WILLIAM COLBY (PRECEDED BY PREPARED SPEECH, FRIDAY, 13 SEPTEMBER 1974)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000200010008-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 58
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 13, 1974
• Content Type: SPEECH

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Center ~nr National SeCUrity Studies
122 tviaryland Avenue, N.E.
4'Vashington. D.C. 20002.
f 2021 544-5380
(Preced.ed by prepared speech, Friday, 1.3 September 1970
ColG~y: l~Iith respect to Chile; Mr. Chairman, since my testimony on Chile
z~ras given ir_ executive session fro!rl ;~rhich it has unfortunately leaked, I
do not propose to discuss the details of our activity there, other than
to point out that they fall S~rithin the genes principles I outlined above.
I repeat what I have previously said that CIA had no connection with
the military coup there i.r_ 1973. We did look forward to a change in
governraeilt.(Audience laughter) But,. in the elections of 1976 by the
democ=ratio political forces. I would add that, in my review of the
transcript; of that testimony, there is no reference to prototype, nor
the term "de-stabilize." The latter, especially, is not a fair descrip-
tion of ov_r national policy from! 1971 on of encouraging continued
existence of democratic forces looking to~,rard future elections. I
tirould also comment that this unfortunate leak, once again, raises the
delima of hotiJ we are to provide the Congress such delicate information
without its exposure and consequent adverse impact ors those who put their
faith in our secrecy and those tirho raight be conterr!platino such a relati on-
ship i_n.the future. This is a matter, of course, for thz Congress to
decide; and. I have every confidence that a fully satisfactory solution .gill
eventualate. I think with that, NLr. Chairman, I wou7_d be very happy to
answer any questions.
Abourezk: Thank you, l~u^. Colby. Before I call on Mr. Borosage, I have
a cyuest:i.on that I s~rould like to ask of you. Your statement is that "covert
action! reflects national policy." TvoT~r, since all covert action is done
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i_,:, ;_ ',~}?"'-~, _~:nd ~nc~n zt is .revea .e L , l.s de.~~-ed y t e x, anc s_~_nce ~. ~ .is
nc i_ i.rei, disclosed nor ac'_.~~?oS,:led~;ed to the pli~lic, how can it reflect na,tior~a,7_
-_ c r .
C: ~~l bv: i,~ecause, f{17~~. Chairman, i t i s g i ven to us by the established elected
autl,or~ities o-; the united States government, the President and the National Security
Cou~~cil and is reported to the Congress.
Abo~..crezk: I migi?t say, i t is not reported to me.
Colby: That may b~ true, Mr. Chairman, and as I have indicated, I believe these
matters should be reported to the Congress in the ma~iier that the Congress establishes.
That is up to the Congress to determine hoer it shall be done. You are correct that
tf~e~e covert actions, by definition, are secret. But> they are not denied. Some
years agc, there was a phrase called "plausible denial" used. We -- I have proscribed
that phrase, because I do not believe that we can tell the American people an untruth.
I .it i nk ~fre can tel l the American peopl e a true statement and keep other rnatters
G~rhich have to be secret, secret. But I do not believe we can tell them an untruth.
P,bo!crezk: I'd like to call on Mr. Bob Borosage.
Borosage: I don't have much to say. In your speech you say that it is a strange
anomaly that the United States has so much information that it makes public, whereas
ou~~ potential adversaries do not. It seems to me that the title of that strange
anocraly, or the reason for it, is called democracy.
Tf~e strange anomaly is that this is supposed to be a society in which the
leg-isla.ture and the people decide what are the policies that we undertake, and
I tr;-ink that that example of what is national policy exemplifies my point. National
policti1 on matters of war-making or acts of war by the Constitution is supposed to be
done at least in conjunction with the legislature. It is not defined simply by the
executive. And the easy assumption that national policy is an executive matter is
e~:actly d-chat has taken us into ail of the wars we've fought and all the agony we've had
over the last decade.
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I Guess, if T can add a personal note, which my be somewhat out of order, it's
very difficult for m~ to be here.. Partly, because I'm very pleased that you've agreed
za ram::.. I think it's a ti~ronderfui thing that you have decided to face your critics.
Or. }.i1e other hand, I grew up in your world. A 4vorld of CIA interventions and of
A~~erica trying to maintain a world order and I was of the generation that +,vas
directed to fight in the war in Indochina. I had friends who fought there. I had
friends ~frho resisted. I had friends who were drafted. All of my friends and myself
i-!enT, through that agony. For many of us, a lot of these questions got out of the
real;n of being policy or something that you would argue about and were seen as
crimi;?al activities. For many of us, it wasn't any longer a question of what the
Uii i:.ed States ~~aas doing, but i t was a question of crimes that tivere being cammi teed i n
oar n~.me that we had no way of controlling, no way of stating. Now there tivere five
years of struggle in this country because of that, of demonstrations of agony. And
or,e of the great problems for people of my generation was that there were very good
people urho ran those policies.
Robert P~1acnamara was a member of the ACLU and many of us saw ourselves in
their positions, and wanted to be in their positions, and were agonized at the
not-ien that good people could be doing these things in our name. I guess the question
than I t~rould like to ask you is to get some notion of the fears that you have, or
the fears that you did have in your youth, because, for me and for at least many of
mar friends, ire have a totally di~FFerent wormview. lde have a totally different set
of fears and of aspirations arhich at least include some minimal principles of
behavior that 4ve would like our country to follo~r abroad.
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Colby: I think, if r. Borosage, the answer to that is that, like every other
c~o~~~ernment employez, I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the
l~nited States. hiy concept of the Constitution of the United States is one expressed
tti-~rough the duly established legislative, judicial, and executive bodies represented
b~~ it. The various policies of the United States, national policy is not an executive
ma~~ter. It is one which depends upon an annual appropriation. It depends upon
the judicial revietiv of the Constitutionality of both the legislation and of the
executive actions. At one occasion, you point out the anomaly. I had the occasion
to follow the suggestion of one of the individuals tivho spoke at this panel of attempting
to negotiate an end to that anomaly.
I had the occasion last summer of being in the receE~tion line when Mr. Breshnev
was over here. And President Nixon presented me to Mr. Breshnev as the new head of
the CIA. ~^r. Breshnev recoiled in some mock horror and asked if I was a dangerous man.
The President reassured him that I agreed tirith the treaty on the limitations on nuclear
wa.r that had just been signed, and I commented to Mr. Breshnev, in my first effort
to~,rard summit diplomacy, that the more we knovr of each other the safer we both will
be. I believe that. That`s e~dhy I believe in working in the intelligence profession
to hopefully increase the kno~~rledge of our leadership about the problems in the world.
