INTELLIGENCE, FREEDOM AND THE PRESERVATION OF BOTH

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
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• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2004
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Ap se 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP88-01314$.ApD1`60520047-7
ntllience agencies in a free oir
Are they really needed? What are the keys to
eontinoing reform within a system of checks and b antes?
Views by 4 who know intelligence operations intimately,
and a philosopher who ponders the relev(ince o rr oraht
Intelligence, Freedom and the Preservation o both
editorial. p_2
Intelligence, Morality and Foreign P l c
ldney Hoak, P-.3
A nation's safety while searching for its soul
Leo Cherne, p.
How Margaret Chase Smith Would Monitor the IA
Margaret `Rase Srrzlth, p. i 1
Should the U.S.Use Covert Action
in the Conduct of Foreign Polity'?
ArthurI.esterJaco s, p 13
before Reforming the "Intelligence Community,"
What (questions Must be ske
U". Thomas Nichols, p.20
End of Indian Democracy?
Paul Kurtz, p.23
The Helsinki Watch II
Gerald L. Steibel, p.27
Letters: Alexander Lipski, Warren F. Kimball, Oscar Handlin, p.26
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Intelligence, Freedom and the Preservation of Both
An editorial
D uring the American Revolution, the secretary to the
foreign affairs committee of the Continental Congress
came to believe that an American representative in Paris was
engaging in financial skullduggery with a French agent
over secret French arms shipments to the embattled
colonies. The French court insisted on maintaining secrecy
to avoid risking war with England. The American secretary,
having little success in pushing his moralistic crusade in
Congress, published his accusations in the Philadelphia
press, thus blowing the lid off the operation. By his act, the
American risked a cutoff of the very supplies the colonies
needed to continue fighting.
Tom Paine-that early American leaker to the press-
was fired from the Congressional committee. His suspicions
were shown to have been mistaken. The damage he did had
somehow to be patched up by others in order to keep the vital
supplies flowing.
To be sure, Paine's reputation is secure as a patriot,
pamphleteer and mobilizer of public opinion in the cause of
the Revolution. However, would history treat him so kindly
had his endangerment proved fatal to the struggling new
nation? Put in terms of the principles by which representative
democracies are governed, does any individual in a
responsible position (or, for that matter, a journalist) have
the right to substitute his own judgment for the collective
judgment of the constituted and responsible authority in
matters directly affecting the safety and survival of the entire
nation?
This troublesome question has been raised 200 years later,
in more ambiguous circumstances, in the course of the
several current investigations of irregularities in American
domestic and foreign intelligence operations. In the present
case there is ample evidence of skullduggery, of abuses of
authority, illegal activities and the planning of projects
abhorrent to the public philosophy. And the exposure has
once again been accomplished with the assistance of private
leaks to the public press.
This time it is clear that Chief Executives have put
intelligence services to improper uses, at home and abroad.
It is equally clear that Congressional overseers of
intelligence activities-the constituted and responsible
authorities-have systematically dodged their
responsibilities (as former Senator Smith points out in her
memoir in this issue).
Reforms are obviously necessary, both in Executive
regulation and in legislative oversight of intelligence
operations. But by what measures, and at what costs to the
safety and survival of the Republic in a world in which
competent secret intelligence and diplomacy are among the
most necessary weapons for survival?
The intelligence community must not conduct itself as if it
were outside the law. Neither can the secret services operate
effectively if stripped of all secrecy, or if monitored by so
leaky a process as to make secrecy impossible.
One of the prices of freedom is the elusiveness of perfect
solutions to such dilemmas. The American intelligence
effort ought not be in conflict with the morality of the
American people. Yet the American people must recognize
that their government-like themselves as individ-
uals-must often make difficult choices among goods, and
sometimes even more painful choices among evils (a
morality which philosopher Sidney Hook elaborates in his,
article).
Before we can reform the "intelligence community" we
must understand the functions of the secret services (Messrs.
Cherne and Jacobs describe these, and Dr. Nichols and
Senator Smith propose some reforms in accompanying
articles).
Such understanding has been speeded by the several
congressional investigations. America faces increasingly
intertwined economic-political-ideological tensions and
paramilitary challenges. Until a few months ago-say, prior
to the August days of the Helsinki conference-the
preceding sentence might have been considered a throwback
to Cold War argument. Not so today. Realities are again in
greater vogue-even if Americans seem not yet ready to
frame new policies based upon what they suspect are the
inevitable limits of detente.
While Freedom House is not here suggesting any
particular foreign policy, we do welcome the widening
recognition, spearheaded now by our Secretary of State, that
detente has a vastly different meaning to our adversaries
than it has to us, and that America's greatest weaknesses are
its internal uncertainties and a momentarily faltering sense
of direction at home and abroad. Reasonable redefinitions of
the functions and operations of U.S. intelligence may help
restore public confidence in the ability of the government to
reform. We therefore regard as essential the full-time
monitoring of intelligence services under a clearly defined
operational guide, with legislative and executive
responsibilities as clearly stipulated. (The public may well
play a greater role in monitoring intelligence services
through the President's new board of intelligence overseers
and the plan for a new commission with public representa-
tion proposed by former Senator Smith).
Such reform should be accomplished speedily with no
further weakening of our security. "Intelligent intelligence"
is vital, Professor Hook reminds us.
Tom Paine's colleagues in the Continental Congress
would agree.
Publications Committee: Aaron Levenstein, chairman; Richard Gambino, vice-chairman; Roscoe Drummond, Wayne Fredericks, Raymond D. Gastil, Oscar Handlin, Arthur L. Harckham,
Sidney Hook, William C. Lewis, Jr., Burns W. Roper, Paul Seabury, Gerald L. Steibel, Philip van Slyck, Eugene P. aligner and Roy Wilkins.
Editor: Leonard R. Sussman
Published by Freedom House, a national organization dedicated to strengthening democratic institutions. 20 West 40th Street, New York, N.Y. 1001 B. Subscription bimonthly, except
July-August. $5. for 5 issues; $9. for 10; $12. for 15; $1.25 per copy; add $2.50 postage per year outside U.S. or Canada. Copyright 1976 by Freedom House, Inc.
Signed articles reflect views of the authors, not necessarily Freedom House or its Board.
Articles in this journal are abstracted and indexed in Historical Abstracts and/or America: History and Life; and indexed by Public Affairs Information Service.
Each International entirety oughXrqer~ox,4Unnilvversil r orl
ational tional Standard Serial ial Nu Numb pp
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Silence, secrecy and a choice among evils are dictated by public as well as
personal morality, observes Sidney Hook, calling for intelligent in-
telligence in defense of a free society.
n the conduct of foreign affairs, as in personal matters,
Ithere are situations in which silence or secrecy
demonstrates a form of morality. There arc also times when
secrecy alone is not enough: The defense ofa free society or
the maintenance of peace in the world may require the un-
covering of complex information about the committed
adversaries of freedom. If, in that process, abuses develop in
the intelligence systems of a free nation, then appropriate
methods must be devised for safely counteracting the moral-
ly illegitimate activities. We must unquestionably, however,
maintain intelligent intelligence operations.
There are at least three fundamental questions whose
answers have a direct bearing on the conduct and outcome of
American foreign policy. The first is whether the normal
political process can cope effectively with the problems and
perennial crises of foreign policy, or whether this is a domain
ntellgence, Morality
and Foreign Policy'
negotiations and actions, because the strategies to meet acts
of foreign aggression must be initiated before their outcome
confronts the nation and limits its choice of alternatives of
response, there is great danger to the national interest-to-
day even to national survival-in deferring to the vagaries of
public opinion that tend to swing pendularly from one ex-
treme to another. De Tocqueville's words are often cited to
drive these points home:
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which a
democracy possesses; and they require, on the contrary, the perfect
use of almost all those faculties in which it is deficient... A
democracy is unable to regulate the details of an important under-
taking, to persevere in a design, and to work out its execution in the
presence of' serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with
secrecy, and it will not await their consequences with patience.
