EXCERPTS FROM THE BOOK 'THE PRICE OF POWER' BY SEYMOUR H. HERSH HOW A BLOODY DICTATORSHIP WAS BORN IN CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300570009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300570009-2
Excerpts from the book
The Price of Power"
by Seymour H. Hersh
How a Bloody
dictatorship
was born in Chile
North American aviators took
charge' of destroying the "Palacio
de Is, Moneda", burying the
democracy that they say they
defend.
SeymourIH=. Hersh, the award-winning North
American journalist,. born in Chicago in 1937,
held more that a.thousand? interviews in order to
write his accusatorial: book "The . Price of Power".
In this book he examines and proves the invol-
vementand:responsibility of U.S.foreign policy,. especially that of ex-president, Richard, Nixon,
Henry' Kissinger'and the CiA, in smashing the.
constitutional government of Dr. Salvador Allen-
de in Chile 1O.:yearsago and immersing that na-
.tion in a bloody dictatorship.
At a timewhen the e Reagan administration has
declared war;'on -the revolutionary government
of Nicara9ua,.also in. order to try to destroy it, we
consider.d to be of vita[ iirrmportance that our re-
adersbecomefamiliar with the following chapter
of Hersh`s.remarkable book as...overwhelming
proof of the> anti-democratic and fascist tactics
which,, characterize the: majority of the heads of
`state which have passed through Washington.
It, is sufficient to know the expression of Kis'-
singer: "to prevent a government of this sort, due
to the. unawareness of the Chilean people", refe
rring to the need to use whatever kind of lawful or
unlawful means to. overthrow the legitimate go-
vernment of :Allende, to better understand and
truly know North imperialism.
TANA 15
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"EL BUDIN REVENTO EN EL HORNO"
No se suponia que octirriera esto. Fue un ver-
d"adero golpe. El budin revent6 en el horn".
El 4 de septiembre de 1910, el triunfo de Salvador
Allende en Chile cay6 como una bomba en Washing-
ton, dejando at6nitos a Henry Kissinger, a Nixon, a
la CIA y a todos los "hombres de confianza ". compro-
metidos en "operaciones secretas"Para impedir ese
triunfo.
"El Almirante Robinson y sus superiores se retor-
cian las manos de desesperacidn... como silos chile-
nos fueran un hijo descarriado "-admiti6 meses des-
pues el edecan del almirante, el j6ven Charles E.
Radford por cuyas manos pasaron gran numero de
memorandum y documentos ultrasecretos', todos
tendientes a impedir que Salvador Allende asumie-
ra el cargo. "Entre las opciones se contaba una pro-
puesta para asesinarlo. Y uno de los documentos
proponia varies modos de hacerio "- denunci6 Rad-
ford, memorizando uno de los pdrrafos leidos: "0
con tamos en ese pats con alguien que to haga... o lo
hacemos nosotros mismos ".
"Me send atonito, horrorizado. Per prim era vez
me di cuenta de que mi gobierno estaba activamen-
te involucrado en planear el asesinato de seres hu- .
manor ".
A,mediados de la decada de 1960, existia conciencia
en todos los servicios de inteligencia norteamerica-
nos de que Chile era un Pais donde la CIA habia conse-
guido sus mayores axitos, logrando penetrar en to-
dos los elementos del gobierno chileno y en los,
puestos claves de la sociedad "a fin de asegurarse que
dicha naci6n cpntinuara siendo una Republica de-
mocratica prog`resista".
Chile era lider mundial de la explotaci6n del cobre.
Pero el 80 por ciento de su producci6n -el 60 por
ciento de sus exportaciones globales- estaba en
manos de grandes empresas, controladas por firmas
norteamericanas, como la Anaconda y la Kennecott
Cooper. Las ganancias de estas multinacionales
eran enormes. La Anaconda Cooper, solamente, ob-
tuvo en la decada de 1960 beneficios que superaron
los 500 millones de d6lares.
Los estudios sobre la distribuci6n de ingresos
mostraban claramente la fragilidad de esa democra-
cia chilena. El 28 per ciento del pueblo -que estaba
en el estrato mss bajo de la escala econ6mica- reci-
bla el 4,8 por ciento de los ingresos nacionales tota-
les, mientras un grupo privilegiado que no represen-
taba siquiera el dos por ciento de la poblaci6n, se
quedaba con el45.9? por ciento de los ingresos.
Segun la version norteamericana, la amenaza mas
significativa era Salvador Allende Gossens, miem-
bro del Partido Socialista, (quien habla sido el candi-
dato derrotado en las elecciones de 1958 y 1964) y en
cuya plataforma politica se propugnaba la reforms
agraria, la nacionalizaci6n de las industrias princi-
pales (especialmente el cobre), la relaci6n mas es-
trecha con los paises socialistas y la redistribuci6n
de los ingresos,
Eri 1958, Allende habia sido derrotado per menos
de un tres por ciento por Jorge Alessandri,. un ultra-
conservador, fuertemente apoyado per las multina-
cionales estadounidenses. yo del clan Kennedy.
En 1964, la batalla electoral la libr6 contra Eduar-
do Frei, del Partido Dem6crata Cristiano. En esa oca-
si6n la influencia.de Estados Unidos fue mucho ma-
yor de lo que se dio a conocer publicamente. A tra-
ves de la A.I.D. (Agency for International Develop-
ment) los norteamericanos canalizaron per lo menos
20 millones de.d6lares en apoyo de la candidatura a
.Frei.
Una inmensa fortuna que provenia de-la AID y de
la CIA se distribuy6 -con pleno conocimiento de los
gobiernos de Washington y Santiago-, entre las or-
ganizaciones 6at6lico-romanas, "cuyo objetivo pri-
mordial era oponerse al protestantismo y el comu-
nismo".
El principal contacto de la CIA y las multinaciona-
les era la organizaci6n de Agustin Edwards, intimo
amigo de Donald M. Kendall (director de la Pepsi Co-
la) y dueno del peri6dico conservador "El Mercurio",
foco de la oposici6n a la izquierda.
