HOW KISSINGER, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE CIA OBSTRUCTED THE INVESTIGATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300300010-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 23, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

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~f0}
More From the Report on the CIA That They
Still Don't Want You to Read
The Unpublished First Section of the Pike Papers
..We were given heavily
"sanitized" pieces of paper.
"Sanitized" was merely a
euphemism for blank sheets
of paper ..
Page 61
The cut-off from informa-
tion struck at the heart of
Committee operations. One
month out of our five-month
liavCS:g';atiye period v.'as lost
while the.. issue was
negotiated ...'
Page 61
`... The authority invoked by
the Secretary of State was
neither "classification," nor
"executive privilege," but a
new doctrine that can best be
characterized as "secretarial
privilege"...'
Page 62
`Overuse of classification is
inevitable when.... some
15,466 persons can
classify information.'
Page 68
THE 8"CH"ECY UZENJiffi
`Classified information pre-
sents a classic paradox:
without it, government sone-
times cannot function; with
it, government sometimes
cannot function.'
Page 66
.
fiTTFICt"HUG THE FLU P10
`On September 24, 1975. .
the Deputy Secretary of State
raised for the first time an
innuendo that the
Committee's action
resembled McCarthyism.'
Page 63
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If this Committee's recent experience is any test, in-
telligence agencies that are to be controlled by Con.
gressional lawmaking are, today, beyond the law-
maker's scrutiny.
These secret agencies have interests that inherently
conflict with the open. accountability of a political
body, and there are many tools and tactics to block
and . deceive conventional Congressional -checks.
Added to this are the unique attributes of intelligence
--notably, "national security,'*' in its cloak of secrecy
and mystery--to intimidate Congress and erode fragile
support for sensitive inquiries.
Wise and effective legislation cannot proceed in the
absence of information respecting conditions to be af-
fected or changed? Nevertheless, under present cir-
cumstances, inquiry into intelligence activities faces
serious and fundamental shortcomings.
Even limited success in exercising future oversight
requires a rethinking of the powers, procedures, and
duties of the overseers. This Committee's path and
policies, its pluses and minuses, may at least indicate
where to begin.
Access
Information
The key to exercising oversight is knowledge. In the
case of intelligence agencies, this translates into a need
for access to information often held by the agencies
themselves, about events in distant places.
It is an uncertain approach to gathering facts, given
the best of circumstances. The best of circumstances
thereby become a minimum condition.
The Select Committee's most important work may
well have been its test of those circumstances, testing
perhaps for the first time what happens when Con-
gress unilaterally decides what it wants to know and
how it wants to know it.
There were numerous- public expressions by intelli-
gences agencies and the Executive that full coopera-
tion would-be accorded? The credibility of such as-
surances was important, since almost all the necessary
materials were classified and controlled by the execu-
tive branch. Despite these public representations, in
practice most document access was preceded by
lengthy negotiations. Almost without exception, these
negotiations yielded something less than complete or
timely access 4
In short, the words were always words of coopera-
tion; the reality was delay, refusal, missing informa-
tion, asserted privileges; and oil and on?
The Committee began by asserting that Congress
alone must decide who, acting in its behalf., has a
right to know secret information. This led to a rejec-
tion of Executive "clearances"6 or the "coin partmenta-
tion"r of our staff. The Committee refused, as a mat-
ter of policy, to sign agreements.- It refused to allow
intelligence officials to read and review our investiga-
tors' notes, and avoided canned briefings in favor of
primary source material. I lie Committee maintained
that Congress has a right to all information short of
direct communications with the President.
Our ability to abide by these policies has been a
mixed record.
On the plus side, an aggressive pursuit of facts and
a willingness to back up this pursuit with subpoenas
produced sonic unprecedented results.'As an example,
never -before had either the Executive or Congress put
together a ten-year review of covert action projects.
By subpoena--which, unfortunately, had to be taken
to the brink of-contempt enforcement-the stall of rte
Committee analyred all official covert action approv.
als since 1965, and reported- its results to the Commit-
tee in a closed hearing.v That presentation was one of
the more interesting and accurate pictur".j of U.S.
covert policies yet assembled, and was of no small
value to our iindiags. Other examples appear through-
out the remainder of this report.
Nonetheless, if that is the positive side, it was off.
set by the extraordinary efforts that were required,
even in a climate favorable to reviewing past Exccu-
live conduct, to identify and obtain documents.
It is a commentary in itself that subpoenas were
EDITOR'S NOTE -
Last week, The Village Voice printed almost
in full the text of the second of three sections of
the report on U.S. secret agencies, dated January
19, 1976, prepared by the House Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, chaired by Congressman
Otis Pike of New York. That second section
contains the investigative record of the Cont-
mittec. As noted in our introduction, we could
not publish the third - section of the report-a
section on re,,otnnrendations--because the Com-
mittee had not written it. And we did riot choose
to publish the first section because it dealt riot
with the Committee's findings but rather with its
frustrations as an investigative unit. -
Herewith we are. publishing the text of that
first section because of the perspective it provides
for understanding the reaction of Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, the White (louse, die
secret agencies, and the Pike Committee itself
to publication of the report and to the fact that
it appeared exclusively in the Voice. By far, the
greatest outrage has been expressed not toward
those whose mismanagement, cynicism, and
downright lawlessness have made a scandal and
a disaster of our intelligence operations, but
toward those in the Congress and the media who
uncovered and reported the facts. The first sec-
tion of the Pike Papers helps explain this in-
verted response. It tells of repeated efforts by,
above all, Mr. Kissinger and by the White House'
the CIA, Senator Henry Jackson, and others to
contain, obstruct, delay, and if possible derail
the Select Committee's investigation. It also tells
some of the effects of these efforts.
In the end, the obstructionists did not succeed.
But the turmoil itself and piecemeal leaks tend
to focus attention on the clash of interests rather
than the substance of the Committee's findings
and still threaten to dilute?its cumulative impact. .
In the following text, space limitations require
us to delete some non-substantive references front
the footnotes. Therefore, footnotes are not num-
bered consecutively; but the numbering follows
the report's throughout.
It is a further commentary that much of the time
subpoenas were riot enough, and only a determined
threat of contempt proceedings brought grudging
results.
Footnotes: -
'It is interesting to note that, despite volumes of
literature, public utterance, and court cases on the
subject, there are no clear definitions of what national
security is. E.q., Note 87 1-larv. L. Rev. 976 (1974);
Becker, The Supreme Court's Recent "National Se-
curity" Decisions: Which Interests Are Being Pro-
tected? 40 Tenn. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
2Justice Van Dcvanter. speaking for a unanin)ous.
Supreme Count, wrote that the Congressional "power
of inquiry-with process to enforce it--is essential
and appropriate as an auxiliary to the legislative func-
tion." McGrain v. Daugherty (1972).
Early it) the history of our republic, the power was
accompanied by "instructions to inquire into the con-
dition of -tile various executive departments, and the
ability and integrity with which they have been con-
ducted." 13 Cong. Deb. 1057, 1067, (1836).
'In a letter to the Chairman dated October 14,
1975, Secretary of State Kissinger stated: "I have no
desire to keep anything from the Select Committee
with regard to the Cyprus crisis or any other subject."
Letter to Chairman Pike, from Dr. Kissinger, State
Dept.- -Oct. 14, 1975.
In a second letter to the Chairman, elated Novent-
bet' 3, 1975, Dr. Kissinger again pledged his coopera-
tion: "Let me reiterate that my intention is not to
withhold any information of use to the Committee...
I remain as determined as ever to do everything possi-
ble to assist the Committee in its difficult and impor-
tant task." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Dr. Kis-
singer, State Dept., Nov. 3, 1975.
At a news conference on. June .10, 19:5, President
Ford stated: "I will make available to the Senate and
house Select Committees these [Rockefeller Conunis-
sion] materials, together with other related materials
in the executive branch." He went on to say: "So
there's not going to be any possibility of any cover-tip
because we're giving them the material that the Rock-
efeller Commission developed in their hearings, plus
any other material that is available in the executive
branch." (Emphasis added.) president's News Con-
ference, Wash. D.C., June 10, 1975.
4'l"he following statement by the Chairman, on No.
vember 14, 1975, with reference to a subpoena of
State Department documents, is typical: -
"Chairman PIKE. That troubles me, Mr. McClory.
The fact is that three days after the subpoena was
due, we have nothing. You have had phone calls. Mr.
Donner and Mr. Field have had phone calls. The
President has not asserted executive privilege, but lie
hasn't clone it."
The Committee also discovered what Chairman
Pike described as the "dribble treatment," where one
or two documents were delivered each day over the
course of several weeks. This was a particularly subtle
iinpeclinient, as it gave the executive branch an op-
portunity to deny that it was withholding information,
while at the same time delaying the Commitiee's
tvurk.
In the domestic intelligence investigation, Drug En-
forcement Administration documents, which had been
requested for over three months, were opened for
Committee "inspection" 48 horns before a hearing on
DEA intelligence. Even then, a subpoena had been
necessary to obtain information. The staff was not
given access to the 17 so-called Kissinger wiretap ma-
terials until 24 hours before Dr. Kissinger appeared
before the Committee; and that took place only after
lengthy negotiations. (Justice Department memoranda
relating to the 17 wiretaps are printed as pp. IX of
the Conlin. Hearings, Part 3.)
tThe Chairman's comments on September 29, 1975,
in a discussion of proposed agreements with the FLx-
ecutive, illustrate the point: -
"Chairman PIKE. . You thought we had ,in
agreement with the President two weeks ago-or a
week and a half ago-and we adopted your proposals
in order to get that agreement.
"(laving adopted your proposals, they said, 'Well,
that is the first bite, now we will conic back for some
more.' They have now cone back for sonic ,,tore.
"You want us to adopt these proposals. You keep
seeing, huge cooperation just around the corner and it
is not there, and it has not been there."
At a Committee meeting early in September, the
Chairman described the Committee's experience thus
far with executive brandy cooperation:
"Here is what we run into ... Nothing is ever re-
fused-things just are not delivered. They very care-
fully do not refuse, but the language is always the lan-
guage of cooperation-the fact is the fact of norm-pro-
duction... .
A month later, the degree of cooperation had not
noticeably improved. As the Chairman stated:
"I think we all know what is going on here. You
asked that we wait another week-and we can wait
for another week. You say that we ought to be con-
cerned with the official statements and, as I have in-
dicated from the clay I got on the Committee, the offi-
cial statements always promise cooperation. There has
never been an official statement which says. 'In no
way are you going to get this information.' But the
fact of the matter is that we don't get the informa-
tion."