Dc Tocqueville's indictment can be substantiated from the
historical record. When memories of past wars are faint,
public opinion can too easily be aroused in support of armed
Dr. Hook
in which ultimate decisions must be entrusted to a dedicated
corps of trained specialists responsible to the executive
power. The second is whether principles of morality can and
should operate in guiding the conduct of foreign policy, and
to what extent the national interest should be subordinated
to such principles when their role is acknowledged. The third
is what moral choices are open to a democractic nation like
our own in a world in which it is threatened by aggressive
totalitarian powers and ideologies.
From de Tocqueville to Walter Lippmann democracies
have been faulted because of their inability to conduct in-
telligent foreign policies. The argument is quite familiar.
Where domestic policies are concerned their fruits can be
roughly but properly determined by consequences perceived
not too long after they have been adopted. If unsatisfactory,
they can be corrected or agitation against them developed.
But the consequences of a foreign policy are rarely im-
mediate. Critical judgment usually follows only after the ex-
perience of bitter fruits of disaster. On the other hand, where
the urgencies ofa crisis situation require immediate response
the democratic process is too slow and unwieldy. It is
therefore concluded that because of the delicacy, complexity
and sometimes the necessary secrecy of foreign policy
Dr. Hook, a board member of Freedom House, is a senior
fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and
Peace, Stanford University.
March-April/1976/No. 35 Approved For Release 2004/10/12
conflict. This was apparent in 1914. And once hostilities
begin, the slogans of total victory or unconditional surrender
become extremely popular. Proposals for a negotiated peace
are denounced as treasonable. On the other hand, after a
costly war popular opinion is apt to become fearful and
defeatist and to resist policies which, had they been adopted
in time, might have prevented the very outcome that was
feared most. The popular opposition to the rearmament of
Britain in the'thirties is a case in point. Another is the failure
to act vigorously-urged only by two public figures,
Pilsudski and Trotsky-against Hitler's reentry into the
Rhineland in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. And
although it is often ignored, the capitulation to Hitler at
Munich was approved with wild popular enthusiasm as in-
suring peace in our time.
Other considerations make much of the instability and ig-
norance of popular opinion. Those who stress them tend to
argue that the only alternative to the paralysis of the national
will in foreign policy in a nation like our own is not to share
the power but to entrust it to the executive branch. In an ad-
dress delivered in New York in 1963, Senator Fulbright
voiced sentiments in this vein which contrast sharply with
some of his later pronouncements:
Public opinion must be educated and led if it is to bolster a wise and
effective foreign policy. This is preeminently a task for Presidential
leadership because the Presidential office is the only one under our
constitutional system that constitutes a forum for moral and
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political leadership on a national scale. Accordingly f think that ac
must contemplate the further enhancement of Presidential authoritt
in foreign affairs.
Whose business is foreign policy?
Granted all this and more, there are overwhelming
considerations that make it dubious to entrust the direction
of foreign policy (always excluding specific emergency ac-
tions whose continuation must be subject to later
congressional ratification) to the exclusive purview of the ex-
ecutive power. First, in a democratic community which
assumes that those who are affected by basic decisions
should have some voice in influencing then, foreign policy
must be a matter of high public concern. Especially today in
the era of' nuclear technology, foreign policy may center on
decisions that spell national freedom or enslavement, or the
life and death of tens of millions. Foreign policy is
everybody's business.
Second, where U.S. foreign policy has been determined by
the Executive independently of public opinion, the conse-
quences have not been very happy for the preservation of
freedom and the safeguarding of peace. Woodrow Wilson,
elected in 1916 to keep the country out of World War 1. it
year later took the U.S. into war and in all likelihood
prevented a negotiated peace. Even if the Central Powers
had emerged from the conflict relatively stronger than the
Allied Powers, Lenin and his faction would probably not
have conic to power in Russia. (Kerensky has admitted that
the continuation of the war was a decisive factor in their
triumph.) Without Lenin, the socialist and labor movements
of Italy and Germany would not have been disastrously split
and we might have been spared Mussolini and I IItler, not to
speak of Stalin and Mao. In any event, no matter who had
won, in the absence of American intervention it would be
hard to imagine a world worse than the Nazi and Gulag
Archipelagos.
Roosevelt during the Second World War regarded the
Soviet Union as a genuine ally rather than as a co-
belligerent, allaying deep popular distrust of the Kremlin's
post-war intentions. Truman expressed Roosevelt's policy in
the remark addressed to Senator Wheeler's committee
which waited on him, after his accession to the Presidency, to
caution against the extension of Soviet rule in Eastern
Europe: "Gentlemen, it is not Soviet Communism I fear but
rather British imperialism"-and this on the eve of the grant
of independence to India and the disintegration of the British
Empire.
Third, in the long run the success of any foreign policy.
even when initiated by the Executive in a crisis, as was the
case in Korea (a needless war largely precipitated by the
withdrawal of American troops and the declaration that
Korea was outside the bounds of our national interest)
depends upon the understanding and support of the people.
The disaster in Vietnam to a large extent flowed from the
absence of popular understanding of what justified our con-
tinued presence there after the initial error of involvement
had been made.
There are good pragmatic grounds therefore for sharing
with the citizenry the determination of foreign policy.
Morality in public affairs
This brings to the fore the second question-one that can
be posed in the form of a further criticism of a democratic
approach to foreign policy. It is often argued that popular in-
fluence on foreign policy is undesirable because it tends to be
naive and moralistic. It assumes that what is good or had,
right or wrong, honorable or dishonorable, in private or-
dinary life is no less so in the life of nations at peace or at
war. But many experts in foreign policy assure us that stand-
ards of morality in private and public life are profoundly
different. Who does not recall the words of statesmen war-
ning against a too simple identification of personal and
public morality? Cavour, the Italian statesman, not the
worst of the great unifiers, uttered a sentiment that all of
them would have approved: "if we did for ourselves what we
did for our country, what scoundrels we would be."
Our former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in an ad-
dress to those contemplating a career in foreign service,
observed "...generally speaking, morality often imposes
upon those who exercise the powers of government standards
of conduct quite different from what might seen right to
them as private citizens."
Although this is a plausible and widely held view, it seems
to me to rest on a confusion between moral standards or
basic moral values, which if valid, are invariant for all
situations in which human beings must act and the specific
situations in which the decision must be made. No moral
principle by itself determines what action should be taken
because, when we are in an agony of doubt about what we
should do, more than one moral principle applies. This is as
true in the area of personal relations as in public policy.
Because we should tell the truth, it does not follow that we
should tell the truth to someone intent upon killing or maim-
ing or robbing others, if not telling the truth will tend to pre-
vent such action. There are always other values involved.
Even in less extreme situations we may rightly prefer to be
kind rather than needlessly truthful if the truth speaking will
result in great cruelty and no benefit to anyone else.
It is wrong to steal but we cannot morally condemn the
man who steals to provide food for his starving family if no
other means exist to alleviate their condition. Every situation
of moral choice is one in which the choice is not between
stood and bad, right or wrong but between good and good,
right and right, the good and the right. One good may be
overridden by a greater good; one obligation by a more
pressing one. Ordinary human life would be impossible if we
did not recognize and act on these considerations. I t is wrong
to kill a human being but iJthe only war to prevent him from
blowing up a plane or city was by killing him it would be
right to do so. To be sure the weight of experience is behind
the moral injunctions and ideals expressed in the testaments
and commandments of the great religions and ethical
systems of the past. But they cannot all be categorical in all
situations because they sometimes conflict. Reflection is re-
quired in order to determine which is to be subordinate to
which. The only moral absolute is, to use a phrase of John
krskine's, the moral obligation to be intelligent in the choice
we make of that course of conduct among possible alter-
natives whose consequences will strengthen the structure of
the reflective values that define our philosophy of life.
