me; in part because in addition to the standard form of collecting intelligence that goes back as far as history -- the human intelligence agents, the spies -?> we have a preeminence in the world in what we call technical means of collecting intelligence. And these have been burgeoning over recent years and providing for us just vastly increasing quantities of data. They have not outmoded the old traditional human intelligence agents; they have, in fact, accented their importance because from a technical system of collecting intelligence you generally learn what happened yesterday, and then when I produce that information to a policymaker, he says: "But why did that happen and what's going to happen tomorrow?" And finding out what people are thinking and what their plans are is the role of the intelligence agent. So today the challenge to us -- and it's an exciting one .- is to bring this together in a complementary fashion, to insure that we fill the gaps that can't be filled by human agents, by technical means; and that with human agents we fill the gaps that can't be filled with technical means. It's a new form of production line for us and a very, very demanding one. JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question) "CAN YOU HAVE YOUR AGENTS INTERFERE IN POLITICS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES?" ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: The question that gets us or has got us into the most trouble in the past is what we call political action -- interfering in the politics or other activities of foreign nations. This is not an intelligence activity. It is a political action. It has been assigned by this government as an adjunct to the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency ever since it was founded in 1947. It is theA9R6WC[9R(PAWgi !0fIa1~bf c$?FAl?4 ROQ, 04 3 e t years these 14 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 activities have been placed under very strict controls. Before we can interfere in the politics or other activities of any other country, we must today gain approval of the National Security Council, the signature of the President of the United States, and I must inform the appropriate committees of the Congress of what we are doing. So we have two branches of the government involved in this as a check and a balance, and there's just no way, without violating the law, that I can go charging off and direct any interference in other countries' political activities. And, I can assure you, I have no desire to go to jail. JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question) "WHAT IS THE INTERNAL ATTITUDE OF THE C.I.A. CONCERNING AGENTS SUCH AS JAMES AGEE AND OTHERS WHO HAVE EXPOSED C. I. A. OPERATIONS UPON THEIR LEAVING THE AGENCY?" ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: We're all very disappointed that people who have assumed the responsibilities of working in our intelligence agencies would be as irresponsible as this when they leave. Mr. Agee has done very severe damage to our intelligence operations. He has taken, for instance, an individual who has worked for us for 10, 15, 20 years -- worked at great personal sacrifice to himself by being undercover; he does not acknowledge, maybe to his family even, that he works for the Central Intelligence Agency. And, I can assure you, that is not done easily and is not done without sacrifice. For instance, this man may have climbed up in our organization and have a position of great responsi- bility and have to pretend that he's working for somebody else in a position of much lesser importance. And what do his children think of his stature? Why didn't father get promoted? Why didn't he advance like others, and so on. And yet after all these years of that sacrifice, Agee will publish this man's name in a book and in many ways reduce his usefulness to us; hurtAAi*oe d'ForRRtt,%is /11101 :a Q4RpRa8-9tat RQQQ20d 43QO -;8 to progress within the Central Intelligence Agency because of some irresponsible _15- Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 individual like this. I think it's most unfortunate. JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question) "DOES OR. DID THE UNITED STATES HAVE SOME C.I.A. CONTRAPTION HIGH IN THE MOUNTAINS OF ASIA? AND IF, IN FACT, T HERE IS A NUCLEAR MONITORING DEVICE ON INDIAN TERRITORY, IS SUCH AN UNAUTHORI- ZED INVASION OF ANOTHER COUNTRY'S SOVEREIGNTY CONSIDERED JUSTIFIABLE PRACTICE BY OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY?" ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: One of the most difficult things about being in the intelligence business with this combination of openness and secrecy is that often we can't defend ourselves against false accusations because if I comment on this particular alleged activity, then I 'm in a spot if I don't comment on the next one. And it just leaves you in a very vulnerable condition, so we have to take a policy of never commenting on alleged or actual past or ongoing intelligence operations. I wish I could do better for you. But Joe pointed out to me at lunch, it's like somebody asking him: "Are you really trying to take over Marshall Fields with a merger or something like that? " (Laughter) You know, you just can't, in his position either, comment sometimes on that because if you say no to one, then you're in a spot if the next one has a true answer of yes. You can't say no when you need to, to keep things private. So I'm afraid I can't answer that question, Joe. JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: Nor can I the other one. (Laughter) (Reading Question) "WHAT IS THE C. I. A. IS POSITION ON THE DEFECTION OF THE SENIOR SOVIET UN-[TED NATIONS EXECUTIVE?" ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: The CIA's position is that this is one of the most delicate of diplomatic and political problems and that it is entirely in the hands of the Secretary of State, and I'm not going to muck up the waters by commenting on his problems. (Laughter) Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-DP88-01315R000200430001-8 JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question ) "DO YOU HAVE A GROUP OF PARAMILITARY PEOPLE TRAINED TO GO TO THE AID OF AMERICANS THAT MIGHT BE HELD FOR RANSOM ABROAD BY A TERRORIST GROUP?" ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: The answer is no, but the answer is that the President has directed the Secretary of Defense to establish such a capability. It is in being and will be very effective in due course. JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question) "WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES AS THEY AFFECT OUR MILITARY STRENGTH? " ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: One of the principles of being an intelligence officer is, you stay absolutely clear of policy. And that's really a very important point because if I ever become associated with a pro-Panama Canal Treaty, or an anti-Panama Canal Treaty, position, from then on any intelligence I produce on that kind of a subject is suspect. And we must scrupulously keep ourselves clear of expressing opinions on policy matters in order to preserve the objectivity which is essential to good intelligence. JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question) "DO YOU AGREE WITH THE 'PUNISHMENT' GIVEN RICHARD HELMS, AND WOULD YOU TRY TO SUPPRESS THE PROSECUTION OF C. I. A. AGENTS FOR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES, AS RECENTLY FIAPPENED WITH THE FORMER F.B.I. DIRECTOR? " ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: The solution of the Helms case was one that worked out very well from my point of view. On the one hand, had he been prosecuted it would have been necessary -- both for the prosecution and certainly for the defense -- to disclose a great quantity of highly classified information. It would not have been fair not to have done so had the prosecution proceeded. It would have hurt our Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 ..17_ Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 country's interests in many respects. On the other hand, the process through which Mr. Helms went was a poignant reminder to all of us in the government, and particularly in the intelligence world, that none of us stand above the law. The law of the United States of America is the governing factor in all of our activities and we have no license, no excuse for violating it in any respect, nor do I have any intention of trying to exonerate or in any way get off the charges of the law anybody in our organization who violates it. They know that. They have to live up to it. JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question) "IS THERE MUCH POSSIBILITY THAT THE TERRORISM PLAGUING EUROPE AND THE MID-EAST COULD SPREAD TO THE UNITED STATES?" ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: There's always that possibility. But I think the country has a good record in highjacking and terrorism because of the precautions we have taken at our airports and elsewhere; because of the attitude of our people in supporting the law enforcement agencies in that type of activity; and because we, being a free society where dissent can be voiced, don't have the same impetus to this kind of activity. But it is a danger and one to which we all must be. continually alert. And I would say that we in the intelligence world, as I briefly mentioned, are spending a great deal of effort in keeping track, as best we can through our sources, through our liaison with other friendly intelligence agencies, of international terrorist activity. And I'm proud to tell you that in a number of instances it has been our information that has thwarted some international terrorist plans that have been maturing -< not in this country but elsewhere and we think that that's a valuable service and we intend to continue doing the best we can to help out here. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA=I6P88-01315R000200430001-8 JOSEPH L. HUDSON, JR.: (Reading Question) "PEARL HARBOR AND THE BAY OF PIGS WERE TREMENDOUS FIASCOES OF THE INTELLIGENCE-COLLECTING AGENCIES, CAN THIS HAPPEN AGAIN?', ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: The honest answer is yes. The other answer is that we are doing everything we can to prevent that. We're human, , were fallible. We're trying to insure, as I brought out in some of my remarks, that differing views on what the trends or likely developments in different world sitations are do come forward. If you suppress the minority view when it's reasonably well reasoned and set forth, you're doing a great disservice and you're inviting the possibility of overlooking some potential problem such as the Bay of Pigs or Pearl Harbor. In short, one of the real challenges in the intelligence world is constantly to question your hypotheses. Are you making the same assumption over and over again? You know, the Arabs will never increase the price of oil. Or, the Arabs will never attack Israel. Or, the Japanese will never attack Pearl Harbor. Or, whatever the assumption may be that seems so true. You've got to constantly probe and ask that. I can't guarantee you we won't make a mistake again, but I will guarantee you we're trying our darnedest to avoid it. JOSEPH L. HUDSON,, JR.: This is the last question. (Reading Question) "DO YOU THINK THERE ARE ANY SOVIET AGENTS IN THE AUDIENCE REPORTING ON YOU TODAY?" (Laughter) ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER: Is there a Soviet Consul General in Detroit? I frequently find the Soviet representatives when I talk. I mentioned the 100-and--some unclassified publications. Anyone of you~an write the Library of Congress and subscribe to our annual product Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CrA-WbP88-01315R000200430001-8 of unclassified studies for $225. And I would just let you know that the Soviet Union is spending $450 in that department. (Laughter) I jts t happened to look at the list the other day. But I'm not giving away secrets today. I'm trying to be as open, as forthright with you as I can. And I'm doing it sincerely in the interest of keeping the American public informed, and in that process generating this greater respect for what must be kept secretive. And I'm working very hard in both directions >- openness on the one hand and tighter secrecy on the other. That which must remain secret must be kept secret. All that can possibly be made available must be made available. I'm so grateful to you for being here and wanting to hear about this today. It's your support that will determine the future of our intelligence activities in this country, and I sincerely believe they are more important to our country today -- in an era of near military parity; in an era of political and economic interdependence with so many other countries of the world ..- than they ever have been before when we had great superiority in all of these fields. You need the insights, the leverage of good information in order to make right decisions. And we need your support in that activity. Thank you. '(Applause) ADJOURNMENT Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-6 28 April 1978 Mr. Russel A. Swaney The ECOno,ic Club of Detroit 920 Free Press Building Detroit, Michigan 48226 Dear Mr. Swaney: Admiral Turner has asked me to thank you for your letter of April. 18th. We are working to edit the speech and will be returning it to you in a few days. We also very much appreciate the tear sheets from the Detroit newspapers. The Admiral is very grateful for the warm reception he received and for your hospitality. Many thanks. Sincerely, Herbert E. Hetu be Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 ARTICLE APPZARrEi3. ON PAGE proved For ReleTaide 2D04WS '!D'cI: i$ 9W f3' 5R00020430Q01}$1 27 April 1978 CIA.ma extend its services to businessmen Detroit CIA director Stanfield Turner says his agency is ready to expand intelligence activi- ties to nonmilitary areas, providing its services to business and giving taxpayers "a better re- turn on their investment." Prior to