6The Committee did accept the assistance of the
FBI in conducting background investigations of its
stall prim to hiring- All decisions. however, concern-
ing the nieniben's of the Committee's staff and their
work were made by the Committee.
The Director of Central intelligence requested that
the Conunitree require its staff to sign secrecy oaths
comparable to those which the CIA requires of its
own employees. The Committee refused. However,
each member of the staff was obliged by the Commit
tee to sign an "Employee Agreement."
T"Compartmcaitation" is a system employed by the
intelligence agencies to restrict the distribution of in-
formation even among othieials witfl,sectn'iiy clear-,
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traces. The justification fur conli trios tuition is de-
scribed in the following excerpts from it letter to the
Chairman from CIA Director Colby, on July 28, 1975:
"National Security Council Intelligence Directive
No. 1 (17 Feb. 1972) instructs the Director of Central
Intelligence to ... develop and review sccurity stand-
ards and practices as they relate to the protection of
intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure.' Since the National Se-
curity Act did not provide for an authority corre-
sponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area,
the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S.
Intelligence Board are responsible for: 'The super-
vision of the disserninatiou of security intelligence ma-
leritil,' The Director of Central Intelligence, acting
with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board, has
promulgated a number of directives, regulations, and
security manuals, related to the protection of foreign
intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and meth-
ods." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA,
July 28. 1975.
9This report resulted from a subpoena of documents
in possession of the "Forty Committee." which is a
National Security Council subcommittee that approves
covert action.
On November 14, by a vote of 10 to 2, the Cont-
initteo approved a resolution citing Dr. Kissinger in
contempt of Congress forhis failure to comply with
the Forty Committee subpoena. The report accom-
panying the resolution (94-b93) was filed December
8. On December 10, after negotiations with White
House officials, the Chairman informed the House
that substantial compliance had been obtained, and
the Committee's report was recommitted.
1. Delay
The record of subpoenas is worth reviewing
It began on August 5, 1975, when an Assistant
Secretary of Defense was asked to appear as a witness
and bring with hint the document by which the Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA) was set up. It was a
simple and logical request. The Defense Department
controls NSA; the Comittee was holding hearings
on intelligence budgets; NSA has the biggest budget;
and the Committee wanted to see the authority by
which NSA operates.
The official did not bring the document. Ile did not
have "clearance" to.10
For this elementary piece of information, the Select
Committee was forced to resort to the first of its
marry subpoenas. It is worth noting that the sub-
poena was promptly honored, which raises the ques-
tion why the document was not delivered in the first
place,
By late August, the Committee was preparing for.
hearings to review what kind of intelligence our mon-
ey buys. Four events were chosen for hearings: the
1973 Mid-East war, the 1974 Cyprus coup, the 1974
Portuguese coup, and the 1968 Tot offensive in Viet-
nam- During August and early September there were
repeated, requests for documents and intervicws.13
In some cases, we were given heavily "sanitized"
pieces of paper. "Sanitized" was merely a euphemism
for blank streets of paper with a few scattered words
left in, often illegible, sometimes misleading, and usu-
ally incortclusive.14 In some cases, notably as to the
1974 coup in Portugal. there was an absolute refusal
to provide anything, until early October.
As a last ditch effort, with hearings approaching, the
Committee turned once again to its subpoena power.
On September 10, 1975, it subpoenaed materials from
the three major intelligence agencies and the National
Security Council.ts
What were the materials that forced the Committee
to resort to the force of law? Were they the names of
agents? No. Were they descriptions of secret intelli-
gence techniques? No. They were, simply, copies of
intelligence publications that had been circulated in
the executive branch during the week prcceeding the
events that we were examining.16clocuments circu-
lated literally to hundreds, if not thousands, of people.
Were they turned over by the date specified in the
subpoena'? Not completely.
The (Ili-cc intelligence agencies supplied some of
their publications.t7 Dr. Kissinger, as Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, refused to
turn over a single piece of paper front reports pro-
vided to the National Security Council during the
weeks in question-ts
By the time hearings on intelligence results began
in raid-September, only two agencies had substantially
complied with our subpocnas.19 More than a month
would pass before a good faith effort at compliance _
was forthcoming front the National Security Council.
Footnotes:
10On August 5, 1975, the Committee received
testimony from Dr. Albert C. Hall, Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (tutelligence):
"Chairman PIKE. Well, Dr. Itall, we did make a
formal request that you bring this piece of paper
creating the National Security Agency With you and
you tell us that you watt us to have everything we
need but you didn't bring it. Why?
"Dr. Hall. We have to get clearance for releasing
this material to you, sir.
"Chairman PIKE. Iferc we are representing the
legislative branch of Government, asked to appropri-
ate hundreds of millions of dollars to a certain agency
and we are having dilliculty finding the statutory au-
thority for that agency even to exist. Now, isn't that
ridiculous?"
In Letters were sent to CIA on Aug. 18, 1975;
Aug. 19, 1975; Aug. 27, 1975; and Sept. 5, 1975.
State Department requests were sent on Aug. 19,
1975; Sept. 8. 1975; and again oil Sept. 8, 1975. Re-
quests were forwarded to the Defense Department on
Aug. 15, 1975: Aug. 19, 1975; Sept. 8, 1975; again on
Sept. 8, 1975; and Sept. 9, 1975.
,,The last two pages of one set of documents were
typical deletions. 'flic first page was apparently a
cable. It was blank, except for the following across
the top: 3/ND/DOLL: VNa1l/'f-0144-6SG TRANS-
House Select Committee Chairman Otis Pike: Ile got
the "dribble treatment"-one or two documents a day.
LATED DECRYPT. VNJAC/VN NR I Y 301300G
FM iTB TO CO INFO BBM STOP CNMB 30119
5610M Tol: 30fA68/1012Z 300"
The second page of the cable was even less infor-
mative. It was completely blank, except for a "Top
Secret" Stamp.
15The subpoenas were directed to the National
Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the Director of Central Intelligence, and the National
Security Council.
16The subpoena to the Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy on the subject of the Mid-East war illustrates the
types of documents called for:
"I. For the period of September 25, 1973, through
October 6, 1973, on a daily basis, or as frequently as
same were issued, the original documents as follows:
all Defense Intelligence Agency estimates. Current
Defense Intelligence Summaries, situation Reports,
and any and all cables emanating from the Defense
Attache Office in Tel Aviv, National Military Intelli-
gence Center daily briefings... ,
17A staff summary, prepared on September 12,
1975, indicated the following non-compliance:
"DIA Items Not Furnished--Cyprus and Mid-East
War
a. DIA Intelligence Summaries for July 14.
b. DIA Intelligence Bulletin for July 13, July 14,
and July 20.
c. DiA. Daily Current Intelligence Briefings for
July 13, July 14. and July 20.
d. DIA Daily Intelligence Iulletins for September
29, September 30, October 6.
C. DIA Intelligence Suntntary for September 30.
"NSA Items Not Furnished-Cyprus
a. SIGSUM's for July 13, July 14, July 19, July 20.
b. "Wrap-up messages" for July 13, July 14, July
15, July 16, July 17."
tHThc September 12, 1975, compliance summary
for NSC reads as follows..
"NSC Items Not Furnished-Cyprus and Mid-East
War
a. Nothing was furnished, unless NSC maintains
that CIA and DC1 documents transnnitted to
iISC via NSC are 'reports provided NSC by
U.S. agencies.'
b. Nothing furnished."
19These were the National Security Agency and
the CIA.
2. Cut-off
This problem was soon dwarfed by a new tactic-
the cut-off.
On September 12, 1975, the President, or someone
using his mine, cut off the Committee from all classi-
tied information. As if that were not enough, his ac-
tion was accompanied' by it demand that we immedi-
ately turn over all classified materials from our own
internal files.21
The reason? The Congress, through this Committee,
had passed judgment, after lengthy deliberation of
the merits, on whether four words "classified" by the
Executive branch could be told to the American peo-
ple 2"_
The Executive, by its legally questionable reaction 23
had now set aside any immediate subpoena problems,
and the public hearing problems as well.
As background, a hearing on September 11, 1975,
had reviewed intelligence performance wiTh respect
to the Mid-East war in 1973. The result Was shocking.
In the words of a CIA document, "the principle con-
clusions concerning the imminence of hostilities
reached and reiterated by those responsible for in-
telligence analysis were-quite simply, obviously, and
starkly---wrong."24
That same document had verbatim quotes from two
intelligence bulletins that were moderately favorable
and from five bulletins demonstrating that intelligence
estimates were embarrassingly wrong. The two favor-
able quotes were declassified and react into the rcc-
ord.25 The five embarrassing quotes, containing the
same type of information, were not declassified by
CIA.
The Committee objected 26
The CIA returned that afternoon to report that,
after all, the five quotes could be declassified 2' How-
ever, in an apparent need not to appear arbitrary in
their earlier decision, they insisted that some 13 words
still remain classified,
The Committee debated those 13 words for over
four hours in a closed session. The CIA Special
Counsel was present and in telephone contact with
CIA Director Colby; the head of the State Depart-
ment's intelligence and Research was there; the head
of the Defense Intelligence Agency was there; and a
high official of the National Security Agency was
there. No agency was without representation, and all
had a chance to speak. Nine words were mutually
agreed to remain classified ,28 but four words were not.
The four remaining words could not reveal any
secret "sources and methods," which is the basis of
official classifications,29 because the information they
contained could have conic front any number of
sources. [n addition, the intelligence was so old by
the time it was reported that it could not reveal how
rapidly our intelligence techniques operated 30 The
Committee satisfied itself on these and other points
before taking sonic half dozer) rollcall votes on the
matter.
It is possible that never before had so much ex-
pertise and thought gone into a declassification de-
cision. For this, the Committee was accused of being
irresponsible si To protect national security. the
"President" invoked a cut-off, perhaps before the
President ever heard of what was going on.
The Committee later learned that in a biography of
Dr. Kissinger it year earlier, the subject to which the
four words referred had been spelled out in great de-
tail. So much for the validity of the classification
argument. No "high State Department official" had
been cut off from information or forced to turn over
his files as a result of that earlier publication. So
much for protecting against irresponsibility.
Police guarding Committee offices wereitistrueted
to prevent any takeover of files by the Executive, and
nothing more was heard of that.
Nevertheless, the cut-off from information struck
at the heart of Committee operations. One month out
of our live-month investigative period was lost while
the issue was negotiated. With little choice, the Com-
mittee agreed that for purposes of getting the investi-
gation under way again, future disputes would be re-
ferred to the President.31 This was agreed to on the
assurance of the president that the Committee would
have no further problem with access to information 35
It is perhaps significtiut that the day the Committee
I
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was cut oil was also the day hearings were scheduled
on the 1974 Cyprus coup. I)carings were to be focused
on the State Department's handling of intelligence,
and of Dr. Kissinger's role thercin.36 Thase hear.
ings had to be cancelled. I lowever, the Committee
located a State Department witness who was to testi-
fy about Cyprus, even in the absence of classified evi-
dence from the Executive-his name was Thomas
Boyatt.