"this does not justify some current degenerate forms of ex-
istentialism according to which individuals are free to decide
for themselves what is right or wrong without any appeal to
moral principles or ideals but merely on the basis of what
they desire. They seem to assume that because principles or
ideals do not possess an absolutely categorical character that
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therefore they have no validity whatsoever. They thereby
overlook the fact that when a legitimate exception is made to
a moral rule, this does not destroy the validity and binding
character of that rule within certain limits and conditions.
They fail to recognize the overriding obligation of another
rule that holds when the conditions are different. The better
is the enemy of the good, and the bad is preferable to what is
worse-when these are the only alternatives.
The situation is quite familiar in the area of civil and
political rights. We all know that the right to know may con-
flict with the right to privacy, the freedom to publish may
destroy a person's right to a fair trial, the freedom to speak
(falsely to shout Fire! in a crowded theatre) with the right to
life. Even the right to worship according to one's conscience
may be abridged if it involves human sacrifice or polygamy.
In this country it is the Supreme Court which determines the
order of priority these freedoms have and under what con-
ditions. In England, it is Parliament. None of these rights
can be considered as absolute in the sense that they can never
be overriden in any circumstance.
It is when we approach the field of foreign policy that the
greatest confusion abounds. A foreign policy must further
the interests and safety of the nation. But any nation worthy
of the support of moral men and women must be committed
to certain moral ideals-freedom, self-determination, peace
and human welfare. But no more in this case than in the case
of personal morality does that mean that we can deduce what
our policy should be in specific foreign policy situations. 11'
we espouse "the right to self-determination" as we should,
that will not mean that in any and every circumstance of in-
ternational affairs, we should support it, regardless of other
moral values involved, any more than that we should always
tell the truth about everything to everyone, or give alms in
any and every circumstance. Self-determination is one value
among others and we must evaluate a claim for it in a
specific case in the light of its consequences on these other
values. Not every province of every country that raises the
cry warrants our support any more than the demand for self-
determination of the Southern States warranted moral sup-
port when they sought to dissolve the Union. I fa country or
region of a country demands self-determination in order to
impose slavery on others or to unleash an aggressive war
there is good reason not to support it. No group that raises
the banner of self-determination really believes that the prin-
ciple should be universalized. Indian intellectuals under
British rule were eloquent about self-determination but they
regarded the slogan as treasonable when raised by the in-
habitants of Goa and Kashmir. The same was true for the
Greek Cypriots in relation to the Turkish enclaves after in-
dependence was won by Cyprus.
Morality and the national interest
There are those who are impatient with considerations
about moral principles where national interest is involved.
They take as their guide Lord Palmerton's pronouncement:
"We have no eternal allies and we have no eternal enemies.
Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it
is our duty to follow." In the light of American relations
with Russia and China in the past sixty years one can cer-
tainly agree with this but read a different implication out of
it. Why should the national interest exclude moral ideals'?
Despite the ambiguities and complexities of the concept of
national interest, it presupposes at the very least national
survival. Even on the plane of personal morality, sur-
vival-except under extraordinary conditions-is integral to
the good life. In order to be blessed, says Spinoza, one must
at least be. The real question is how narrowly the national
interest is to be conceived. We are not talking about national
survival under any circumstances but of our survival as a free
and open society. To some moral and patriotic Frenchmen
the acceptance of Churchill's proposal to Vichy to accept un-
ion with Great Britain, even if this meant that France as a
separate nation would exist no more, was preferable to the
continued existence of France under fascist rule.
Once the survival of our free society with all its imperfec-
tions and limitations is regarded as desirable, to what
measures are we therewith committed in its defense? Cer-
tainly not to any measures regardless of their consequences
to our security and the character of the society we seek to de-
fend. The untenability of the doctrine that the end of
national security justifies the use of any means to insure it is,
first, that often the means employed are not the most in-
telligent means of securing that end; and, second, that the
consequences of using some means may adversely and un-
acceptably affect the constellation of other ends-our in-
stitutionalized rights, freedoms and services-whose securi-
ty we are defending. Nonetheless there are occasions when
the ends and values whose presence defines a free and open
society conflict, and we must choose between them. There
are occasions when freedom of the press does severely pre-
judice a person's right to a fair trial. There are occasions
when speech is used to incite a lynch mob to deprive a person
of life or limb. At any definite time the conflict of freedoms
is resolved or should be resolved by the action whose conse-
quences are more likely than those of any other action to
further the total structure of freedoms in the community.
Normally the suspension of freedom of the press for a few
days with respect to certain features of a case, with unlimited
freedom to comment subsequently,- is considered by reflec-
tive judgment to be less undesirable than the miscarriage of
justice that may result if such freedom remains unabridged.
Some of those who protest in the interests of a free press that
there is an absolute right to know in such cases do not extend
it to the right to know the sources that the press relies on in
its investigatory reports.
The great danger, of course, in invoking the sanctions of
national security to curb any of the normal traditional
freedoms of the market place of ideas is that the national
security may not be involved at all, that it may be used as a
pretext for arbitrary and illegal personal or factional in-
terest. Measures that under proper safeguards may
sometimes be both morally and legally legitimate in times of
clear and present danger to the national security of the na-
tion may be abused and misemployed against fellow citizens
with whom we differ about policies. This was illustrated in
the Watergate episode in which opponents within the
democratic process were treated as if they were enemies of
the democratic process.
How defend the free society?
This makes focal the third question: What moral choices
are open to a democratic society faced by an armed and
powerful enemy whose declared objective is the destruction
of free institutions like our own? If our society with all its
imperfections-and with its multiple mechanisms for im-
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provement-is worth surviving, it is worth defending. How-
can it legitimately defend itself'
At this point it is necessary to distinguish between two
types of totalitarian powers and ideologies. Although as
democrats we are morally committed to condemning both,
both are not of the same direct and pressing concern to a
culture that seeks to preserve its freedom. The First t} pe has
very unpleasant consequences for citizens who live within its
borders but such nations do not threaten the peace of the
world-for example, Franco's Spain and Tito's Yugoslavia.
We need no present defense against them. The other type is
aggressive and expansionist. It seeks overtly and sometimes
covertly to undermine the strength and security of free coun-
tries and their allies. Today that characterizes the policy of
the Soviet Union and in lesser measure. Communist China.
The nature of the struggle to defend and preserve the free
world requires at the very least some measures of secrecy.
For example, any agreement on multilateral limitation on
nuclear weapons is not worth the paper it is written on unless
there exists some method of checking on the performance of
the principals. If the U.S. has discovered a method of check-
ing compliance by the Soviet Union, making such
knowledge public would invite the Kremlin to devise
methods of escaping detection of violations and encourage it
to stockpile nuclear weapons to a point where its predom-
inance would make it relatively invulnerable to any response
the U.S. could make if the Kremlin launched a nuclear Pearl
Harbor. Secrecy on these and related matters is an axiom of
political morality one is tempted to write, of political sanity.
Our secrecy is not enough. We require in the interests of
our defense-and of the peace of the world-intelligence in-
formation concerning the Kremlin's success in penetrating
our secrecy and its progress in devising methods by which it
can undermine our defense. What is true for military
measures. mutatis ntutandis is true for some political
measures, too.