speaking recently to the Economic Club of Detroit, Mr. Turner told reporters the CIA is increasing its collection of. economic and political data that could be of value to businessmen and other nongovernmental groups. "We want to share what information we col- lect when it can be unclassified," he told a news conference. "For example, there is eco- nomic and political information that we can collect that would be of value to American businessmen. "The CIA can be open in only one direction sharing information. The more you release, the less you have to protect. And it gives the taxpayers a better return on their in- vestment." Mr. Turner said the Soviet Union, while con- centrating heavily on maintaining an extensive spy network, has fallen seriously behind the United States in the technical aspects of in- telligence. He said satellites and other devices have en- hanced the agency's ability to gather informa- .tion worldwide, but have not reduced the CIA's need for personnel. "We now have an increased demand for the human element; ' he said. "We use the tech- nology to collect information, but we.need the traditional human agent to know what some- one's plans and intentions are." Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R00010d446b'1- 7 r 20 April 1978 &S_ t-+c- dom.... j ~3 zv By SHIRLEE IDEN There's a "gone with the wind" sy 1 drome at work in the United States that Frank Snepp doesn't like at all. "When it comes to Vietnam, we'd like to think it happened 100 years ago," he said. "The problem with that is, if we do forget, we might do it again. We almost did in Angola and I believe we'd be deeply involved there today if it weren't for the lessons of Vietnam." For Snepp, an ex-CIA agent, the author of a book on the American evacuation of Saigon called "Decent Interval" and the subject of a long interview in the May edition of Pen- thouse magazine, his own experience there and subsequent events have made it impossible to forget. A trim, youthful man, neatly dressed in a dark brown suit and striped shirt, Snepp told how he served almost five; years in Vietnam as an officer of the; Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He; was the. agency's chief strategic ana- lyst in the Saigon section. Following his two tours there, the CIA gave him their Medal of Merit for his perform-I ance. He was born in Charlotte, N.C., som of a former Marine who is now a supe rior court judge.. He worked in radio and on newspapers and graduated from Columbia University. He earned. a master's degree in . internationa relations there. "WHEN I was about to graduate in 1968, one of my professors recruited me for the CIA," he said. "I hadn't! known he was an agent but he'd been! watching me. One of the reasons hel gave. for joining was to avoid the. draft." , Snepp thus-joined the CIA to avor going to Vietnam andended by serving almost five years theme. He was in Sai- gon when the end came on April 29, 1975 and he was one of the last Ameri- "I was hauled owplwved lbitl embassy onto a helicopter and shot at all the way up," he recalled. 011 Snepp said the government, particu- Six months after he returned to this larly Henry -Kissinger, had "impec- country, in January 1976, Snepp; cable intelligence" that the commun-, resigned from the CIA. He had decided; ists would move into Saigon in force to become a whistle blower. and there would be no negotiated set The writing and emergence of tlement. -"Decent Interval" (published in _ 1 "Yet Kissinger and the government; November 1977) was as secretive as turned their backs on that intelligence' any CIA undertaking. The publisher and it was tragic. They forgot to plan, (Random House) went to great efforts for the evacuation of our friends andi to- insure no leaks.- there was no ultimately, the leave-taking became a advance publicity and book reviewers free-for-all," he said. got their copies about the same time Snepp estimates that 30,000 Vietnam- the CIA bought its copies. ese had been trained by U.S. agencies including the CIA and they were just SNEPP'S publisher moved secretly cut off and massacred by the incoming! with the book because of being burned } communist armies. before. They dealt with the CIA when., "Some young embassy officers and! publishing Victor Marchetti's book, others mounted their own evacuations "The CIA and the Cult of Ming cargo planes and they got-thou- Intelligence." The agency managed to: sands of people out," he said. "130,000 delay its publication for more than two were finally evacuated but the years and imposed their right to alter; embassy was' only responsible for the text. Legal costs alone were nearly about half of those saved. The U.S. $150,000 to-Random House. government