SUSPICIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 11, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2004/11101 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZIiE
ARTICLE ALFFEAt W 11 November 1979
W PAGE_
F S=ri: ;+~ ~++~.r.~ ~1-r~:,~,': .~.I:i.'~..~ Oci:rlr,rn, and each has stressed the prim.-icy of nat onal
0 _onstruction and independence.
Hie \IPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of
11aolat led by Agostinho Neto, is generally recognized as
0 -s, strongest and most radical of the three. I he M PLA. was
!:nded in the mid-1950's and began armed resistance Ic
Portugese in 1961. It draws its primary support from the
imbundu people, who make up about 23% (it the country's
nulation Urban based, with a socialist orientation, the
'LA seems to have considerably more support across
hal iines and among educated Angolans than the other
o groups.. its forces currently hold the central portion or
rgolr.r, including the capital city of Luanda, where it
,laced itself the legitimate government of the country on
r:ependerice day.
The Soviet Union, Cuba, Algeria, Mozambique, and
r.inea-Bissau all recognize the MPLA's claim tc
ritirnacv, and all have furnished it with military.
:-.istance. The MPLA started receiving modest amounts or
viet aid in the early 1960's to fight Portugese domination,
:rer first having been refused support by the United States.
,wever, it was not until after the April 1974 revofuton in
rrtugal, and most recently since the spring of 1975, that
So iets began providing truly large quantities of`
istance ovreAptloro\mwlt?rr iease'ZUU411"fPJ'r""'UIHtL71"2523=U-IJ-1 UUUIUUtibUU
 INTELLIGENCE Rayed For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
the 1973 coup. State's African bureau in June recommended
almost unanimously that the United States stay out of
Angola. Moreover, Davis, according to an official directly
involved, warned that "neither Savimbi or Roberto are
good fighters - in fact, they couldn't fight their way out of
a paper bag. Its the wrong game and the players we got are
losers."
Since President Ford's decision, the United States has
maintained a "two-track" policy toward events in Angola.
Secretary Kissinger continues to publicly decry Soviet and
Cuban intervention, supporting the call of the Organization
PAGE 3
for African Unity for negotiations between the combatants
and an end to outside interference. On the second track, the
U.S. government itself intervenes by sending funds and
arms to UNITA and FNLA. In addition to this covert
assistance, the Administration is requesting an un-
precedented increase in open aid to Zaire in FY 1976, as the
graph below indicates. The Administration has come close
to admitting that this assistance will be used in Angola, in
spite of a congressional prohibition on providing aid to
countries which pass it on to other parties or use it for non-
defensive purposes - both of which Zaire has been doing in
behalf of the FNLA.
ANGOLA: BACKGROUND NOTES
MAURITANIA
IVORY
COAST
ZAMBIA
Population: Approximately 6 million people, with
population centers in the west coastal and plateau
regions.
Ethnic Groups. Angola's three primary ethnic groups
are the Bakongo in the north; the Kimbundu and the
Ovimbundu in the south.
Resources: Angola produces coffee, sugar, cotton,
tobacco, and other foodstuffs. The country is con-
sidered to be potentially one of the richest in southern
Africa, with large resources of oil, diamonds, and iron
ore.
History: Angola, a ?Portugese colony for 500 years,
was granted independence on November 11, 1975.
Strategic importance: Angola is strategically located
in southern Africa. Its major ports provide the
primary outlet into the Atlantic Ocean for Zambia
and Zaire, and its railroads provide the major outlet
for Zambian and Zairian copper. It is also located
north of Namibia (Southwest Africa), the colony of
South Africa, which the United Nations and the
World Court have ruled is held illegally by South
Africa.
per capita income: Approximately $200 per person
(1973 figure)
Foreign Investment: The Portugese lead in foreign in-
Size: With over 481,000 square miles, Angola is twice vestments in Angola. American corporations have ap-
the size of Texas. Angola lies on the southwest coast proximately $240 million capital investment in
of Africa, bordered by Zaire, Zambia, and Southwest Angola, almost 90% by Gulf Oil Company which has
Africa (Namibia). Included in its territory is Cabinda, the rights to the oil in Cabinda. Texaco has a
a small coastal area north of the Congo River estuary marketing operation in Angola, and other oil com-
bordered by Cyl ppr&e* e$tetv1a9ei2004/11/01: Cl F A4e% e513 (h1A6?QQ.1-4
Mediterranean Seal
CENTRAL
AFRICAN REP.
CONGO
REP.
ZAIRE
.Source: State Department.
 INTELLIGENCE REPC)RT
U.S. AID TO ZAIRE FY75-76
(in millions of U.S. $)
FY75 FY76
Estimated Proposed
$4.0 $19.6
LI
FY75 FY76
Estimated Proposed
$5.3 $44.9
F7
FY75 FY76
Estimated Proposed
$9.3 $64.5
THE ZAIRE / ANGOLA
CONNECTION
The following exchange took place between Senator
Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii) and Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger before the Senate Appropriations
Committee on November 20, 1975:
Inouye: "Is Zaire providing military or economic
assistance to any of the warring factions in Angola?"
Kissinger: "I think Zaire has a major national interest
in the future.of Angola since its major outlet to the sea
goes through Angola, and, therefore, the orientation
that controls Angola will have a sort of stranglehold
on Zaire, too. So I believe that it is certainly giving
some economic assistance."
Inouye: "If that is the case, would you say that we are
providing some indirect subsidies to Angolan- in-
surgents?"
Kissinger: "I think that would be correct."
Source: (unless otherwise indicated)
60 "Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations."
.Senate fleoringc before the Committee on Ap-
propriarions FY 76 p. 1467.
(I) Economic Aid-
Breakdown of FY 76 figure as follows: (in millions of
U.S. 5)
5.0 PL 430 (Food For Peace)
.6 Population Grant
22.7 Security Assistance
11.0 Commodity Credit
Corporation Credits
(Source: Zaire, Desk, State Department)
2.6 Other
N.B. Total FY 76 Figure
Does Not include a requested $20 million from Ex-IM
Bank. This figure is down from S56 million in FY 75,
due to "severe liquidity problems" in Zaire. according
to an official at Ex-IM Bank.
PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF
FUNDS
Sec. 505 - Conditions of Eligibility of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, is excerpted
below:
(a) In addition to such other provisions as the Presi-
dent may require no defense articles shall be fur-
nished to any country on a grant basis unless it shall
have agreed that -
(1)
it will not, without the consent of the President -
(A) permit any use of such articles by anyone not
an officer, employee, or agent of that country,
(B) transfer, or permit any officer, employee_ or
agent of that country to transfer such articles by
gift, sale, or otherwise, or
(C) use or permit the use of such articles for pur-
poses other than those for which furnished;
CI - -141
 IN-rELLIGENCE R PORT
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South African Intervention
The outside power with the largest direct involvement in
Angola currently is white supremacist South Africa. South
African troops entered Angola as early as August, and on
September 9 South African Defense Minister Botha ad-
mitted that the country's troops had secured the Ruacana
Falls hydroelectric project inside the Angolan border,
across from South African-controlled Namibia. The South
Africans then escalated considerably in late October, accor-
ding to reliable U.S. intelligence sources, and their forces
started to move deep into Angola. There are now two
separate mechanized South African units, with a strength
between 1,000 and 1,500 men, operating inside Angola. Ad-
ditionally, the South Africans have equipped and otherwise
supported yet another armored column of about 1500
Africans and 500 white mercenaries which has driven the
MPLA out of many key positions in southern Angola, os-
tensibly on behalf of UNITA and FNLA. The South
African government has censored its own press concerning
its involvement in Angola, but on November 29, Die
Burger, the official paper of the ruling National Party,
reported that the fighting in Angola has become a "mobile
conventional war", in which South Africa is providing
"brain power, advice and supplies" to the two Western
backed independence groups. A November 23 article in the
Washington Post reported that not only were South African
regular troops fighting hundreds of miles into Angola, but
that these forces were supplied from permanent South
African military bases on the South-West African border
with Angola, from which "regular airlifts of military equip-
ment were made deep into Angola by C-130 transport air-
craft."