What this entails is that "intelligence measures" be in-
telligent. The revelations concerning certain unsavory and
foolish CIA operations is not an argument for the abolition
of the agency but for its improvement. As well argue that we
can remedy defective vision by poking the eyes out of our
head, as that the best way of correcting the shortcomings of
past intelligence practices is to abolish its functions, or, what
is tantamount to the same thing, make the details of its
operations known to a large congressional committee whose
staffs are in a position to leak secrets to the press. Great Bri-
Intelligence cannot help a nation find its
soul. It is indispensable, however, to help
preserve that nation's safety while it con-
tinues the search.
by Leo Cherne
Air. Cherne presented the following testimonI,. Dec. 11. at
the invitation of the House Select Committee oil
Intelligence, chaired bt Rep. Otis Pike. Air. Cherne was one
of . /2 members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visorv Board. On Feb. 17 President Ford natned A1 r. Cherne
to the three-man, independent board of intelligence
overseers. 11e will go on leave as chairman of Freedom
Houses executive committee.
am grateful for the invitation to testify before this
Icommittee. When I received the request earlier this week I
was told that representatives of both parties concurred and
had expressed the hope that I might present sonic overview
and some sense of future needs for intelligence. I will un-
avoidably repeat some things you know, perhaps some which
have been stated a number of times, but I do hope there will
be some observations which will be helpful to you in your
most important undertaking. May I first salute this com-
mittee for the two main thrusts of its investigation. Under
your direction, Mr. Chairman, there has been the effort to
determine whether our intelligence has been adequate to the
needs and dangers we have faced and whether we have
proceeded to obtain the intelligence we require with suf-
ficient regard for the rights of the individual and the
obligations of law under the Constitution. Before I expand
on those, I think you are entitled to something of my own
background against which to measure my observations.
I have been the executive director of the Research
Institute of America for nearly forty years. That activity has
sharpened whatever capabilities I have as an economist and
political scientist. Those forty years have been devoted in
good part to the study of the governmental institutions
gathered in this city. I confess, at a time when it is
fashionable to derogate government, that I have always had
a passionate respect for this most difficult, overcriticized,
underpaid, and very undervalued activity.
Twenty-four years ago the distinguished theologian, Dr.
Reinhold Niebuhr, urged me to succeed him as chairman of
the International Rescue Committee. I have since then oc-
cupied that post. That committee was formed days after
Hitler came to power for the purpose of assisting the
democratic leaders and scholars of Germany whose love of
liberty might compel their flight from that country. The I RC
has assisted hundreds of thousands of those who have fled
fascist, communist, and nondescript forms of totalitarian
jeopardy. Those helped have fled the Soviet Union and the
military government of Greece, Castro's Cuba and
Duvalier's Haiti. We assist those who have been refugees
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tain and every other democratic nation in the world has an
Official Secrets Act or something equivalent. While such an
act has never been necessary in America, our system does
anticipate that officials and journalists alike will dem-
onstrate a high sense of responsibility. Each must be aware
of the inevitable and necessary tension between governmen-
tal secrecy and the need of the public to know; yet each must
recognize, in the absence of an absolute demarcation of their
respective territories, that some secrecy is essential to sur-
vival of freedom, and each has the duty to discover where the
invisible line rests in each situation.
There have undoubtedly been abuses in CIA activities,
particularly in the failure to abide by the restrictions on the
field of its surveillance. But these could have been exposed
and corrected without destroying the effectiveness of in-
telligence operations abroad. In other words there is an in-
telligent way of revealing the inadequacies of intelligence
services and an unintelligent way which profits no one but
the KGB and other enemies of the relatively free nations of
the world.
There seems to be a wilful blindness among some com-
mentators about the necessary role of intelligence services in
the defense of a free and open society in an era in which the
sudden death of a culture is possible. The blindness is
sometimes reinforced by a smug moral posturing which con-
fuses principles with tactical measures. The same con-
siderations-the health and integrity of the democratic
process-that condemn the giving of a bribe to a domestic
official may justify the offer of a bribe to an official of a
foreign country for information-not procurable in time by
any other way-that may be crucial to the national safety.
Those who on a priori grounds condemn an action without
regard for its consequences in preserving the structure of
democratic freedoms are guilty at the very least of blatant
hypocrisy. This does not give carte blanche to any fool to un-
dertake any project because it seems to him advantageous at
the moment. Here as elsewhere there is no substitute for in-
telligence-for intelligence ultimately responsible to the
authorized representatives, legislative or judicial, of the
democratic community. It is sometimes necessary to burn a
house, or to permit it to burn, in order to save a village. This
does not bestow a license for arson. We must recognize the
evil we do even when it is the lesser evil. But if it is truly the
lesser evil then those who condemn it or would have us do
nothing at all are morally responsible for the greater evil that
may ensue.
The President's new
intelligence overseer
assesses his role
Mr. Cherne
from the communist countries of Central Europe and those
who safely reach Hong Kong. We have helped resettle more
than 100,000 Cubans who have fled to this country, and are
helping 18,000 of the Vietnam refugees to resettle in this
country-and many, many others throughout the world.
For more than twenty years I have been chairman of the
executive committee of Freedom House, an organization
which was founded in 1941, with Eleanor Roosevelt, William
Allen White, David Dubinsky, Roy Wilkins, Wendell
Willkie and others, to advance the struggle for freedom at
home and abroad. The present chairman of the Freedom
House board of trustees is former Senator Margaret Chase
Smith.
Just a couple of final personal notes which I do think rele-
vant to this committee's purposes. I have had the privilege in
one context or another to serve each President since 1938.
Each of these undertakings has involved an opposition to
totalitarianism, left or right. On one occasion, I was told that
I had incurred the displeasure of the director of the FBI. I
had made myself a determined nuisance to Senator Joseph
McCarthy beginning one month after he entered the Senate
in 1947 and continued that opposition to the Senator until
1954 when the Senate censured him. My attention was
drawn to the Senator because of my own deep concern with
the Communist Party. I found it alarming that the party,
through its instruments in Wisconsin, openly and actively
supported McCarthy, if only for the purpose of unseating
Senator Robert La Follette, who at that moment had
launched an investigation into the extent of communist
domination of U.S. labor unions. At a later time I thought
that the frequent social contact between Senator McCarthy
and FBI Director Hoover inappropriate. My saying so was
not appreciated. In time my criticisms of Senator McCarthy
and of his disregard for personal rights led to a threat being
conveyed to me that libel proceeding would be instituted if I
did not desist. I said that such an action would serve a pur-
pose I long thought useful-having the Senator in a court
under oath. The threat of action subsided.
Bipartisan protections
Gentlemen, I have not simply recited a personal
background, and I do appreciate your indulgence. I hope I
am sensitive to the committee's concern for the protection of
the right of privacy of American citizens and the conduct of
intelligence within the law, and, perhaps most important, for
the urgency of assuring the American people that in-
telligence and personnel of the intelligence community must
never again be requested or permitted to perform some ser-
vice useful to anyone's domestic political purposes. If there
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is only one object which I would wish my testimony might
reinforce, it would be that one. Neither foreign intelligence
nor domestic intelligence, not CIA or FBI, must ever again
be requested to perform or acquiesce in an activity which,
whatever guise is asserted, actually seeks to serve an in-
dividual's ambition or a political candidate's or party's pur-
poses. Even minor political favors-wigs, voice changers,
whatever else-simply ought to be impermissible.
It is with a kind of relief that I now know as a result of
these investigations that the abuse of and by the intelligence
community has occurred during the administrations of both
parties. This misbehavior has occurred under Presidents who
were held in awe, or admired for their grace and youth, or
respected for their candor, or revered for the gratitude we
reserve for those who got us out of danger, or were seen as
simply ruthless, beleaguered, or ambitious. Gentlemen, this
has not been a problem more characteristic of one party than
the other.
