THE STATE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE TODAY BY STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300250008-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 10, 1979
• Content Type: SPEECH

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THE STATE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE TODAY
by
Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
10 April 1979
For the past several years, the Central Intelligence Agency and
the other agencies of the American Intelligence Community have been the
subject of almost daily speculation, accusation, analysis, and advice.
There seemed to be something for every appetite: the alleged abuses, the
failures, the intrigue, the good old days. If the thoughtful observer
.trying to evaluate the state of American intelligence were not confused,
it would be a surprise.
Very little has been written about the significant current of change
which has affected American intelligence during these same years. Change
stemming from the investigations of the mid-70's which have increased
markedly the public's interest in intelligence activities; from the
increasingly legalized context in which intelligence activities are now
conducted; from the near revolution in the process by which intelligence
is collected; and, finally, from the new requirements placed on intelli-
gence agencies as a result of the United States' changing perception
of its role in international affairs. An appreciation of these forces
and the inevitable affect they are having on intelligence lends perspective
and balance to the admixture of fact and fiction; confirms the strength
and resilience of the institution which is the eyes and ears of this
nation overseas; and underscores the magnitude of the Intelligence
Community's achievement in adapting successfully to a totally changed
operating environment.
The New Openness: Progress and Pitfalls
The congressional investigations of 1974 and 1975 brought American
intelligence activities under more public scrutiny than has ever been the
case for a major intelligence ornanization in the history of intelligende.
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Both the public and the Intelligence Community benefitted substantially
from those investigations. But an unfortunate side effect was the
destruction of much of the confidence and support the American public has
traditionally had for its intelligence agencies. While that support and
confidence, is beginning to return gradually,
some individuals continue to
suspect-that intelligence organizations maybe still engaged in the kinds of
activities for which they were criticized. They are not. Corrective action
was necessary and it has been taken. Over time, openness and increased
visibility will confirm that fact.
In addition there is now a series of oversight procedures which
serve as an important check on intelligence. In the Executive Branch, it
begins with the President himself taking a direct and personal interest
in what we are doing, and continues with an Intelligence Oversight Board
to which the public has direct access. In the Legislative Branch, two
committees of the Congress are empowered to conduct intelligence oversight
exclusively.
Greater openness also means that more of the intelligence product
can be passed directly to the public through regular publication of
unclassified analytic work, adding importantly to understanding of key
global problems like terrorism, economic trends, military spending,
nuclear proliferation, and energy. It also permits more intel-ligence
analysts to be able to speak in public and to participate in symposia and
academic conferences. Access to information will enable the public to
understand what intelligence agencies are doing. Greater understanding
plus the assurance that oversight controls exist and are working will
rebuild public confidence.
However, a controlled openness policy cannot be considered a license
to disclose properly classified information. Today, leaks are a very
serious problem. The media seems ready to publish any leaked information,
believing wrongly that they can evaluate the national security equities
of doing so. But those equities are seldom apparent. The media sometimes
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grind; that it is not axiomatic that if something has been leaked to
.them, the KGB must also have it; and that the effect of not being able to
protect sources of information. is the same for the Intelligence Community
as it is for the press--we lose them. For the media that may mean the
loss of a story; for intelligence it could mean the loss of a life.
No foreign individual or intelligence service, will entrust lives,
or information to us unless we can keep them secret. It is impossible to
ferret out information in a closed society like the Soviet Union if what
we do and how we do it is known. It is impossible to operate at all if the
identities of American intelligence officers are systematically revealed.
Unauthorized disclosures not only reduce our capability to produce
intelligence on which policymakers can base sound decisions, but also
damage the long term ability of this country to know what is going on
around it. And, in a world where more societies are closed than open,
the United States cannot long survive in ignorance. Legislation is badly
needed to stop this epidemic of damaging disclosures before it is too
late.
The New Legalization: Dilemmas and Contradictions
Protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosures is a complex and difficult legal process. There is a natural
tension between the effective and impartial administration of criminal
justice and the successful prosecution of intelligence. Criminal justice
requires that all relevant information be available to the prosecution
and the defense. And yet, national intelligence interests often require
that evidence derived from intelligence sources be protected against
disclosure. The resulting dilemmas are painful and not infrequent.
Are these real dilemmas? Yes. When the Attorney General must drop
the prosecution of a criminal case in order not to disclose intelligence
secrets, as occurred recently in the case against two ITT officials, it
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does not seem to recognize that l eakers often `have a personal
 is a genuine dilemma. There would be no dilemma if on the scale of
national ..values law. enforcement_ interests 'were always superior to intelli-
gence interests. Intelligence information would always be brought forward
as needed. Or if law enforcement interests were always subordinated to
intelligence interests, any criminal proceeding would be terminated
should any intelligence information be threatened with disclosure. .