United States-South African
Collaboration?
The extensive South African and U.S. intervention in
Angola places the United States in a de facto alliance with
the apartheid regime, raising the possibility that the
governments are secretly cooperating. Certainly, the South
African leadership hopes to bring the United States into
open support of its position in Angola, as it has already
proposed. When the South African-backed troops driving
northward towards Luanda were reportedly stalled in their
efforts, the South African press began to call on the
PAGE, 5'
Western powers to begin open support of their allies in
Angola. An MPLA counter-offensive would force the South
Africans to ask for even greater intervention.
United States and South African cooperation in southern
Africa is not unknown. In the early 1960's, South African
intelligence worked closely with the CIA to recruit
mercenary forces for the Congolese civil war, according to
intelligence sources. This collaboration was part of what
three independent Administration sources describe as a
"close" liaison relationship which the CIA has maintained
with South African intelligence for years.
Administration spokesmen deny any connection with
South Africa. One State Department official noted as the
reason for State Department opposition to intervention in
Angola that the United States will certainly "be tainted with
the South African brush-" He also noted that the United
States is building up an increasing debt to the South
Africans who "are not at all adverse to calling in their
markers."
However close the cooperation between the United States
and South Africa, the extent of South African intervention
in Angola has already caused tremors throughout Africa.
Uganda's President Idi Amin who had severely criticized
the Soviet intervention in Angola, warned the FNLA and
UNITA that the African states "may have to review their
positions on the Angolan situation and their attitude to your
two parties in particular," because of the reports of South
African assistance in the fighting.
Both Nigeria and Tanzania, important African states,
now recognize the MPLA government, having changed
their position of neutrality after learning of the South
African role. Ethiopia has announced that it may also alter
its position. The Organization of African Unity has called a
foreign minister's meeting on the Angolan situation for
December 18, 1975.
 INTELLIGENGE REPc7.'RT
THE IMPLICATIONS OF COVERT ACTION
The intervention in Angola is a CIA covert action
program. It need not have been: the President could have
acted openly, come before the Congress and made the case
for intervention, The decision to act in secrecy was not
simply a tactical choice; it has broad consequences for
American policy in Angola.
Hidden from Whom?
The CIA intervention in Angola is not a secret to the
combatants there, to the leaders of other African countries
or to the USSR. The primary victims of secrecy are the
Congress and the American people. Covert intervention
enables the President to avoid submitting his policy to the
public and Congressional scrutiny which open policies must
endure.
Generally, a President faced with a hard.or controversial
choice in foreign policy must address many audiences.
Within the bureaucracy, opponents of the policy have their
day in court. New commitments of resources require
Congressional approval and come under debate in the
Congress, the press and the public. One result is that public
policies generally do not stray too far out of touch with what
the public will condone.
All of this is avoided with secret policies. Covert action
projects usually originate in the Clandestine Services branch
of CIA, and are approved by the 40 Committee, an inter-
departmental committee of five members. Generally the ap-
propriate intelligence analysts in the CIA and country desk
officers in the State Department are not consulted or in-
formed. Any disagreement within the bureaucracy is closely
guarded and severely restricted. Finally, a covert policy
simply avoids Congressional and public discussion.
In a Lou Harris poll released November 21, 1975 at
the Democratic Issues Conference in Louisville, Ken-
tucky, the following opinions of the American people
were reported:
* A solid majority, 75% - 18%, believe it would be
wrong for the U.S. to commit soldiers to another war
like Vietnam.
* 72% of the people feel this country should avoid all
guerilla-type wars in the future, and involvement
where it appears we are participating in civil wars in
another country.
The ability to act secretly has policy consequences. A
President is much more likely to decide to intervene simply
because it can be done without expending the time and effort
to gain public support and congressional approval.
Proponents of covert action often argue, as William Colby
did in his statement to the.Pacem in Terris IV convocation
on December 4, 1975, that although covert action was mis-
situations truly important to the country" in the future. By
their very nature, however, clandestine operations are most
attractive not for situations clearly important to our
defense, but precisely in those instances in which the in-
tervention would be controversial, the national interest un-
clear.
The decision to intervene in Angola illustrates this clear-
ly. Angola presented a situation in which a national libera-
tion movement equipped and armed by the USSR was com-
peting with other movements for power in a country not of
vital concern to the United States. The response could have
been to intervene, to protest Soviet intervention or to do
nothing. The African bureau of the State Department was
almost unanimously opposed to intervention. Since
Secretary Kissinger was ardently in favor of intervention
and served as chairman of the 40 Committee, it is difficult
to believe that the objections received much consideration.
President Ford chose to intervene, supporting FNLA and
UNITA with $50 million. Given the current absence of con-
sensus on foreign policy, it is at least doubtful that he would
have made the same decision if he had been required to win
Congressional approval for the funds. Finally, it is unlikely
that the Congress, struggling with the domestic economy
and sharing the public disenchantment for U.S. intervention
in Indochina, would have appropriated the funds to in-
tervene in the civil war in Angola.
Secret Commitments
President Ford was not faced with a decision to intervene
for the first time in Angola. He was presented with a 40
Committee recommendation for a covert action program in
support of a longtime American client facing increasing
pressure from a Soviet-supported group. The secret com-
mitment of the CIA to Holden Roberto and FNLA
significantly altered the bureaucratic perception of the
situation in Angola. The Soviet assistance to MPLA was
viewed as a "test" of American mettle primarily because the
CIA had long supported Holden Roberto in Angola.
In Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, the Soviet Union
also provided extensive aid to marxist liberation groups, but
this did not trigger American involvement. In Angola, the
administration's response reflected the established secret
commitment to Roberto and the ties with Mobutu in Zaire.
Without these, the dramatic increase in Soviet assistance to
MPLA might have produced private American
remonstrations to the USSR, or even a visible effort to align
African and international opinion against Soviet in-
terference, but direct covert intervention would have been
used in the past, `&p anfi d btRwlea: $10ft1g00in: CIAfR[P$$8.15R000100660001-4
 INTELLIGENCE RE}Toved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
The CIA is, as its director William Colby suggests,
"merely an instrument of American foreign policy," but its
activities and capabilities may create or foreclose options
which greatly influence substantive decisions. The CIA, like
the inexpensive handgun known as the "Saturday Night
Special," is an instrument more likely to be used simply
because it is there.
Angola - A Congressional Oversight
In December, 1974, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (P.L. 93-559).