never admits this." The secrecy surrounding the evolu-1 lion of Snepp's book is the only secret, MANY OF those who were not saved thing about it, he says. were people Snepp knew well. And "I didn't reveal any classified infor-i even today he explains: "Over 100,000 mation and I haven't been accused of I boat people are afloat on the ocean this," he said. trying to find a country to take them in Nevertheless, he is accused of or crammed into hellholes called 'refu- breach of contract with the Justice gee camps' in Thailand.. Congress Department, which has filed suit . should liberalize the immigration against him. Random House has been restrictions." subpoenaed. __R acrid_thA inistration has just, Snepp is accused of having breached made a statement which he endorses the secrecy agreement that every which will admit 25,000 boat people agent signs on joining the CIA. and other refugees into this country "When I resolved to write my book, i each. year. I decided not to dear it with the "We owe them this and they should agency..I felt the CIA had forefeited be helped." their right to' review it,,, he said. The anguish of the evacuation and: "There aren't any secrets in it and I } its tragic overtones moved Snepp to ! went through channels while still a write . "Decent Interval," but other member of the CIA. I wanted to do an incidents following compelled him to after-action report, but it was write it. squelched." . In his opinion, these incidents added Snepp said the most ominous part of up to a concerted, calculated cover-up the legal moves against him is that the of the true facts of the evacuation. He ! government wants to charge him with said he saw top ranking CIA officials ; a breach of fiduciary obligation. leas"404616i6'theiZl4 f Of3",,0002 3000~14mmdn law concept of pullout. the obligation of a servant to his mas. ter," he said- - Approved For Release 200411/ I~l 88-01315R00020~A4,D60< -8`' z~. Whether vie like it or'not, a democracy cannot survive without a good intelligence service. People who gather secret information are the eyes of those who make decisions. A President deprived of secretly-gathered foreign intelligence would be a blind man in the conduct of foreign affairs. In his speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, made a conscious - and credible - effort-,a gef that point across. The admiral and his people are trying to win back the U.S. public support for the agency which has been in such bad odor in recent years. ..The public was turned off by disclosures of CIA conduct, some of it clearly illegal, during the Watergate period. The functions of the agency were abused by people in power. .In that time of national recrimination, some peo- ple went to the extreme of suggesting the agency be disbanded and that the country-get out of the shady spy business altogether. Thus, "clandestine" Lecaine a dirty word. The admiral, in his Detroit speech, said the CIA has developed technological spying to its highest degree ever and most military information is now gathered by satellites capable of taking incredibly detailed photographs on a regular basis. But, said the admiral, a satellite cannot tell the agency what people are thinking in Moscow or Peking or elsewhere. There remains a need for agents who gather information to enable U.S. ex perts to suggest answers to such questions. The admiral concedes that there is a conflict in a society as open as this one over the public de- mand for disclosure and the intelligence need for secrecy. But, Turner argues, the country still has to have secret information to survive. The CIA has always been efficient at gathering economic information overseas. Much of this is now being offered to the public and it is useful to businessmen and scholars. The agency is therefore offering a visible benefit to the public, something tangible for the money spent on the agency. This kind of service will help rebuild public confidence in the CIA. . But, important as this is, the reports published openly by the CIA do not satisfy the agency's most critical function, which is to find out ,what is likely to hit the country, militarily,-before the blow is struck. Approved For Release 2064/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8. (V7 DETROIT NEWS C' l4 S? 'S Approved For Release 200411'r lpl4 J l P88-01315R000200430001-8 f eA/- ~ T G f Ca I ~, rU ' . c. t J (a t ~ ?