La pesadilla de las empresas norteamericanas era
la posible nacionalizaci6n de sus redituables subsi-
diarias chilenas. Un Paso que ya habia dado timidd-
mente Frei, que hasta 1967 habia adquirido el 51 por
ciento de la Kennecott y el 25 por ciento de la Ana-
conda. f
No obstante, durante los anos de gobierno demo-
cristiano habia repuntado la actividad empresarial
norteamericana y la CIA habia operado con total im-
punidad, tratando de reprimir las actividades politi-
cal izquierdistas. .
Aun asi, la Casa Blanca temia que Para 1970 los
democristianos eligieran un candidato aiin mds pro-
gresista (ya en 1969 Frei habia restablecido sus rela-
ciones comerciales con Cuba).
Richard Nixon empezd su magistratura con un pro-
fundo resentimiento hacia Eduardo Frei. Las ten-
dencias "izquierdistas" del presidente chileno y los
intentos, aunque debiles, de nacionalizarlas empre-
sas de cobre norteamericanas a finales de la decada
del 60 eran suficiente justification. Nixon tenia ade-
mas otra raz6n. Frei era kennedista, un social liberal
que habia adquirido prominencia politica con el apo-
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Haste los mismos reaccio-
narios que auspiclaron y
justificaron el golpe milltar
fascista en Chile hoy son re?
primidos por la dictadura de
Pinochet con el apoyo de
Reagan.
Even the reactionaries who
favored and justified the
military fascist coup in
Chile are today repressed
by Pinochet's dictatorship
support by Reagan.
"THE PUDDING BURST ON THE STOVE"
This wasn't supposed to happen. It was a real blow.
All of a sudden the pudding blew up on the stove. "
Henry Kissinger, Nixon, the CIA and all the men of
confidence engaged in secret operations to prevent the
election of Allende were left dumbstruck by his triumph in
Chile on 4 September 1970, which hit'Washington like a
bomb.
According to his confidential aide,Radford, Admiral
Robinson and his superiors were 'Wringing their
hands"over Chile "almost as if they (the Chileans) were an
errant child." Over the next few weeks, Radford saw many
sensitive memoranda and options papers as the
bureacracy sought to prevent Allende from taking office.
Among the options was a proposal to assassinate Allende.
One options paper "discussed various ways of doing it,"
Radford remembers. "Either we have somebody in the
country do it or we do it ourselves. I was stunned; I was
aghast. It stuck in my mind so much because for the first
time in my life I realized that my government actively was
involved in planning to kill people. "
CHILE: A HARD NUT TO CRACK
By the mid-1960s Chile had become widely known in the
American intelligence services as one of the CIA's
outstanding success stories. The Agency had managed to
penetrate all elements of Chilean government, politics, and
society and took credit for insuring that Chile remained a
progressive democratic nation.
Chile was a world leader in the mining of copper, but 80
percent of its production - 60 percent of all exports from
Chile - was in the hands of large of corporations mostly
controlled by U.S. firms, most prominently Anaconda and
Kennecott Copper. Profits for the American firms were
enormous: During the 1960s, for example, Anaconda
Copper earned $500 million on its investments.
By 1968, studies clearly showed the fragility of this
Chilean democracy. At that time, 28.3 percent of the
Chilean people at the bottom of the economic scale took in
4.8 percent of the national income, while the 2 percent of
the population at the top received 45.9 percent of the
income.
The most significant threat to Chilean democracy, in the
view of American policy makers, was Salvador Allende
Gossens, a member of the Socialist Party, who had
unsuccessfully run for president in 1958 and 1964 on a
platform that advocated land reform nationalization of
major industries (especially copper), closer relations with
socialist and communist countries, and redistribution of
income.
In 1958, Allende had lost the presidential election by less
than 3 percent to Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez,. an
archconservative who was strongly pro-business and was
heavily backed by American corporations.
The presidential elections of 1964 came down to a battle
between Allende and Eduardo Frei Montalva, representing
the Christian Democractic Party.
The United States' influence on the 1964 election was
more extensive than has been publicly reported. At least
$20 million in support of the Frei candidacy was funneled
into Chile by the United States through the Agency for
International Development (AID).
Millions of dollars in AID and CIA funds were allocated,
with the full knowledge of the Chilean and United States
governments, to Roman Catholic organizations throughout
the country whose objective was to oppose Protestantism
and communism.
The principal contact in Chile for the CIA as well as for the
American corporations was the organization of Augustin
Edwards, a close friend of Kendall's who was the owner of
the conservative El Mercurio newspaper chain in Chile and
a focal point for the opposition to the left.
The most profound issue, for the American corporations
was the threat of possible nationalization of their profitable
subsidiaries in Chile. By 1967, the Frei regime had
purchased 51 percent of Kennecott's Chilean company
and 25 percent-of the Chilean Anaconda firm.
Frei's reforms did not affect other industries: and there
was a general increase of American business activity and
the CIA continued to operate at will throughout the country,
primarily seeking to repress leftist political activities. Even
so, the White House feared that the Christian Democrats
would choose an even more liberal candidate in 1970. In
1969, Frei had reestablished trade relations with Cuba.
Richard Nixon entered office with a profound dislike for
Eduardo Frei. The Chilean President's movement to the
left and his attempts, albeit feeble, to nationalize the
American copper companies in the late 19E50s were
justification enough, but Nixon had another reason:
Eduardo Frei was a Kennedy man, a social liberal who had
risen to prominence with the aid of the Kennedys.
KISSINGER FROWNS
Any doubts in the Frei government about its standing
with the White House were removed after an unusual face-
fo-face confrontation at a June 1969 meeting of Latin
American ministers in the White House. There, Gabriel
Valdes, Frei's Minister spoke "of the impossibility of dealing
with the United States within the framework of inter-
American relations; the differences in power were too
great. "
Nixon was caught off guard and Kissinger frowned. At
one point in his talk, Valdes said that Latin America was
sending back 3.8 dollars for every dollar in American aid.
Valdes reported, "Kissinger was looking at me as if! were a
strange animal."The next afternoon, Kissinger asked for a
meeting with Valdes which he began by declaring, "Mr.
