LET'S DECLASSIFY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300310001-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved or 2 1314R0003003'4000138
By ItLC Y-111 l..11) WI;UDSSONT sllchev's secret hen lie saw Kemlody
More than half a century ago Wood- on October 31--the clay after. Kennedy,
row Wilson called for "open covenants had seen photographs of the Soviet
openly arrived at." It was a good idea rn}sires-?and assured Kennedy "that sal i_,
then, alm ~h at." Other w s goo en ea the Soviet Union would never. become
the t}rne didn't. think so. They made-a involved in the furnishing of offensive
lot of secret deals, and a generation ? weapons to Cuba (Robert Kennedy's
later the world deals,and d ae: war yon. words). I have never been able to as-'
certain the answer to this question but
Now, I think, Wilson's idea, is not circumstantial evidence leads me to
merely good but indispensable if mail- believe that Gromyko had not. been,
kind, is to avoid catiastrophe. The told.
Pentagon Papers provide fresh and
dramatic evidence that Government of- -WMt if President Kennedy had not
`ficials operating behind closed doors kept his secret and had confronted
do not possess some mysterious high Gromyko with the photographs? Might
-wisdom denied to the rest of us. In not the public confrontation have been
creed, one could make a good case that avoiclecl? What if I~hrushchev had told
the outside public exhibits more good Dobrynin of his intentions? Surely Do-
sense. bryni.n would have told Khrushchev'in
Suppose the Johnson Administration strong terms that putting Soviet mis-
had been a goldfish-bowl operation, silos into Cuba would take the world
leveling with the Congress and the to time br}r.ik.
people. If -the truth had been released - The most bizarre example of secrecy
about the events an the Gulf of Ton- today is that at the talks on the limita-
kill in August, 1.964, would there have tion of strategic arms---SALT. Suppos.-
been a -Tonkin Resolution? Most un- edly secrets- are to be kept from po-
liiiely. Without the Administration's tent.ial enemies, but here the potential
massive snow job, I believe it is proba- enemies sit down together to talk
ble. that the American people and the about important matters that arp kept
Congress would never have permitted from their own people. U.S. officials
say that 'they have..to.--be
It U.S. ground war on the mainland of secretive'
Asia. about. the talks because the Russians
The system of secrecy backfires even want it that way, but I suspect that
within governments and at the highest ? the American officials have not pressed'
evels. The case of Adlal Stevenson at for openness.- I- think that the talks
the time of the Day of Figs crisis, when might very well progress better if they
he declared (and believed) that the U.S. were open to the public.'
had nothing to do with it, is well Of course, there are valid arguments
known. For no gain whatever, the U.S. at times for secrecy: military matters
Suffered a serious loss of credibility. have to be kept quiet so long as the
Also well known is the fact that The present archaic. international security
New York,Times knew about the plan- system continues to exist; codes must
-nod invasion beforehand but refrained be protected; information in personnel
from printing much of the story at the files t}mat might damage reputations'
request of President Kennedy. If The ;should not be released; often diplo-
Times had published-the story surely mats can avoid making propaganda
a'storni would have arisen--but a dis- speeches by '.holding private negoti-
astrous foreign-policy blunder proba- ations.
-
.bly would have been prevented. What is needed hi the establishment
I think it has not been published be. of a rule that unless there is oYerriding
'fore that in the Cuban missile crisis reason for secrecy, Government busi-
the shoo of secrecy was on the other ness should be done in the open. I
foot. I have learned from a Russian would suggest that all executive de-
source in a position to know that on partment documents be automatically
October 23, 1962, in the heat of the Se declassified after one year unless a
curity Council debate, when Stevenson. newly . established commission rule
angrily turned to Soviet Ambassador that a valid reason existed for a docu-
.Valerin "Lorin and .said that he would nment to remain classified. The corn-
wait: "until hell freezes . over" for mission should be a quasijudicial insti-
Gorin's answer as to whether there Outman not under time authority of the
were Soviet missiles in Cuba, Zorin executive department. It would review
stalled and_balked for the simple rea documents at the time they are first
son that he didn't have the foggiest classified gild would-not permit classi-
ddea of the true answer. It is also clear fication unless a strong case were pro-
.from Robert Kennedy's book, "Thin- seated. In short, the less material clas--
teen Days," that Soviet Ambassador sified, the better, and for material that
DoIirynin in Washington did not know is classified, the sooner it is declassi- .
on that same date, the day after Presi- fled, the better.-
there were Soviet missiles in Cuba. Richard Hudson is editor o War/ ;
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