These abuses are perhaps inherent in the fact of power.
And all too much power, for too long a time, was en-
joyed-with no restraint by anyone-by a much praised man
who held his police post too long and knew too much about
too many people, and appeared not at all reticent to convey
that fact.
Let me tell you why I am especially relieved to Find this a
problem not confined to one party. The bipartisan character
of these past difficulties means that we can now proceed to a
bipartisan set of corrections and protections which even in an
election year have a chance of being kept out of partisan
politics.
While I am still on the subject of abuses for reasons of per-
sonal ambition or political advantage, let me say something
about the board on which I serve, the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board. I do not appear here as a
representative of that board or, for that matter, as anyone's
representative, but simply as your guest at your invitation. I
am not free to speak of the deliberations of that board or the
recommendations we have given to a succession of
Presidents, but I know of no restraint which can keep me
from telling you that on not one occasion have I observed a
single member of the board bending a judgment or stressing
a weight which would advance the political interest of the
particular President, his administration, or party. The very
privacy which has been accorded to PFIAB has, I believe.
sheltered it from the temptation to grandstand. politick, or
otherwise bend before the political winds.
I myself was involved in one very reassuring episode in this
respect. I was appointed a member of that board at a point
when the Watergate investigation already made it quite clear
that there had been a serious breach of faith. Days before I
learned of my appointment, I made an address critical of the
Watergate affair and of responses to it which had been com-
ing from the White Clouse. I thought Admiral Anderson,
chairman of that board, ought to know of my views, and I
quickly sent him a copy of those remarks. I received not the
slightest suggestion that I desist from such expressions.
Detente-no limit to many hostile actions
Gentlemen, when I was invited to testify, I was, in
particular, requested to make some comments on our future
requirements in the intelligence area. I regrettably see
nothing in the foreseeable future likely to change the fact
In the field of limiting arms, in-
telligence is the sensor assuring
our own safety, and a guarantor
of whatever prospects for peace
we see.
that sovereign nations remain virtually unimpeded by law in
all of those areas which involve national security.
I welcome the fact that efforts toward detente have been
made and that there is an increasing realization in and out-
side of Government that detente is a process, not a conclu-
sion, a means of limiting the most frightful dangers of
belligerency, I believe some portion of the American people
may have made assumptions about detente not shared by the
architects of that policy. I also believe that, initially at least,
the policy was oversold. But I am sure I say nothing you do
not know vividly when I add that the policy of detente does
not effectively limit hostility or ideological warfare or local
warfare, or organized subversion, or encouragement of
terrorists, or many of the other hazards with which we have
become all too familiar.
We live in a far more interdependent world than was the
case even rive years ago, and things now happen so quickly
that the reaction time for those who must make decisions is
terribly short, and therefore effective intelligence analysis
and estimates are so much more critical. The shock of the oil
embargo made that painfully clear. But our dependency on
foreign petroleum is only one of a number of areas in which
we are dependent on other nations, and they on us. The fact
of mutual dependency, however, is no assurance that the
economic conduct of nations will be benign; that rivalries
will not be painful and dangerous; that food, raw materials,
national monetary reserves and a host of other things will
not be made the subject of dangerous conflict with our adver-
saries, and even intervals of extreme tension with one or
another of our friends.
These pressures which have radically narrowed the world,
even as they have enlarged the hazards we face, will continue
to press our country into conferences, undertakings, new
bilateral and multilateral agreements, all of which have as a
common purpose the reduction of unrestrained rivalry in
arms, resources, and ideas.
Even if this were a lawful world, the dangers would be
great. But it is not a lawful world. It is not a world in which
nations have a uniform commitment to ethical or legal con-
cepts, and consequently the policy makers in our nation have
no alternative but to rely on the very best knowledge, the
most objective analysis, the most careful assessment, the
most objective estimates.
Just in the field of limiting arms it is urgent that we know
all that we can about our own capabilities and about those of
any adversary, and particularly the Soviet Union. We have
long ago concluded that mutual inspection is unavailable and
therefore obviously hope that it is unnecessary. This places a
particular burden on the intelligence community, since it is
therefore the sensor assuring our safety and a guarantor of
whatever prospects for peace we see. I recognize that this
must have been said before this committee a score of times.
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And yet I think there are certain fundamental truths, now
that these hearings are drawing to a close, that must be
reemphasized not for the fact of your understanding but for
the fact of public understanding of the role and requirement
for intelligence.
Less dramatic intelligence
But we do tend, when we talk about intelligence, to look at
the more dramatic aspects: the October war, the oil boycott,
a massive grain purchase, climactic events in Cyprus, or
Angola, or Portugal, or Chile. The fact is intelligence may be
at least as valuable in much less dramatic areas: the sharp
analysis of trends, political, social, military and economic;
potential developments, such as the formation of new cartels
like OPEC; economic assessments, including assessments of
the most unlikely events. What, for example, our policy-
makers need to know, would be the result if, for several
years, the industrial nations of the West suffered unabating
acute inflation? How sturdy would the democratic
governments be? How well would our various international
organizations function? Would the European Community
remain intact? Would we see the beginning of trade wars as
countries sought to protect their weakening currencies?
We have needed to know how the member nations of
OPEC both intended to and actually used the wealth ac-
quired since the fall of 1973. The simple fact of quadrupling
of petroleum prices set into motion the largest transfer of
wealth in modern times. The stability of international
monetary arrangements depends on that kind of knowledge.
And wise decision making, informed by such intelligence,
not only assists the economies of Western industrial nations,
but enables us better to know the particular problems of the
less developed nations as well.
There is all manner of technology about which we need to
have the very best of intelligence. Recommendations are
made which must be decided by particular agencies in the
Executive Branch that advanced computers be sold to coun-
tries which are now not eligible for such purchases, that
other forms of high technology be made available. We of
course wish to enlarge our balance of trade, strengthen the
American dollar in the process. We need to know, among
other things, whether certain items which are on restricted
lists are sold by us to one country only to be resold to coun-
tries which are not eligible. But the much more penetrating
questions with which intelligence must deal involve the com-
plicated net assessment of all of the radiating results which
flow from the transfer of high technology.
I will not go further with illustrations of the various kinds
of intelligence which will continue to be absolutely basic to
informed decision making because I am already
embarrassed to have said so much about things you clearly
know. I'd like to look briefly, however, at the means by
which this intelligence is derived. All of us would of course
prefer to have this information gathered by and confined to
researchers functioning in libraries, statisticians pouring
over trade data, political and economic scientists providing
their reasoned projections-and I have just described the
great bulk of the work which is performed within the
intelligence community. Both in numbers of people and
dollars spent, this is the giant slice of the intelligence dollar.
In addition there is information of the most vital kind, not
found in libraries, which we must also understand. There are
Without intelligence the terror-
ists would be given an absolutely
open field.
on occasion tactical and collusive arrangements which are
part of international trade negotiations, or the pricing of raw
materials which are vital to us. There is the entire difficult
business of knowing as much as we can of someone else's real
intentions.
There are those within the world's intelligence community
who believe that terrorism may well prove to be the most
serious of tomorrow's hazards. It is already among the most
brutal and difficult to anticipate of today's dangers.
Without intelligence and whatever clandestine means are
needed to secure it, the terrorists would be given an absolute-
ly open field. Even with the very best of intelligence, the
terrorist finds easier pickings in open societies. If high-
jackings are commonplace in either the Soviet Union or the
People's Republic of China, they have done an effective job
in hiding that knowledge from us. And yet I am sure we will
all instantly agree we would not wish to pay the price of that
form of government to secure whatever safety they enjoy
from the terrorist.