Minister, you made a strange speech. You came here
speaking of Latin America, but this is not important.
Nothing important can come from the South. History has
never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts
in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and
then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no
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KISSINGER FRUNCE El. CENO
Las recipiocas antipatias quedarcn al descubierto
en el Encuentro de Cancilleres .atinoamericanos
(celebrado en la Casa Blanca en `-969). Alli Gabriel
Valdes, N:inistro de Relaciones Exteriores des Frei
hablo "de la imposibilidad de tratar con los Esrados
Unidos, dentrodelmarcodelasre..!acionesinterame-
ricanas... oorque las dife.rencias :le poder era.n de-
masiado 5randes ".
Nixon fie tornado por sorpresa y Kissinger frun--
cio el ceno. En su discurso, Valdes denuncio que
America Latina devolvia 3,8 dolares por cada dolar
de ayuda aorteamericana..
"Kissinger me miraba como si fuese un animal ex-
trano -recordaria despues-.A1 rato se me acerco y
me dijo: "Senor ministro, hizo ust 9d un extrano dis-
curso. Usted viene aqui hablandc de America La ti-
na, Pero eso no es importante. Nada importante
puede venir del Sur.
"La his::oria nunca fue producida en el Sur. El eje
de Ia historia comienza en Moscri, sigue hasta Bonn,
cruza a Washington y luego Mega a Tokio. Lo que
ocurre en el Sur carece de importancia. Usted pierde
el tiempo ".
-Me lirxite a responderle: "Sen:)rKissinger, usted
no sabe ns da de nosotros, ni de ese : ur "-memora Valdes
-" No" --admitio- "y no me importa' .
En este' punto, Valdes, atonito insultado le esne-
to:
"listed es un alemin wagne:-Iano- Un hombre
muy arrogante "-
Kissinger, consu larga y variada experiencia en
operaciones clandestinas llevadas a cabo en todo el
I mundo, pudo ejercer un control casi total sobre los
servicios 3e inteligencia, a poco de instalarse la ad-
ministration Nixon. Su instrumento burocratico era
un grupo de alto nivel conocido como el Comite 40
-formalmente presidido por el mismo- que era, en
teoria, responsable de aprobar las "rnas delicadas"
acciones 3ncubiertas de la CIA. Y aun supervisaba y
monitore sba muchas actividades de inteligencia
de las Fu~arzas Armadas.
Se trataba de un orgarusmo qu e podia utilizarse a
ignorarse, a voluntad. Asi por ejeniplo, la CIA recibio
ordenes de conducir las activida les dirigidas. a de-
rrocar o asesinar a Allende sin el conocimiento o par-
ticipacion de los n> poi alto. El in-
tento --que no rebaso el estado Leta:-- de reeditar las
posit: )nes retoricas Xennedyanas por parte del
equip) Carter, cons-:ituia una necesid.ad his':erica,
dada a aguclizacion de la crisis general clue afecta
todas ]as esferas de:_ sistema capitalisa. Por eso no
es ex:trano que, como respc,esta ideologica., se apela-
ra a la comprade plumas para hacerles el juego a Los
intereses gubernamentales de restaurar la imagen
de la riemocracia burguesa.
El mensaje del documento R se proyecta hacia
la periferia del siste:rna capitalista impcrtante zona
donde Los monopolies exportan to que ha dada en
llama:-se su cultura transnacional. La concepcior- so-
ciold, ica del tema se fundamenta en el material in-
formativo de sus mass media y, operando en senti-
do inverso en este caso por medio de una, pregunta
hipotetica, el objetivo es neutralizar un cambio de
opinion desfavorable a su ideologia y mantener en
Las mantes la ilusion de la c.emocracia occidental. En
la cicada novela se estab]ece una cornparacion con.
un nuevo tipo de "sistema" que amenaza Las liberta-
des del individuo; sistema que, sin mencionar su
nomtre y por tanto sin referirlo historicamente con-
cretizado sugiere ser la sociedad socialista, 'juesto
que le son atribuidos ciertos rasgos significativos
que la propaganda burguesa difunde acerca del so-
cialis-no. Entre lo arl:istico de esa literatura y la infor-
mac;on directa de Los mass media un rnismo rnensa-
je ideulogico, en esencia, 1]ega a Los individuos a tra-
ves de su alte-nativa dialectica: la esfera emotional
padece Los embate Has internos con la gu erra de seces son y se habia ex-
tendido a lc largo de sus fronteras (:,on la anexi6ri de
Texas, Nuevo Mexico V California, se lanza a la buis-
queda de nuevos mercado.s para sus excedentes y
espacio vital, mas ally de sus fronte ras, en to que: se-
ra su "marE. nostrum" : el Caribe. Es la puesta al dia
de la Doctri na Monroe, con los corolarios de Teodoro
Roosevelt y su "big stick". Tres paises. Nicaragua,
Republica Dominicana. y Haiti fueron ocupados rnili-
tarmente por los marines. En Haiti se quedaron mas
tiempo que en los dermas: 19 anos, durante los cua-
les se encargaron de establecer las Lases para peren-
nizar su hegemonia con los medics que todos cono-
cen, entre los cuales se cuenta la creacibn de una
guard:ia, fuerza militar "indigena". a su servicio. En
Nicaragua, in miembro de esta gua::dia, Somoza, to-
ma el poder. Asimisrrao, en Repub lica Dominicana
sucede otro tanto con Trujillo. En Haiti el gui6n es li-
geramente i.iferente yes el propio ejercito quien po-
ne a Francois Duvalier en la silla presidencial en 1957.
Este, antes de morir y despues de 14 anos de San-
grienta dictadura, designo a su hijo Jean-Claude Co-
mo su sucesor a la "presidencia vitalicia".
De 1915 a 1934, los norteamericar..cs se fiiaron tres
objetivos or. Haiti: el control de las aduanas y de las
finanzas, elde la economia y el desarme de la pobla-
ci6n, que permanecia armada desde la guerra de la
independencia.