Thomas Boyatt was the State Department officer in
charge of the Cyprus desk during the period in ques-
tion. The Committee was interested in what kind of
intelligence had been supplied to Boyatt regarding the
1974 coup against Archbishop Makarios and the con-
sequent Turkish invasion.
More important, the Committee wanted to examine
how that intelligence;-as well as Mr. Boyatt's analysis
of it, was handled by the decisionmakers at State. Mr.
Boyatt had, in fact, advised one of our staff members
that he vigorously criticized the handling of intelli-
gence at the time of the Cyprus crisis. This criticism
was embodied in a written report which was sent
through the State Department's "dissent channels." 37
[Page 25 of the Draft Final Report not available-
editor's note.]
Footnotes:
21Rex E. Lot:, Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, delivered the order:
[T]be President's responsibities for the na-
tional security and foreign relations of the United
States leave him no alternative but to request the
immediate return of all classified materials heretofore
provided by any department or agency of the execu-
tive Branch and direct all departments to decline to
provide the Select Committee with classified materi-
als, including testimony and interviews which disclose
such materials, until the Committee satisfactorily al-
ters its position."
22When Mr. Rex Lee appeared before the Commit-
tee to announce the President's cut-off of information
it became evident that the executive branch had not
given the matter equally careful consideration.
'Chairman PIKE. Mr. Lee, you say it revealed
certain foreign communications activities of the
United States. Is that your. language?
'Mr. Lee. That is what I am advised, Mr. Chairman.
'Chairman PIKE. Did you look at the language of
what the Committee released?
"Mr. LEE. I did not.
"Chairman PIKE. You are sitting here making a
statement, saying that we have released language. re-
lating to the communications activities of the U.S.
Government, and you did not even look at the lan-
guage we released."
231n his appearance before the Committee, the
Assistant Attorney General asserted that the dispo-
sition. of security information is solely within the pre-
rogative of the executive branch:
"Chairman. PIKE. You say the legislative branch
of Government had no right whatsoever to make any-
thing public that the executive branch of Government
does not want public. Is that your position?
"Mr. LEE. That is our position as far as classified
information is concerned.
"Chairman PIKE. So what you say is that in this
great democracy, one branch of Government, and one
branch ... alone may decide what is secret, and one
branch of Government ... alone may decide what
is not secret."
In support of his position, Mr. Lee did not assert
that the Congress or the Committee was bound, as a
matter of law, by Executive Order 11652, which
established the current classification system, nor did
he offer any contrary interpretation of Section 6(a) of
H. Rcs. 591, which explicitly authorized the Com-
mittee to release such information as it deemed advis-
able.
24This quotation is taken from the summary con-
clusion of a post-mortem prepared by the intelligence
community itself. The principle conclusions of the
post-mortem began as follows:
"I. There was an intelligence failure in the weeks
preceding the outbreak of war in the Middle East on
October 6. Those elements of the intelligence coot-
muni(y responsible for the production of finished in-
telligence did not perceive the growing possibility
of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its im-
minence.
"The information provided by those parts of the
community responsible for intelligence collection was
sufficient to prompt. such a warning." The Perform-
ance of the !Intelligence Community Before the Arab-
Israeli War of October 1973: A Preliminary Post-
Morten Re, port, Director of Central Intelligence
December 1973).
2ST'he two verbatim quotes which were voluntarily
declassified by the CIA were:
We continue to believe that an outbreak of major
Arab-Israeli hostilities remains unlikely for the im-
mediate future although the risk of localized fijlrtlog
has increased slightly.... 4 October IC73 (emphasis
in original).
"There are reports that Syria is peeps ing for an
attack on Israel but conclusive evidence is lacking.
In our view, the political climate in the Arab states
argues against a major Syrian military move against
Israel at this time. The possibility of a rtrore limited
Syrian strike-perhaps one designed to retaliate for
the pounding the Syrian Air Force took from the Is-
raelis ors September-l3-cannot, of course, be ex-
cluded." INR Memorandum to the Secretary, 30 Sep-
tember 1973 (emphasis in original).
261'hc first of five quotes, which was later released,
is as follows:
"Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and
Egyptian military readiness are considered to be coin-
cidental and not designed to lead to major hostilities."
DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973.
The text was the subject of an extensive discussion
among the Chairman and representatives of the CIA:
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Parmentcr, before we go into
questioning, would you tell me why you have omitted
from your sanitized statement here the actual pre-
dictions, as contained in the report from which you
read, i. e., the DIA Intelligence Summary Statement
of 3 October 1973? I want you to look at what the
original report says and tell me why we should not,
here in open session, hear what the DIA actually said
on October 3, 1973.
"Mr. PARMENTER. There are sources and meth-
ods here that we will be happy to discuss in execu-
tive session.
"Chairman PIKE. Sources and methods in that
statement?
"Mr. PARMENTER. Yes, sir. -
"Chairman PIKE. I find that incredible. How does
that differ from the one you read oil the preceding
page (INR Memorandum to the Secretary) as far as
sources and methods are concerned? . All I ant
asking you is, could you tell its why the reading of
this plain, blank conclusion by the DIA as to the like-
lihood of the outbreak of war, would reveal a source
or a method?
Mr. ROGOVIN. I will assume that the reason for
the deletion was the manner in which the informa-
tion was secured-
"Chairman PIKE. It doesn't say how the informa-
tion is secured. This is a conclusion.
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find, as I look at
what has been deleted and what has been omitted
and what has been retained and read, differs not as
to sources and methods, not as to the necessity of
protecting the sensitivity of stuff, but whether it is
in fact rather self-serving...:" Sept. 11, 1975.
27A11 five quotes are reprinted in the Mid-East War
Post-Morten in an appendix. to this report. The first
two quotes are typical:
"Syria-Egypt-The movement of Syrian troops and
Egyptian military readiness are considered to be co-
incidental and not designed to lead to major hostili-
ties." DIA Intelligence Summary, 3 October 1973.
"Egypt-The exercise and alert activities in Egypt
may be on a somewhat larger scale and more realistic
than previous exercises, but they do not appear to be
preparing for a military offensive against Israel. Cen-
tral Intelligence Bulletin, 5 October 1973." Post-
Mortem, DCi, 6 (December 1975).
280f the nine words which the Committee agreed
not to release, few of them would have revealed,
directly, any sensitive intelligence sources or methods.
Instead, in most cases, they constituted personal
characterizations, the publication of which might
have been embarrassing to the United States or to
individual foreign officials.
29"Sec. 7, In the interests of the security of the
foreign intelligence activities of the United States and
in order further to implement the proviso of section
102(d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947
(Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first session)
that the Director of Central intelligence shall be re-
sponsible for protecting intelligence sources and' meth-
ods from unauthorized disclosure . ." 50 U.S.C.
? 403 (1973).
35tH the closed session, Mr. Rogovin, Special Coun-
sel to Cite CIA, stated: "... [T]heexperts feel very
contidenr this is the bottom line that can be made
public. These are references to real time reporting.
Comm. Execs. Sess.. Sept. 11, 1975... .
31Mr. Lee referred to what he characterized as the
traditional procedures by which the Congress has re-
ceived and treated classified information, a characteri-
zation which elicited the following colloquy:
"Chairman PIKE. If it is your position that we
may never disclose information, how can we carry out
our responsibilities?
141 r. LEE. Tire santc'wuy,~Mc.`Ch~iirnrrtn, that for
decades other committees in Congress... .
"Chairman PIKE. That is exactly what is wrong,
Mr. Lee. For decades other committees of Congress
have not done their job, and you have loved it in
the executive branch. You tell tits that Congress has
brut advised of this. What does that mean? It means
the executive branch collies up and whispers in one
friendly Congressman's car or another friendly Con-
gressman's car, and that is exactly what you want to
continue, and that is exactly what I think has led its
into the muss we are in."
34-I'ext of letter from Mr. William Colby, Director
of Central intelligence, to the Chairman, elated Sep-
tember 30, 1975:
"With the approval of Cite President, I am forward-
ing herewith the classified material, additional to the
unclassified material forwarded with my letter of 29
September 1975. which is responsive to your subpoena
of September 12, 1975. This'is forwarded on loan with
the understanding that there will be no public dis-
closure of this classified material (nor of testimony,
depositions or interviews concerning it) without a
reasonable opportunity for us to consult with respect
to it, In the event of disagreement. the matter will be
referred to the President. If the President then certi-
fies in writing that the disclosure of the material would
be cletrinrental to the national security of the United
States, the matter will not be disclosed by the Com-
ntittec, except that the Committe would reserve its
right to submit the matter to judicial determination."
350n September 26, 1975, Mr. McClory described
the President's position as follows:
"We have assurance, in my opinion, of getting
everything we need, and I would hope we would find
we were getting everything we need."
36Mr.Willioru Hyland, Director of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State, was scheduled to be
the key witness on September 11, 1975. It was unfor-
tunate that the cut-off and later restrictions on testi-
mony from Foreign Service officers, prevented the
Committee from a full investigation of the Cyprus
crisis. There is a closely held State Department report
identifying the people who killed the American Am-
bassador, Rodger Davies, during that crisis, and a
public protest has perhaps not been raised because
these same murderers are now officials in the Cyprus
government. Questions related to that intelligence re-
port should, and must, be cleared up.
37"The 'Dissent Channel,' through which this ntem-
orandunt was submitted, provides those officers of the
Department of State who disagree with established
policy, or who have new policies to recommend, a
means for communicating their views to the highest
levels of the Department." letter to Chairman Pike
from Dr. Kissinger, Dept. of State, Oct. 14, 1975.
3. Silenced Witnesses
in response a new tactic was fashioned-the
silenced witness.
On September 22, 1975, Mr. Boyatt was ordered
not to tell the Committee "information which would
disclose options considered by or recommended to
more senior officers in the Department."38 The order
was added on to the existing ban on classified infor-
mation.
That was not the end. Anything Mr. Boyatt did say
would have to be in the presence of State Department
monitors, by order of the Secretary.
It is worth pointing out that this prohibition ex-
tended to more than Mr. Boyatt's options or advice.
Any information that would disclose those options
was also banned. An attempted interview by the staff,
with monitors, demonstrated that this covered almost
everything the man ever did or said 40
The State Department's order was issued in spite of
two United States laws which protect and guarantee
the right of it federal employee to provide informa-
tion to Congress.