The amendment prohibits the expenditure of any funds for
any covert action project "unless and until the President
finds that each such operation is important to the national
security of the United States." [emphasis added]
CIA Director Colby testified in executive session that the
United States has no strategic interests in Angola. His state-
ment was supported by NSSM 39, a 1969 National Security
Council analysis of American policy toward southern Africa
which concluded that "the United States does not have vital
security interests" in the entire area of southern Africa,
much less in Angola alone. Only the most expansive defini-
tion of "national security" could provide the basis for the
finding required by law. According to congressional
sources, President Ford has made that determination.
The Ryan Amendment also requires the President to
report the details of any covert action project "in a timely
fashion" to six committees of Congress. Introducing the
amendment to the Senate on October 2, 1974, Senator
Hughes (D-Iowa) called it the "beginning ... of imposing
some order and structure to . . . exercise a measure of con-
trol over the cloak and dagger operations of the U.S.
government."
After the act was passed, each of the six oversight com-
mittees-the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Ap-
propriations Committees of the House and Senate -
delegated the authority to receive briefings to a handful of
senior members. To brief six committees, CIA officials had
only to inform about fifteen representatives about the agen-
cy's covert actions abroad. These few, bound by secrecy
regulations and fearful of leaks, have neither informed their
colleagues nor curtailed the CIA's activities abroad.
When Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), chairman of the
Senate Subcommittee on Africa, heard about the Angolan
intervention, he demanded a briefing for the entire Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Although only three or four
Senators appeared for the briefing, those present expressed
serious objections to the enterprise. Senator Clark now
states that his hands are tied. He cannot go public with the
information, he informed CNSS Associate John Marks,
because "if I were to tell you that the United States was in-
volved in covert activities in Angola, I could be kicked out
PAGE 7,
sanctions. Learning about the activities in executive session
has severely circumscribed his freedom of action.
Senator Clark's experience demonstrates the limits of
congressional oversight of covert operations. The 1974 Act
which many hoped might limit covert operations abroad
may serve only to make the Congress complicitous in acts
which it neither initiates nor can hope to control.
In 1974, Congress also passed the War Powers Act to
control Presidential war-making. According to the Ad-
ministration, however, the Act does not apply to the CIA or
to civilian or mercenary troops engaged in conflicts. Thus
the Act is said not to apply to American pilots reportedly
flying Forward Air Control planes (FAC's) in combat
operations in Angola. As a result a covert CIA operation
enables the President to avoid the reporting requirements of
the Act, further diluting the ability of Congress even to learn
about American intervention, much less to control it.
WHO DECIDED TO
INTERVENE IN ANGOLA?
Approval for a clandestine operation is given by the
top-secret "40 Committee", which is directly account-
able to the President. At the time of the decision to es-
calate CIA involvement in Angola, the "40 Com-
mittee" was made up of the following individuals:
Henry Kissinger, Chairman Gen. George Brown
Assistant to the President for Chairman of the
National Security Affairs Joint Chiefs of Staff
William Clements William E. Colby
Deputy Secretary of Defense Director, CIA
Joseph Sisco
Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs
The CIA intervention in Angola is no longer secret. That
continues in spite of being revealed suggests that its
Open Secret
secrecy was not directed at the Angolans. "Overt covert ac-
tion" may become a new weapon in the President's arsenal.
It enables the President to retain a closed decision-making
process and to act unilaterally, and later allow the Congress
and the public to know about the policy. The President can
then claim that congressional and popular acquiesence
ratifies the policy. Congress, of course, is always more
of the Senate." In theory, he cannot even inform his reluctant to interfere with an on-going operation than to
colleagues in the SeAd?IaJi4ll LFx96s10i'~mo*;e1?Q94AAP1 : CI R8 W15RQQO11OQ6tOQitn4ent or operation.
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WHY ARE WE IN ANGOLA?
Ever since the end of World War II, we have justified
our mindless meddling in the affairs of others on the
ground that since the Russians do it, we must do it
too. The time is at hand to re-examine that thesis.
Senator Frank Church
Speech on "Covert Action:
Swampland of American Foreign Policy"
Pacem in Terris Convocation
Angola, like Vietnam before it, is of little intrinsic interest
to the United States. As noted above, the 1969 National
Security Council study, NSSM 39, concluded that,
"Although the United States has many interests in southern
Africa, it has none which could be classified as vital security
interests." Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reiterated
this view in his press conference on November 10, 1975,
noting that "We have no United States interest to pursue in
Angola." The outcome of the struggle in Angola is simply
unrelated to our nation's defense.
Administration spokesmen are now fond of offering
economic rationales for many American defense policies.
Angola has great wealth in resources, but the present total
value of fixed American investment is quite-small, the vast
majority of it held by one company, the Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion. Ironically, Gulf officials do not share the Ad-
ministration's fears about the MPLA. On November 15,
Gerald Bender reported in the Los Angeles Times that Gulf
officials had communicated their reservations about
American intervention to the State Department. Direct
American economic interests are not at stake in Angola,
and any Angolan government will encourage trade
relationships with the United States.
The defense of democratic freedoms is also not at issue.
The suppression of democratic liberties in Angola did not
stimulate significant American concern during the years of
Portugese colonialism. It is also unclear which, if any, of the
three competing movements would establish a con-
stitutional democracy in Angola.
Why are we in Angola? CIA Director William Colby in-
formed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the
primary reason the Administration is intervening in Angola
is that U.S. assistance is the only way to prevent the Soviet-
backed MPLA from forcefully taking control of the coun-
try. Two inter-related explanations are offered for the con-
cern generated by the prospect of an MPLA victory.
A Soviet Satellite?
One version rings with traditional Cold War fervor,
rather than the softer tones of detente. Put simply, the
charge is that the Soviet Union intends to "colonize
MPLA would establish a "Soviet satellite" in Angola which
would, as U.N. Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan claims,
"considerably control the oil shipping lanes from the Per-
sian Gulf to New York." The explanation makes three
major assumptions: that the USSR intends to establish a
satellite in Angola; that MPLA would follow Soviet dic-
tates; and that a Soviet satellite would constitute a threat to
the United States.
The intentions of the USSR in Angola are far from clear.
The Soviet Union has been the prime source of support for
most of the anti-colonial movements in southern Africa, and
has given aid to MPLA for years. In the fall of 1975,
Soviet aid to MPLA began to increase significantly, and has
escalated rapidly over the past months. The initial Soviet es-
calationmay have been a response to the supplies and rein-
forcements which Holden Roberto and the FNLA were
receiving from Zaire. Indeed, many Administration sources
state that the June decision by Ford and Kissinger to es-
calate aid to FNLA and UNITA sparked the Soviet in-
tervention. The massive Soviet reaction in turn triggered a
response by the CIA, Zaire and South Africa. By
September, MPLA faced the intervention of the South
Africans in the south. Spokesmen in the State Department
agree that some of the Soviet assistance, and the recent
arrival of Cuban advisors, may have been a reaction to the
intervention of South Africa.
Whatever the intention of the USSR, the tragic reality is
that all of the competing groups in Angola are now receiving
and using far more deadly weapons to fight one another
than were ever available to oppose Portuguese colonialism.
Even assuming rapacious Soviet designs, the belief that a
victorious MPLA would serve as a Soviet satellite is con-
tradicted by the stance of the MPLA, and the Soviet
experience in Africa and elsewhere. MPLA is an indepen-
dent, socialist movement with a national base, not merely a
Soviet puppet. According to Kenneth L. Adelman writing in
Foreign Affairs in February, 1975, Agostinho Neto of
MPLA is personally close to Mario Soares, currently the
American favorite in Portugal, and certainly an ardent anti-
communist.