Se puede decir que los norteamencanos lograron
sus objetivcs y que hasta ahora esc e control perma-
nece inmute.ble pese a !as contradicciones pasajeras
que puedar.. tener sobre los modal as de los Duva-
Iiercl
Iioy el ir.iperialismo norteamericano ejerce un
control casi :otal sobre la produccior_ nacional, sobbre
:sus finanzaa, su comercio, en el cam oo cultural y na-
turalmente, en su vida politica
Ademds de los sectores tradicionales de la pro-
duccion, cor trola tambten el sector snag dinamico de
la economia la producci6n manufacturera, de la cual
quieren hacer un modelo perfecto de dependencia
econ6mica. Io por nada el general Vernon Walters,
'lurante una visita a Haiti en abril d a 1981, despues
de haber declarado "Estoy aqui pa-a preparar con
destrozado a tiros en las aguas del Atlanti-
co cuando buscaba su libertad?
"La lucha del pueblo haitiano ;por su 1i-
bertad, verdadera independencia y sobera-
nfa nacional seguira adelante hasta dejar
de convertirse en la nacidn Haas pobre y
analfabeta. de toda nuestra Amenca ", con-
signd un patriota haitiano antes de morir
tbrturado en una carcel nortearnericana a
manos de los defensores de la "civi&acidn
occidental y cristiarza ", segtin testinionio
que legara a manos del TANA.
The land of Petidn and Toussaint L'Ouverture
(prematurely killed in t=rance at the hands of
Napoleon Bonaparte's colonialist troops) is
humiliated and bloodstained by the cruel
dictatorship of the younger Duvalier, Jean
Claude, imposed like his "Tonton Macoutes" in
197 by North American democracy.
Where is Mr. Reagan "s concern for the human
rights of the Haitian people, who are victim of
North American concentration camps or shot to
pieces in Atlantic waters when they seek their
liberty? '
According to a statement which came into the
hancs of TANA, before being tortured to death at
the hands of the defenders of "Western and
Christian civilization"in a North American prison,
a Haitian patriot declared: "The struggle of the
Haitian people for their liberty, true
independence and national sovereignty will go
on until Haiti stops being the poorest and most
illiterate nation in the whole of our America.'
he young and vigorous North American imperialism
4 cf 1915, had by that time resolved its internal
problems with the war of secession and had expanded its
frontiers to their full extent with the annexation of Texas,
New Mexico and California. It then launched a search for
new riarkets for its surplus and living space beyond is
frontiers in what was to be its "mare nostrum" -- the
Caribbean - in a modern version of the Monroe Doctrine
with the corollaries of Theodcre Rooselvelt an his "big
stick" Three countries, Ni--aragua, the Dominican
Republic and Haiti were militarily occupied by the marines.
They stayed longest in Haiti (19 years) during which time
they o-dered the establishment of bases to perpetuate their
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ustedes el porvenir de Haiti..." desarro]lo todo un
panegirico de las industrias de las "sous traitance"
como Have del exito economico y del desarrollo para
Haiti.
A nivel global, lo que caracterizo la economia hai-
tiana durante la ultima decada fue la gran importan-
cia que han tornado las industrias off-shore, que pa-
saron a constituir el 26 % de la produccion territorial
bruta.
La produccion de juguetes y articulos deportivos
paso de 3,5 millones de dolares en 1970 a 40.6 millo-
nes en 1979. Lade prendas de vestir crecio de 1.7 mi-
llones de dolares en 1970 a 54 millones en 1979. La
de aparatos electricos paso de 0 en 1970 a 13 millo-
nes en 1979, mientras que la de otros aparatos elec-
tronicos paso de 0 a 11 millones en ese mismo lapso.
Son 162 compahias norteamericanas las que controlan
esta produccion.
En una. publicacion oficial del gobierno (2) se indi-
can, entre otras, las siguientes razones para invertir
en Haiti:
1. La atmosfera pacffica de respeto democratico a la
ley y el orden.
2. La actitud amigable de las autoridades y de los
ciudadanos haitianos hacia los extranjeros.
3. Facilidades de contacto directo por afire y mar
desde Puerto Principe con los principales puer-
tos.
4. El bajo costo de la mano de obra.
5. La habilidad de nuestra fuerza de trabajo, facil de
adiestrar.
6. La ausencia de cualquier tipo de control de cam-
bio sobre las transferencias del capital.
7. La ausencia de restricciones sobre el empleo de
extranjeros para cargos de gerentes, superviso-
res, etc.
Se agrega un sistema de exoneracion de impuesto
y franquicia aduanales. El 74.6% de estas fabricas
utilizan materias primas provenientes del exterior
c> El 67% de las empresas exportan sus productos
hacia el mercado norteamericano y solo el 9% produ-
ce para el mercado interno.
Alrededor de 40.000 personas y del 80% del em-
pleo industrial se concentra alrededor de las indus-
trias de erisamblaje. Hay que senalar que en 1981 se
dio una disminucion de la produccion del 13%. Es-
tas industrias, que han acentuado el caracter de de-
pendencia, han tenido durante la ultima decada una
tasa de crecimiento de 41 % anual.
En el plan quinquenal de desarrollo economico y
social del 81-86 c41 el gobierno haitiano concluye que
estas empresas estan muy poco integradas a la eco-
nomia nacional y que no tienen ningun efecto indus-
trializante.
A proposito de la industria en general, el mismo
plan concluye que, aparte de las de ensamblaje, la
industria haitiana esta confinada a los bienes de
consumo corriente.
La superexplotacion de los trabajadores haitianos
se manifiesta a traves del sajario que cobran. A con-
tinuacion incluimos coma datos los salarios minimos
devengados por los trabajadores d tr6
e
ensarnA prdv1 a[oLS Release 20u41'iui IA-R
hegemony by well-known means. One of these was the
creation of a Guard, an "indigenous" military force at their
service. In Nicaragua a member of this Guard, Somoza,
took power. In the same way, his counterpart Trujillo
followed in the Dominican Republic. In Haiti the scenario
was slightly different; it was its own army which put
Francois Duvalier into the presidential seat in 1957. Before
dying and after 14 years of bloody dictatorship, he
designated his son, Jean-Claude, as his successor to the
"life presidency".