Clearly neither view is correct. The values are variable and cannot
be ordered in advance.
Each case must be separately judged on its
merits, and intelligence interests must be placed in perspective with
other interests. such as justice and precedent, when deciding whether and
on what basis to proceed with prosecution. The Attorney General has the
discretion to decide whether a prosecution is warranted and on what basis
to go forward.
However, the Director of Central Intelligence has a role in influencing
that decision whenever intelligence interests are concerned. In the
first place, he is responsible for ensuring that no relevant information
is withheld from the Attorney General. Access to relevant information,
regardless of its classification, should not be a point of dispute.
Beyond this, the Director is responsible for giving the Attorney General
an estimate of the potential impact of the public disclosure of intelli-
gence information that may be relevant to a criminal prosecution. This
kind of an estimate is something the Attorney General must have to make
informed decisions and to properly weigh the consequences of those
decisions. If it should happen that the Director concludes that the Attorney
General has come to the incorrect balance, then he must appeal to the
President to decide whether the best interests of the United States favor
prosecution or not. In brief, the Director cannot frustrate a prosecution
simply-by withholding secret information from release. That choice lies
with the Attorney General and the Director must appeal that choice if he
does not agree with it.
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The foregoing takes on greater force when one considers the neces-
sities of proof under some of the basic criminal statutes which are of
special concern to intelligence agencies. Suppose, for example, that a
government employee is arrested attempting to deliver a classified
document to a foreign agent, and the delivery is frustrated by the
arrest. A crime has been committed under the espionage laws. Yet
prosecution would exact an extraordinary price. The government would be
required to show that the information in the document was of enough
significance to materially injure the national security if it had
fallen into the foreign government's hands. That burden of proof
would likely require that the document be offered as evidence and that a
government witness confirm its accuracy. The net result would be that the
trial proceedings would have succeeded in doing exactly what the defendant
was being tried for attempting but failing to do, that is, transmit and
disclose the information. Moreover, the information's accuracy would
have been verified in the bargain. A spectacle of this sort would not
be pleasant to contemplate for those who had to struggle with a decision
to prosecute.
Another well publicized problem in trial proceedings is the last
minute discovery blitzes that have been favored by defense counsels in
some espionage cases, the recent case of the United States versus Kampiles
for example. It is unfortunately true that whenever the CIA is involved,
it is inviting for a defense attorney to hope to collapse the prosecution
by pressing for more disclosure than the CIA is likely to be willing to
provide. Hence, the evolving "gray mail" approach against which there
are no easy countertactics.
Another set of legal dilemmas we face centers on the many rules and
regulations which have recently been applied to intelligence agencies,
especially those to protect the privacy of American citizens. Because
they are new and often complex and because they must be interpreted in
the light of sometimes unique activities, they have impacted heavily
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 on the speed and flexibility with which intelligence agencies have
traditionally been able to operate. Often questions of Constitutional
Law have been involved which have required both the Attorney General's
and the CIA's legal staffs to think through issues in the midst of an
operational crisis.
While we applaud and, in most instances, can adapt to these efforts
to ensure the constitutional and privacy rights of Americans, the issues
are complex and must be assimilated by intelligence officers in the field who are
not attorneys. The uncertainty as to whether all applicable legal standards.
are met can lead to overcaution and a loss of initiative. In fact,
today, our officers are almost forced to avoid operations which could
involve US persons. This in turn could reduce response flexibility in
crisis situations when the lives and property of American nationals may
be involved.
The Revolution in Intelligence Collection: Opportunities and Challenges
The third factor of change that the Intelligence Community faces stems
;from intelligence collection technology. In addition to open sources, basically there are
three ways of acquiring knowledge about other countries: by photographs from
satellites or airplanes, by intercepting signals that pass through the
air from military equipment or communications systems and by the tradi-
tional spy.
The capabilities in imagery and signals intelligence are burgeoning.
Interestingly, rather than denegrating the value or need of the tradi-
tional spy, technical capabilities have increased his importance.