One statute says that the right of a federal employee
"to furnish information to either House of Congress,
or to a Committee or Member thereof, may not he
interfered with or denied."61 The second law, which
directly bears on the Bogart situation, was specifically
designed to encourage candid testimony of employees
from federal agencies, including the Department of
State 42
The authority invoked by the Secretary of State
was neither "classification." nor "executive privilege,"
but a new doctrine that can bust be characterized as
"secretarial privilege."43
The Secretary of State was demanding special
treatment. If this Committee could not have received
testimony from CIA officers or FBI agents about ad-
vice or options they presented to senior officials, it
would have had no choice but to shut down.44 Over-
sight would be dead.
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Fortunately, therCIA, the FBI, and the other inlet-
ligence agencies had either not heard of "secretarial
privilege." or did not believe it existed.
On October 2, 1975, the Committee voted to
issue a subpoena for Mr. liovatt's Cyprus critique.
Dr. Kissinger responded on October H. 1975, refer-
ring to the subpoena as it "request." It was denied.
even though it was not a request, but it legal order
to produce a document 46
Time and control are, as we noted at the outset, in
the hands of those who have possession of documents.
Therefore, the Committee, more than one month
after issuing its subpoena. accepted from Mr. Boyatt
no testimony and no document, but something less.
We were given Mr. Boyatt's memo after it had been
mixed into a number of other paragraphs drafted else-
where in the State Department--ostensibly to protect
Mr. Boyatt. ft ended tip very much like the proverbial
"riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."47
This time the euphemism was "an amalgam."48
Footnotes:
38T'his order was embodied in it September 22.
1975, -memorandum from Lawrence S. Eagleburger.
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Management, to
William G. Hyland, the Department's Director of
Intelligence and Research. This directive stated that
"the following conditions will pertain to sworn inter-
views by the Pike Committee staff:
"The Department of State insists that a State De-
parnncnt representative be present during the inter
views. Should the interviewees wish to be represented
by their own legal counsel, the State Department
representative will be in addition to that private legal
counsel.
"The interviewees are to decline, by order of the
President, to discuss classified material.
"The interviewees are to decline, by order of the
Secretary of State, to give information which would
disclose options considered by or recommended to
more senior officers in the Department of State."
When Mr. F.agleburger appeared before the Com-
mittee on September 25, he stated that the orders
contained in his memorandum of September 22 were
executive privilege, nor am I asserting a secretarial
privilege."
44One example comes front reports on the Cyprus
crisis: "On the basis of a single CIA report from
Athens, the analysts, notwithstanding their earlier
concern, conveyed the impression to the polieymakers
that the world had been granted a reprieve." CIA
Post Morten on Cyprus. p. iii (la lluary 1975).
Not only were we told about the report, we were
also told about its impact on policymakcrs. -
The Committee Counsel, on Nov. 6, 1975, noted
that, "MR. DONNER . . . A subpoena is not all in-
vitation to negotiate. A subpoena is a command by a
duly authorized body of government to deliver infor-
mation."
47Winston S. Churchill, radio broadcast.
480n November 4, the Committee, by a vote of 8
to 5. agreed to the following resolution:
"Resolved by the Select Committee on intelligence
of the House of Representatives that an amalgama-
tion of Department of State documents to include in
its entirety the papers described as the Dissent Ment-
orandunt prepared by Thomas Boyatt while Director
of Cypriot Affairs in the Department, fulfills the re-
issued at the verbal direction of the' Secretary of
State.
4oThis was clearly indicated by the following ex-
change among Mr. Field, on behalf of the Committee,
Mr. Boyatt, and Mr. Hitchcock, the Department's
monitor:
"MR. FIELD. Mr. Boyatt, would you please de-
scribe for us- in detail what was done in the State
Department not with respect to classified intelligence
reports or information, but ... knowledge of any of
these events, who was involved, and what they were
doing?- Would you please describe that for its in
some detail?
"MR. BOYATT. I would like to ask Mr. Hitch-
cock's advice.
"MR. HITCHCOCK. I regret but it appears to me
that this -comes to the problem of the description of
the decision-making process which my instructions
seem to indicate is proscribed.
"MR, FIIELD. In other words, it is your position
that who was doing what in the State Department
has something to do with decision-making?
"Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes.
"MR. FIELD. We can't discuss this activity? We
can't discuss where he went to, what he did, who
he told, what that person told him in response? We
can't discuss as I understand it, whether or not he
is aware of any moves made by the Secretary of State
towards-Turkey, towards Cyprus, cither?preceding or
during this period." -
4t"The right of employees, individually or collec-
tively to petition Congress-or a Member of Congress,
or to furnish information to either House of Congress,
or to, a committee or Member thereof, may not he in-
terfered with or denied." 5 U.S.C. ? 7102 (1973).
42"Upon the request of a committee of either
House of Congress, a joint committee of Congress, or
a member of such committee, any officer or employee
of the Department of State, the United States informa-
tion Agency, the Agency for International Develop-
ment, the United States Arms Control and Disarnta-
ntcnt Agency, or any other department, agency, or
independent establishment of the United States Gov-
ernnient primarily concerned with matters relating
to foreign countries or multilateral organizations, may
express his -views and opinions, and make -recom-
mendations he considers appropriate, if the request
of the committee or member of the committee relates
to a subject which is within the jurisdiction of that
comtnittee." 2 U.S.C. ? 194a (1973).
43CItairrnan Pike, questioning Dr. Kissinger in an
open hearing on Oct. 31, 1975, stated. "i feel that you
are alleging a privilege which has heretofore been
reserved only to Presidents." Dr. Kissinger responded,
"I have deliberately not asked the;President to exercise
Innuendo of McCarthyism: The late Wisconsin
Senator at a hearing with helpmeet Roy - Cohn.
quirement of the subpoena issued by the Committee
on the 2nd clay of October, 1975.
"Provided the amalgamation is accompanied by
an affidavit signed by a person ntutually acceptable
to the Department of State and the Committee as
represented by the Chairman and the ranking min-
ority member, attesting that the aforementioned Boy-
att memorandum is contained unabridged in the am-
algamation: -
"The. adoption of this resolution shall in no way
be considered as a precedent affecting the right of
this Committee with respect to access to Executive
Branch testimony or documents,"
4. Flank Attack
the Committee for pursuing the plain truth. Will' that
opinion? the fiction of an amalgam became feasible.
Some day the full story of Cyprus may be told,
but not by this Committee.
a. An Attack. Avcrte d
if no "flank" attack was launched by the FBI
to discredit the Committee, it may have been because
one was averted by -the Committee-
On October 9, 1975, Mr. Martin Kaiser, it manu-
facturer of wiretap. equipment, testified before the
Connnittee. He indicated that the FBI bought his
equipment through a middleman. U.S. Recording,
who added a 10 percent markup. There was no justi-
fication for the markup, and it later developed that
the president of U.S. Recording and a top FBI official
were close friends.
The Committee began an investigation of U.S. Re-
cording and its FBI friends. The justice Department
and FBI later began their own probe of the same
matter.
On December 23, 1975, two and one-half months
after Mr. Kaiser testified, he was subjected to a six-
hour interview by two FBI agents. The agents were
allegedly carrying out an internal FBI investigation
regarding the agency's contractual dealings with U.S.
Recording Company.
Mr. Kaiser called the Committee to relay his con-
cern, and offered to give a statement under oath as to
the conduct of the FBI agents.
In a Committee deposition of December 30. 1975,
Kaiser claimed that the FBI agents were more con-
cerned with discrediting the Committee's inquiry
and personnel than conducting their investigation of
U.S. Recording. Ultimately, the agents had elicited
from hint a statement, written by an FBI agent, which
in some insignificant details recanted portions of his
testimony. Mr. Kaiser then repudiated that written
statement, which he had signed while agents stood
over him and thrust it in front of him.
Taking the initiative, the Committee, on December
31, 1975, released a copy of the written statement, a
full copy of Mr. Kaiser's December 30, 1975, depo-
sition, and the text of a letter to the Attorney Gen-
eraldemanding a full explanation of the entire inci-
dent S6 This was done to head off any FBI "leak" of
the statement its agents had taken while Kaiser was
Footnotes:
49Mr. Eagleburger's statement, delivered to the
Committee offices on September 24, 1975, read:
"Mr. Chairman, this is far from a hypothetical
issue. To cite but a single example, the Foreign
Service and the Department of State were torn apart
in the late 1940's and early 1950's over an issue that
raised some of the same concerns that are before us
today-the ability of Foreign Service Officers to give
to the Secretary and their other superiors their can-
did advice, secure in the knowledge tht this advice
will remain confidential. The events of those years
not only injured individuals, but also did significant
damage to the process by which foreign policy is
made. Who can be certain how many recommenda-
tions during the years that followed were colored by
memories of those experiences?"
50"I must say again, as I said in the statement
today, the issue for me right now is an issue of prin-
ciple. It is the question of our duty to protect junior
and middle-grade ollicers of the Department in the
conduct of their duties within the Department .
5t"While I know that the Select Committee has
no intention of embarrassing or exploiting junior and
middle-grade officers of the Department, there have
been other times and other committees-and there
may be again-where positions taken by Foreign
Service Officers were exposed to ex post facto public
examination and recrimination." Letter to Chairman
Pike from Dr. Kissinger, Oct. 14, 1975.
52The plain facts are that Senator McCarthy de-
stroyed the careers of State Department employees
on the basis of their beliefs and politics. This Com-
mittee never sought the political views of any federal
employee. Senator McCarthy operated without evi-
dence. This Committee sought only evidence. Senator
McCarthy forced people to testify. Mr. Boyatt wanted
to testify. McCarthyism grew out of a lack of char-
acter and integrity, and from a climate of hysteria.
Restrictive rules are no answer to such problems.
53"MR. HAYES. [O]ne of the things that has
deeply offended me . has been the immplication, the
very clear implication, that your position of protect-
ing middle and lower level Foreign Service officers
is a position of protecting them from McCarthyism...
"SECRETARY KISSINGER. With respect to the
charge of McCarthyism, I want to make clear that I
do not accuse this committee of engaging in McCarthy-
ism and 1 know indeed that the Chairman has a
On September 24, 1975, two days after written
instructions to Mr. Boyatt were issued, the Deputy
Secretary of State raised for the first time an innuendo
that the Committee's action resembled McCarthy-
ism.49 The Committee's initial reaction was to dismiss
any such inference as a temporary lapse into poor
taste.
Unfortunately, it was not a temporary lapse.