In each of the areas to which I have addressed these
observations, there is a common thread: intelligence is the
basic instrument enabling us to anticipate danger-military,
political, economic-enabling us to know the direction from
which the threat may come, and enabling us if at all possible
to apply unprovocative responses in the hope of avoiding the
danger.
Intelligence is the means which enables us to reach a
widening net of agreements with some measure of
confidence that they will be complied with. There is not the
slightest prospect of any arms control measure without the
most effective application of the technology and intellect
which combine to produce good intelligence. And I'd like to
observe that we are talking of this at a time when the
problem is still relatively manageable. Not many years into
the future we will regrettably be dealing with nuclear
capabilities which are widespread and at the possible
disposal of some who may be tempted to use that capability
to suggest nuclear blackmail.
Now let me say some things about the future of subversive
warfare or some more modest activities that are included in
the phrase "covert action." The Soviet Union has already
made it clear that it does not interpret the Helsinki
agreement as in any way moderating the urgency of its
ideological efforts. Indeed, leaders of the Soviet Union have
been remarkably candid in observing that they think the tide
is running in their favor. There is no monolithic communist
movement, but there are communist parties in most
countries which are more or less available to advance the
interests of one of the centers of communist power. I am
doing no more than describing the events which occurred in
Portugal, which presently exist in Angola, which hopefully
will not threaten a Spain in transition. The Italian
Communist Party may be closer to achieving its purposes in
Italy today than it was when we were so fearful of that
prospect in the late 1940's. Now, shall we eliminate under
any and all circumstances the ability of the United States
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and other Western democratic nations to try in some modest
degree to apply some counterthrust to this otherwise
unrestrained subversion? Are we simply to conclude that the
very nations which had hoped that Angola might in fact be
independent must now sit by helplessly as one form of
colonialism is replaced by another?
In a public interview within the past month. Governor
Averell Harriman was quoted as saying that his greatest
concerns are not with the fall of one city, but rather with the
overthrow of countries and governments world-wide by
Russian undercover activities. I quote specifically:
The Russians are not nuts, they are not crazy people. they're not
I litter. But they are trying to dominate the world by their ideology
and we are killing the one instrument which we ha%c to fight that
ideology. the CIA.
Incidentally, I happen to disagree with the bleakness of the
Governor's assessment. I do not think these investigations
will have that effect. Clearly that is not your purpose.
Hopefully, instead, this committee will have added to our
understanding of what needs to be done to increase the
effectiveness of the intelligence product and the more
efficient organization of the community so that it may
achieve the ends we require. I do regret, however, that it is in
the nature of an investigation, especially one which focuses
on inadequacies and misbehavior, that the resulting public
understanding will neither be complete hor balanced. You
have identified some of the notable intelligence failures.
How I wish it had been possible to illuminate some of the
very considerable successes! The very fact that they exist is
the strongest reason for keeping their nature and their means
quite private. I was reminded of this just last week, in seeing
an old movie on television, Tora. Tora. Tara, that "in the
interest of vital security" even a President, Franklin
Roosevelt, was for a time taken off the list of those privileged
to see the results of the Ultra Machine which broke the codes
of our enemies. President Roosevelt was allegedly removed
simply because he had been careless.
Unfortunately, an investigation like this one does not
provide the opportunity for the public to have the sense of
the thousands of decent, able, extraordinarily professional
analysts, painstakingly applying research and scholarship,
doggedly reviewing prominent and obscure facts and data so
that the policy maker may have timely analysis, assessment
and recommendations. They are truly an unheralded group
of men and women selected from scores of professional
disciplines-economists, historians, psychologists,
translators, lawyers, monetary specialists, geographers,
doctors, military analysts, biologists, cryptographers. optics
and communications scientists, and a host of other fields of
scholarship working toward a common purpose: that those
who must decide have at their disposal the very best of
knowledge and understanding to illuminate their decisions.
Where does the danger lie?
Mr. Pike, on Monday night as I watched television news, I
heard you say that,it is not the Soviet Union which is our
greatest danger. If I correctly quote you, you said that the
greater danger is that the people no longer believe what their
government tells them. I do agree that we have a serious
crisis of belief, of confidence in institutions. But let me
dissent on two counts. Whatever the failure of our own
government-and those failures include this body as well as
the Executive Branch-those failures are within our
capability to control, correct, or change. That, thank our
bicentennial stars, is our good fortune. But whatever danger
may lie before us from the Soviet Union or any other foreign
source cannot be readily corrected by the American people.
No ballot box will diminish that danger, no burst of renewed
faith among us can altogether deflect that danger-not here,
not in Angola, or Portugal, or Central Europe.
I dissent somewhat, Mr. Pike, on other grounds; they are
no less serious. There is a crisis of belief in our government,
as you have said, but it is not simply that. We are in the midst
of a crisis of all authority, of all of our institutions. Those
who study the public opinion of the American people agree
that our regard for all our institutions-medicine, education,
religion, military, the Executive Branch, the Supreme Court,
the Congress, business, organized labor-our confidence in
each of them is at the lowest point since we have measured
these attitudes, In fact, a majority of the American people do
not have high confidence in a single one of these institu-
tions-not even medicine or religion.
I suggest, therefore, that when any of us who are leaders in
any walk of American life think we can repair our own
misfortune by identifying the greater distress of someone
else's trouble, we may be deluding ourselves. We may indeed
be the architects of our own mutual terminal agonies. We all
share the difficulties of what Eric Hoffer calls an "age of
disillusionment." A novelist reminded us a number of years
ago-it was James Joyce-"History is a nightmare from
which we awaken." While there is still time, I urge we end
this orgy of reciprocal abuse, escalating disbelief, and
profligate accusations. There are sins enough which we have
committed, but it is not for these that we seek expiation as
much as for the difficulties and frustrations which simply
flow from the fact that we are living in the most complex and
dangerous time in the entire history of mankind. We must, I
think, very soon put aside our denigrations and concentrate
once again on the affirmative tasks of protecting liberty,
individual and national. Until then, we condemn ourselves to
suffer the consequences of each other's misbehavior.
I will conclude, -gentlemen, by telling you of a most
extraordinary coincidence. I received the invitation to share
these thoughts with you on Monday. On Tuesday I was
obliged to travel to California. On that plane, sitting directly
behind me was an old, tired, stooped and, to me, remarkably
small woman. I had imagined her to be taller. Because she is
a person whose wisdom is widely conceded, I imposed on
her. I told her that I would be testifying today and that I
knew that the problems in her country were quite different
from ours. I thought nevertheless that she might have some
observations-which would be useful to me, and asked
whether I might put four questions to her. I will recall that
exchange as exactly as I noted them immediately after I
returned to my seat.
"Mrs. Meir, both of our countries are democracies. We
accept ethical and religious restraints on our behavior. Do
we have any right whatever, Mme. Prime Minister, to
conduct covert programs in other countries, to meddle in
their affairs, seek to change their outcomes?"'
"Mr. Cherne, we forget that other countries are not like
ours. They are not governed by the same restraints. They
don't hesitate to do the things which democracies worry
about. Look now at Angola. Must we all sit by and watch'?
Mr. Cherne, I attended a Socialist conference in Berlin last
February, and we heard then what would happen in
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Portugal. And we did nothing. And it happened as they said
it would. But we remain paralyzed by our own doubts and
confusions."
"But Mrs. Meir, our Congress understandably feels it
must know what is being undertaken. Don't you have the
same feelings and pressures in your Parliament, your
Knesset?"
"Frankly, no. We have a Foreign Affairs and Security
Committee of the Knesset, but they do not expect to be told
of things that would be better if they did not know. But
perhaps we feel a sense of danger which is not felt in your
country. Also our representatives, Mr. Cherne, know that
we will not use our intelligence abilities for things which are
political, which intelligence people should not meddle in."