- .In defense of intelli. n- ce' nether we like it or not, a democracy cannot gathered by satellites capable of taking incredibly survive without a good intelligence service. People detailed photographs on a regular basis. ? who gather secret information are the eyes of But, said the admiral, a satellite cannot tell the those who make decisions. A President deprived of agency what people are thinking in Moscow or secretly-gathered foreign intelligence would be a Peking or elsewhere. There- remains: a need for blind man in the conduct of foreign affairs. agents who gather information to enable U.S. ex- In his speech to the Economic Club of Detroit, S f ld Turner director of the CIA made t d ,. perts to suggest answers to such questions. The admiral concedes that there is a conflict in ans ie , - A m. a conscious - and credible =effort to get that;: a society as open as this one over the public de point across. wand for disclosure and the intelligence need for' The admiral andhis people are to secrecy. But, Turner argues, the country still has tryuig tivin:=? "; -- .. back the U.S. public support for the agency which = to have secret information to survive. ;,.. , Th CIA h 1 b ffi ' - t t th has been in such bad odor in recent years. The public was turned off by disclosures of CIA conduct, some of it clearly illegal, during the Watergate period. The functions of the. agency were abused by people in power.:". In that time of national recrimination, some peo- ple went to the extreme of suggesting the- agency be disbanded and that the country get out of the shady spy business altogether... Thus, "clandestine" became a dirty word. The admiral; in his Detroit speech, said the CIA has developed technological spying to its highest degree ever and most military information is now as a ways een a den ga erusg a economic information overseas.. Much of this is now being offered to the public and it is useful to businessmen and scholars.: The agency is therefore offering a visible benefit to the public, something tangible for the money spent on the agency. This kind of service will help rebuild public confidence in the CIA. But, important as,this is, the reports published openly by the CIA do not satisfy the agency's most ; critical function, which is to find out what is likely to hit the country, militarily, before the blow is struck. , . . ..... Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2Oa4/[1WI' I IR1-RM:CB8 OIS15R000200430b0 I+8 , 15 April 1978 C I. nare Ris JFa ie CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Director Stansfield Turner gave further evi- dence of his agency's new and more open look when he told Detroit's Economic Club the other day that the CIA wants to share its intelligence information with the public. "There is economic and political informa- tion that we can collect that would be of value to American businessmen," he said, and added that the CIA is prepared to expand its intelligence activities into non-military areas i that might give taxpayers "a better return on I .their investment." Later, in Columbus, he said the old modus operandi of keeping CIA work secret "is no longer the policy because the public wants to know. We will be speaking more, answering _the media more completely and publishing more." ? And in an address at Ohio State University, he said: "We hope the academic community can gain from intelligence. We need the relations with the academic community be- cause the lifeblood of intelligence is the annual infusion of a few good, high-quality persons from the campus." GItANTED TJJAT much of what Turner states may be attributed to rhetorical image- building on behalf of his embattled agency. Still, the promise to share intelligence gains with those in this country outside the military and governmental community who might benefit from it, is constructive and overdue. No other organization in the United States has the formidable facilities for sheer collec- tion of information that the CIA does with its electronic devices, its high-flying planes, infra- red cameras and assorted language and politi- cal experts and grey eminences.. TURNER NOTED THAT through the use of satellites there is a good, deal of data available about possible oil and energy re- serves, crop, projections and industrial poten- tial and that the CIA, as a public-funded agency, should share such information on a lar er scal C, (A c-C)( 1 ~/t I`/GC v29 t al Sqz._; 6 . p Approved For p~eJeas 2 04/11/01 CIX-RDP88-01315R0002~0430001-8 This hind of talk rve are hpp to sa doesn't sound like the sinister cloak-and-dagge Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315 ff00.02Q04 000T&. 1 0t-v",4 OAKLAND TR 3UN U (C c, n 14 April 1978 v---~ G C.--1.- DETROIT. (UPI) - CIA Di- rector Stansfield Turner- said yesterday his agency is ready to,.