From 1915 to 1934, the North Americans had three
objectives in Haiti: control of customs and finances, control
of the economy, and the disarmament of the people, who
had remained armed since the war of independence.
It could be said that the North Americanas achieved their
objectives and that to this day their control remains
immutable despite transient contradictions in the
Duvaliers' behavior. (1)
Today North American imperialism exercises almost
total control over national production, finances and trade, in
culture and, of course, in political life.
In addition to the traditional production sectors, it also
controls the most dynamic sector of the economy,
manufacturing production, of which they wish to make a
perfect model of economic dependence. It was not for
nothing that General Vernon Walters, during a visit to Haiti
in April 1981, after declaring, "I am here to prepare the
future of Haiti with you....", developed a full panegyric on the
industries of the "sous traitance" as the key to economic
success and development for Haiti.
On a wider scale, the Haitian economy has been
characterized during the last decade by the great
importance of off-shore industries, which constitute 26% of
the gross national product.
The production of toys and sporting equipment
increased from 3.5 million dollars in 1970 to 40.6 million in
1979. That of clothing increased from 1.7 million dollars in
1970 to 54 million in 1979. That of electrical goods rose
from 0 in 1970 to 13 million in 1979, while that of other
electronic equipment rose from 0 to 11 million, in the same
period. This production is controlled by 162 North
American companies.
In an official government publication (2) the following are
pointed out as some of the reasons for investing in Haiti:
1. A peaceful environment of democratic respect for law
and order.
2. The friendly attitude of the Haitian authorities and
citizens towards foreigners.
3.. Facilities for direct contact by air and sea between Port-
au-Prince and the other major ports.
4. The low cost of labor.
5. The capacity of our workforce, easy to train.
6. The absence of any kind of exchange control over the
transference of capital.
7. The absence of restrictions on the employment of
foreigners as managers, supervisors. etc.
A system of tax exemptions and customs exemptions
is incorporated. 74.6% of these factories use raw
materials from abroad " ). 67% of businesses export
their products to the North American market and only
9% produce for the home market.
About 40.000 people, 80% of the workforce, are
concentrated around the joint industries. It shoul._d he
pointed out that in 1981 there was a 13% reduction in
production. These industries, which have accentuated
dependency, have had an annual growth rate of 41 ?o
P88-d1r Ae411 d 6570009-2
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SA LARIO MINIMO
D :A.RIO (trS$)
Mexico (Prcv. de Sonora)
13,20
Rep. Dominicana
6,80
Jamaica
5,00
El Salvador
4,40
Barbados
3, 80
Haiti
2,64
La Reynolds, compaiiia nortearriencana que ex-
plotaba la bauxita, anuncia el cierre de su planta Pa-
ra el ano 1983. Este compania, que aparte de este
mineral explotaba el oro y otros metales sin ningun
control por parte del gobierno y los exportaba direc-
tamente, despues de ago:ar el mineral, Cerro sus
puertas y se fue.
E 21 de diciembre de 1981, Ronald Reagan escn-
be a Duvali-ar una carta en la cual le dice como el ge-
neral Haig, habia quedado impresicinado por el apo-
yo de su gobierno a las empresas privadas y a Ia re-
forma economica,"... (Ia) firme opasic16n (de Duva-
tier) al aventunsmo cubano y Ia continua coopera-
cion en vanos aspectos multilatera_es".
" .Quede muy complacido al leer en su carta quo
el gobierno haitiano sostiene nuestros propositos de
promover el desarrollo economico internacional.
Nosotros q ieremos asegurarle quo Haiti serd un so-
cio maduro en las irnciativas de ]a cuenca del. Ca-
Si hay uiia superexplotacion de los trabajadores
haitianos y de los recursos naturales del pals, de
parte de la:; transnacionales nortea.mericanas, por el
otro lado hay un apoyo financiero que preve, a pesar
de los gritos escandalizados de los organismos in-
ternaciona.es sobre la corrupcion del regimen, una
ayuda de 530 millones de dolares is ara los proximos
trey ahos.
Pero cuando viene el general Walters, no es solo
pars hablar de empresas manufactureras, last but
not the least, hablan de ayuda miht.ar. Segun el New
York Times del 7 de Mayo de 1931, el Pentdgono
ofrec16 a Duvalier un credito de 300 millones para Ia
compra de material y 199 millones para el adiestra-
miento militar, por su parte el Newsweek del 8 de
octubre de 1981, citaclo por un periodico clandestino
de Haiti, se sehala qu.e policias haitianos son a43ies-
tradcs en Chile y oficiales de Ia marina en los Esta-
dos Unidos.
La vieja ambicion de todas las potencies en el Ca-
ribe, el Mcle de Saint Nicolas, puerto natural donde
desembar(;o Colon frente at pasa e de los vientos,
parece halrer sido ya destinado a sustituir Ia base de
Guantanamo. Es la principal carta. que estan jugan-
do actualrzente el gobierno de Je:an-Claude Duva-
lier y los rn)rteameric.anos.
LA CRISIS DEL MODELO ECONOMICO
Y POLITICA JEAN-CLAUDISTA
lEl 8 de agosto de 1981 Jean-Claude Duvalier da
un discurso en el cual declara que 'el sector agricola
ha fracasado", que "el modo de pr:)duccion y la fuer-
te conceJ}tzagI4n de los in, resos tuvo Como corolano
un.ceegirlr er to sensible de !as im;:)ortaciones de los
productos ahmentici(Ds y de bienes de consumo du-
rablas,no usenciales" y que "en el Campo del empleo
y de los ingresos, los sectores dirigidos hacia Ia ex-
po rtAH?oVrrb&f61F' ~ '~ F#tf PM)
D 0009-2
In Cie five plan for econorric and social development
the Haitian government concluded that these
1981-86(4)
,
enterprises are only marginally integrated in the national
economy and that they have no industrializing effect.
Wito regard to industry in general, the same plan
concludes that, apart from joint industries, Haitian industry
is confined to ordinary consumer goods.
