WHY IT COULDN'T BE THE KGB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000300180012-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: February 6, 1971
• Content Type: NSPR

1'e-b 19'(1
Approved For,Release 2004/10/28: CIA-RDP88-01314R0003001 OA 2~ 1,-
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`Perhaps the most plausible of all oven inserted by the forger in an
explanations so far offered of the attempt to discredit Khrushchev
origins of the ' Khrushchev and, with him, the still surviving
memoirs. is that which traces it to -members of the Soviet leadership,
is the factual' evidence of the meet-. previous article. publicatioirfn the Nest, and fdh~re-
ing between staff members of But if anti-Stalinism was the transmission hack to Russia. this
"Time-Life" concerned with the "chief concern" of the people re- powerful demand that the Soviet
0 - C,(. I-cc "
material on the West. There is the cern of the "ini;['driial opposition" in closed; and the Soviet peoF7tc
KGB's sinister image, which makes Russia, but no `one has seriously hemmed in, on the grounds th,,~at
it easy to blame anything udder- suggested that this inchoate and any extensive -lifting of travel re-
hand or mysterious that emanates unorganised group of loosely con- striations might promote the free
from the Soviet Union on that bale- nected individuals is responsible . circulation 'of political ideas. th:,lt
ful organisation. There is, `finally, for the memoirs (and if anybody would rapidly lead to the over-
the motive, indeed a whole series were to suggest it, this would again throw of the exist.ing~, system.
of motives which, if not individual]y point to a forgery rather than to The theme of open borders is
convincing, are. impressive eby Khrushchev). developed in the book at every con
people who do accept the view that hand, the ' chief concern of the
much of the material is not genuine Western propaganda organisations
Khrushchev have to account for -and that means primarily.
it- -in some way, and it is American. organisations - which
much easier to blame it on the seek to influence the formation of
KGB than on the ('IA. public opinion in the Soviet Union
? ? he role played by Victor Louis from outside. Vast amounts of
leaves ho doubt that the KGB
did have a part in the operation money are spent on their activities,
.but this does not mean that ii for reasons with which few people
.was responsible for tho whole book. in the Nest would quarrel. Most of
The memoirs contain just too much us recognise Stalinism as all evil,
material which goes against every- , and we have good reason to fear
thing that the KGB stands for. that its revival in Russia in any
The KG13is the inner fastness cf form, or the arrival of neo-
the Soviet police state, a huge Stalinism, would not only do much
organisation with tentacles stretch damage to the people of the Soviet
ing into every area of Soviet lift'. Union but might well plunge the
Like every bureaucracy, it has a world back to the darkest days of
vested interest in its own self- the Cold War-or worse.
preservation, which, in this case, In that sense, therefore, the
means also the preservation of Western propaganda organisations
Stalinist aspects of the Soviet which use their resources to rein-
system. It attracts to its rants force the anti-Stalinist trends that
some of the most conservative and already exist naturally in the
authoritarian elements of Soviet Soviet Union-and that are often
society, who find within it thesco;. , suppressed by the KGB--are work-
-for indulging in Stalinist vices that nag, ultimately, for the benefit both
is being gradually restricted ]n of the Soviet people and of the
other areas of activity. Therefore West, in the common interest of
individuals and as an institution,
is anti-Stalinism.
Yet whatever else may be said
of the Khrushchev memoirs, re
one could deny that the thrust.
of the book is wholly?find sharply
anti-Stalinist. In the words of
Edward Crankshaw's introduction,
"The chief concern of the person,
or persons, responsible for re-
leasing these reminiscences to the
West--it certainly appears to be
one of Khrushchev's chief concerns
-was tp counter -the current
attempts to rehabilitate Stalin."
The anti-Stalinist emphasis of th.e
memoirs is so obvious that it has
been stressed by virtually every
reviewer. Khrushchev's occasional
asides that pay tribute to Stalin
do nothing to weaken this
.,,JS is wucr~ rut l Jt1 cvlllvs --borders are kept closed, is some-
fn. In so far as anti -SfhIT-" m in thing that neither Khrushchev nor
the Soviet Union is ultimately a the KGB could be imagined as
factor for'' the maintenance of saying. The remark is, 4ndecd,
peace, the CIA would see it as one
of its functions to foster this by vaguely reminiscent of a point lie
every means available to it-and, once made in a public speech, but
sometimes, to create the means, here, as elsewhere, the forger's
when these are notavailable. licence appears to have greatly
Apart from the book's broadly. extender. Khrushchev's original
anti-Stalinist directions, perhaps meaning.
the most consistent and emphatic' Ile builds up to a crescendo, at'
political theme raised in the the end of the book, with the ring
memoirs is that of the need for an frig declaration, "It's incredible to
open society in Russia. The me that after 50 years of Soviet
variations on this-theme go so far' power, paradise should be kept=
beyond anything that Khrushchev under lockand key."
could conceivably advocate without `Yet tlle~n live where.they want,"
being accused at the same dine he announces, when talking about
of wishing to overthrow the Soviet the wish of Vladimir Ashkenazy,
system as to suggest that much the pianist, to live abroad. But he
of this material must have been goes further; much further: "I think
impression. They merely serve to , inserted by the forgers. the time has cone to give every
show up his- own inconsistency, It is even more certain that the 'Soviet citizerithatchoice."
and may be pies med to ha I{ ul "~14~ t o or
.Approved Von el~as. FOB : Ib-RDP88-01314R000300180012-1
ceivable opportunity, starting from
a talk with Tito, who "intrigued'.'
Khrushchev with the story that: is
Yugoslavs were "free" to go abroad
as and. when they wished, and
ending with Khrushchev's own bold
proposition, when talking about .
Easterfl Europe, "You cannot herd
people into paradise with threats
and then post' soldiers at the
gates. -
Khrushchev, . the man who
authorised the building of the
Berlin wall and who boasted about
it, concedes a little too readily
the claim that this shows a
"defect" of the system in the
words ?a Western propagandist
might use-although he also says
that it is a necessary and a tern-
-porary defect. "Unfortunately," he
further admits, "the German
Democratic Republic-and not only.
the GDR-has yet to reach a level r
of moral and material development cai`?'?
where competition with the West
is possible."
Not only the GDR? To say, in
effect, that the Soviet Union is not
behind the West-, as he is made to
say, and that this is why the
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