The next day, on September 25, 1975, Deputy
Secretary Eagleburger appeared before the Committee
to explain the Boyatt order. His statement again re-
ferred to State Department employees' problems with
Congress - in past tines-i clear reference to the
McCarthy period of the 1950's, as . his subsequent
testimony made clear.t0 On October 14. 1957, Dr.
Kissinger's written response to the subpoena of
Boyatt's intelligence critique again raised a reference
to McCarthyism 5t
The implication was baseless 52 as both Mr. Eagle-
burger and Dr. Kissinger ad'ntitied under questioning53
Facts seemed to make no difference-. Within days
of the innuendo being raised by Dr. Kissinger and his
reply, newspaper columns and editorials were re
porting their charges of McCarthyism 54
To the extent that such media activity may have
been inspired, directly or indirectly, by the State De-
partment, it helped erode support, within and outside
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record in this regard, and from the consictiotrs of a metro by Dr. Kissinmer informing them~for the first
many of the members that I am familiar with, I kn,'w torte. of President Nixun's decision.
the this is not the intention of Iles cornntittcr."
Ina separate minter, this Committee teas told by
"MR. IIAYFS .. I don t think there has been former CIA Director iIichard I leims of a decision to
one insum~e that yrnram cite or IKit Sur Leigh can undertake a covert-action project in Chile, h1r. I-Itlms
cite, where this Committee hus ever taken it upon had been called into Ihe Oval office and told by Presi-
itself in the tradition of tiro McCarthys . . . to, in dent Nixon. with Dr. Kissinger and Mr. John Mitchell
essence, run a purge operation, present, that he was to uridertake the project in spite
"MR. EAGLEBURGFR. Mr. Hayes, there is no of CIA reservations. Ire was also told "not to inform
implication in my statement that this Comrttee is the. other members of the Forty Conmrittec."(4
performing in the way I described the Department A pattern was emerging.
went through in the late '40's and early '50's. That Not all covert actions were generated by the CIA.
is not, sir, my point." Sept. 25, 1975. - In particular, paramilitary operations of the worst
5'tThe Now York Times editorial of October 19, type scented to come from outside the CIA. Sonic
1975, was entitled, "Nco-McCarthyism?" projects came from the President. Some projects came
"in view of th4 facts, the intelligence Committee's from his-Assistant for National Security Affairs, and
insistence that it has the right to reach into the sonic had their beginning in the Departntent of
interior of the State Department to subpoena the State,
dissenting memoranda of. junior and middle-rank of- Forty Committee records were subpoenaed to see
ficials--and to summon them 1o testify on policy if the pattern was valid.66 The subpoena was limited
issues-is clearly contrary to the national interest...," to the official document by which a covert action was
The Washington Post editorial of October 6, 1975, approved. These records were often no more than
-
e to
u
- ---.._...
o
subpoenas snowed
State Department is a relevant one, even though it nothing-because it was mostly deletions.
appears that in this case the conunittre of Congress The.deletions came in all shapes and forms. Typ-
wishing to question Mr. Boyatt apparently is inclined I ically, there would be one line left on a page, say-
to praise him far his v,iew
-o.' __._ -
s
Certainly Mr. Kissinger should ube faulted Mort his
Cyprus policy...."
Saone of the most disturbing aspects of the inci-
dent-quite aside from the propriety of interrogating
a Comrnittee witness about the Com mittee--was that
the interview was replete with FBf suggestions of pre-
judice on the part of the Conrririttee Counsel. Vigor
was apparently seen as prejudice, and by two agents
who had never met the Comnrittce personnel they
were denigrating.
In early November, about the same tune the Boyatt
problems were being resolved, the Committee moved
on from the subjects of money and what our money
buys. The third topic of our hearings was risks, and
how well those risks are controlled.
Seven new subpoenas were issued. Four were for
materials pertaining to subjects of prior hearings.
They were honored.57 The remaining three were di.
-rected to Dr. Kissinger, for materials pertaining to
upcoming hearings. Not surprisingly, those subpoenas
eve
t
SN
n
unanswered.
Once again, some background is helpful.
Two of the three subpoenas were for covert
action recommendations made by non-CIA officials,
since the CIA had already opened up the covert ac-
tion files to us. The third subpoena was for intclli-
genee records on Soviet compliance with strategic
arms limitation agreement (SALT).
When considering risks, covert actions rank as per-
haps the highest risk operations in the government,
short o? war. The law allows CIA "to perform such
other functions and duties related to intelligence af-
fecting tire National Security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct." 6o This is the
legal authority for covert action. A subcommittee of
the National Security Council, presently called the
Party Committee. has been assigned the task of di-
recting these actions.
By tracing mm~cy, the Committee came across mil-
lions of rounds -of ammunition and weapons being
purchased in the early 1970's. The purchases were
destined for a questionable military venture in a far-
off war that most Americans had probably never
heard of, much less felt they had any national inter-
est in.
The CIA's military escapade was had enough, but.
on examining documents, the Committee discovered
that the Forty Comniittee appeared not to have net or
voted on the operation. In fact, internal documents
showed that CIA and the State Departntent had
turned the project down three times in_the-previous
two years.
It turned out that during a trip overseas, Pncsi.
dent Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had met alone with the
head of a foreign government [the Shah of lrait-
editor's note). At that man's request, the Administra-
tion had involved CIA in an internal war in the leaf
of state's neighboring country [the Kurdish rebellion
in lraq--editors note). john Connally, on the verge
of Treading Democrats for Nixon," was sent back to
the foreignleader, apparently to bring him the good
news of final approval.
A month later. after training for the project had
already begun, Forty Committee tmenhers were sent
5~. Deletions
Secretary Kissinger: He was "alleging a privil g
heretofore reserved only to presidents,"
ing, "A CIA project was telephonically approved,"
or, "The Connnittee voted to approve a CIA paper
entitled [title deleted)." Ofen, if there hacl been
numerous items considered at a meeting, the deletions
themselves had keen cut and pasted together. For ex-
ample, item eight might follow item one, giving the
impression that only two items had been considered
that days/ Sometiincs there would be only one word
left on a page--"Chile"--nothing else, anywhere; but
it was still classified top secret. The information,
needless to say, was worthless 6s
Wholesale deletions were encountered in the Com-
mittee's investigation of domestic covert activities as
well.
of the "New f.cft,"tlike nearlyrollr FBI actions,Pwas
extremely well documented. The Connnittee requested
the appropriate docutments in JulysS What it re-
ceived were summaries so heavily excised as to be
unusable.
One memorandum, for example, referring only
generically to tine "Now Left," contained the sub-
heading, "Recommended Procedure," on one page,
and "Results" nn the next. The pages were otherwise
blank. Another document with the same type generic
reference, "Black Extremist Organization," was like.
wise excised in its entirety.
The Committee protested. Negotiations followed 7s
Firialfv, in mid October, -an agreement was reached
whereby less excised metros were made available to
Committee stall, at FBi hcadgmmrters. The Committee
persisted, selecting a representative mnmbcr of nerrt-
rranda to be delivered to its own offices. After some
delay, they were delivered, still exci;sccl.
Requests for the documents pertaining to FBI na-
tiomd security wiretaps letl to a similar experience.
Orre set' of docrmnents was delivered, excised bevond
use. Negotiations took place fot- almost a month.
Finally, a second set of docunrcnfs was nrovidcd. hill,
cram, without identifying rutrgets of electronic sur-
veillarice.
Footnotes:
57The following suhpoenas were honored:
1) To the Assistant to the ]'resident for Natioturl
Security Affeiis, for all minutes of Ihe National Se-
curity Council intcllihenee Committee, its Working
Group and its Economic intelligence Suhconrmitrce;
2) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, for the minutes of till meetings of
the Washington Special Action Group concerning the
Midetrst War, the Cyprus crisis, and the Portugal
coup;
3) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, for all intelligence reports furnished
to tie National Security Council between October 5
and October 28, 1973, relating to the Mideast war;
4) To the Director of Central Intelligence, for all
written requests and memoranda of requests front
the CIA to the Internal Revenue Service since July 1,
1961, for tax information or oflicial action by IRS.
5BThese subpoenas were not complied with:
I) To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs for all Forty Committee records of
decisions taken since January 20, 1965, - reflecting
approval of covert action projects;
2 To the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs for documents rc1ating to the Soviet
Union's adherence to due provisions of the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972 and the Vladivostok
agreement of 1974; and
3) T'o the Secretary of State for all State Depart-
ment documents recommending covert actions to the
National Security Council since January 20, 1961.
60The National Security Act of 1947 states:
"(d) Powers and Duties.
"For the purpose of coordinating the.intelligence
activities of the several Government departurerts and
agencies in the interest of national security, it shall
be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the
National Security Council-
5) to perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the National Security Council may from time to
time direct." 50 U.S.S. 403(d) (1973).
64"MR. FiEL.D. In the case. of the Chile operation,
could you describe very briefly how that was directed?
"MR. IiELMS. Well, there was a part-
"MR. FIELD. flow you came to be told-
"MR. HELMS. There was some activity undertaken
at the President's direction in Chile by his saying to
me that he wanted this effort made and that I was
not to inform the other members of the Forty Com-
mittee.
"MR: FIELD. in other words, in the case of the
Chilean operation, were you called to the Oval Office?
"Mr. HELMS. I was in the Oval Office.
"Mr. FIELD. You were called into the Oval Office
and who was present?
"MR. HELMS. The Attorney General a
d D
n
r.
Kissinger." Exec. Sass., Oct. 23, 1975.
as"CHAIRMAN PIKE. The question then becomes
-and Mr. Field stated this yesterday-are those op-
erations which are generally within the CIA, and in
the normal course of business, normally more respon-
sible? Do they normally get our nation into less difli-
culties than those which somebody outside of the
intelligence operation clepartrment tells there to do?"
"CHAIRMAN PIKE. Well, here we are seeking to
look at the genesis of all oversight and the degree of
control and the degree of responsibility by which
these operations get launched.
"You and i, and Mr. Dcllunra, and Mr. Treat, as
members of the Armed Services Committec, for years
heard the magic word, "The Forty Committee." it
has scemed to us as we get deeper and deeper into
this that the Forty Committee really has not been all
that relevant in the decision-making process in the
oversight process. The Forty Committee is always
held forth as being that body which exercises judicial
restraint, perhaps. in authorizing these various oper-
ations. It has seemed to me and I think most of the
members of this committee that the activities of -the
Forty -Committee have been relatively negligible in
authorizing these operations.
"We arc trying to get the information to see
whether anybody ever really argues about these
things, to see whether anybody votes no on these
things, to see whetlier the Forty Connnittee is a
reality or a rubber stamp."