The super-exploitation of Haitian workers is indicated by
their salaries. Below is a compilation of data on the
minimum salaries earned by workers in joint industries in
the C. aribbean.t5>:
COUNTRIES MINIMUM DAILY SALARY (IJ.S.$)
Mexico 13.20
Dominican Republic 6.80
Jamaica 5.00
El Salvador 4.40
Barbados 3.80
Haiti 2.64
Reynolds, a North American company which extracts
baux te, announced the closure in 1983 of its plant. This
company, which also extracts and directly exports gold and
other metals without any government control, after
exhausting the bauxite depos ts, closed its doors and left.
Or 21 December 1981, Ronald Reagan wrote: Duvalier a
letter commenting on how General Haig had been
impressed by the support of the Haitian government for
private enterprise and economic reform: "..(the) firm
oppcsition (of Duvalier) to Cuban adventurism and his
constant cooperation in various multilateral aspects."
".. I was very pleased to read in your letter that the
Haitian government upholcs our aims of promoting
international economic development. We wish to assure
you that Haiti will be a matt,re partner in the Caribbean
bassi initiatives..."
Vv pile there is super-exploitation of Haitian workers and
of the country's natural resources by the North American
transnationals, on the other hand there is financial support.
This is anticipated to be 530 million dollars aid in the next
three years, despite the scandalized cries of international
organizations about the regime's corruption.
Eli it when General Walters came it was not only to speak
of manufacturing enterprises, last but not least, he spoke of
military aid. According to The New York Times of 7 May
198-', the Pentagon offered Duvalier 300 million dollars
 Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300570009-2
je internacionales no han podido crear los efectos
multiplicadores". Llega a decir tambien que "la falta
de eficacia y de vigor del Estado... ha contribuido
a crear un nivel de gastos incompatibles con nues-
tras necesidades reales y el estado de los ingresos
internos". Termina con un llamado para que "se le
preste una ayuda sustanciosa a Haiti indispensable
para la paz frente a las infiltraciones comunistas en
America Central".
Si bien este discurso, como veremos despues, te-
nfa como principal meta atraer la ayuda externa que
empieza a limitarse frente a la incapacidad y la co-
rrupcion del regimen, tratando de lucir como una to-
ma de conciencia de la gravedad de la crisis y una
voluntad de cambio, era tambien la confesion abier-
ta del fracaso de la politica economica del jeanclau-
dismo basada en hacer de Haiti el Hong Kong del Ca-
ribe.
Tasa de Crecimiento en relacion
al,periodo 1978-1980 sobre la base del
Periodo 1975-1976 (6)
P.T.B.
(-) 3%
Importacion
(-)7,3%
Consumes
(-)1,8%
Inversiories
3%
Exportaciones
(-)17,1%
El deficit de la balanza comercial pasaria de (-)
794,9 millones de gourdes ") en el periodo 78-80, a
(-) 1.119.6 millones de gourdes en el periodo 80-8 1.
Segun este mismo documento oficial el gobierno
haitiano, mientras que en 1976 se estimaba que el
48,27% d.e la poblacion tenia un ingreso inferior al li-
mite admisible de pobreza, esta proporcion alcanza
un 68,9% en 1980. Durante estos Ultimos cinco aiios,
el ingreso medio por habitantes ha disminuido en un
1,4%, pasando de 962 gourdes anuales a 949. Nada
cambio a nivel de la distribucion de los ingresos:
40% de la poblacion recibe menos del 15% del ingre-
so, mientras que el 20% acapara el 50% del ingreso.
Las 4.000 familias mas ricas del pais tienen un ingre-
so per capita de 50.000 gourdes anuales.
La tasa de desempleo es del 50%. El consumo dia-
rio de calorias per capita es de 1.900, siendo lo nor-
malmente aceptado 2.375.
Estos textos oficiales del gobierno haitiano tienen
claramertte entre sus metas el obtener ayuda de los
organismos internacionales y de los gobiernos que
lo sostiene, pero se constituyen al mismo tiempo en
las actas de acusacion mas graves que se le pueden
levantar a 25 altos de duvalierismo y apoyo nortea-
mericano. Terminan entonces pidiendo para los
proximos 5 anos 6.8 10 millones de gourdes del exte-
rior, es decir, 1,362 millones de dolares, principal-
mente del BID, de los Estados Unidos, del Banco
Mundial, del Mercado Comt n Europeo, del PNUD,
del PAM, de la CEE, de la CDI,'de la Republica Fede-
ral Alem,ana, de Taiwan e Israel.
Esta gravisima crisis economica y social se vio
acompai ada de otra igualmente fuerte a nivel politi-
co.
Inmediatamente despues de la eleccibn de Re-
agan y antes de que este asumiera el poder, Jean-
Claude, :tnicia of d repre o t el vL
Approved or 2elease 0()4j~a/1% dX-KD
credit to buy materials and 199 million for military training.
Newsweek of 8 October 1981, quoted by a clandestine
Haitian newspaper, pointed out that the Haitian police are
trained in Chile, and naval officers, in the United States.
The natural port of Mole de Saint Nicolas where
Columbus disembarked in front of the Wind Passage, long
coveted by all the powers in the Caribbean, now seems to
have been earmarked to replace the Guantanamo base.
This is the principal card which the Jean-Claude Duvalier
government and the North Americans are currently
playing.
THE CRISIS OF JEAN-CLAUDE'S
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MODEL
On 8 August 1981, Jean-Claude Duvalier gave a speech
in which he declared: "the agricultural sector has failed",
that: "the mode of production and the heavy concentration
of revenue has shown as a corrollary a tangible increase in
the importation of food products and non-essential durable
consumer goods", and that: "in the area of employment and
of income, sectors directed towards exportation, in
particular the international joint industries, have not been
able to create multiplying effects". He also said that: "the
state's lack of efficiency and strength... has contributed to
the creation of a level of expenses incompatible with our
real needs and our income levels". He ended with a call for:
"substantial aid, indispensible for peace in the face of
communist infiltrations in Central America, to be lent to
Haiti."