It is clear that, thanks to some of the intelligence work of the past ten or
fifteen years, yve now have a self-agreement ~vhich depends upon the fact that we
can ~ronitor whether the Soviets are complying with it or not. A situation we v~rere
unable to do when our intelligence was so sneak that we had to ask for on-the-ground
inspections. I think that the fears that I had in my youth are very similar to the
ones you had, fir. Borosage. We probably faced the problem of a national threat
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ar~d ~;;ar at about the same age, and I -Faced it again in the Vietnam situation and I
s~,eirc three and a half years there working on that problem in the best way that I
could for my country.
~~nidentified member of the audience: ~io~7 many did you kill?
Colby: I'd like to answer that question. I didn't kill any. (Audience
laughter) I'll tell you the answer to that question.. The Phoenix program was one
part of the total pacification program of the government of Vietnam. There were
se~,~eral other parts: The development of local security forces in the neighborhood
-to protect the villages; the distribution of a half a million weapons to the people of
South Vietnam to use in unpaid self-defense groups. A venture that I doubt that many
oi:her governments would try or would meet with the success that the Vietnamese did.
It also included a program of developing local village and provincial elections
and giving authority to the elected officials thereof. It gave decisions about
economic development programs in the localities to the local officials. There were a
variety of programs of this nature, including the inducement, reception, and.
resettlement of over 200,000 Vietnamese who had served with the Viet Cong and decided
to core over to the government's side and were received and not punished for whatever
they had done. It involved the reception and resettlement and eventual return to
village, as security improved, of hundreds of thousands of refugees.. And it included
tha Phoenix program which was designed to identify the leaders of the Communist
apparatus that was bringing terror and invasion to the population of South Vietnam.
The Pi~oenix program was designed and started in about 19fi8 in order to bring some
degree of order and regularity to a very unpleasant, nasty war that had preceded it.
It did a variety of things to improve the procedures by which that was run. It
provided procedures by which the identification of the leaders, rather than the
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follo~:vers, became the objective of the operation. By vahich the objective was to capture,
rat,~er than to kill, the members of the appar~t!~s. By which there were limits placed
on the length of time of detentions and the procedures for interrogation.
Unidentified m^mber of the audience: Ho4~r many were killed. while you ~vere over
the~~e?
Colby: I have testified on that and I said that over two and a half years of the
Phoenix progi?am there were 29,000 captured; there were 17,000 defected; and there
~~re?z~e 20, 500 ki 11 ed, of ~rrhi ch 87% of those ki 11 ed were ki 11 ed by regular and para-
military forces and 12% by police and similar elements. The vast majority of those
killed ti?,~ere killed in military combat, fire fights or ambushes, and most of .the
r~r~ainder were killed in police actions attempting to capture them. The major stress
of the Phoenix program was to encourage the capture for very sensible easy reasons.
First, or.rr respect, not the Communists, our respect for human life where it can
be gained (audience 1aughter), and secondly because a live captive has information
and a dead body has none.
(Paul Sakwa)
Unidentified member of the audience: Bill, I was a former colleague of yours.
P-gay I ask you a few questions?
Chairman: Excuse me just a minute, please. If I might -- it makes it tougher
to shut you off if you say that -- I ~~ronder -- what I would like to do is allow the
parol?ists their chance to question and then following that I arould like to offer the
audience an opportunity.
Unidentified member of the audience: Per. Senator, I ~7ork in clandestine services.
Chairman: I know that. If you'd permit me to do that I'd be very grateful
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''.~~sr,~:", ~y~r. chairman, I'd 1i're to ask Mr. Corby to co;r;ment further on this question
o,- file statutory authority of the Central Intelligence Agency to engage in covert
o~:er%~tions. I read that statute over and over and over, and it does say what you
said it says tivith regard to other duties and functions related to intelligence affecting
the nt~ional security, but it seems to me you find a lot more flexibility in that and
particularly the word "intelligence" than I as a user of the English language would
finU in it. ~~Jill you comment further on whether you think that is really an ideal
statement of statutory authority that does not leave any ambiguity?
Colby; I think that history over the years has given that deliberately general
ph;,ase a great deal of content. A great deal of content that has been ratified by
the Congress and ratified by the executive and has come to, shall ure say, not a little
public attention, and without any change being made in it.
Chairman: Congressman Harrington first; the woman here the second from the
er~d, I don't know your name; and then Mort Halperin and then Mark Raskin, and
Din Ellsberg.
Harrington: Mr. Colby, if I could, let's turn to the country of the week. My
problem basically is in a couple of broad areas, and let me say at the outset that
I'll stand by a memory that I have of two readings of your testimony, and obviously
not Finding it as a.ccesible as you do day to day, it is very hard to have more than
a rr:mory. The term "political destabilization" was indeed used and I think, to go
t0 th,e Credit given you, was very candid discourse as far as the CIA operation in
Chile. Let me also say, and I say this only because I don't want to be deterred from
!~v~hat I think the central concern that I had with this all along is, that your historic
ir~t?1ligence gathering and evaluation role is one that I not only endorse but, in a
sense, accept as a legitimate facet of agency operations and one I might, from a
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T ~;~,-r?~s~~ ~~ t~ers!~e~.ti"e o` a~tatching this unravel suggest that maybe it is thr only
place that you people should be going unless you want to witness the continued
d-i s ~i nt~ grati on of your cred~i b-i i i ty overal 1 because of what i s going on. But s i nce
you have already indicated in your addendum to your prepared remarks, your intention
not to address speci~ics raised in your testimony to Lucien Nedzi on April 2?_,
lei: m-` at least get into the question of what I think is the fiction of congressional
o~~~.rsight. Was Lucien Nedzi, or were the informal members of the Armed Services
Ccrr.rnittee structure that oversaw, at least theoretically the CIA role with specific
reference to Chile, informed with that degree of specificity before April 22 of this
year?
Golby: I believe i`lr. Nedzi is a rather recent appointee to that-'chairmanship, but
over the years since 1964 a variety of congressiotaal committees and individual congressmen
ar~d senators have been -- were made aware at appropriate times in the period of our
covert action activity. This Uaas done according to the procedure set up at that
period -- at each period -- and as you knoVa we have a round-up recap every now and
again and the April 22nd one tivas one for the House committee. There had been
previous total round-up recaps for other committees of the Congress well prior to
-that time, and, in fact, right after the coup in 1973.
Harrington: tilell, if it was as substantive as my effort to obtain information
fre~~i you on the Inter-American Affairs Sub-Committee before which you testified,
I skill question whether or not there was the kind of language you have chosen to
use indicating frank and substantive information being given to the committee. But
let me make the point that Lucien Nedzi, I believe, in late 1972, was first given
tine designation as Chairman of the apparently-prior loosely structured apparatus
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at she Armed Services Committee level on the House side, and it was apparent to me,
in tfie forf:y eight pages of your testimony, that the information being given him that
day ~:~;as unquestianably being given to hm for the first time by the very nature of the
r?osporrses and by the very absence of anything really short of what 14,~ould paraphrase
a> being Colby monologue to a certainly interested and to a degree and on occasion
~r;credulous and rather small audience. In fact, the audience as far as that particular
testimony consisted frankly of f~1r. Taedzi as a member of the Congress, yourself, T~1r.