67"MR. FiELD. I think this is the best example of
the kind of deletions. The items skip front item I to
item 4, Items 2 and 3 are clearly cut and pasted out
of the document. It then skips front 4 to 7. In other
words, here is a document that could conceivably be
Iwo or three or four pages long. it gives you the leel-
ing that sou have t'otten a reasonable amount of in-
fornuuion, but in fact all somebody has dznre is snip
out little sections and paste them togcthci and cunt-
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conduct, not sophisticated or legitisjsatte, itItclligence
secrets.
Other important information was withheld, such
as a Committee request for certain records of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. On
August 25, 1975, a letter was sent asking for a copy
of the Board's agendas since 1961. No written re-
sponse to that letter has even been received.
The Board interested the Committee from the stand-
point of command and control. There have been nu-
merous recommendations, for example, that a pending
executive reorganization make this group the key
command and control unit for foreign intell igence91
The Committee is still waiting for the Board's doc-
uments to be delivered, despite the fact that the rank-
ing minority member of the Committee took a per-
sonal interest in the matter. A month of his efforts
produced only a limited right to see certain informa-
tion, not the documents themselves.
Another important piece of information the Coin-
mittee requested was the names and relationships of
newsmen who worked for both the CIA and the
American news media at the same time. Congress-
man Delltmms asked for this in executive session on
August 6, t975.2 The information was re-requested
by letter on October 14, 1975, and on October 21,
1975, and on October 31, 1975, and on September 2,
1975.43
The Committee is still waiting for answers about
the newsmen. The only information it did receive
was in response to inquiries about specific news-
men, after Nye had determined from other sources that
there was a CIA connection. In fact, in one case, the
CIA denied the relationship until confronted with
irrefutable proof.
As a final example, there is a category of intelli-
gence that is sent to the Secretary of State, who then
controls its further dissemination. It is called "NODIS
CHEROKEE.1194
The Committee specifically requested NODIS
CHEROKEE information with reference to the Cy-
prus crisis in 1974. It was told none existed. Two
months later other officials revealed that the mate-
rials do exist. When the Committee went back to
State with this new information, it was simply told
NODIS CHEROKEE was not going to be given to
Us96 By then, there was no time left to issue a
subpoena. -
a. The Right Question
Perhaps the most difficult problem its developing
information about intelligence activities is knowing
the right question to ask.97
As an illustration, Committee staff obtained the
names of CIA proprietaries, after lengthy negotiations.
Some time later, staff members noticed that certain
names were not on the list. The explanation was that
those were "fronts," and we had not asked for fronts.
Nor was this sort of semantic contest confined to
staff inquiries. In one public hearing, Congress-
man Stanton and the FBI's Raymond Wannall con-
sumed more than five minutes drawing distinctions
among "surreptitious entry," "burglary," and "illegal
break-in."
Another example grew out of a Committee investi-
gation of a covert action project that had taken place
some years ago. This particular project was the sub-
ject.of unusual interest by the Committee, both be-
cause of the country involved and because it entailed
tampering in the free election of an allied nation. The
Committee's objections to the project were strong
enough that it voted to recommend to the President
that the project no longer be kept secret.
Astonishingly, while the Committee was in the
midst of objecting to this past project, CIA was ob-
taining approval for re-instituting the same type of
project in the same country. The CIA never told the
Committee about this renewal. When newspapers re-
vealed the new project, Committee staff asked the
CIA why it had not been told. The response was,
"You didn't ask the right question."
Time and again, a question had to be repeated and
variously repeated. Only then would the sought-
after facts emerge, even though the intent of the
questions had been readily apparent. The operable
ground rules were, as one official put it, "After all,
we're not.a Coke machine; you don't just put in a
quarter and expect something to come out."
Examples of the difficulty in asking the right ques-
tion are a bit like trying to prove a negative; the full
impact may not be possible to illustrate. It was,
however, the most nagging factor in attempting to
exhaust the items that deserved Congressional insight.
The significance is that it reflects an attitute which
cannot be expected to change; and, as long as that
is the case, ready access to documentary evidence and
primary source material is all the more imperative.
Footnotes:
ss"Because the investigation of the political assas-
sination allegations is incomplete . I will make
available to the Senate and House Select Committees
these [Rockefeller Commission] materials together
with other related materials in the executive branch.
.... should add, that the Senate and House Conunit-
tees are also in the process of making further investi-
gations as they have been charged with the responsi-
bility by the Congress; so there's not going to he any
possibility of any cover-up because we're giving them
the material that the Rockefeller Commission devel-
oped in their hearings...." President's News Confer-
ence, Washington, I).C., June 10, 1975.
86More than two dozen phone calls were made, by
three separate members of the staff, over a three-
month period.
s7"MR. JOHNSON. On May 9th of '73, Mr. Schles-
inger issued a directive calling on all CIA employees
to report any and all abuses by the CIA. That is a
matter of public records, there isn't any question
about that, is there?
"MR. COLBY. No, sir.
"MR. JOHNSON. And is it also a fact that by
May 21, just 11 days later, there were several hun-
dred separate reports of abuses which had been re-
ported to him?
. "MR. COLBY. There were a number of abuses. I
couldn't give you a quantitative statement.
"MR. JOHNSON. That is the report that has been
called by a variety of names, it has been called poten-
tial flap activities, or jewels. or the fantily jewels;
isn't that the report we are talking about?
"MR. COLBY. Yes."
as"On 4 September I formally requested to see the
original copy of the unsanitized 'family jewels' from
the Review Staff at CiA. I was put off. Then Seymour
Bolten, Chief of Review Staff, countered with an of-
fer to have someone sit with Mr. Pike and let him
read a version. This was unacceptable, so they further
'compromised' and offered to let Jack Boas and A.
Searle Field sit at CIA with the sanitized 'family
jewels' and ask for each sanitization as it came up.
This was also unacceptable and the access flap
started.
"Now, I have been told by Donald Gregg and Sey-
mour Bolten that 'no one will see the original, unsani-
tized family jewels.' " Memorandum to Mr. A. Searle
Field, from Emily Sheketoff, Oct. 7, 1975.
89"Pike told reporters the documents had been
turned over to him, for Committee use, 'a few minutes
before noon.
"'We have been trying to get documents with hard
evidence and a particular document including the re-
port generated by Mr. Schlesinger about alleged im-
proprieties within the CIA,' [Pike] said.
"Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger served
as CIA director for a few months in 1973 and held an
in-house investigation of the agency before he left
that post." "Pike Gets a New Report," The Washing-
ton Star, p. A-10, Oct. 11, 1975.
91From time to time, the Board has examined the
scope and effectiveness of covert action and the tech-
nical means of gathering intelligence. Staff was in-
formed of current discussions to enhance the responsi-
bilities and resources of the Board. Another concern
was the role and interrelationships of members of the
Board with the business community. Many of these
members are affiliated with major intelligence com-
munity contractors.
92"MR. DELLUMS. Describe the existence and na-
ture of the CIA secret propaganda operations in the
U.S. I would appreciate detail. flow many U.S. jour-
nalists overseas are in contact with the CIA? How
many outlets for media operations does the CIA have
in the U.S.?"
93This set of requests was for "a complete list of
all people now in the news media who have ever had
a relationship, contractual or otherwise, with the
Agency." Letter to Donald Gregg, Assistant to the
Director, CIA, from Emily Sheketoff, Oct. 21, 1975.
94"MR. HITCHCOCK. NODIS CHEROKEE is a
particularly sensitive category of NODIS messages
limited in use to relatively few embassies, covering
intelligence materials of extraordinary sensitivity,
handled virtually only by the Secretary, the President,
if he is involved, and the Chief of Mission. And virtu-
ally one-man dissemination in Washington and the
field."
96"All of them (NODIS CHEROKEE) ... contain
diplomatic correspondence between the capitals and
Washington. . . Thus, these messages do not deal
with the intelligence matters of concern to the com-
mittee and do not relate to your request of 16 Octo-
ber." Letter to Gregory Rushford from J. J. Hitch-
cock, Department of State, Jan. 5, 1976.
97"MR. PIKE. It has been my experience and judg-
ment thatif you [Mr. Colby] are asked precisely the
right.qucstion, you. will give,an honest answer. You
do net'Iad us into these areas which would help its
know'sh but the'right question was to ask. You do not
snake it easy for its to ask the right question. Anyone
who thinks you have been running hack and fortis
to Capitol hill with briefcases bulging with secrets
which you are eager to bestow upon us hasn't sat on
my side of the desk."
Congress and
the Secrecy
Dilemma
Classified information presents a classic paradox:
without it, government sometimes cannot function;
with it, government sometimes cannot function.
Spy agencies cannot publish details about their
operations. At the same time, Congress cannot fail
to report to its constituents about abuses of their
government. What it all means is that there must be
a responsible system of classification, accompanied
by an equally responsible and effective system of
declassification.
We have neither.
It has been easy to create secrets, but this govern-
ment has yet to construct an adequate way to`handle
the problems too many secrets create. We have no
Official Secrets Act-which would make it a crime
to publish secrets-because such a law would be un-
constitu tionaLl00 Therefore, the only real enforce-
ment of classification is sanctioning those who depend
on access to secrets,tol such as Congress. Congress
can be, and has been, either cut off from classified
information or convinced to receive secrets selec-
tively.
That is only the beginning of classification problems.
The law says that there are to be only three cate-
gories of classifications: top secret, secret,' and con-
fidential.' 2 In spite of this, intelligence agencies
spawn all sorts of "higher" classification, such as
"code word" or compartment" categories. Just as
often, information is simply withheld from Congress
under ad hoc arrangements. This Committee was
frequently told that, whereas its mandate was legal
authority to receive classified information, that was
not enough.
Footnotes:
10OMr. Colby stated: "I do believe that the question
of an Official Secrets Act has to be looked at in the
context of our Constitution ... I would not apply it
to the press, for example, because I think that would
run into real conflict with our Constitution."
Chairman Pike summarized the witnesses' testi-
mony as follows: "I gather that your are all agreed
there should be no Official Secrets Act or the equiva-
lent thereof, and that our Constitution simply doesn't
allow it, for openers."
toUn the course of the investigation, one official
reminded Committee staff of an anecdote involving
President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. Dur-
ing one of their visits, President Kennedy apparently
asked the Russian leader about a Soviet citizen who
had been sentenced to 23 years for running naked
through Red Square shouting, "The Party Leader is a
moron." Chairman Khrushchev allegedly replied, "He
got one year for indecent exposure, two years for
insulting the Chairman, and twenty years for reveal-
ing it state secret." .
102The classification categories and criteria used by
the executive branch are defined in Section 1 of
Executive Order 11652, as follows:
"SECTION 1. Security Classification Categories.