-. expand intelligence activities- to nonmilitary areas to provide its services to business and give taxpayers "a better return-. on their investment." Prior to speaking to the- Ec"o-- nomic Club of Detroit, Turner told reporters the CIA is in- creasing , ?? its- collection of " eco- nomic and political information that could be of value. to busi- nessmen and other nongovern- mental groups. "We want to share what infor- mation we collect when it can be unclassified,"'-Turner told; a news conference.. "For example, there is economic--and.?political information- that we can collect that would be of value to,Amer- can businessmen. - "The CIA -can be opeq in only one direction -sharing infor- mation, The more you release, the less you have to protect. And it gives: the taxpayers-'?a better return-on- their investment." Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 rS'i,E .PP JAR wASHjT.~GTCN CTAP. (GREEN LINE) C (,4 (_6 I T /'J c~_, p +, PAGE proved For Releas2Q94/M/019 PA-RDP88-01315R00020@WOI0~1-8~',.-,,,,,,,,,, o S L, . Give Taxpayers 'Better Return' Tu-Mer Wan-'is CIA to n te' icze n ce ' United Preis Internatiom! . ; In a clear departure from the tight- lipped approach of his. predecessors. CIA Director Stanfield Turner has expressed a desire to share intelli- gence information with the public. He also promised that the CIA will be talking more. "We want to. share what informa- tion we collect when it can be unclas- sified," Turner told groups in Colum- bus., Ohio, and Detroit yesterday- "For example, there is economic and political information that we can collect that would be of value to American businessmen." he told the Economic Club of Detroit. He said the CIA is ready to expand its intelligence activities to non-mili- tary areas that could give taxpayers "a better return on their invest- ment." IN COLUMBUS last night, Turner said the tradition of keeping CIA work secret "is no longer the policy because the public wants to know. We will be speaking more, answering the media more completely, and pub- lishing more." Turner said the Soviet Union, while concentrating heavily on maintaining an extensive spy network, has fallen seriously behind the United States in the technical aspects of intelligence. He said satellites and other devices have enhanced the CIA's ability to gather information on a global scale, but have not reduced the need. for personnel. "We now have an increased de- mand for the human element," Turner said. "We use the technology to collect information, but we need the traditional human agent to know what someone's plans and intentions are." "WE HOPE THE academic com- munity munity can gain from intelligence,'. Turner said in an address at Ohio State University. "We need the rela- tions with the academic community because the lifeblood of intelligence is the annual infusion of a few good high quality persons from the cam- t pus," he said. "It's a demanding and exciting profession." He said he is confident that out of the new trends, "we are building a strong intelligence community, the best in the world." Turner has testified before con- gressional committees that the CIA now is accumulating so much infor- mation through modern technical means it shouid be shared with the nation's industrialists, academics, economists and businessmen. He said that through satellites there are great amounts of informa- tion about potential oil and energy re- serves, crop perspectives and indus- trial expansion, and that the CIA, as a public-funded agency, should share such information on a wider scale. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 DETROi.T FREE PRESS f. +~ 1~4 ~ 78 Approved For Release. 2004/11/6 : 6fA- ~ 8-01315R00020U43681v -8' By E-t;C SHARP Free Press Staff Writer Looking more like a friendly college professor than Amer- ica's head spy, Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, smilingly sidestepped all the juicy stuff Thursday. Did the CIA really lose a nuclear spying device up in the Himalaya :Mountains 13 years ago and avoid telling the Indian government about it? No comment, Turner replied. Did the CIA have any involvement with Russia's top United Nations employe, Arkady Schevchenko, who left his job last week over differences with his government and is in seclusion in New York? "I am not confirming or denying what you say," Turner answered. What does the CIA think of President Carter's decision against deploying the neutron bomb in the near future? That's another area we can't go into, Turner said. TURNER WAS IN DETROIT to address a meeting of the Economic Ciub at Cobo Hail. At a pre-luncheon press confer- ence, a question-and-answer session with a group of college students and his after-lunch address, he ran into the major problem for all intelligence officials: You can't talk about a lot of your work until it has evolved from current events to history. Outside magazine recently published a report