Phillips and f?9r. Slatinger, and I arould say that that really even falls rather short
o~= Y~hat ~;ould pass for the dimension of Armed Services Sub-Committee oversight.
You've indicated in general, too, that your efforts, at least as they were reflected
in Chile and I can infer from that generally, e~~ere to keep the State Department
informed at all times of activities that were conducted in the carrying out or .ghat
yora characterized again today as a directive given you by the executive;lbranch in
the course of their Constitutional mandate. Was this particular situation that you
have described in detail, either going back to the 1960's or with more relevance to
the 1910 Allende period through the latter part of last summer, followed as a matter
of practice in keeping informed various embassy department personnel in Chile during
that period of time? I make specific reference to former Ambassador Davis, to
former Assistant or Deputy Ambassador Slatterman, and to a variety of other people
~~rho might be loosely in the category of those who would be,-as a part of their
S~f;ate Department discipline, responsible for Latin American affairs in general --
Jack Coupage, Ambassador Designate to Greece; Charles Meyer, who I think was his
predecessor in that role; and Mr. Cory who aaas the former Ambassador to that
country. Do they fit within the purvue of what you have indicated? teas an effort
to keep State Department personnel informed of these operations that you were mandated
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~.o carry out by the National Security Council?
Colby: If I may answer several questions, Mr. Harrington, on the question of
reporting to the committees and particularly your reference to my reporting to-the
Latin American Sub-Committee of the Foreign Affairs Committee, as I outlined in some
detail at that time where we discussed it at some length, our reports to Congress run
on three levels: The one is an open session, of tivhich this one is a comparable
example, where we can, without divulging our operational methods and secrets; we
also report broadly in executive session on the substance of what is going on in the
world, and that particular hearing that day tivas arranged for that purpose, to try
to report generally on what was happening, and as I said at that time, I vas not
prepared to discuss our operational activities in Chile at that particular hearing.
I was prepared, and so indicated in our conversation, that I was prepared to discuss
any operational detail with the constituted sub-committees of the Armed Services
Committee or the Appropriations Committee, and I did so.
As I recall it, Mr. Harrington, I think there were a couple other of the members
present on the April 22 event. I've forgotten precisely who they were and how long
they spent there. But with. respect to the question about clearance with State, the
Department of State through the Deputy Secretary of State, is a member of the Forty
Committee who considers and approves the various covert action directions that we
get or approvals that we get.
The State Department, as do the rest of us, handle this on a very strictly
compartmented basis offering the need-to-know principle for the reason for limiting
sharply who should and tivho should not know. Weil, obviously, each department determines.
that for itself. There are occasions in which these matters are held extremely tightly
and made available only perhaps to the principal concerned. There are other occasions
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in which a broader group of people, including the Ambassador and including others in
tr;~ State Department, are made available. I really am not prepared, I just can't say
right now, which item avas made available to which State Department officer at this
particular point.
Harrington: Let me, if I can, just try to get a little bit further into that
question. Perhaps the more interesting part of your discussion 4vith h1r. Nedzi and
those other members whose names you don't remember this afternoon, urho made up the
sub-committee on intelligence oversight --
Colby: I remember their names. I'm not sure if they were there.
Harrington: -- ran to the method you used to operate in the furtherance of this
kind o~f an activity where I believe, if I could roughly paraphrase it without being
held to exactness in langugage, you indicated that it vas usually or customarily the
case to inform and to include State Department personnel, and I assume from that at
the reasonably ranking level, in the country in which the operation was to ba carried
out, first because it made relationships easier; second, to a degree it avoided problems
of attempting to of necessity go around them; and third, and because I can infer that
the method of operation as far as getting approvals usually ran apparently some sort
of joint chain of command though I a~ould suspect that the CIA could take, at least
as you described it, a great deal by Jay of credit in the initiation area rather than
necessarily just being at the execution or the furtherance level. I say that because
I want to read, just for the sake of not expecting that I am going to get any more
directness than I have had, statements made on three occasions by three separate
individuals all of whom were directly concerned with Chilean policy on the part of
this country's government before congressional committees over the course of the last
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year. The first was before our sub-committee, the ?nter-American Sub-Committee, on
June 12th of this year by Deputy Ambassador or Deputy Chief Slatterman. "Despite
pressures to the contrary,".and I'm quoting notiv, "the United States government adhered
to a policy of non-intervention in Chile's internal affairs during the Allende period.
That policy remains in force today."
Let me read secondly from testit,i~~ny given to the Church sub-committee last
spring. Again, given by former Ambassador Cory, quoting, "I said it was obvious
from the historical record that Ure did not act in any manner that reflected a hard
line." This is a~ith reference to Chile. "The United States gave no support to
and electoral candidate. The United States had maintained the most total Bands off
the military policy from 1969 to 1971 conceivable." And so on, but the -- and let
me read one more significant paragraph in view of your testimony. "The United States
did not seek to pressure, subvert, in-`luence a single member of the Chilean congress
at any time in the entire four years of my stay. All of my instructions came from
State in that no hard line toward Chile was carried out at any time."
I could read the last of former Inter-American Ambassador Meyer's but it runs
along the same lines. "The policy of the government, Mr. Chairman, was that there
would be no intervention in the political affairs of Chile. We were consistent in that
eve financed no candidates, no political parties before or after September 8 or
September 4th rather."
I think it is obvious that there is an apparen~ discrepancy between what they
are stating as officials of the United States government, and what you have testified
to -in a session before, as you calf it, relevant House sub-committee, and I r~rould
also as a backdrop to this quote, if needed, the comments from Senator Symington
that 4vere dttr~e~pFbi~tlReil~a~~i2~~drF-1~Or~~~11dPi88,I.Odti1E3~Dld'b2llU~i1~$ta~ that as
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a member of the Senate structure for oversight, statements made by yourself came as
a surprise to him as to the d?gree of involvement in this country. I say it because
I think it does tend to make the point both of the fiction of oversight and of the,
at least, casual use of the truth on the part of a variety of State Qepartment officials
that have appeared before congressional committees over the course of the last year.
Colby: f~1r. Harrington, I am prepared to go into the CIA there in detail before
the proper committees. I am prepared to go into the CIA operations in detail before
any other members who are brought into the matter by the proper committees. I am
prepared to change our procedure if the Congress decides to set up the structure in
another way. Until one of those happens, I respectfully must not get into a further
discussion about the details of our activities there.