MPLA spokesmen have repeatedly stated that they in-
tend to establish a non-aligned and independent govern-
ment. Adelman reports that Neto went to the USSR for aid
only after being refused by the United States. In an October
interview with members of the Southern Africa Committee,
Paulo Jorge, part of the MPLA delegation to the United
Nations, stated that, "We can assure you that we have
fought for 14 years for the complete independence of the
Angolan people, not to be under the umbrella of another
power or another country." The Washington Post reported
Africa," as Daniel P, Moynihan informed the Pacem in on November 15 that MPLA had turned down a Soviet
Terris convocation on December 2. In this perspective, offer for a major arms airlift to Luanda.
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This stance is supported by the history of other Soviet-
supported liberation movements in Africa. Both Guinea-
Bissau and Mozambique are now run by Marxist, Soviet-
aided national liberation movements, but neither serves as a
Soviet satellite. Prime Minister Joachim Chissano of
Mozambique has refused to allow Soviet warships the use of
that country's ports. David Ottaway of the Washington Post
recently reported on December 3 that Chissano publicly
rebuked the USSR for placing too much pressure on his
government. Similarly, Uganda's Idi Amin, a recipient of
large-scale Soviet military assistance has bitterly criticized
the USSR's activities in Angola, and recently sparked a
rupture between the two countries.
Historically, the USSR has had little success in
dominating any movement which has come to power with
an independent national base. As Richard J. Barnet of the
Institute for Policy Studies notes, "Every revolutionary
government that has come to power without the Red Army
has turned out to be ambivalent, cool or even hostile to the
Soviet Union," including China, Yugoslavia, North Viet-
nam, Albania, and Cuba.
If our concern were actually to avoid the creation of a
Soviet satellite in southern Africa, our policy might more
profitably support MPLA's independence, rather than force
greater dependence on Soviet aid and assistance by in-
tervening on the other side. CIA Director William Colby
suggested in his executive session testimony that our pur-
pose in Angola was to force a negotiated settlement between
the three independence groups. Thus far, however, our in-
tervention has caused, as one well-placed State Department
official noted, "a mutual ante-raising, an inconclusive situa-
tion, and a hell of a lot of dead Angolans."
Even if MPLA were to act as a Soviet satellite in southern
Africa, it would still not constitute a threat to our defense.
Some suggest that the USSR would use air and sea bases in
Angola to threaten sea lanes around the Cape of Good
Hope, endangering our access to oil. A good geopolitical
imagination can develop several other possibilities. Yet the
threat seems plausible only in the event of a lengthy conven-
tional war between the United States and the USSR, an
extraordinarily unlikely prospect for two Great Powers
armed with nuclear weapons.
There was no need for the United States to choose
sides. Angola provides the United States with an op-
portunity to set a more worthy example in foreign
policy. To this end Washington could declare its
readiness to establish relations based on the principle
of mutuality of interest with whomever ends up
governing Angola. It could seek from the Soviet
Union a mutual agreement not to engage in an Angola
war by proxy. It could prove to itself and the world
that it did learn something in Vietnam.
John Marcum
President African Studies Association
Address to its 1975 annual conference
The Nixon Doctrine in Africa
The more sophisticated justification for Administration
concern with Soviet intervention has been outlined by
Secretary of State Kissinger. Kissinger chastized the USSR
for having "introduced great-power rivalry into Africa for
the first time in 15 years," and views Soviet intervention as a
violation of the rules of the game in Africa, a violation "in-
compatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions." Soviet
intervention becomes a test of American will, and "the
United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power
embarks upon an interventionist policy ..."
The Kissinger explanation reveals the basic principles of
current American policy abroad, reflecting the bureaucratic
lessons drawn from Vietnam. Since the much heralded
"great debate" about foreign policy has not yet taken place,
these lessons are still best formulated in the Nixon Doctrine,
outlined in the first State of the World address on February
18, 1970. The fundamental premise of the Nixon Doctrine
was that the United States would retain all of its com-
mitments, and continue to define and police an international
order in various regions of the world. The USSR and
nationalist movements are still viewed as the major threat to
that order. In this context, detente is the attempt to en-
courage the Soviet Union to accept the American definition
of order in exchange for a relaxation of tensions.
The Vietnam debacle forced a change only in the strategy
of effecting this objective. The lesson drawn by the national
security bureaucracy from the war was simply that the
American people would not support a lengthy intervention
costly in American treasure and lives. The Nixon Doctrine
announced that the U.S. would "look to the nation directly
threatened to assume the primary responsibility of
providing manpower for its defense." It was necessary, as
U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker said about Vietnamiza-
tion, to "change the color of the corpses."
The Nixon Doctrine does not exclude the possibility of
direct American military intervention. Indeed, a world
power must periodically use force to demonstrate the con-
tinued will to do so. The lesson from Vietnam was that in-
tervention could not be gradual or depend upon large
numbers of American troops. Current theory would begin
with a massive application of American airpower. The
Forward Air Controllers (FAC's) now in Angola were used
in Vietnam to target bombing missions.
Angola may represent a "test case" for the Nixon Doc-
trine. Faced with Soviet violation of the rules of the game,
the U.S. has reacted by providing large covert military
assistance to the FNLA and Zaire. It looks to Zaire - and
ultimately to South Africa - to enforce regional stability.
If covert assistance is insufficient the country will face the
prospect of further escalation.
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 PAGE.10 INTELLIGENCE REPCiRT
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The Global Policeman
There is, of course, an alternative to the Administration's
imperial perspective. In an area. in which the U.S. has no
vital defense interests, the President could react to Soviet es-
calation by rallying African and international opinion to
condemn outside interference. By encouraging others to act
collectively, the United States would share the right to
define and enforce the "rules of the game." The United
States would thereby avoid tragic entanglements in conflicts
unrelated to the nation's defense. The Chinese adopted this
position in late October, terminating assistance to Zaire and
FNLA and joining with the OAU to condemn the involve-
ment of outside powers.
The secret intervention in Angola demonstrates that, in
spite of the defeat in Indochina and the chaotic situation at
home, our national security managers still assume that the
United States must police a self-defined order in regions of
the Third World. For the United States, the implication is
that we may once again be involved in a costly conflict in a
distant land. For Angola, the result is that the United States
and the Soviet Union may be prepared to fight a proxy war,
down to the last Angolan.
CONGRESSIONAL UP-DATE
Because of growing concern in Congress about the use of
covert funds in the Angola war, several bills have been
offered prohibiting the expenditures of such funds and
limiting the President's ability to wage an undeclared war.
The following is a brief summary of legislation concerning
Angola:
Senate
? The Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Foreign Assistance unanimously approved a Clark amend-
ment on December 16 stating that no U.S. funds can be used
for covert military assistance to any party in the Angolan
conflict, unless the President submits a written report
stating the amount and justification for his requests. In any
case, the President cannot authorize Angola aid until 30
days after his request, by which time Congress, by simple
majority, can vote against it. This Amendment, originally
offered by Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), to the Security
Supporting Assistance Act of 1975 will not be voted on by
either house until after the Christmas recess, and probably
not until early February 1976.