Official information or material which requires pro-
tection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest
of the national defense of foreign relations of the
United States (hereinafter collectively termed "na-
tional security") shall be classified in one of three
categories, namely "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Con-
fidential," depending upon the degree of its signifi-
cance to national security. No other categories shall
be used to identify official. information or material
as requiring protection in the interest of national
security, except as otherwise expressly provided by
statute."
1. Oaths and Agreements
The first matter of business between the CIA and
the Committee was a request by the Agency that all
of the staff be required to sign six pages of CIA
oaths.
These elaborate oaths stipulated, in effect, accept
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able conduct for Congressional employees with.rc-
spect to things CIA had determined were secret.
Without oaths, secrets would not be forthcoming.
The staff represents, of course. Committee members,
but the members were not asked to sign oaths. Per-
haps this was because members would not do any-
thing untoward with secrets. More likely, it was be-
cause they would protest loudly.
The Committee reminded CIA that subjecting our
employees to Executive oaths would violate the con-
cept that Congress is an independent and co-equal
branch of government.
It is the Constitutional responsibility of Congress
to control its own staff, and this is the course the
Committee followed."It required every employee to
sign a statement, drafted by the Committee, reflect-
ing the needs anti considerations of Congress, and en-
forced by Cotsgressa07
This may seem like so much posturing; but it is
important not to underestimate the significance of
firmly establishing the premise that a target of in in-
vestigation does not' lay down ground rules." As the
Agency noted, this has not been tite case in the past;
and it may be one of the reasons this investigation
had become necessary tos
The next move was to require the Committee to
enter into agreements.
The proposed agreements outlined certain cate-
gories of information so sensitive that the Committee
was to agree in advance not to see them. When this
was rejected, a modified version of those agreements
set forth proposed rules and regulations the Com-
mittee would abide by if certain classified information
were to be made available.109 These agreements also
included a proposal to "compartment" our staff.110
Compartntenting would mean dividing them up and
restricting their access to each other's work,
The Committee refused to sign. It refused even to
agree, as a matter of "understanding," that Execu-
tiverules would be binding. Such proposed under-
standings included allowing intelligence officials to
review the notes of investigators before notes could
be brought back to Committee offices. Other com-
mittees have consistently been subjected to that ar-
rangement Itt
The FBI then came forward with a six-page agree-
ment that they requested be signed before classified
information could be handled by the Committee.
The FBI proposal was even more restrictive than
CIA's. Secret documents would he made available in
special rooms at the FBI, with FBI monitors present.
Notes would be reviewed by FBI agents. After notes
had been appropriately sanitized, they would be sent
to. our offices?12
Once again, the Committee refused to sign. It did
agree orally to put all future requests for documents
in writing. The repercussions of this oral agreement
illustrate quite nicely the problem with agreements.
A few days later the Committee received a letter from
the Justice Department stating that requests for ma-
terials that had been made a month earlier by Com-
mittee members in public hearings had not been ful-
filled. Even though FBI officials had publicly agreed
to furnish the documents promptly, the requests had
not been "in writing."tta
While the Committee was negotiating an end to the
cut-off from classified information, another agreement
for handling secrets was proposed by the Executive.
The Committee was asked to agree that certain cate-
gories of information be inaccessible.[ 14 Other cate-
gories would be available only to senior members, by
means of selective briefings. Again, it was not
agreed to.
Footnotes:
t07The following excerpts are from the agreement
signed and honored by the members of the Commit-
tee's staff:
"EMPLOYEE AGREEMENT
"1. I have read House resolution 591, 94th Con-
gress, establishing the House Select Committee on In-
telligence, and the Committee's Rules and Security
Regulations.
"2. 1 understand that as a condition of employ-
ment with the Committee I am required to, and hcrc-
by agree to, abide by House Resolution 591, 94th
Congress, and by the Committee's Rules and Security
Regulations,
"4. 1 further agree that I will not divulge to any
unauthorized person in any way, form, shape or
manner the contents of classified information received
or obtained pursuant to House Resolution 591, 94th
Congress. I understood that it is my responsibility to
ascertain whether information so received or obtained
is classified. I further understand and agree that the
obligations hereby placed on me by this paragraph
continue after my employment with the Committee
has terminated."
todAs the Chairman expressed it to Mr. Rex Lee of
the Justice Department: "it means the Executive
Branch comes up and whispers in one friendly Con-
gressmans car or another friendly Congressman's car,
and that is exactly what you want to continue, and
that is exactly what I think has led its into the mess
we are in."
t'w"c. The compartmentation procedures of the In-
telligence Community have been established pursuant
to statute and National Security Council Intelligence
Directives. The simplest way for the staff to obtain
access to this compartmented material would be to
accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified
in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties
in recess to such compartmented material throughout
the intelligence Community." Letter to Chairman
Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, July 28, 1975.
ttsThe specific suggestion came in a letter to the
Chairman: "The security principle of 'coinpartmen-
tation' involving special access and information dis-
semination controls is designed to ensure that only
those individuals whbse 'need to know' have been
specifically approved by sonic higher authority, who
have been specially indoctrinated, and who undertake
special commitments to protect it are provided access
to a particularly sensitive category of foreign intelli-
Senator Henry Jackson: He was "extremely helpful" to
the CIA in its "problems" with Senate investigators.
gence sources and methods. Compartmentation assists
in the application of the 'need-to-know' principle by
ensuring that individuals are provided access to only
that information clearly essential to the performance
of their duties... .
"For your information, in addition to the Senate
Select Committee's use of the modified secrecy oath
dealing with compartmented access, the following
House and Senate committees have obtained com-
partmented access for their staffs, which was granted
after the normal briefings and signing of the secrecy
oath:
"Armed Services Committee
"Appropriations Comtnittee
"Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee"
Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA, July
28, 1975,
tttThe CIA has also informed this Committee that
all other Congressional committees leave their per-
sonal notes at Agency headquarters.
112"(3) The Department will furnish access at the
Hoover Building in Room. 4171 to those materials re-
quested:
"(a) only to the members of the Committee, where
it is determined by the Attorney General that the
materials involve peculiarly sensitive foreign intelli-
gence sources of peculiarly sensitive ongoing foreign
intelligence operations.
(c) An exception to (a) and (b) above is made
for the identities of so-called "live" informants or
potential informants as defined in the Fill Manual
of Instructions as to which no access will be fur-
nished unless the identity of the individual as an in-
formant or potential informant has already been made
known to the Committee, , . .
"(a) Before the copies of ... materials are taken
to the Committee's offices, the Bureau shall. within 24
hours of the selection, make appropriate excisions and
paraphrases of information which might, if inadver-
tently disclosed, endanger scnsitive F131 sources or
sensitive ongoing operations.
"The Committee staff may remove 'notes an `un-
screened materials bhliy if such notes are reviewed
and cleared by the Bureau under the provisions of
(6) (a) thru (e) above." Procedures, submitted by
the Department of Justice, to the House Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, Aug. 19, 1975.
1r)-You will recall that the Committee agreed to
put all requests for materials, documents, informa-
tion, and briefings in writing... .
"To date the Department has not received written
requests which encompass all of the oral requests
which were trade by the different Committee mem-
bers during the testimony of Messrs. Pommerening
and Walsh before the Committee on August 7, 1975.
Letter to Mr. Field, from Mr. Steven Blackhurst,
Department of Justice, Aug. 21, 1975.
114"l. Identities of secret agents, sources and per-
sons and organizations involved in operations which,
if disclosed, would be subject to personal physical
clanger, or to extreme harassment, or to economic or
other reprisals, as well as material provided confiden-
tially by cooperating foreign intelligence services;
diplomatic exchanges or other material the disclosure
of which would be embarrassing to foreign govern-
ments and damaging to the foreign relations of the
United States; and
"2. Specific details of sensitive intelligence methods
and techniques of collection... .
"Verification procedures will continue to be avail-
able in case of Committee questions concerning mat-
ters deleted by the Executive agency,
"Other matters, the complete confidentiality of
which the President personally certifies is essential
to the effective discharge of Presidential powers, may
be withheld." Draft Agreement, submitted to the
Committee, Sept. 28, 1975.
2. Selective Briefings
Soon after the opening hearings, staff began in-
vestigating a high-risk, secret program. A request was
made to interview the official in charge of the pro-
gram. The interview was granted. but the official
refused to talk about the program. He sat with a thick
book of documents, but he refused to let any docu-
.ntents be reviewed. They were too secret.
Intelligence officials made a proposal the Com-
mittee would hear again and again. The Chairman
and perhaps the ranking minority Member could be
briefed on the programJt7 in light of the fact that the
Committee had been told that clearances would not
be used to block the staff's work, it protested. When
the Chairman refused to be briefed alone, intelligence
officials relented and allowed staff to have access to
the information, so long as the Chairman was briefed
first.
A second example illustrates the problem with
selective briefings. The Committee inquired into a
project that included foreign military assistance via
the CIA. It was "too sensitive" to discuss with staff.
Once again, intelligence officials asked to brief the
Chairman and senior Members.
The full Committee and staff were briefed, and the
consensus was that the project had turned out to be
one of the more outrageous ventures by CIA. Sorne
months later, this same project was the subject of
a Committee action to ask the President that the full
story be made public.
A recent CIA operation in Africa followed the same
awkward course of senior Member and senior staff
briefings first, then full and prompt disclosure to the
Committee. This Committee consistently maintained
this policy that everything told to senior members
was promptly told to the full Committee.119 If Con-
gress wanted a one- or two-man Committee, it had
every opportunity to set one up. It has not clone so
to elate. Preventing this from happening de facto was,
and is, a serious challenge.tt9.
Footnotes:
117'Vhis request was a constant problem. as illus-
trated by the Chairman's remarks with reference to
subpoenaed Forty Committee materials:
"Chairman PIKE. It has been indicated to me that
I would be permitted to go down and look at these
documents. That is not satisfactory to me. We sub-
poenaed these documents for the Committee. One of
the difficulties which my predecessor had was that
lie was in possession of information which the rest
of the Committee did not have. This Chairmen has
made it clear from the outset that when we subpoena
documents for the Committee and when there is
information which the Committee feels it is essential
that the Committee-have, I am not going to look of
the information and deprive the rest of the Conlntit-
tee of it."
tt9"Chnirman PIKE. I have two problems with that
verification situation. ' . - .. -
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We have had this situation time and time again
in.the House of Rept-csentatives where the members
of a committee, and the members of the house are
asked to trust the discretion of the Chairman, or of
the Chairman and the ranking Member.