that CIA expedition to India lost the nuclear-powered device, intended to monitor atom tests in China. Turner said comment might compromise the identities of people involved or jeopardize covert agreements between nations. He said he Schevchenko case Is one of the most delicate diplomatic situations" the State Deaprtment faces and "I am not about to muddy the waters." TURNER STRESSED repeatedly that he believed the United States had the world's best intelligence network and is far ahead of the Soviets in the technical inteiligenceiield, ranging from computers to spy satellites. He noted that the CIA has come through three years of scathing criticism and outside examination and he feels the agency has been strengthened by that experience. "I think that sometimes in the past we in the intelligence - community got a little remote from the attitudes and standards of the country," Turner said. . - ? - - He said the CIA is now subject to "surrogate"s nspection by the president, Congress and an intelligence watchdog board, who insure for the public that the agency does not exceed the bounds of law. Turner said that covert political meddling In the Internal affairs of other nations was now under the strictcontrol of the president and that assassination as a tool of foreign policy had been outlawed absolutely. JOSEPH L. HUDSON 311, presiding officerattheEconomic Club luncheon, expressed the confusion many Americans teel about their country's foreign policy by saying itis "difficult to understand the introduction of Soviet troops in Ethiopia and Angola and at the same time be told that detente is upon as and , the SALT talks are moving along well." - - "So much of what we do, so much of what welearn must be kept secret in the national interest," Turner said.He added that the public "should not be too quick to make hereos of" former i CIA agents who have wri ten accounts of their:r:tivities G i j .Z CC :] N O ''rU.+_c ~1 b S e u 1 cIL4 Km~Y C' I' 4- -r- n+Qi& Turner In Detroit sometlmea In the peat we' Approved For Release 2004/11.3'1;000200430001-8 dkV 1, smote..." :, _ Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R00020Q430O1-8v DETROIT NEWS 14 April 1978 C~?< i-v I ~r ~r~FYu. its limits 1 ST P1'EN ~CA94 ~39ws Staff 1Vrit+r Adm. Stanfield Turner, director of the CIA, was in Detroit yesterday to drum up support for the agency and its new gospel of openness. . But he ended up illustrating the limits of candor by refusing to comment on the nuclear-powered monitoring device his predecessors allegedly left on an Indian mountaintop. "Often,. we can't defend ourselves against false accusations . Turner replied yesterday when asked about a magazifa report that CIA agents lost a device con- taining highly radioactive plutonium 233 in the Himalayan Mountains 13 years ago. "If I comment, I am'vulnerable when ?gsr ~.'Yrme y.ac w~ NEWS F'I-7C1TC-+!AFCt.D P.C87Na4W VA 3 i1E MG FOR DETROIT-A EA TEENS - Three high school students, guests of the Economic Club for Adm. Stansfield Turner's appearance yesterday, chat with the CIA director. The students (from left) are Kathy Monarch, of Lincoln High School; Robert Rockwell, of Mott Senior High School, and Kathy's sister, Andrea. The -=Economic Club regularly invites high school students to its speaking luncheons. Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 INESd 'ORE' rr.T Cl:. t: G - d For Release 200 1 i C '- Pgg-trW1315R000~OgggOQ9-p 6I(1 A4-Qvp- 1/p Detroit (UPI) - CIA Director Stansfield Turner said yesterday that his agency is ready to expand intelli- gence activities to nonmilitary areas, providing its services to business and giving taxpayers "a b.,ter return on their investment." Prior to soeal:ing to the Economic Club of Detroit, Turner told reporters that the CIA is increasing its collection of economic and political information that could be of value to businessmen and other nongovernmental groups. "We want to share what information we collect when it can be unclassified," Turner told reporters. Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8 Mr . -Dwight,, ek ermann 522 Fifth Avenue New York 36, New York ,'J Thank you so very much for your nice note. It is indeed pleasant to hoar a little favorable tone in some of our press recently, but I think the opportunity you gave me to speak at the Economic Club was one of the factors which begins to build a better understanding of what intelligence is really all about in our country. Thank you so very much for your thoughtfulness in sending me this note. Best regards. Sincerely, W. E. Colby Director WEC : lm (30 Apr 75) Distribution: Orig - Addressee 1 - DCI -I-- A/DCI 1 - ER Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000200430001-8