Technical intelligence collection generally reveals what happened in the
past. But that often raises the questions, why did that happen and what
may happen next? Fathoming the "whys" and the "whats" requires uncovering
people's concerns, the pressures which influence their decisions, and
'their intentions. This is the unique forte of the human intelligence
agent and is indispensable if we hope to be able to anticipate future
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mation in the mast-effective, least exoensfve;: lea t' isTEy waya.^ his" mar sound-'
l ogica. and s cipl e, but because technical ca{ a6T.l i ti es. are growl ag s4 ra~ai d1y
intelligence collection can no longer be managed in the traditional
trends in world affairs. The challenge here,then,is to pull together our
Intelligence is a large bureaucracy spread over a number of different
government agencies and?departments, each with its own priorities and
concerns. It has taken some fundamental restructuring to accommodate
these changes. Since the National Security Act was passed in 1947, the
Director of Central Intelligence has been authorized to coordinate all
national intelligence activities. However, until just over a year
ago, he has never had adequate authority to do so. The President, in
Executive Order 12036 of January 1978, strengthened the Director of
Central Intelligence's authority to direct all collection activities.
The Order authorized setting up a tasking office--a single locus which
can direct the right mix of collection assets on an intelligence question
to find the right answer. The intent of this tasking organization is not
to tell other agencies how to do their business, but to ensure that each
of the different collection systems, some operated by Defense, others by
the CIA, etc., are used to best advantage Whenever they are neea-ea:-
The same Executive Order gave the Director of Central Intelligence
authority for the first time to put together a single intelligence
budget. This has helped enormously in assuring the complementarity of
photographic, signals, and human collection assets and efforts. Those
changes in budgeting and in collection are still evolving, but are coming
along well and are making a substantial. difference in the mangement of
intelligence.
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 The ForeignPoligy Context - New Demands
The final challenge facing the Intelligence Community today stems
from the changing perception of the US role in world affairs which is
moving from an interventionist outlook to one where the constraints on
our ability to influence events in other countries are more widely
recognized and accepted as normal.. This is not a transition toward
isolationism,. but rather a gradual emergence from our post-Vietnam
aversion to international interaction to a more reasoned, realistic view
of the world. Clearly, we must continue to play a major role, but
circumstances now require us to gauge more carefully what that role
should be.
How much more difficult it is to know which side of a conflict we
should support. Traditionally we often favored those whom the Soviets
were agalns t Some of our choices today are not that simple.. In a number off'
!instances-just last year;-we found two communist regimes fighting e--ach other -'
Neither was an ideal candidate for our support, even if, the Soviets were
supporting one or the other.
loigreover, -it' is -also not nearly so-,cTear -today -that--it-is necessary- for- the---- --
United States to take sides on all international issues even if-the soviets are-`.___
pressing for advantage. The consequences
of a nation succumbing to Communist influence are not always as irreversible
as we often thought. Indonesia, Sudan, Egypt, and even Somalia shook off
that influence to return to independence.
Even when we want to support some nation, there are problems in
providing that support which did not exist a few years ago. One stems
from the revolution in international communications. International
actions are instantly communicated around the globe, instantly analyzed,
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 and instantly judged. That judgment--often approbation
even though often coming from second or third order powers, can influence
even major powers.
In such fora as the United Nations each country uses its one vote
and the major powers often find themselves in the minority. Whether the
lesser developed countries join or fragment on a specific issue, their
independence makes consensus difficult.
These realities do not mean that we are impotent in world affairs.
They mean that the leverage of our influence, while still considerable,
must be exercised more intelligently if it is to be effective. We must
not be satisfied with putting a finger in the dike, but instead must be
able to interpret the underlying forces which can be influenced and
driven over time and as a consequence anticipate rather than just react
to events. For intelligence this requires a vastly expanded analytical
capability.
Thirty years ago the primary concern of American intelligence was
keeping track of Soviet military activities. Today threats to our
national well-being are not limited to actions which the Soviet Union
could take, nor to purely military concerns. Certainly, intelligence
interests continue to encompass the military--the Soviet military buildup
continues; recently wars have been or are being fought in Chad, the
Sahara, Rhodesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Yemen--but today our field of
interest has broadened to include politics, economics, food, population,
narcotics, terrorism, the health of foreign leaders, and energy reserves,
to name just a few. There is hardly an academic discipline, hardly an
area of the world about which national leaders do not need good information.
. The need to deal with these problems has reshaped our approach to
analysis. In military analysis the emphasis is on fact finding and
,Ntic.
comparison. Generally, military commanders want to know4size, character-
istics, and location of the enemy. What are his capabilities? But when
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 analyzing.political and economic issues, we are
The analyst requires different analytic techniques., a different mind-set.