Abourezk: I wonder if I might raise a quick point before G,ae go on to a quick
question by Fred Uranfman. It seems that CIP, covert activities are never discussed
in advance with anyone that I know of. Now, if it is discussed with Lucien P~edzi or
Stuart Symington, I'm not aware of it. I think this most recent Chilean thing
indicates that is the case. You say, Mr. Colby, that you are prepared to discuss
the Chilean operation before any appropriate committee -- that's over with. We
are always talking about ~?hat the CIA has done tine or three years, four or five years
in the past. Do you think it might not be a good idea to discuss what you are doing
new, at this-time, even before the apprcpriate committees? And I, personally, would
like to see you go further than that if you are prepared to call what you do in covert
activities national policy, then shouldn't the nation be brought in, if not on specific
matters, at least on the general principle of whether the nation approves of assassinations
(a~idience applause) -- does the nation approve of CIA sponsored governtrent coups,
many things of which I personally (slight applause) -- please hold it -- of many things
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that I a.nd I know a lot of Americans personally disappro~re of. If you don`t want to
talk about the specific activity, the CIA will not even talk about the general
principle of these things. I mean 4~rouldn't that be an appropriate matter for public
debate to establish whether or not then a specific Chilean operation or the Cuban
operation might be then national policy?
Colby: I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman. I think that my presence here demon-
strates that I am prepared to talk about covert actions, and I`ve talked about a
bunch of them.
Abourezk: If I can just impose on the time of the panel and follow this up --
Colby: As for discussing future events, many of them cannot be predicted in the
future but a number of our covert activities have gone on over a number of years and
during that number of years there have been periodic appropriations, some of ~vhich
is used for same of these operations, and ti}rhen they get significant enough, they
must be covered in the appropriations process. I did state that to Mr. Nedzi in an
open hearing a few weeks ago that there are no secrets from that particular sub-
committee or the corresponding sub-committee of the Appropriations Committee. PJone.
And that beyond a responsibility to respond to his questions, I have a positive respon-
sibility to bring to his attention things that he might be interested in; and I hav e
undertaken to bring to the various committees our current activities so that they
will be informed of what we are. doing.
Abourezk: Let me ask you this. Did the Chairman of the oversight committee
know in advance of your Chilean operation?
Colby: Various of our individual actions in Chile over the years were reported
at that time and in some cases before the funds ~~rere expended to the appropriate
chairmen of the committees involved.
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Abourezk: Now, are you responding specifically to the recent disclosure over
the weekend?
Colby: No, I'm riot responding specifically because I don't vrant to talk about
the individual operations. Sut I am giving you a general principle. I can't say
that every dollar that CIA spent in Chile aras individually approved by a chairman,
but I can say that the major efforts were known to the senior officials of the
Congress as established.
Abourezk: I would like to refer to the ~~~eekend disclosures of the Chilean
action, the Chilean operation by the CIA, was that specific action, vvas the knovrledge
of that action provided in advance to the supervising committees of the Congress?
Colby: The action disclosed by Mr. Harrington's letter over the weekend covered
the period from 1964 to 1973. I believe that I have ansvrered that question in my
earlier ansvrer.
Abourezk: I wonder if you vrould repeat it and capsulize it so that --
Colby: That at various times during that period, the major steps vrere brought
to the attention of the chairman or appropriate members of various of these committees.
Novr, I cannot say that every individual instance was brought to them, but there were
a series of discussions between CIA and senior members of Congress which brought them
up to date vrith the fact that this occurred, and was occurring.
Abourezk: I want to have one more specific question. In the nevrspaper story by
Lawrence Stern in the "4Jashington Post," it states that $350,000 vras authorized to
bribe the Chilean Congress which at that time was faced with deciding a run-off
election between Allende and the opposition candidate. Just for example, did the
committees, were they aware of that?
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Colby: Mr. Chairman, -vith great respect, that fails a~rithin the category of the
details that I'm not going to talk about.
Abourezk: Is there anything in this story that you urould be able to either
admit or deny?
Colby: I can't remember every detail of the story, but I, right at the moment,
but I think I've made my position clear that I do not grant to talk about the details
of our operation in Chile outside of the duly constituted committees of the Congress.
Chairman: Mr. Fred Branfman.
Branfman: Mr. Colby, putting aside various arguments over what actually happened
in operation Phoenix and given your understanding of what did happen under? it, if you
were ordered by the President of the United States and the National Security Council
to engage in such actions against either Americans or other people in other third arorld
countries, I'd like to know if you would have any moral objections to it? I under-
stand where you might have some legal or you don't-think it is within your charter, but
from a moral point of view, what -- would you have any moral objections to it?
I am particularly intrigued by a statement you made when you testified before
Congress in '71 about the An Tri sentencing procedure whereby Vietnamese are
sentenced to two years Vrithout a lawyer, and you said you wouldn't want to see these
legal standards applied to Americans, although they were being applied to Vietnamese.
Ghat moral distinctions -- from a moral point of view notiv, I understand that could
mean different things -- but are there any moral implications to that? From a moral
point of view what are the distinctions between arhat we do to Americans and Vietnamese
and other countries?
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Secondly, I'd like to kno~~~ whether, since Senator Symington told you at your
confirmation hearing that "we are getting pretty sick of being lied to" -- he's on
the oversight committee, do you -- if we don't want to take your ~vord that there are
nor example the CIA is not now involved in paramilitary activities in Cambodia, if
ti~ae don't want to rely simply on your testimony, nothing personal here but there is
a lot of feeling that over tL~~enty years CIA directors have lied to Congress, even
by people like Symington, do we have any means to discover this? Do we have any way
of finding out avhat you people are up to other than having to take your word for it?
And thirdly, I just want to know if you -- what your understanding is of the fact
that so many Americans are sick and tired of what they understand tine Vietnamese --
the CIA is up to. Whether it is your understanding, as mine, that millions of
Americans are opposed to any kind of assassination programs, any kind of police
programs, any kind of attempts to overthrow foreign countries or influence the
political practices in foreig;~ countries in that if and when .the GIA does this, is it
your understanding as it is mine that this is repugnant to most Americans and, in fact,
is being carried out against the will of most Americans?
Colby: Mr. Branfman, I have a considerable degree of modesty as to whether anyone
has a monopoly of morality. (outbreak from the audience)
Chairman: I'd like to ask the audience, please, it does slow down the proceedings
here. It`s all right to be happy and everything, but please don't interrupt the
question or the answer. I would be very grateful. It would help a great deal.
Please proceed.
Colby: With respect to the question about the due process under Vietnamese law
and the advice of counsel, I do stand by the fact that I would hope that Americans
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ti~dill have the benefit of due process including the a}vice of counsel. As a former
member of the Bar myself, maybe that is a professional promotional device, but I
think it is a very useful one. However, in Vietnam there were only two hundred lawyers,
and it tivas a little hard to get advice of counsel for ever?y persan arrested in Vietr;am
under those circumstances, and therefore a variety of other activities were conducted to
try to' improve the legal and procedural aspects of the Phoenix program.