"1 have a great deal of problem with the concept
that I should be privy to information which is with-
held from the rest of the Committee. That is No. 1."
tt9:lfntelligence agencies are constantly maneuvering
to keep information from Congress:
"MEiMMORANDUM FOR
THE RECORD 23 February 1973
FROM: [deleted], CHIEF, WESTERN 1tEMIS-
PIiERE DIVISION
RE: MEETING WITH SENATOR JACKSON
TO DISCUSS HOW CIA SHOULD
HANDLE INQUIRIES FROM SENATOR
CHURCH'S SUBCOhlMilTTEE ON MU1:
TiNATIONAl. CORPORATIONS, IN RE-
GARD TO CIA INVOLVEMENT WITH
ITT IN CHILE IN 1970.
"TOPICS DISCUSSED. Senator Jackson's advice
to us was as follows:
"I. Senator Jackson felt strongly that the first
order of business for CIA in terms of handling the
basic issues that were involved in the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corpora-
tions asking the Agency about its activities in Chile
in 1970, was to discuss the problem with the White
House. (Jackson) was quite explicit that this con-
versation should be carried out by Schlesinger and
that he should talk with no one other than President
Nixon and Mr, flaldermmn (sic). The Senator stressed
repeatedly that the Church Subcommittee on Multi-
national Corporations had focused on ITT only in
the sense that this was the top of the iceberg. .
"2. Senator Jackson felt that the ultimate solution
to the problem facing the Agency ... could be found
in getting Senator McClellan, acting on behalf of
Senator Stennis, to call a session of the CIA Over-
sight Committee. This Committee would then look
Into the nature and scope of CIA's activities in Chile
in 1970. Once that was accomplished, the Oversight
Committee would handle the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. Senator Jackson repeatedly made the comment
that in his view the CIA Oversight Committee had
the responsibility of protecting the Agency in the
type of situation that was inherent in the Church
Subcommittee. As a result of this conviction, Senator
Jackson would work with the Agency to see that we
got this protection .
"4. Once the Oversight Committee had heard the
details provided on the CIA's involvement, `the
Agency could send a brief statement to the Church
Subcommittee staff members in response to the ques-
tions which they had previously posed to CIA. Senator
Jackson agreed that the following statement would
be perfectly adequate for this purpose:
"'The testimony of Mr. Helms on 5 and 7 Febru-
ary before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
clearly established that CIA neither gave to nor re-
ceived from ITT funds for use in Chile in 1970 for
support of political parties. In addition, Mr. Helms'
testimony brought out the fact that there were no
joint action programs established in the context of the
1970 political developments. in Chile. CIA regards
Mr. Helms' testimony on this topic to be accurate
thus, no further elaboration is planned.'.. ,
"9. Coinnrent. Senator Jackson was extremely help-
ful throughout 23 February on the issue of the
Agency's problems with the Church Subcommittee,
Senator Jackson is convinced that it is essential that
the procedure not be established whereby CIA can
be called upon to testify before a wide range of
Congressional committees."
3. Special Restrictions
Committee Members are not the only object of se-
crecy arrangements proposed by intelligence officials.
Other Members of Congress apparently cannot be
trusted with secret information about the government
they govern.
Time and again, staff was told that it would be
difficult to turn over documents becauseuf Rule 11.
Rule II is-a House rule that allows members of the
House of Representatives to have access to all "com-
mittee hearings, records, data, charts, and files :.."120
.The Committee was asked to sign letters affirming
that it would not turn over any documents to another
Member of the House. The Committee was eventu-
olly asked to pass it Resolution to that effect. Some-
times this acted to delay the forwarding of documents.
The primary result was that most materials the Com-
mittee received in the closing months of its investi-
gations were "on loan."t2t
The concept of loaning materials to the Committee
had other advantages for the intelligence community.
The first advantage is the right to possession and
control of tinat disposition of our files. Without a
loan arrangement, stall was told that certain papers
could not be provided.
The other advantage in loaning documents per-
tained to a possible court contest over release of clas-
sified information. If release of it document were
going to be legally disputed, the Executive clearly
wanted to be in the position of having legal possession
of that document. Unfortunately, release or publica-
tion of Committee information raised far more imme-
diate, and practical, problems.
Footnotes:
t20Specifically, House Rule Xf (2) (e) (2) provides
that:
"All committee hearings, records, data, charts, and
files shall be kept separate and distinct from the con-
gressional office, records of the Member serving as
chairman of the committee; and such records shall be
the .property of the House and all Members of the
House shall have access thereto."
t2tThe standard caveat, which accompanied all ma-
terials turned over to the Committee, was adopted
front it letter of Sept. 30, 1975:
"This is forwarded on loan with the understanding
that there will be no public disclosure of this classi-
fied material (nor of testimony, depositions or inter-
views concerning it) without a reasonable oppor-
tunity for us to consult with respect to it." Letter to
Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA.
4. The Release of Information
One of the most troubling problems the Committee
faced was what information to release and what proc-
ess to follow in making its decision. A corollary
problem was what to do about unauthorized release
of information.
Existing standards for classifications are vague,
arbitrary, and overused. Almost anything call be a
"source" or "method" of intelligence-which are the
primary criteria for foreign intelligence classifica-
tions. As a result, the sources or methods by-line is
used to classify items that have practically no bearing
at all on intelligence, but was extremely embarrass-
ing.t23
Overuse of classifications is inevitable when, by the
Executive's most recent estimate, sonic 15,466 persons
can classify information.t24
The difficulty 'is thatno one in Congress can de-
classify. The Executive Branch claims exclusive and
sole jurisdiction. This gives an administration the
power to use the classification system in a manner
that can result in manipulation of news by declassify-
ing information that can be used to justify policy,
while maintaining classification of information that
may lead- to contrary conclusions. Another aspect to
be recognized is that classification can hide conduct
from the American people that is well-known to the
foreign country involved. Castro knew of the assas-
sination attempts, the Cambodians knew they were
being bombed, but the American people, whose gov-
ernment was engaging in these practices, were not
aware of the activities because of the classification
system.
The dilemma arises when a Congressman or Com-
mittee receives information which one or the other
decides should be brought before the people they
represent. This Committee faced that problem and
did not reach a satisfactory solution.
The procedure followed by the Committee was
that when it decided to consider making public cer-
tain information taken directly from classified docu-
ments or testimony, it would give appropriate execu-
tive branch officials 48 hours' notice. It would then
allow those officials to appear before the Committee,
in closed session, and present arguments against re-
lease of all or part of the information. If no agree-
ment could be reached, the materials at issue would
be forwarded to the President. They would be re-
leased unless the President asserted, personally and
in writing, that release would be "detrimental to the
national security."t26
The Committee used this process with three sep-
arate pieces of information. All three were covert
CIA projects. Their release was proposed in sep-
arate motions placed before the Committee by Con-
gressman Johnson.
The initial Johnson motions were introduced in
November 1975, aridvoted down by the Committee,
with five Members not present. Some weeks later, the
motions were made again, with all but one Member
present, and approved by the majority. 128 This began
the release of information process.
The next step was to draft a short statement out-
lining the significant aspects of each covert opera-
tion.129 The statements were forwarded to the Special
Counsel to the Director of Central intelligence, with
tin accompanying letter notifying him of an oppor-
tunity to present the Intelligence Community's views
in a hearing three days later.
The Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Colby,
appeared, accompanied by appropriate officials, to
present any specific objections lie might have. His
response was specific, but sweeping. Ile objected to
everything, no matter how it was worded, and no
matter how impossible it would be to identify a
country, a source, or an operational method.t3t
Mr. Colby's response seemed to end any good faith
effort to work out mutually acceptable release of in-
formation, but the Committee made one more effort.
The three statements were rewritten, making them
even more general than before. Names of countries
were taken out; only gross dollar totals were used;
and innumerable generic descriptions were inserted.
In one case, far less remained than had appeared in
newspaper articles attributed to high executive branch
officials.
In a hearing the next day, Mr. Colby still objected
to the release of anything.132
This meant that all the materials had to be for-
warded to the President for a decision on whether
release would be detrimental to the national security.
The President, of course, turned to CIA for guidance.
More than three weeks later, the Chairman was
informed in writing by the President that the Com-
mittee could not implement its decision to release
the two statements,
Incredibly, the President's letter was classified
"secret," The secret stamp was unnecessary, because
there were no facts at all about the covert: projects
in his letter. The types of projects at issue were not
even mentioned, The letter was simply a rhetorical
pronouncement of ho}k important confidentiality is,
and how telling the American people what their gov-
erntkent is doing in these matters would harm our
best interests.
It should be noted that one of the items that al-
legedly would harm this nation's security if made
public had already been made public--by Dr.
Kissinger.t34
Footnotes: -
123A_ typical example was the CIA refusal, at
first, to declassify part of the 1973 Mid-East War
Post-Mortem. That position produced the following
exchange with the CIA Special Counsel:
"Chairman PIKE. Mr. Rogovin, I find, as I look at
what has been deleted and what has been omitted
and what has been retained and read, differs not as to
sources or methods, not as to the necessity of protect-
ing the sensitivity of stuff, but whether it is in fact
rather self-serving, or whether. it is in fact rather dam-
aging."
124This estimate was provided to the Committee by
the Interagency Classification Review Committee,
which was established by President Nixon in Execu-
tive Order 11652, which also established the security
classification system now in force....
1261n the event of disagreement, the matter will be
referred to the President. If the President then certi-
fies in writing that the disclosure of - the material
would be detrimental to the national security of the
United States, the matter will not be disclosed by the
Committee, except that the Committee would reserve
its right to submit the matter to judicial determina-
tion." Letter to Chairman Pike, from Mr. Colby, CIA,
Sept. 30, 1975. -
t28The votes were 10-2, 10-2, and 10-2.
t29The shortest statement was two pages; the long-
est was 14 pages.
13iMr. COLBY. Mr. Chairman, we have several dif-
ficulties with this report. We looked through it. We
tried to identify what things might be released and
what things might not. There are a few odd sentences,
that might be released."
132"Mr. NELSON. . , I consulted with the Di-
rector. It Js his position that he would object to the
declassification of either of these papers as' I de-
scribed them to him over the phone."
134"Tokyo-U.S. assistance prevented a takeover by
Soviet-backed elements in Angola in July, a senior
official aboard U.S. Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger's plane said en route to Tokyo yesterday."
Washington Post. A-17, Dec. 8, 1975.
This was the first administration acknowledgement
of U.S. involvement in Angola.
"Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's admission
that the United States is trying to be helpful to some
neighbors of strife-torn Angola is a surprise only
because Kissinger has openly acknowledged it."
Jeremiah OT.eary, "U.S. Admits Indirect Aid to
Angola," Washington Star, A-4, Dec. 10, 1975. -L
Approved For Release 2006/07/24 CIA-RDP88-01314R000300300010-9 -