? Senator John Tunney (D-Calif), along with Senators
Alan Cranston, Dick Clark, Edward Kennedy and others,
has offered an amendment to the Defense Appropriations
bill, which, if adopted, would prohibit any covert money
within that bill for any activities other than intelligence
gathering purposes in Angola. Nevertheless, even quick
passage of this amendment would not cut off CIA funding
of the Angolan conflict because money appropriated in
other bills could still be used.
? Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-Mo) has offered an
amendment to the Security Supporting Assistance bill that
would prevent the Administration from sending civilians
into "paramilitary operations" as has been done in Angola.
This amendment would close a loophole left by the War
Powers Act of 1973 which bars the President only from
sending military personnel into combat situations without
prior consultation with Congress.
House of Representatives
? Cong. Don Bonker (D-Wash) and Cong. Michael
Harrington (D-Mass) have introduced legislation to the
Security Assistance bill. One amendment would bar aid to
Zaire "unless and until the President determines and cer-
tifies to Congress that Zaire agrees not to furnish such
assistance to any group claiming governmental powers in
Angola." The second amendment would bar any assistance,
directly or indirectly, to Angola.
? The Congressional Black Caucus made a statement op-
posing the intervention of non-Angolan powers in the civil
war, and deplored the apparent alignment of the United
States with South Africa.
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 INTELLIGENCE RJq~9 ed For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
Bibliography
The following is a partial list of documents and
books on Angola for those who wish to do additional
reading.
Congressional Hearings
"Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders," An Interim Report of the Select Committee
to Studv Governmental Operations with respect to
Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, November 20,
1975. (Write to the Select Committee, U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510)
"The Complex of United States-Portugese Relations:
Before and After the Coup," Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Africa, of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, March 14, Oct. 8, 9, 22, 1974. (Write to the
Subcommittee on Africa, U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, Washington, D.C. 20515)
"Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs," Hearings
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Senate, February 19, 1975. (write to the Committee
on Foreign Relations, U.S, Senate, Washington, D.C.
20510)
Books
Abshire, David, and Samuels, Michael, eds., Por-
tugese Africa - A Handbook, New York, Praeger,
1970.
American University, Area Handbook for Angola,
Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office,
1967.
Barnett, Donald L., Revolution in Angola. In-
dianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1972.
Davidson, Basil, Africa in History, New York, Mac-
millan, 1968.
Davidson, Basil, In the Eye of the Storm: Angola's
People, London, Longman, 1972. (also Penguin,
1975.)
Duffy, James, Portugal in Africa, Cambridge, Har-
vard University Press, 1962.
Marcum, John, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I,
Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press, 1969.
Vansina, Jan, Kingdoms of the Savanna, Madison,
University of Wisconsin Press, 1968.
Wheeler, Douglas, and Pelissier, Rene; Angola, New
York, Praeger, 1971.
Approved For Release 2004/11/0
PAGE 1 t
Organizations to Contact
For further information on the Angola situation, con-
tact the following organizations:
Project on Southern Africa
Courtland Cox
Center for National Security
Studies
122 Maryland Ave. NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
[phone]
Washington Office on Africa
110 Maryland Ave. NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
American Committee on Africa
305 East 46th St
New York, N.Y. 10016
Southern Africa Magazine
Southern Africa Committee
Fifth Floor
244 West 27th St.
New York, N.Y. 10001
ORDER FORM
If you would like extra copies of this intelligence
report: CIA's Secret War In Angola, please fill out
form below:
S0c each additional copy
$40.00 for 100
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for copies
-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
 INTELLIGENCE REPORT
Advisory Committee
Contributors to this
issue of Intelligence
Director:
Richard J. Barnet
Report:
Robert Borosage
Marjorie Benton
Adrian DeWind
Robert Borosage
Associates:
Leslie Dunbar
Courtland Cox
Josie Anderson
Thomas Emerson
David Klaus
Jerry Berman
W. H. Ferry
Christy Macy
David Cortright
Steward R. Mott
John Marks
Courtland Cox
Peter Weiss
Morton Halperin
Susan Kaplan
David Klaus
Christy Macy
John Marks
Christy Marwick
Judy Mead
Copyright (c) 1975 by the Center for Natio
nal Security Studies. All rights reserved.
Florence Oliver
A Project of the
Fund for Peace
NON-PROFIT ORG.
US POSTAGE
PAID
Permit No. 45490
Center for National Security Studies
122 Maryland Avenue NE
Washington, D.C. 20002
ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED
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 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-Q1315P000 60't Fd,~- /ifq-r/ iU'RI
ICE=]
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 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
(United States) N.Y. Times (N.Y.:12/22/74) origi-
nal charges; N.Y. Times (N.Y.:1/16/75) verifica-
tion by CIA director William Colby in testimony
before the Senate Appropriations Intelligence
Subcommittee; John Marks and Victor Mar-
chetti, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
(New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) pp 146-164,
good background discussion of the CIA's do-
mestic operations; Baltimore News American
(Baltimore:1/12/75), an interesting example of
the CIA-local police relationship can be found
buried in this news report, and several following
it.
,(Cuba) Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand
Days: J.F.K. in the White House (Boston: Hough-
ton Mifflin Co., 1965) pp 233-297; Roger Hils-
man, To Move a Nation: the Politics of Foreign
Policy in the Administration of J.F.K. (New York:
Doubleday and Co., 1967), pp 78-82; and David
Wise and Thomas Ross, The Invisible Govern-
ment (New York: Vintage Books, 1964) pp 23-
73.
(included in the information packet and sum-
marized in the New York Times on 9/8/74).
'?(Zaire) Morris, op cit; Marchetti and Marks op
cit. p 139; Hilsman, op cit., pp 245-267; Bar-'
net, op cit., p 248.
"(Somalia) Morris, op cit.
12(Angola) Marks and Marchetti, op cit. p 155;
David Welsh, "Flyboys of the CIA," Ramparts,
Dec. 1966 p 12; Bazil Davidson, In the Eye of the
Storm (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1972),
p 239.
"(South Africa) Information generally known to
be true and confirmed by former members of
the National Security Council Staff. For a good
general discussion see, Tad Szulc, "Why Are We
In Johannesburg?," Esquire, Oct.1974.
J(Guatemala) Wise and Ross, op cit, pp. 165, 183;
Susanne Jonas and David Tobis & N.A.C.L.A.
Guatemala (Box 226, Berkeley CA 94701:N.A.C.
L.A.; 1974); Richard J. Barnet Intervention and
Revolution: The United States and the Third
World (New York and Cleveland: World Pub-
lishing Co., 1968) pp 232-234.
'(Equador) Philip Agee, Inside the Company: A
CIA Diary (London: Penguin Books, 1975), dis-
cussion of Agee's experiences as a CIA officer in
Equador in the early '60's; Roger Morris, "The
Aftermath of CIA Intervention," Society Vol. 12,
no. 3 (March/April 1975).
,(Peru) Marchetti and Marks, op cit., pp 138-9.
6(Bolivia) Marchetti and Marks, op cit., pp 139-
45.
7(Brazil) Agee, op cit; and Morris, op cit.
8(Chile) Marlise Simons, "The Brazilian Connec-
tion" The Washington Post, (Washington:)/6/
74); Letter by Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass)
on the testimony of CIA Director William Colby
on file at the Center for National Security Studies
"(I ran) Marchetti and Marks, op cit. pp 46, 49, and
51; Wise and Ross, op cit., pp 110-114.