As for the question of how to check on CIA, I think the front benches here of the
press do a superlative job of showing us and catching us whenever they can. I think
that the various members of Congress and the various staff members as they travel
around, they have a chance to ask our people what's going on. They get a feel of
these people. There are a lot of other people who are quite willing to bring to
the attention of the public or to the appropriate authorities any wrongdoing by the
agency or any contradiction between ghat 4ve are duly authorized to do under our
constitution and what we are not duly authorized to do. And, therefore, I think
that any exceptional effort to use CIA in an improper ~vay will come out, and I
have talked to our oGVn employees, and I have told them that it is my conviction that
if anybody tried to misuse CIA against the American people that CIA ~vould explode from
within and I would think it a good thing.
Chairman: Nancy Stein.
Stein: I knov~r that I speak for a lot of people here when we say that we really
appreciate the effort of Senator Harrington to get a full investigation into the
Chilean thing, and eve really encourage him to continue with that.
Harrington: Thank you for the promotion, Nancy.
Stein: I ~pprovedtFo~Re~ease 2fOPb~4/11~t1em~lASF~DP8$e0'1315R00v200~1v0o8m~rica have
suffered first hand the consequences of U.S. foreign poi icy and covert operations.
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CIA activities have led to the overthro~,v of governments in Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia,
and now Chile, the details of arhich you knotiv better than any of us, Mr. Colby. To
achieve its goal, the CIA has infiltrated, distorted, and attempted to destroy the
political, social, and economic lives of the people of the third world. They have
resorted to terror and genocide. We kno~rr that the CIA conducted the training of
foreign police in Texas under the auspices of the Office of Public Safety so that
they learned to make bombs and conduct terrorists actions against their otivn people.
U!e know about your operation Phoenix in Vietnam which resulted in, you said yourself,
20,500 people murdered, and similar programs else~vhere. but all of these programs
Gvon't work, because we are talking here about the struggle of the people for their
o~rvn independence and self-determination. In Vietnam, the people are continuing to defeat
the United States military and CIA apparatus; and, despite setbacks, the people in
Latin America are gaining strength every day. The United States, in fact, has had to
resort to the imposition of Facist governments around the world because of the strength
of the peoples movement.
I want to read a brief portion of a document written by some organizations in
Latin America that I think represent the interests of the majority of the people
there, and they are leading the struggle against you and the CIA apparatu.; that you
represent.
"The peoples of the world live under the permanent threat of the most aggressive
imperialism that has ever existed. They have not been indifferent to the organized
genocide directed by yankee imperialism against the heroic people of Vietnam.
this unequal war, -vhose flames are still not extinguished, the belligerent and treacherous
character of U.S. imperialism has been fully exposed. But in this war it has once
agai n been show~a?~re~c~Fg~~le~~e~0~0~~1/~1ey ~I~iI~Q.~O~~,~r~~0~~f~00~~~0~~7 i s weak
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ti?,nen con-~=rooted by a people prepared to fight and be free whatever the price. The
Latin American people from the last century until today have suffered a string of
military interventions and unjust wars executed and fermented either by tF~e 1`lorth
L^_ult inat i onal
American armed forces or the ~ monopolies. There 4vas the plunder of Mexico,
the occupation of Puerto Pico, the intervention in the Oom;nican Republic, tt~e Bay
of Pigs, and many other acts that our America does not forget and will never forgive.
There is Sheli, Esso and Standard Oil, United Fruit, and ITT, the money of h1r.
titi*hich, with Papy Shel ton,1!~iitrioue and Siracusa,
Rockefeller and hlr. Ford, ar,d there is the CIA ~ and nodjl you,
Mr. Colby, have left indelible evidence of the oppressive ar,d overpowering
policies of the United States against the popular movement in Latin America. There
is now the conclusive awakening of our people that is setting into motion millions
and millions of people and is moving toarard our true independence ~~or the definitive
illumination for the unjust capital system and the establishment of our true revolu-
tionary socialism."
I just want to say to you, Mr. Colby, that the best ar?swer to all of your policies,
the policies of the CIA, it is going to be the vrill of the people who are going to
.win and that we know that you ~~rill suffer eventual defeat. (audience applause)
Chairman: Mort Halperin.
Colby: Play I, as a point of personal privilege, Mr. Chairman. Miss Stein, you
said that I said that 20,000 people were murdered. I did not. You justified apparently
the murder of Mr..Mitrione. I don't see how you can. You said that the CIA conducts
genocide. It does not. You said that you hoped that the people urould win.
I agree with ,you because I think the foundation of our country is in its people,
and I think the people of this United States deserve to have their freedom protected..:
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Chairman: Before going to Mort Halperin ~rrho is next, I want to follow up on
that with one question. Is there anything that the CIA has done overseas that
you would not do in the United States? (audience outburst)
Colby: Mr. Chairman, of course. Ede are engaged everyday overseas in trying. to
learn through secret, clandestine operations. ~+atters aahich are kept secret and are
illegal. In the closed societies and countries that tive work in and in some of the
other countries that eve share this world with, there are a lot of illegal things,
according to our standards, done overseas, and I think this is a natural aspect
of the fact that we live in a world of sovereign nations, each one of wi~ich must
protect its own security.
Chairman: I wonder i f you woul d anst~rer the question, ~ti?hat things aroul d you
do overseas -- what things would you do here that you would do overseas and vice
versa?
Colby: In the United States we do a lot of things which are perfectly proper
and legal. We have a large number of employees out at Langley who do research, who
study, who learn what is going on in the v~rorld and try to make the best assessment they
can out of it.
Chairman: Excuse me. In the context of what we are talking about -- illegal
activities, tivhat activities in the covert operation do you engage in overseas that
you would approve of in this United States, is a better way to phrase the question?
Colby: I believe I said that, in my prepared statement, that CIA must do those
things .that are lawful in the United States. I did not say that we had any authority
to commit crimes in the United States and I deny that tive do have any such authority
and we have given very strict directions to our people that they will not.
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Chairman: But you do undertake activities overseas that would be crimes in this
country?
Colby: Of course. Espionage is a crime in this country.
Chairman: Other than espionage?
Colby: Of course.
Chairman: Mort Halperin.
Halperin: Mr. Colby, I was encouraged by your statement that you now think. it
is a legitimate question whether we should, given our correct perception of our
interests, engage in any covert operations. And then your additional statement that
you do not think abolishing such operations, if I understood you correctly, would
have a major impact either on current activities or on the correct security of the
United States. ? 4vonder whether we can assume that that statement was made tivith,
among other things, the correct situation in Greece in mind. Specifically if, as
appears to be the case, Greece may well be getting a government which decides to
withdrativ from NATO and eliminate American bases, would your statement sti17 hold
that elimination of covert actions would not affect the current security of the United
States? Do you believe that American security interests require or justify American
covert intervention to prevent a Greek withdrawal frorn NATO and has the CIA proposed
to the Forte Committee or do you expect that it arould propose to the Forve~Committee
operations designed to prevent a Greek government from coming to power which would
seek to withdraw from NATO and close American bases?