"Mrs. Meir, can you tell me, since our countries each have
excellent intelligence services, how did we miss the Yom
Kippur war?"
"Well, I will tell you this: we should not have missed it. I
think we had enough information, but there was obstinacy.
It was not read properly. And you know your people did the
same thing and helped reinforce our refusal to believe what
we should have understood. No, I tell you, we should not
have missed that one."
"One final question, Mrs. Meir, do you have problems
keeping things secret which must be secret?"
"Sometimes. But not as in your country. But this is a
problem of democracies. If you'll forgive me, it's a
misunderstanding of democracy. Because a country is
11
democratic, must everything be known? Must we weaken
ourselves and strengthen our enemies? In democracies we
think all countries are like ours. Unfortunately, Mr. Cherne,
they are not."
Mr. Chairman, I sometimes think we act as though we're
a group of honorable men playing poker in a 19th century
saloon. There, if someone made an effort to look at another
player's cards, he'd run a high risk of getting shot. In the
game of nations, if we don't, we run a similar danger.
In 1888 Lord Bryce in The American Commonwealth said
that America was "sailing a summer sea towards which as by
a law of fate the rest of civilized mankind are forced to
move." Ambassador Moynihan, in the 1976 The American
Commonwealth recently said, "Liberal democracy on the
American model tends to the condition of the monarchy in
the 19th century: a holdover form of government, one which
persists in isolated and peculiar places here and there, and
may even serve well enough for special circumstances, but
which has simply no relevance to the future. It is where the
world was, not where it is going."
Mr. Chairman, both comments, a century apart, are
eloquent. I believe they were both, at least in part, wrong.
We were neither sailing a summer sea then, nor are we about
to fall off the edge now. The world's troubles are great and
our problems in dealing with them manifest. This committee
is devoting its serious thought to some of those problems.
Intelligence cannot help a nation find its soul. It is
indispensable, however, to help preserve that nation's safety
while it continues the search.
How Margaret Chase Smith
Would Monitor the CIA
The former senator, for years a maverick member of CIA subcom-
mittees, tells why Congress has been derelict in preventing presiden-
tial and other abuses of intelligence operations. Her plan for revamp-
ing CIA oversight procedures is set forth for Freedom at Issue.
by Margaret Chase Smith
The President's Feb. 17 reorganization of intelligence ser-
vices did not recommend changes in congressional oversight
of intelligence. Former Senator Smith discusses this aspect
of intelligence reforms.
A s a former member of senatorial subcommittees. on the
Central Intelligence Agency, I view the congressional
investigations and revelations on the CIA with mixed reac-
tions.
I have not the slightest doubt about the justification of the
investigations. I have not the slightest doubt that some good
can come from the investigations and the revelations. I have
not the slightest doubt that this is long overdue. I have not
the slightest doubt that Congress has been derelict in its
responsibility on the CIA. And I have not the slightest doubt
about the right of the American public to know.
I have these feelings because of frustrations and concerns I
had as a member of senatorial subcommittees on the CIA.
Because of my seniority on the Senate Armed Services
Committee and on the Senate Appropriations Committee, I
was entitled to go on the Senate CIA subcommittees long
before I was admitted to them. I was blocked by the senior
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Republican on these committees, because he viewed me as a
"boat rocker"-so much so that the second Republican
position on the CIA committees was not tilled rather than
admitting me to the subcommittees. But it finally reached
the point at which the chairman of the CIA subcommittees
told the senior Republican that it was no longer tolerable for
me to be kept off the subcommittees.
It was under these circumstances that I finally went on the
CIA subcommittees. Once on, I experienced constant
frustration. First, I found it particularly difficult to get
responsive answers from CIA Director Allen Dulles. For
example, he refused to give the subcommittees, at my
request, a comparison of United States and Russian
strengths, military and otherwise, throughout the world and
nation by nation. Second, when I pressed him to do so none
of my colleagues on the subcommittees supported me and so
Dulles' defiant refusal stuck.
These experiences were disillusioning. Yet I can under-
stand the attitude of my colleagues who refused to support
my interrogation of the CIA director. They displayed the
weakness of not wanting to have the responsibility of
knowing what was going on in, and being done by the CIA. I
cannot condone this in the slightest. But I can understand
it-and I will tell you why.
Consequences of leaking
Leaking to the press is a prevalent congressional disease.
Too many congressmen and senators do it for their own
political self-promotion for headlines and currying favor
with the news media. Some conscientious members,
therefore, did not want to know too much lest they be
suspected of leaking to the press what some of the headline-
hungry and news-media-favor-seeking legislators did, or
might, leak to the press. It was very simple-if they didn't
know, then they couldn't be suspected of leaking.
The "leakers" in Congress are not hard to spot. And I
know the feeling about them. When it was proposed that the
CIA subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropria-
tions Committees be enlarged to include some senators
outside those committees and include a senator who was a
notorious "leak," I served notice that if he went on the
subcommittee I would resign because I would not take
responsibility for the probable leaks he would make.
If the congressional committees investigating the CIA
were free of subjective partisanship, I would have far less
concern about what they are doing. But, in my opinion, there
has been distressing subjective partisanship. In some
respects, these CIA congressional investigations remind me
of the congressional "witch hunts" conducted by the late
Senator Joseph McCarthy-and we all know what great
damage the McCarthy "witch hunts" did to the State
Department. In some measure, what Joe McCarthy did to
the State Department in the 'fifties, current congressional
investigating committees are doing to the CIA in the
'seventies. Unchecked, these activities will greatly
undermine, if not destroy, our intelligence capability so
essential to our national and international security.
So often, though, we find the "kettle calling the pot
black." In the strident criticism by extreme anti-CIA
elements, President Ford was charged with "politically
exploiting" the case of the assassinated CIA agent because
the President gave him full military honors and burial. The
assassination was caused by those who blew the agent's
cover. It hardly behooves critics of the CIA-who have
deliberately blown the CIA's cover for their own self-
aggrandizing political exploitation-to sit in judgment, cry
"foul" and criticize President Ford for honoring a CIA
agent who gave his life for his country as surely as any soldier
killed in combat.
Such hypocritical criticism comes closely on the heels of
the revelation of the cover-up by the Senate committee
investigating the CIA. There were strongly indicated
intimate associations of the late President Kennedy with an
attractive associate of the underworld who might have been
contacted by the CIA with respect to political assassination
of a foreign leader. The defense of the chairman of that
committee that it was the unanimous decision of the
committee so to act is not only unacceptable but an insult to
the intelligence of the American public. A cover-up decision
is wrong-even if it is bipartisan-and unanimity does not
bestow sanctity upon it. How ironic for a congressional
committee exposing the covert actions of the CIA to be
guilty itself of a political cover-up!
If there is a valid distinction-if there is a valid
rationalization-if there is a justification-then tell it to the
widows, children and parents of the CIA agents slain or
about to be slain.
Perhaps the most significant revelation about the CIA has
been the flagrant, personal, presidential exploitation of the
CIA. Such presidential abuse is in direct contrast to the past
congressional dereliction on oversight responsibility. But, in
view of the necessarily inherent secret character of the
international and national security mission of the CIA, what
is the proper and responsible middle ground between the
partisan extremes of presidential exploitation (under the
guise of national security) and past congressional dereliction
and current congressional exploitation (under the guise of
"the right to know" and "freedom of information")?
A plan to monitor the CIA
Only a veritable Solomon could provide the an-
swer-mine is certainly no better than others. Because of the
irresponsible leakage that stems from inherent congressional
partisanship. I would recommend the abolition of
congressional committees on the CIA. Instead, I suggest the
creation of a permanent (not ad hoc) five-member joint
commission composed of representation from the three
branches of government and from the public.