Over the years, with the emphasis on factual military analysis, the
Intelligence Community grew accustomed to consensual analysis frying to
ensure the Defense Intelligence Agency, the CIA, the Army, Navy, and Air
Force all agreed with an analytic conclusion. A consensus regarding
military capability is not bad because, for example,f one `Ancy es?imates~'-` _Ce
a bomber's range is 1,000 miles and anotier estimates (}~i0 miles; l`;a0!1- --~
miles is probably a reasonable working estimate.
But with political or economic intentions, consensual analysis can
be dangerous. If two analysts look at the evidence and one concludes the
Ov
enemy will attack on Monday and A- Friday, the one absolutely wrong
conclusion would be Wednesday. If Monday is sent forward as the
assessment, then, beside the reasons that Monday wasselected must appear the TT
reasons _ why. Fridayseemed only somewhat less reasonable. Then the ~ecisiori~nakern
compare the two points of view, add whatever additional insights he may
have and reach a reasoned conclusion of his own based on a complete
evidentiary base.
This change in analytic emphasis and technique has meant that the
Director of Central Intelligence, as the President's chief intelligence
advisor, and the single signatory on all National Intelligence Estimates,
must be more deeply involved in the analytic process than heretofore
so that key decisions on analysis and estimates do not flounder in search
of the least common denominator. That has also meant that he has an
increased responsibility to ensure that dissenting views do come forward.
In the past, dissenting comments appeared in the footnotes of estimates
and often were based on different assumptions than the majority opinion
in the text. The two could not be meaningfully compared. Today. Minbrfity-
views-are placed side by side in the text with the Estimate's views so they can
be easily compared.
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 The essence ofpolitical and economic intelligence, as opposed to
military intelligence, is that differences of view be emphasized rather
than precise predictions made. No one will believe a prediction that a
(OUR ~~tf [ occur: n T nays , but a thorot gY e i cats o o
iup _ - seems just over the horizon can be helpful. Good economic and
political analysis lays out those forces pushing in one direction and
those pushing in an opposite direction. Then, the decision maker can
weigh the factors on both sides and reach his own conclusion.
SUMMARY
The adjustment which the Intelligence Community is having to make
to the changes I have described has not been an easy or a placid process.
It is especially difficult for the intelligence professional to-adjust to
an environment of greater openness. Secrecy, as I have noted, is a life
or death ingredient of intelligence. It is also difficult for the
professional to attempt to turn his spies into lawyers and in frustration
to call them off from actions that are logical, desirable and ethical simply
because of legal technicalities that stretch one's credulity. It is just
its difficult to adapt the ingrained habits of each of the collecting
mechanisms to see themselves as part of a team effort which requires
coordination and direction. And it is difficult to shift analytic talent
away from current and factual matters and onto long run and interpretative
questions when all of the incentives and rewards have long been with the
former. It is especially difficult to achieve these adjustments in a
period of generational change. The veterans who signed into this
exciting profession in the post-World War II days are retiring. The
mantle is passing to an equally capable new generation. Still, the
passing of this baton is bound to be characterized by distress at seeing
one era end and another begin; but more so when the waters ahead are new
and unchartered, and hence point, when viewed from the past, to an
uncertain future.
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 Yet the intelligence arm of our government today is strong and
capable, even as it undergoes substantial change. It is. strong because.
that original generation of professionals was superbly capable and is*
leaving behind a great heritage. It is strong because their successors
are first class also. It is a great tribute to the youth of our country
that some of the best of them have seen through the shallow criticisms
and distortions and have joined the ranks of the intelligence community.
Even in the days of greatest public abuse, the recruitment of top-notch
young people did not flag. And so we are going forward with good
people; with a strong foundation of public and legal support; with ever
expanding technical ingenuity characteristic.of America; and with superb'
analytic talents free to apply their intellect and imagination to all
manner of important issues. We are ahead of the Soviets in all these
dimensions. We are setting the pace for other free world intelligence
organizations. The fact that the rate of evolution makes us uncomfortable
is normal. Too much has been made of it.
Out of the present metamorphasis is emerging an-intelligence com-
munity where the legal rights of Americans and the salutary constraints
and controls on intelligence operations are balanced with a continuing
need to be able to garner information. The transition has not been easy
nor are we there yet. But we are moving rapidly and surely in the right
direction. Our goal is to construct a new model of intelligence,
uniquely American model which will conform to the laws of the land and
will reflect American ethical principles and ideals. _ _
Thus ; tE1e Nation's Intel li gence Communi ty- i s earning. a return of public
-confidence. This Community has_-served,-Et continuing to serve the needs
of our country superbly. It does this because of the faithful and capable
professionals who dedicate their lives to producing the best intelligence ever
for our Country. They deserve public approval and encouragement. They, indeed,
have mine.
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