This speech, as we shall see later, had as its principal
objective the attraction of foreign aid (which was beginning
to be limited due to the regime's incapacity and corruption).
This was an attempt to appear both aware of the gravity of
the crisis and to display willingness to change. However it
was also the open confession of the failure of Jean-
Claude's economic policy based on making Haiti the Hong
Kong of the Caribbean.
Growth rate in the 1978-1980 period in
relation to that of the 1975-75 period (6)
G.N.P.
(-)
3%
Imports
(-)
7.3%
Consumption
(-)
1.8%
Investment
3%
Exports
(-).17.1%
The deficit in the balance of trade went from (-) 794.9
million gourdes (7) in the 1978-80 period to (-) 1,119.6
million gourdes in the 1980-81 period.
According to this same official document of the Haitian
government, while it was estimated that in 1976 48.27% of
the population had an income below the official poverty
line, this proportion rose to 68.9% in 1980. During the last
five years. the average income per capita has decreased
by 1.4%, a drop from 962 to 949 gourdes anually. The
distribution of revenue is unchanged: 40% of the
population receive less than 15% of the revenue, white
20% monopolize 50% of the revenue. The country's 4,000
richest families have an annual income of 50,000 gourdes
per capita.
There is a 50% unemployment rate. The daily calorie
consumption per capita is 1,900, while the accepted norm
is 2,375.
These official texts of the Haitian government clearly
have among their objectives that of obtaining aid from
international organizations and from the governments who
sustain them. At the same time they constitute the gravest
record of accusation possible after 25 years of the Duvalier
system and North American support. They end therefore
by requesting 6,810 million gourdes from abroard for the
 Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300570009-2
enientc que.labia nacido en el pals no Lacayo from the delegation of the Sandinist
Workers Central was the first to declare himself in favor of
the report presented by the Defense and Interior
Commission. Immediately afterwards, the journalist
Onefre Guevara, FSLN delegate, emphasized that since
the far ndation of ATOA on 21st September 1981, "it has
been an organization that has strongly projected solidarity
with 'icaragua and with all peoples who are fighting
against imperialism". S milar sentiments were expressed
by the delegates, Jose Luis Villavicencio (ANCEN),
Consejlo Ortega (FETSALIJD), Domingo Sanchez
(Patristic Front of the Revolution), Angela Rose Acevedoi
(AMNI...AE), Alberto Blanco (UNAG), Manuel Eugarrios
(UPN) Ramon Perez (CDS) and Yadira Centeno
(CONAPRO Heroes and Martyrs).
NEW CHAPTERS
Witr the structuring of chapters in Brazil, Ecuador and
Bolivia, following a successful tour by the Tnbuna's
President, Guillermo --oriello, the number of member
bodies of the Tribunal in different countries rose to 28, all of
which mill be represented in the three day Solemn Hearing
to be held in Managua commencing 17th October.
rori?ilo, in a meeting the Executive Committee,
reported: "In all these countries we can perceive the
existence of steadfast solidarity with Nicaragua and also
with the peoples of El Salvador and Guatemala, coupled
with a categorical repudiation of the U.S. governments
bellic 3e policy".
Meanwhile, in important meetings held by the chapters
of Mexico, Costa Rica and El Salvador, work plans were
appro% ed for their participation n the October Hear ncl arid
in the First International Contest of Ant-imperialist
Cartocris, whose extended closing date is 31st November.
and a so for the parti:ipatior of sculptors from tinese
countr es in the elaboration of the bases for the
constriction of the Monument of the Liberators and Heroes
of Our America, which is to be raised in Managua.
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ANIVERSARIO - PANAMA
Estimados Companeros
Revista Soberania
Quiero a traves de la presente saludar a todo el co-
lectivo per el II Aniversario del Tribunal Antimperia-
lista y felicitarlos por la importante labor de denun-
cia y esclarecimiento que en ese mismo perfodo han
realizado con la revista "Soberania"; la que vino a
1lenar un gran vacio de informacibn para todos los lu-
chadores antimperialistas.
Hoy mds que nunca frente a la escalada en las
agresiones en contra de nuestros pueblos y particu-
larmente en America Central los objetivos del Tribu-
nal y la presencia de "Soberania" son armas de lu-
cha indiscutible. Felicitaciones y adelante.
ROQUE V. SUAREZ
ANNIVERSARY - PANAMA
Dear Companeros of the magazine Soberania
1 wish to greet everyone in the collective on the occasion
of the 11 Arnversary of the Anti-Imperialist Tribunal and to
congratulate you on the important work of denunciation
and elucidation which you have accomplished with the
magazine "Soberania": which came to fill the huge vacuum
of information for all anti-imperialist fighters.
Today more than ever in the face of the escalation in the
acts of aggression against our peoples and particularly
those of Central America, the aims of the Tribunal and the
presence of Soberania are weapons in the incontrovertible
struggle. Congratulations and carry on!
The political and ideological importance of your magazine
SOBERANIA cannot be over-emphasized at such. uncertain
times for the world and especially for the Central American
and Caribbean countries due to the growing threat from
Reagan and his henchmen.
HORACtO MADEROS ACOSTA
PEDRO BETANCOUR_ MATANZAS.
El GSAL -Grupo de Solidaridad con America Latina-
Portugal saluda a] Tribunal Antimperialista de
Nuestra America por su valiosa labor en pro de la li-
beracion de los pueblos de America Latina y el Cari-
be.
VIVA LA REVOLUCION POPULAR SANDINISTA
VIVA LA SOLIDARIDAD INTERNACIONAL DE LOS
PUEBLOS
GREETINGS - GSAL
The Solidarity with Latin America Group-Portugal wishes to
send its greetings to the Anti-imperialist Tribunal of Our
America, in recognition of its. valuable contribution to the
liberation of the peoples of Latin America and the. Caribbean.
LONG LIVE THE SANDINISTA'POPULAR REVOLUTION
KONG LIVE THE INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY OF PEOPLES
CONCURSO-COLOMBIA
Tribunal Antimperialista de Nuestra America.