15(Albania et al) Marchetti and Marks, op cit.
p.46.
16(Eastern Europe) Steven Stewert, Operation
Splinter Factor (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co.
1974).
"(Greece) New York Times, 8/7/75; Stanley Kar-
now, "America's Mediterranean Bungle," At-
lantic Monthly, 2/75 Vol. 235, No. 2-
"(Western Europe) Tom Braden, "I'm Glad the
CIA is Immoral," Saturday Evening Post 5/20/67;
Memo from Allen Dulles to the general counsel
of CIA dated April 21, 1964 on file at the Center;
Ronald Radosh, American Labor and United
States Foreign Policy (New York: Random
House, 1969) pp 438-9.
19(China) Marchetti and Marks, op cit., pp 127-9
and 165-9.
20(Tibet) Marchetti and Marks, op cit. pp 127-9;
and David Wise, The Politics of Eying: Govern-
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 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
ment Deception, Secrecy, and Power (New
York:.Vintage Books, 1973)pp 239-62.
"(Viet Nam) Wise and Ross, op cit. pp 155-64;
Gelb et al, U.S.-South Viet Nam Relations,
19,10 - 68 (The Pentagon Papers) (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1971), (BEA) II, pp 648, (BEA) 1, p. 582;
(Washington: 1971 Government Printing Office)
(GPO) v 11, p 18, (GPO) v 12, p 483 and Bantam
Press, pp 123-24.
22(Laos) Fred Branfman, The CIA in Laos, unpub-
lished paper available from the Center for Na-
tional Security Studies and presented at the
Center's conference on Covert Action in Sept.
1974.; Hilsman, op cit. p 115-6; and Pentagon
Papers, op cit. (BEA) Ii p 456, (BEA) I I I p 536 and
(BEA) II p 344.
23(Cambodia) Wilfred Burchett, My War With the
CIA: Memoirs of Prince Norodom Sihanouk
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1973).
"(Philippines) Marchetti and Marks, op cit. p 129;
and memo of April 21, 1964 from Allen Dulles to
General Counsel of the CIA which is on file at
the Center.
21(Indonesia) Wise and Ross, op cit. p 136-46;
Marchetti and Marks, op cit. p 62. and pp 150-
151; Barnet, op cit. pp 236-7.
For More Information
contact:
The Center for National Security
Studies
122 Maryland Ave., N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
[phone]
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 .s
00
CIA
on
CAMPUS
hand what you can
do about it)
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 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
FACTS YOU SHOULD KNOW
THE CIA RECENTLY ADMITTED TO THE SEN-
ATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:
that hundreds of professors, administrators, and
graduate students on over a hundred college
campuses across the country are secretly hired to:
? travel overseas and spy for the CIA in foreign
countries
? conduct secret research projects for the CIA,
in which even research assistants do not know
the true sponsor
? help secret recruitment of students for the
CIA
IN ADDITION, THE CIA
A uses students and professors unwittingly for
its own purposes
0 has written thousands of books and articles,
giving, no indication that they are CIA funded,
or express CIA analysis
0 uses academic research and academic ex-
change programs overseas as cover for CIA
operations
? secretly recruits foreign students on U.S.
'campuses to become spies for the CIA
O conducts investigations of students "as
potential employees" without their knowledge
Approved
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTEL-
LIGENCE recently released a report on CIA
clandestine ties with universities, which was heav-
ily censored by the Agency. The report did
acknowledge that such activities ."can only pre-
judice, if not destroy" academic integrity and
fruitful exchange. The Committee did not stop
these practices. Instead, it states:
"It is the responsibility of private insti-
tutions and particularly the American aca-
demic community to set the professional
and ethical standards of its members."
The university should be a place where students
and professors can exchange ideas in an atmos-
phere of openness and trust. The secret presence
on campus of the CIA is contrary to this openness
and makes a mockery out of the trust .needed for
learning and growth.
Students should not be deceived by professors
who secretly work for the CIA. Students should
not have to participate in research on subjects like
controlling human behavior, without knowing the
CIA is sponsoring the experiment. Students and
professors travelling abroad should not have to risk
being labelled as CIA agents as a result of the
CIA's insistence on concealing operatives under
"academic cover." Foreign students who have
come to our universities in good faith should not
have to fear the scrutiny of teachers who secretly
look them over as potential traitors to their home
countries.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
officially documented these practices but left it to
For Release 2004/11 /01 : CIA- RQPgArQ r 1 5PiQiQQfIi0P6QtQI i4i own house.
Student governments should accept this challenge
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
and make the CIA a subject of intense debate on
campus.
One method is the introduction of a resolution
in student governments (sample text on next page)
which allows students to go on record against the
CIA's secret use of universities. Passage of such a
resolution at your school will pressure the admin-
istration to require the CIA to openly identify its
local representatives and activities. Passage at
scores of schools will force Congress and the
President to take action.
The CIA is an organization that directly affects
students. Now, if students act together, they can
have an effect on the CIA.
A CAMPAIGN TO END
CIA ABUSE OF
THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY
The Center for National Security Studies, a non-
profit public interest group, in cooperation with
student organizations, academic associations, col-
lege presidents and . concerned individuals, is
launching an educational campaign around the issue
of CIA's continued subversion of the American
academic community.
JOIN US
Due to CIA's refusal to end its secret ties with the
academic community,' and in response to the
Senate Committee's recommendations, the Center
is calling on you to join the campaign. The Ameri-
can Association of University Professors and the
National Student Association have already passed
resolutions condemning the CIA's secret campus
activities. Your school can do the same.
1) UISI:LUJt any %,lrvi-o-u av...... --
covert relationships on campus and seek assur-
PROFESSORS:
^ ask faculty ethics committees to set ethical
and professional standards prohibiting secret
CIA connections
^ pass resolutions within faculty senates
prohibiting members from carrying out se-
cret operations for CIA
^ send letter to CIA Director George Bush
demanding an end to the use of academic
exchange and research programs as cover for
CIA covert operations abroad
STUDENTS:
^ pass resolutions of student body calling for
an end to spying and secret relationships on
campus (see oppositetpage)
^ distribute educational material, bring a
speaker to address students at the university
COLLEGE PRESIDENTS:
^ file a Freedom of Information request to
the CIA requesting all past and present CIA
ties to their university
^ make such information public to students
and faculty
ALUMNI:
^ write to college. presidents demanding an
end to such practices -
STUDENT NEWSPAPER REPORTERS:
^ investigate and expose CIA's secret pre-
sence on campus
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 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
DATE
4.10.77
ndy:
is pamphlet is being dis-
ributed at the campus of
orgetown University.
(Today is "hate CIA day" com
plete with signing petitions
etc.)
I thought someone in your
office may be interested...
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 ?` \DJO TV REPORTS, INC.
Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA R88c M' M3rll5ROO04,0066 GTON, D.C. 24,-3540
6 1.4 I `, L( ~{~ J I
G.. /~ 0 3 ! A-P I
(J
The Larry King Show
VA 0
? STATION 'WTOP Rad lo
DATE December 18, 1978 12 Midnight CITY Washington, D.C.
LARRY KING: Our special guest tonight is Louis Wolf.
He is coauthor, along with Philip Agee, of "Dirty Work: The
CIA in Western Europe," that is published by Lyle Ste-w-e-?t-t-.