Colby: As I said in my statement, I do not think that covert actions -- the
elimination of covert actions -- would have a major effect on our current activities
because it is such a small portion of our total activity. Secondly, I did not
think it would have an immediate adverse effect on the security of the United States.
That i s a di ff'~~~~iQv~~~s~i~rl~aefl~~~~~~r~1a'n~l~-~~~~1?~~3~~i~8?~g~r8R?~4~4~~ 7be i n the net
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interest of the United States. On that, I really do not ~hin~: it is very userul ';or
me to discuss in this forum vrhether any particular proposal should be made or should
not be made about an individual covert action. I think that exactly -falls vrithin
the category of those things that I believe, if we are to conduct covert actions,
should be conducted within those very restricted circles in the executive and reported
to those very restricted circles in the legislate'.~e which can enable *t~em to be done
and still be kept secret.
Halperin: hay I just follow that up with one point. Did I understand you
correctly to say that vahile there might be a net advantage for the intervention in
Greece 'that you were not prepared to discuss, but nevertheless the staternent that
t~ere would not be any major impact on American security if vae did not conduct covert
operations would apply to all of the world including Greece?
Colby: Well, I'm thinking, fir. Halperin, of the fact that the current st~~tus of
the world is such that it does not look that eve are on the brin~C of any serious damage
to our country at the moment. The capitol, I think, vaill still stand whether any
particular covert action takes place or not, at this time.
Chairman: Mark Raskin.
Raskin: Mr. Colby, I was puzzled by some conceptual questions. One 4vas what
you thoughta "threat" avas, whose interests were really being served in your view,
and how you defined them; and along those lines, in the last generation as'you know,
the Rockefeller family, the Nelson Rockefeller family, has been very much involved
in different forms of intelligence activities of the United States. Is it going to
be the case that the CIA, under your direction, will continue to be involved or
use various of the Rockefeller-owned corporations abroad either as covers or be
involved with Approvec~~r~elease ~~4/11%~~:' C~~=R~~8=8~3~~R~~~2~~~0O~~~hov~ does
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the agency intend to deal with the question of conflict of interest? l~Jill that be
made public to Congress and the American people?
Colby: If Mr. Rockefeller is confirmed as the Vice President o~F the United
States, the CIA ~;~ill respond to him as the Vice President of the United States.
4,lhatever the authority that suggests something to us, we are restricted by our
legal authorities in vrhat we can do, and eve are not given any privilege to engage in
conflict of interests with anybody. And I did indicate in my confirmation hearings,
and I believe I'm still bound by it, that if anybody asks me to do something which
is improper and outside the proper lines of authority of my responsibilities, I am
quite prepared to resign and leave it.
Raskin: Does that mean then that the Central Intelligence Agency will not use
various of the corporations, of the Rockefeller corporations,. as covers around the
world?
Colby: I don't believe that is a useful subject to discuss, Mr. Raskin; ,because
I get back to my responsibility not to talk about the operational details of my agency.
Raskin: Let me just add one more question to that, then. Did the Central
Intelligence Agency use ITT as a cover in Chile?
Colby: Again, I would say that I do not propose to discuss the details of our
operations. I do not want to get in a situation where I say, no, no, no to a series
of questions and then have to say no comment because the answer is pretty obvious at
that point. I think it much more useful if I just say no to the ~vhole run of such
questions.
Chairman: Daniel Ellsberg.
Ellsberg: I have two brief questions that do not relate to your operations, Mr.
Colby, and the~pipfro~e~~or~2eG@~~~~f}04/~~~1F? 1~~--14~SL9~315Fd~0~20~r'Ir0~13-xhat you
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have testified publicly that the Central Intelligence Agency did have information
about the imminent overthrow of constitutional government in Chile which the U.S.
government failed to pass on to the constituted government of Chile?
Colby: I doubt that I testified to that publicly.
Ellsberg: Would that be correct?
Colby: tJhat leaked I'm not quite sure right now. It's hard to keep up with
them. (audience laughter}
Ellsberg: Would you tell us that no~v, if that's the case, sir?
Colby: What I will tell you is that since so much has leaked I don't have much
problem saying it, we had a general appreciation of the deterioration of the economy
and political situation in Chile running throughout 1973. The situation was getting
worse and worse, in a variety of ways -- politically, economically, socially and all
the rest, and that at varying times during that year, we had information which indicated
that a coup might take place. One did take place as you remember in about the end
of June, I think it tivas, which was an aborted effort and which was put do~rrn right
aGVay. We had a series of other reports indicating various steps toward such a coup.
We i~rere not involved with the people who were leading any of those efforts, but we
did have information about them.
Ellsberg: Did you pass that information, sir, to the elected government of
Chile the constitutional government might be about to be destroyed by the methods
you had information on?
Colby: It's my responsibility to report such information to the authorities of
my country.
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Ellsberg: UJas it passed on to youur knowledge?
Colby: It is a political action tivhether to pass that on to another country or
not. That is a policy decision for the policy leaders of our country.
E1isberg: To your knowledge tivas that policy decision made -- was it passed on?
Colby: I do not think so, but I cannot say for sure.
Ellsberg: h1y next question, sir, is -- this should rely on open information in
your capacity as director of intelligence, I'm sure -- what is your best estimate
of the number of people who have been killed by the present regime ~rhich replaced
constitutional government over the last year? Your estimate of the number that have
been imprisoned, and of the number that have been tortured in that period?
Colby: I would rather not use exact numbers, because I'm not sure of them. Our
estimate at the time was that in the fighting that -took place at the time of the coup
there was somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 people killed. It is also our impression
that there were very few what you might call executions -- very few. There were some,
I admit that. It is not my responsibility, but that is a fact that happened. It's
the military government that brought it about. Ho~v many I cannot tell you for sure.
As for the number tortured, I have no idea.
Ellsberg: No idea?
Colby: I do not have an idea of the number that were tortured.
Ellsberg: slave you read estimates, for example by "Amnesty International."
Colby: I have read various papers on this subject.
Ellsberg: But your agency has not given you an estimate?
Colby: There may ~vell be one but I just can't recall it here at this moment.
Ellsberg: Finally, on this train, have you asked for such an estimate?
Colby: I asked for estimates about the other two matters; I have not asked
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fc,~ tha.t particularly. I don't z,sk for. a lot of question; i:hat core up in our
intelligence business . +rJe have a rather 1 arge and efficient group of analys ~s l~1ho
serve up the answers to the obvious questions around the urorld. T>ere there tiger cages on Kan San
Island, the answer is yes. Were there shackles in the tiger cages? Yes. Those
tiger cages were built during the French time and have been used ever since.
Branfma.nn: Mr. Colby, you have just violated what you just said a little ti?~hile
ago that you weren't going to lie as Director of the CIA and I think that this
can now be perfectly avell demonstrated to your or anybody else's satisfaction that
it was common practice to be tortured in Vietnam, and more that you know it and you
have just lied after saying just a minute ago that you wouldn't. I think it's
disgraceful. (audience applause)
Colby: I respectfully disagree.