Envio con esta mi colaboracion al Concursio de hu-
mor a celebrarse an Managua el proximo ones:
Quiero augurarles el major resultado an el Concur-
so para bien de los intereses de nuestra AAmerica,
en estos caminos no suficientemente andados del
humor y la caricatura.
ROQUE V. SUAREZ
PANAMA
MATANZAS - CUBA
Esta demos poner de relieve la importancia politica
e ideologica que su revista SOBERANIA, reviste en
momentos tan inciertos para el mundo y en especial
para los paises de Centro America y del Caribe, dada
la creciente amenaza de la administracion de Re-
agan y sus secuaces.
LIC. HORACIO MADEROS ACOSTA
PEDRO BETANCOUR. MATANZAS.
CONTEST-COLOMBIA
Anti-imperialist Tribunal of Our America;
I enclose my entry in the cartoon contest to be held in
Managua next month. f
I wish you the very best in this contest in the interests of our
America, along the all too infrequently trodden paths of humor
and the cartoon.
ALEXIS FORERO (ALEKOS)
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SOLIDARITY-COSTA RICA
I am delighted and honored to send you -nv most respectful
greetings anc at the same time give my ull support for what
you are lighting for, the intense struggle against yankee and
world imperia ism.
It is reassuring to know that there is a group of people such as
yourselves concerned with offering the people of Latin
America and the world a clearer vision of what is happening in
our America and the truth about the most genocidal and tyrannical
apparatus ever: the Government o$-the Un4ed States.
IN EVERY LAT N AMERICAN THERE LIVES A SANDINO, A MARTI,
A BOLIVAR -LONG LIVE FREE AMERICA
Organo del TANA No. 11 The ATOA Magazine No. 11
Managua, Nicaragua Libre Managua, Free Nicaragua
Septiembre-Octubre 1983 September-October 1983;
Revista de CirculaciGn National and International
DIRECTOR CONSEJO EDITORIAL.
Freddy Ba zan EDITORIAL COUNCIL
REDACCION
STAFFWRITERS
Gregorio Selser
Julio Cortazar
Mario Beriedetti
D.J. Flakoll
Laura Albizu
Guillermc Toriello
M.Z. All & Chandra Van
Binnendiik
Seymour H. Hersh
Arnold Antonin
Enrique Soldevilla
Freddy Balzan
Fernando Penalba
Philippe Delon
Carmen Guerrero
Richard Parker H.
Julio Gutierrez
Joaquin Torres
Guillermo Toriello
Claribel Alegria
Arnoldo Mora
Xavier C:hamorro
Freddy Balzan
Julio Cortazar
Phillip Agee
Terry Agerkop
Ratael Cancel Miranda
Apolinar Diaz Callejas;
Hamlet Hermann
Jaime Cialarza
Telsforo:
Telephone: 747 09
Irnores o en: Printed in:
CPASA y Talleres EN D
Per es to media tengo Ia aie3ria y el honor cle sa1udar
les m.ty respetuosainente y a la vez darles mi gran
apoyc por la lucha que est3n Uevando a cabo por el
intenso combate contra el, imperiahsmo yanqui y de
todo el mundo.
Me es complacientE saber que existe urr gnxpo de
personas como ustedes interesados en brinclarle at
pueblo latinoamericano y mundial, una vision mas
clara ie las cosas que suceden en nuestra Arnenca y
en ofrecernos la realidad acerca del instru.mento ge-
nocida y tirano que jamas haya existido: el gobierno
de los Estados Unidos.
JORGE: QUESADA MVIENDEZ
EN CrdDA HOMBRE Y NINO LATINOAMF.RICANO VIVE
UN SA.NDINO, MARTI, BOLIVAR...
VIVA AMERICA LIBR.E.
MESSAGE-WIDF
I
ANTHMPERIALIST TRIBUNAL OF OUR AMERICA
APARTADO 49
MANAGUA NICARAGUA
FRATERNAL GREETINGS ON SECOND ANNIVERSARY
GOOD WORK FUTURE SUCCESS FOR PEOPLES
SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF DETERMINATION
MIRJAI IRE TUOMINEN
SECRETARY GENERAL -
WOMENS INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION.
TRIBUNAL ANTIMPERIALISTA
DE NTJESTRA AMERICA TANA
APA.FTADO 49
MAN a.GUA. NICARACUA
OCALION SEGUNDO ANIVERSARIO RECIBAN
FRATERNAL MENSAJE LABOR REALIZADA FA-
VOR :;OBERANIA Y AUTCIDETERMIN. ACION PUE-
BLOS EXITOS FUTUROS.
MIRJr,N VIRE TUOMINEN
SECR.F TARIA GENERAL
FEDEaACION DEMOCRATICA INTERNACIONAL
MTJJE 3 ES
NUESTRA PORTADA: Tratar de ser como el "Che" Guevara, OUkt COVER: To trf be like "Che" Guevara as perhaps the
as el mejor ho nenaje que le podemos rendir en el decimosex- best homage that we can pay him on the sixteenth
to aniversario de su asesinato y sobre todo no olvidar fames anniversary of his assassination. That, and never to forget
una de sus frases donde desbordaba de su gran amora la hu- hia expression. overflowing with his great love for
manidad y su total desinteres por las cocas materiales: "So- humanity and his total lack of interest in material things:
bre todo, seen capaces de sentir en to mas hondo cualquier "t,hove all, to be capable of feeling to one's very depths
injusticia contra cualquiera en'cualquier pate del rrundo. E:s whatever injustice against whomever in whatever part of
la cualidad mas linda de un revolucionario..' the world - that is a revolutionary's finest quality..."
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AT
7 4 Tap
 Approved For Release 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP88701314R000300570009-2
BANCO NACIONAL
DE .DESARROLLO...
HEAD OFFICE:
Casa Matriz:
Tels:
Servicios: SERVICES.'
ADDRESS.
uireccion:
Cable:
Bcnades
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 ..~ ,., :. 004UQ(28~:LPa: RDP.$Br-Qa 3 a 4t0~Q057--~-
 Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300570009-2
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000300570009-2