Lyle Stewart, our good friend, has published an extra-
ordinary book, a very high-selling book, $24.95, now In a second
printing. And this book is coauthored by Philip Agee, who, as
it says, was to the CIA what Spartacus was to Rome, and our guest,
Louis Wolf. Mr. Wolf, a journalist who has done intensive re-
search on the American intelligence community, spent more than
two years of painstaking analysis on this book alone. He fer-
reted out many of the names, compiled the biographies, and checked,
double-checked, and triple-checked his findings with official
government publications, as well as with Agee. The result,
"Dirty Work," is a major, unprecedented expose of the CIA, what
it does and who does it, on a scale never seen before.
The last time Mr. was on to discuss mostly
the publishing business and the concept of publishing a book
l i ke this -- since then we have had Mr. Hetu on from the CIA,
discussing that agency's reaction to it. And we expect to invite
the C I A back. And maybe one n i g h t we' l l get them a l l together
and we'll have a lot of laughs. In fact, we could look right
over, and if they'll hop out, they could drive over now.
We welcome to our microphones Louis Wolf.
How did you get started as an investigative journalist?
That always interests me.
LOUIS WOLF: Well, I got interested in journalism by
having come into contact with the problems of people in Southeast
OFFICES IN: NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
Material supplied by Radio 7V Reports. Inc. may be used for flee and reference purposes only. It may not be reproduced, sold or publicly demonstrated or exhibited.
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 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660gQ1-,~(.-,,-,,; 'Za
-APPEARED NEV TIMES S A S
.J3- 1 '2 unvsneturrA- -i errR
.REMEDIAL SPYING
CIA HOLDS
C2ASH COURSE..
FOR COLLEGE- .
PRESIDENTS- -
The CIA, under pressure to
stop its admitted widespread
covert activities on American
college campuses, has initiat-
ed a series of seminars to woo
leading university adminis-
trators. In the. past nine
months, seven university
presidents have visited CIA
headquarters in Langley, Va.
for day-long briefings, ac-
cording to CIA spokesman
Dale Peterson, "tq talk about
our many common interests."
..This latest goodwill gesture
comes in the wake of a. flood
of requests from some 80 uni-
versities for agency files con-
cerning clandestine recruit-
ment of students and faculty
by CIA operatives. Admitting
only to the covert recruiting
of foreign students on Ameri-
can campuses, Agency Direc-
tor Admiral Stansfield Turn-
er has openly refused to give
any assurance that he will
comply with strict guidelines
proposed by- Harvard Uni-
versity President Derek Bok
to limit the Agency's campus
activities.
The CIA's uncooperative
attitude has irritated Bok and
other academic leaders, but
the Agency is encouraged by
attendance at the seminars
which took place in March
and June of this year. Agency
spokesman Peterson says
such topics as clandestine ac-
tivities on campus, university-
agency relations and research
were discussed at the two
Aap.r?R7*fR iRWWqprZa
dents) doing it because they
see some mutual benefit."
turned out very beneficial so
far. That's why we're proceed-
ing and are planning to have
some more."
Peterson refused to give us
the names of the presidents who attended, insisting that
to do so would be "an inva-
sion of their privacy." Mean-
while, the Center for Nation-
al Security Studies has filed a
Freedom of Information re-
quest to find out more about
the college presidents and the
secret Langley pow-wows.-
-Joel Kotkin and
?Dorothy Samuels
S-t-t, 0 i e5 .
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 Li ;-A 1
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D:00
6:00
7:00
7:00
7:15
d:i5
8:45
9:00
Room 8338 Rayburn Office Bldg., Independence & S. Capitol St
Registration
Sandwiches & coffee served
Introduction and welcoming remarks by Ralph Stavins, Director,
Safeguards for the Whistleblower, Remarks by U.S. Senator co-sp
Keynote address by Daniel Ellsberg: Whistleblowing and Risk Tal
Film-The Case Officer. Director, Saul Landau. Filmed by Haske
John Stockwell, former CIA employee and subject of The Case Officer takes questions from audience.
Donald Jordan Frank Snepp
former Chief Intelligence officer former CIA analyst
CIA's San Diego Office author, Decent Interval.
Panel: Slowing the Whistle on the CIA
Saturday .~i ;10 or n1, 11O ----/:lay 2
International inn, 10 Thomas Circle N.W.
Moderator: Mark Lynch
A.torney. ACLU
Continental Breakfast. Guest Speaker: Robert Borosage, Director, Institute for Policy Studies
Freedom of Speech in National Security Agencies
:30 Panel: Personal Experiences and Object Lessons in Blowing the Whistle
Raymond Connolly Mike McDougal ' . It. Ronald McRae Renault Robinson
former analyst former U.S. Army Officer - U.S. Navy officer, Chicago Police Dept.
Army Security Agency ?
10:30 Coffee Break
Sgt. Leah Wainwright Moderator: Christopher Pyle'
U.S. Army professor, and formerly with
Army Intelligence
10:40 Panel: The Nuclear Threat
Mr. John Bennett James Conrad Dr. Tom Mancuso Moderator. Dr. Ted Taylor_- --
nuclear technician Nuclear Regulatory nuclear scientist, formerly with professor, Prmcelon University
U.S. Navy ? ? Commission Atomic Energy Commission project detector, N.R.C.-
.12:00 . Luncheon-Guest Speakers
Safeguard Study, 1975-L
James Abourezk, U.S. Senator: Protective Legislation for National Security Employers
Daniel Schorr, author and TV commentator: Journalist as Whistleblower or Source
'L t ~~ ? .- i emoon --A'ia},j 2
International Inn, 10 Thomas Circle N.W.
7:15 _ Workshops:
Caring for the Personal Needs of the Whistleblower
The Legal Options for the Whistleblower
The Congressional/.Executive Connection
2:30 Panel: Personal Conscience and National Security
Charles Brennan 'Adm. William P. Mack . Marc Raskin Emory Swank Moderator_ Gloria Emerson
former Director of ? formerCotnmander political philosopher former U.S. journatistand author
Domestic Intelligence - 7th Fleet, Vietna tit f ~p n arsand Losers
FBI Approved For Release T004/1'~A ? gW%PP88-O'~ftud'. 00660 ~f: ~'
cy t t at ona$ Book Award
3:30 Worksiop Reports
A
'
j
eYr7?r-r~r RelO
tYli04/11/01 ? CIA
RDP88
01315R
 Approved For Releas~AWg4 1 SCg1111 fREf 8-01315
29 April 1978
There are no rules In. such a
game. Hitherto acceptable forms
of human conduct do not apply ..
longstanding American eoncepts
of fair. play" miwt`&e? ?recon
sidered>;,We . must. ' ..learn to?'
our enemies by 'irtore"'ciever
more, sophisticated andgmore?`
.
effective--,:methods thouitthose
usedagonist us
Although President Carter '
SAN FRANCISCO:
that even if the Badiilo bill
pledged in his inaugural address
HILE -THE. the. U.S.. media says
fails to pass, Congress should be
W last year, "We will not behave in forced to prohibit all covert'in-.
was busy looking for Communists. under every foreign places
? sous to violate our
`
-
bed the world's most .:tervention designed t
.. .;
rules and standards here at
ruthless spy organization was at manipulate. 6-ents.