Chairman: Before we go to Mort Halperin, Congressman Harrington has asked permission
to be excused. He has to catch an airplane to his district. I want to thank him
very much for his appearance here. (audience applause)
Chairman: Mort Halperin.
Halperin: Mr. Colby, I wonder if you could explain to us by what authority and
by what criteria you decide what a properly constituted body of the United States
Congress is to tivhich you have to answer questions. The Senate Watergate Committee
tivas established by an overwhelming if not unanimous vote of the Senate of the United
States and directed to investigate 4atergate and related matters. As a member of
that committee, a member of that committee asked your agency for information, and
yet you have told us that you gave him what you wanted to give ,him and drew the line
at information that you would only provide to duly constituted and authorized committees
of the United States Senate. Now, as far as I can tell, that was a duly authorized
committee authorized to receive that information. As far as I am aware, the Senate
cif the United States has never voted that the Armed Services Committee or the
Appropriations'~c~~~eeora~gl~~~e~y4/~a~1i;t~~sRP~.~~0~~o5~R~Oge~O~hatO$ formation,.
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and I wonder if you could explain what it 'is that gives you the right to say that
this committee is authorized and that the !~!atergate Committee is not.
Colby: I am merely follo~;ping the precedent established by the House and Senate
.over some 25 years.
Halperin: But if you'll excuse me, the Senate !datergate Cormittee was never
established before.
Colby: You are correct that there is no specific resolution of either the Nouse
or the Senate that sets up those particular committees, but in the early 1950's those
subcommittees of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee of the
House and of the Senate were established as our proper oversight and revietiv committees.
And the practice grew up, over those 25 years, that tre would only speak to those and
not to the others. There were a series of recommendations presented to the Senate and
to the House over those years recommending a change in that procedure. Each of those
suggestions was turned down, so that the standing arrangement then continued.
Halperin: But, with all respect, that's for the general policy of what you have
to tell them generally about your operations, but I don't understand why that isn't
superseded in a particular area by an overwhelming vote of the Senate requiring them
to answer. By your logic, the FBI and every other agency of the government -- in
many cases only answering to their appropriations committee or their authorizations
committee -- would have said to the Irlatergate Committee, tive're sorry, we're the FBI
and Ure only answer to our standing committees. These other groups understood that
this is an extraordinary situation; that the Senate had overwhelmingly authorized
this extraordinary investigation, and that seems to me to supersede twenty five years
of practices without a vote of the United States Senate, in requiring the agency to
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respond to the questions of that committee.
Colby: Excuse me. It is 25 years with a number of votes recommending change
which were never got.
Halperin: But never authorizing the practice, simply failing to change it.
Colby: That's right. The fact is, however, that I am prepared at any time to
change this process. At any time the Senate and the House direct me to do so. I`m
not giving anything aaray; I'm merely reflecting the Constitution.
Halperin: But the Senate directed every member -- every part of the executive
branch -- to answer the questions of the ~Jatergate Committee. And now you are
saying, no, you want a specific resolution telling you to ans~ver them.
Colby: I am merely saying that I will comply to the way the Senate wants to
arrange the oversight of the operational aspects of the intelligence business. There
is special legislation which indicates that the intelligence business is a very
special business. I am charged in statute with the protection of intelligence
sources and methods against unauthorized disclosure, and I am prepared to change my
procedure at any time the Senate and the House determine to do it. Until that time,
I think I have to follow bath the tradition of the House and the Senate and the
specific directives.bf the statute itself.
Chairman:- One more -- Dick Barnet -- on the panel.
Barnet ~ Per. Colby, do you consider the covert operations in Chile to have
been a success?
Colby: I think that that falls into the category of not talking about our
operations. It is hard (audience laughter) to say whether it is successful or
unsuccessful without talking about ti~~hat they were. If they were one thing, they
were successful. If they were another thing they were not.
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Barnett: I'm not asking you to comment on the operations. I'm asking you to
comment on the results. Let me put to you what I think based on information that I
have the results were, and then I would like your evaluation as to 4~lhether that was
a success.
Colby: I would perhaps save you the time, Mr. Barnett, by saying that I reiterate
that our policy at that time was to look forward to a victory in 1976 of the democratic
forces through elections.
Barnet': Well, as a result of the activities --
Colby: No, not as a result of our activities. The coup had nothing to do ~~rith
our agency.
Barnet The failure to withhold information which you had from the constitutionally
elected government, we have a military dictatorship which has repealed two generations
of reforms in Chile, has obliterated a system of reform which has evolved under
conservative and Christian democrat government. We have a situation today in Chile
where large parts of the middle class are considerably worse off than under the
regime that succeeded it. We have a regime so incompetent that we have tens of
thousands of people literally that are on the brink of starvation, for which I think
the United States and your agency in particular, must bear some responsibility.
Colby: 4Jith due respect, I disagree with you because our appreciation of the
situation in Chile and the analysis of the situation in Chile was that the coup in
Chile, the military coup in Chile, was brought about by the policies of the Allende
government,. which so mixed up the situation in Chile that the military decided to
act against the government. Now, we did not have anything to do with the military
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cc~a;~ i;. Chile, and therefore I dr, not think that you can say that the result today
is the result of either CIA or the United States.
Halperin: Are you really saying, in line with the policy of candor that you
say that the agency is attempting to folloyv, to tell us that the activities o~F
the agency in support of hostile press, in support of strikes, in support of
di?r~ct support of armed nationalist groups in Chile, did not have a direct effect
on the atmosphere which produced the coup?
Colby: I said that our policy 4vas to encourage the democratic forces in Chile
to sustain themselves in looking toward a victory in the elections of 1976.
That is what our policy was and that was what our activities were aimed at.
Halperin: Have you, as a result of what happened in Chile, ordered a review of
that part of the agency that develops plans for encouraging democracy in foreign
countries?
Colby: 4Je have not given any assistance to Chile since the coup.
Chairman: h}r. Peck.
Colby: Other than certain funds -- let me correct that (audience laughter) --
other than very limited items that were committments made prior to the coup and
have nothing to do with the period after the coup and will have nothing to do
with the period after the coup.
Peck: Mr. Colby, your statement was the CIA was not directly involved in the
coup, however, you have admitted that there were activities before that, but isn't it
true that the Central Intelligence Agency is not the only agency of our government
involved in covert activities? Isn't it true that agents of the Defense Intelligence
Agency were directly involved in the overthro~v of that government? Isn't it true
that military officers of the United States government held a party several tiveeks
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before the coup at an Air Force base in Argentina, ,lust across the mountains, in
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~vhich they did toast to the success of the coup? Isn't it true that agents of
the Defense Intelligence Agency were acting in the Port of Valparaiso during tl?e
coup, helping to direct the police and military operations and rounding up suspects
for internment during that period? And isn't it true that these same agents of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, undercover as Defense attaches in Santiago throughout
the period of destabilization in Chile, were actively working for. the Central
Intelligence agency?