for we know that this trust ,The Center says the CIA"
work. infiltrating.,and subverting home,
which our nation earns is should end all penetration and
governments. and Y,,.mass
essential to our strength," he nova
movements- throughout the, world'-,
manipulation of. independent
says he favors covert operations, -
and at home N ? - nations
institutions_ in foreign
and says he will take "personal
Since its establishment in 1947: hibitio
' .. pro n
responsibility" to insure the
the Central Intelligence Agency'; responsibility
`against any interference in
"obeys the law." elections-. strict
(CIA) has been a law unto itself,` agency
s. (such as the recent
This position is' no different
acting:.without restraint- and. in
ltalian: elections),-. and an
from that of past Presidents who
totale secrecy. ': Acting '.as--.. the:;
' penetration of independent in
have used the CIA without the
clandestine wing of a:U.S. foreign;;
or Consent- of the trade stitutions, unions the particularly churches
policy -directed:; against . all knowledge ,
: press
and
elected government. It also
progressive movements . on -the,
universities. . :
contradicts Carter's- so-called. They also
globe the-agency has altered the
say demands should
human rights policy, considering
course of: history by means of
-he made to end all paramilitary
the agency's past history. -and
assassination, infiltration, ex ti
-police support opera ons;
According to former National `
tortion9 bribery
and parasriila
covert or overt, including the
k
operations., ~?"
trading of police weaponry one
s,"Onesearches in vain for
Revelation's on CIA misuse. of
the training of foreign police. The
the Agency (CIA)
U.S.' should also get, out of the
power~broke during theVietnam ca ce that fivi war and lik the opening of _a intervened anywhere_in _two business of internal
4e, 1/has
. policing of
~s decades o'h:.. b of human
floodgate more - and mo all
re:
other countries, the Center says.
rights ' r r
outrageous 'reports of then
Finally, -they say' demands
An ;increas1g, number of
a
agency's -activities canoe mtt . `. ll`
tfi the U.S:'agree
from di?tig dealing irr ;Asia and organizations
must bean end to secret activities, include exposure of
" of the foreign -in-
Latin'America to the overthrow there
telligence services- in the U.S..
interventions abroad and they=.
of democratically"",,' elected'
The booklet declares, ' 'For
are calling on citizens to demand'
governments, to ~, massive
citizens concerned with human
assassination operations in South Congress put an, end to covert -
rights- and American foreign
operations o by the IA as a means
Vietnam. _ C
policy, the upcoming decision is a
con oreign policy
a nation ?? in the world ' f ducting foreign
crucial test and a unique op-
Hardly
not.-been victimized: by-_ the: _~ po
rtunity: An active citizens`'
'
CIA. - Millions` of deaths can be
THESE called campaign around the country,
attributed to., direct and indirect could be instrumental in eAdir4
for. total support of HR 6051 which
'. covert activities-
CIA 'activities. There' is ,even' t
will:; be introdiiced: in Congress the CIA's;
some dismantling a'
some question as to the role of the
abroad, and
of suffering- and
24 major cause
CIA in' the' assassinations of sponsored by a gip
around.. the world.
President John Kennedy and, his - 'Congressmen,' led" by Rep." repression
brother_#tobert.;,~ vNa? HermanBadillo..(,,, p;-;r``
.. contact The, Center- for National
Now, for the first hire: iii the
agency's history it,_ is seeking .1
legal authority to carry out its~-
covert operations when Congress .rt
votes on a new legislative charter
for the CIA this year =
government should. be kept in-
formed about whahappening
around the world,' but 'whether
k`"engage in secret manipulations of
world events. ri
._ ~~tT~v~tJ-rtiL
HR 6051 is acomprehensive bill
designed to reform both domestic:
and foreign intelligence
operations, and would prohibit all.
covert intervention abroad by the
CIA.
And the bill; would: dismantle
the CIA's. Clandestine Services
responsible" for covert ;ac-,
tivities) andlimit. the,CIA to its)
function of intelligence.
'assessment.-
A booklet put out by the Ceatee
for;, National Security Studies-
Security Studies, 122 Maryland.-
ova NF?. Wunhin; 22
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R00 OI1660(e,1-4 r
ID E
Covert Action: How it Works
Foreign Secret Police
Map of Covert operations
around the World
Violations of Human Rights
Resources and Organizations
in the U.S.
CIA's Domestic Crimes
CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 122 Maryland Avenue N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002
Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
 Approved For Release 2004/11/1 CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
Will the United States stop intervening
secretly abroad? Congress must decide the
answer to this question this next year, because for
the first time in thirty years, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency (CIA) is seeking legal authority
to carry out covert operations overseas. At issue
in this debate is not whether our government
should be kept informed about what is happen-
ing around the world, but whether the CIA
should continue to engage in secret manipulation
of these events.
In spite of his "absolute commitment to
human rights," President Carter has indicated
that he favors continued use of covert operations,
the results of which inevitably violate these rights.
The President has pledged that he would take
"personal responsibility" for CIA operations
to insure that the Agency "obeyed the law." Yet
this policy keeps in place a secret network of CIA
operatives throughout One Third World whose
activities violate both local and international law.
This year, the Congress will vote on a new
legislative charter for the CIA which will define
its authority. The outcome of this vote will be a
true test of this country's commitment to human
rights. A foreign policy concerned with fostering
human rights abroad must begin by ending di-
. rect U.S. violations of these rights. Through its
secret manipulation of democratic institutions
in foreign countries, as this pamphlet will show,
the CIA tramples on human rights to further
American interests abroad. Throughout its
history, the CIA has served as a primary instru-
ment for the export of repression and violence.
A complete prohibition on covert operations
would thus give dramatic evidence of n;.s coun-
try's respect for human rights.
Also at issue in the upcoming debate is the
future direction of American foreign policy. The
Vietnam war showed that the Americ r r
Approved For Release 2004/11/01 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001"-4
 Approved For Release 2004/11/01: CIA-RDP88-01315R000100660001-4
F I
OREIGN SECRET
POLICE: CIA'S GLOBAL
L EGACV'Y
S net i 11e CIA helped to establish many of
t-,L:: present repressive regimes around the world,
has nal m ally been intimately involved in
s.?tting up and training the secret police forces
w cessarv to keep these unpopular governments
i power. 1 hese include:.
SAVA K, Iran's secret police, was founded in
1L>i7, four years after a CIA-sponsored coup
p laced the present Shah in power. This feared
organization reportedly employs 40,000 agents,
who, according to Amnesty International, per-
ate all levels of Iranian society. SAVAK
carries out its suppression of Iranian dissidents
"with extreme ruthlessness," according to Am-
r;esty, and severe maltreatment and torture is
commonplace. Although the Shah says there are
a,),tut 3,000 political prisoners in Iran, ?nformed
estimates by foreign journalists place the num-
h r between 25,000 and 100,000. Since 1972,
nitre have been well over 300 executions of
politicai prisoners in Iran, a country in which
is ie re is no freedom of speech, association, or the
press, where trade unions are illegal, and aca-
demic freedom is non-existent. In addition to
s, irplying Iran with conventional arms (over $18
bl.ion worth since 1972), the U.S. government
lia!; also sold millions of dollars worth of sophis-
ti;;ated computer surveillance equipments to Iran
o?i>er the past few years, incuding a $500 million
tie:tronic intelligence gathering system called
II3_X. Exemplifying the close relationship be-
1",veen the Iranian. government and the U.S. in--
teefigence community was the appointment in
19:73 of Richard Helms, former Director of CIA,