Colby: Our attaches of any foreign country are known as attaches. They, by
reason of the structure of the Defense Department, they report to the DIA, the
Defense Intelligence Agency. That doesn't make them agents. It makes them
officers in the United States Army or Navy or whatever it is.
Peck: Just the same as agents of the Central Intelligence Agency?
Colby: I think they are officers or enlisted men in their respective services.
That's what they are. There are some civilian employees of the Department of the
Army, Defense, the Navy and so forth. They are overtly known as that, and that
the anstiver to your basic question is that the other agencies do not conduct covert
actions.
Chairman: Now, from the audience. I'd like to ask if you would ask one
question. Please be brief because there are a great many peapie who 4vant to ask
but state your name before you ask the question and go ahead and ask it.
Paul Sacklow, go ahead.
Sacklow: My name is Paul Sacklow, and I'm sort of unique here, I think, because
Bill Colby and I are from the DEP in the clandestine services. It used to be called
DEP. There were a~couple of gentlemen here yesterday from the DEP area, my old
friend Bob Meyers and Tom McCoy. Bob used to be in charge of operations in Vietnam,
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Cambodia, and Laos, years ago. Tom P~cCoy was out in Vietnam with Colby with Phoenix
and other programs, both were very brilliantguys, and the conference has invited them
in and I think very politely and usefully to present the CIA attitude on a~hat we are
trying to do here, to clarify this. But, in looking over 'the record, I did not
identify any other person from CIA and the clandestine services tivho had a opposing
position on Vietnam and what went an in Indochina. I happen to repre-sent that, and
I oppose Mr. Colby, and I respectfully ask him again to please declassify all of
the documents I've asked him to declassify including five of my own memos to Richard
Bissell, Jr., the Deputy Director for the clandestine services and about forty other
documents,. intelligence disseminations, in which you, Bill, are deeply involved and
sent insyourself. I want those unclassified. You have desanitized them. You have
butchered them. You have destroyed them, and you have made me look like a fool.
I will not permit that, sir. And I think this conference has made an unfair
evaluation in the kind of invitee that it has made. You have not -- I have not
been invited -- I came here. I found out about it by accident. Colby has been
invited; Tom McCoy has been invited; Bill Pleyers has been invited. Some other
spooks have walked in .here --
Chairman: Paul, please. If you have a question, go ahead and ask it. If you
want to make a speech, do it somewhere else. We've got many people who want to ask
questions here. It is unfair to all of these other people. Seriously, I don't think
that you ought to be unfair to them.
Sacklow: All right, sir. Do you want me to stop now?
Chairman':: GJould you please ask your question or stop, one or the other.
Sacklow: I want, under the Nuremburg thing that has been worked out by the
judicial system, international and U.S., I wonder how Mr. Colby uses moral actions,
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ho~.~ you respond, not just according to the Constitution and not just according to
the laws that have been passed, but as a moral human being under the Nuremburg
thing, how does he as a human being respond to the tremendous butchering and murder
and destruction in Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. How does he as a
human being respond to that? I'd like to know. That's my question, sir.
Colby: I respond as I indicated at one point a~ith great concern for the human
life sacrificed in southeast Asia and which I believe was started by the attempt of
the North Vietnamese and their Communist Allies to take over South Vietnam.
Chairman: Next.
Porter: I'm Gary Porter. Per. Colby, you addressed yourself early on to the
question of American CIA involvement in Laos and justified it by referring. to the
allegation that the North Vietnamese refused to have the troops leave Laos after the
eras established secret arir~y
country / in 1962. This would imply that the United States CIA was not /
involved with supplying viith guns and other equipment and material to Armee' Clandestine.
Laos before. Now, I'd like to lay out these facts and have you either confirm or
deny them. First of all, is it not true that the CIA forces were already supplying
(inaudible) at the time of the cease fire in Laos at the time of the Geneva meetings
in 1962? And in that period following the same, the Pathet Lao as a member of
the tri-particle coalition government demanded it as was their right under the
arrangement and that the United States ceased its military and economic aid through
the ( inaudible ) who were ensconced in bases within the classified (inaudible).
consulted on
That under the agreement the Pathet Lao had a right to be /all major questions
of defense and foreign policy. And that, in fact the U.S. continued those supply
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P arthet ~, ao
~,u~~ly operations against the de!~ands of the / chat they end them. This
took place over 90 days and that the U.S. in continuing that supply operation had
P arthet L_ao
a plane shot do1,~n by the / That the Chinese government, itself, made it
clear that they would personally help the Vietnamese to maintain their troops in
Laos until the U.S. ti?rithdrew Now, do you confirm or deny these facts?
Colby: I will say that CIA did begin a program of assistance to the tribesmen in
Laos in, I believe, 1960. This was a program which was run by CIA and was also
participated in by the U.S. military. At the time of the Geneva Accords in 1962,
CIA ceased i is supply and tivi thdrew i is people. The mi 1 i tary wi thdreav its people. lrle
did leave some people in Laos for intelligence purposes but not for paramilitary
purposes. After -- when we were through -- I've forgotten the number but it was
in the neighborhood of 1,000 people who checked out through the international control
checkpoint. The North Vietnamese withdrew, if I remember, it was something on the
order of 40 or 50 people, leaving some 5,000 behind. That in itself did not change
things until they began to attack some of the people of the Maos up in the country.
At that point, in order to respond to the attacks made by those forces illegally
-in Laos, CIA was asked to and did begin a program of covert supply to those forces
to protect themselves against the North Vietnamese incursion.
L`Armee Clandestine
Porter: Are you saying that the United States did not supply ~ g0
days after the Geneva meeting?
Colby: I deny that CIA did anything before they were provoked to it and
requested by the people in Laos to help defend themselves against the North
Vietnamese incursions against them.
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Porter: It is on the record admitted by US officials that the US did, in
Pathet Lao military aid
fact, supply the ~ ti~~ith ~ 90 days after the Geneva meeting.
Colby: 1~1e respected the Geneva agreement provisions. I'm not sure what the 90
days is right at the moment. We respected the Geneva Accords agreement at that time
and were only led to a violation of them by a greater violation by the North
Vietnamese.
Porter: Can you answer yes or no. U1as the CIA carrying on the supply operation
against the Pathet Lao?
Colby: Yes. Against the demands of the Pathet Lao., certainly, and their
North Vietnamese allies because they ~vere North Vietnamese allies and they were
attacking the Mao tribesmen.
Porter: Did you say we did carry on the operation?
Colby: As a defensive measure against violations of the Geneva Records by the
Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese.
Cantor: I'm Susan Cantor. Mr. Colby, you said that the CIA was nat involved
in the military coup that took place in Chile.
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