I recommend that the Legislative branch be represented
by the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore
of the Senate because they are the elected heads of their
legislative bodies. I recommend that the Judicial branch be
representated by the most junior Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court because that Justice would be
chronologically freshest from ranks outside the Supreme
Court. I recommend that the Executive branch be
represented by the Vice President, rather than the President,
to avoid a conflict between prior presidential direction of the
CIA and subsequent presidential oversight of the CIA.
My choice for the fifth member and chairman of the
commission would be a representative of the public
appointed by the President and confirmed by the House as
well as the Senate. I would require that the public
representative and chairman be a person not of the same
political party as that of the President in order to assure
some element of political independence. Ideal for such
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representation would be an elder statesman of the stature of
the late Bernard Baruch or Eleanor Roosevelt.
The first function I would assign to such a commission
would be to write the charter for the CIA defining not only
its proper areas of activities but, as well, the proper
relationship between it and the President, the Congress and
other agencies of the government. The commission's second
function would be to police the CIA to insure compliance
with its charter-to police constantly and not sporadically.
Third, I would require its four government members to
accept the grave responsibility and accountability for the
actions of those branches of the government they represent.
If these five designated persons could not be trusted as
guardians against misconduct by the CIA, against
presidential personal and partisan exploitation of the CIA,
and against the congressional disease of leakage and
partisan exploitation of the CIA in sensational hearings and
exposes, then who could?
Should the U.S. Use Covert Action
in the Conduct of Foreign Policy's
Why did we create the CIA in the first place? Is secrecy sinister? Can
covert actions make up for mistaken foreign policy? Would our
suspension of covert acts be tantamount to unilateral disarmament?
Some answers by a senior CIA officer.
by Arthur Lester Jacobs
T he question posed for governmental and public
consideration is whether the United States government
should use covert action in the conduct of its foreign policy.
The ambiance of our times is hardly conducive to
objective and sober consideration of this question.
Emotionalism and sensationalism are pandemic. The news
media have been filled with lurid portrayals of poisoned dart
guns, penetration, infiltration, assassination, lacking only a
sex angle which may yet come. The use of the pejorative
"Department of Dirty Tricks" neither provides facts nor
allows for reasoned discussion.
One would think that any discussion of this question
would have been preceded by the consideration of the
security threats to the United States and whether and what
types of action are desirable to meet those threats. It would
be pertinent, first, to examine the efficacy of various
methods of implementing our foreign policy.
But the opponents of covert action take the draconian
position that we should totally abandon our existing
capability for a variety of moral, legal and political reasons
and dismantle the organization for implementing it. Others
condemn such action in principle but grudgingly concede
that certain circumstances might justify it, while demanding
interdictions in some types of action and stringent
The author was an attorney, civil engineer, tax-division assis-
tant to the Attorney General and member of Treasury's Ex-
cess Profits Tax Council before becoming a career senior of-
ficial in the Central Intelligence Agency. During 19 years In
the CIA he monitored some of its most sensitive operations in
this country and abroad, and negotiated with foreign senior
officials, including the chief of state.
requirements for authorization and control. The more
extreme supporters of covert action oppose any change from
present authorization.
I do not write as an apologist or defender of any past
covert action, be it real, imagined or distorted. At the same
time, I would not, even if permitted, inventory past
achievements of covert action, except to voice my conviction
that they have served the nation well. I do not represent the
CIA or any other agency of government, or any elected or
appointed officer. I write as a private citizen on the use of
covert action as a legitimate means of protecting national
security and implementing our foreign policy, the needs for
reaffirming the validity of that means, and to point out the
dangers of abandoning it.
I share the concern about the possibility of our
government engaging in any unauthorized intervention
abroad, and particularly in a war. And I am just as
concerned with my civil liberties and those of others because
I know how they have been threatened before. As a retired
intelligence officer, I have no more or less qualification to
speak to the issue before us, which is essentially political.
What I do have is a body of experience in covert action that
may enable me to separate fact from fiction as to its use, its
limitations and its potential for misuse. And, if I can
dissipate some common misconceptions and allay some
misgivings and doubts, I will have made a contribution.
Definition of covert action
There is considerable confusion about the terminology of
the various types of secret operations and their substance.
Such terms as covert operations, clandestine operations,
covert intelligence, secret operations, secret intelligence,
covert action and others are being used interchangeably.
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In defining covert action, we can begin by excluding what
may be called, technically, secret intelligence. While
intelligence gathering may be done openly or secretly, the
collection of intelligence which is secret in nature or is
obtained by secret methods is called secret intelligence
operations. Conversely. counter-intelligence is the defense
against the collection of and use of our secrets by
governments and forces hostile to ours. The distinguishing
characteristic of secret intelligence and counter intelligence
operations from covert action is that the end product is
information.
In positive terms, covert action may be defined as acts in-
tended to influence events or attitudes in which governmen-
tal interest is concealed through secrecy or a visible facade
called cover. The end product in any covert action operation
is an act or a series of acts, not information.
Some illustrations of covert action operations may clarify
this further. They may range from a one-time publication of
a news report to the support of a publication over a longer
period of time. They can include sabotage and counter
sabotage. They embrace psychological warfare against a
pervasive ideology maintained over a long period of time, or
efforts directed to influencing the outcome of a single
political event.
Covert action may include the support of friendly
apolitical individuals or organizations as well as political
forces. It does not necessarily involve any monetary in-
ducements. It usually involves a confidential contact and
access to an individual in a position of influence or political
or apolitical power, based on the individual's confidence and
respect for the judgment and advice of the covert action of-
ficer.
Covert action is not necessarily concealed from the
government of the country where the action is being con-
ducted, when it is in mutual interest that the operation be
conducted free from publicity in both countries, as it was in
Laos.
Covert action can include economic action to acquire
materials vital to our interests and to deny them to those
governments and forces which could use them against us,
where the acknowledgement of governmental interest could
prejudice the success of either action.
Covert action can include acts which are innocent of
themselves when governmental interest is thought to be more
effective without governmental attribution or a label on
them. Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe broadcast for
years to the communist world when governmental funds and
guidelines were concealed because to acknowledge them
would detract from their effectiveness. Both radios now
broadcast using overt U.S. funding.
Covert action can be a force for peace and against violence
by disrupting or blocking unconstitutional and violent acts
which can be a disservice to our interests.
Covert action can be used positively to engender and sup-
port organizations, individuals, attitudes and events in
American interests and defensively to neutralize and counter
forces against our interests.
In sum, covert action has as great flexibility and variety in
form and substance as can be devised to meet a given task or
an assigned requirement.
Most important, in examining past and present critical
reviews it has been and is postulated that no covert action
should be undertaken without the authority of the policy
making elements of our government. (So far as I am aware,
no such operations are being conducted presently without
such authority; and during the time of my association with
such operations, I knew of no covert action without it.) It is
further postulated that the covert action under discussion is
that directed solely against foreign forces inimical to
American interests. Third, it should be agreed that the covert
action agency should be divorced to the maximum extent
possible from ultimate policy making.
Whether covert action operations could be better
managed by the agency responsible, should be controlled
more closely by the policy-making levels of government,
should be limited in scope and type, should have closer
Congressional oversight, could be conducted more
economically, should be divorced from secret intelligence
and counter-intelligence operations-all these are important
questions and there is a wide range of answers to each of
them. However, these answers are beyond the scope of this
review since we are fundamentally discussing the validity of
a function of government in the long-term interest of the
United States and Americans of future generations. For the
purpose of this discussion, I accept the disability that the
defeats of covert action operations, real or imagined, are
orphans laid on the doorstep of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and its achievements and successes must re-
main unknown. If the cynicism and distrust generated by
past misuse and abuse of the governmental processes is to
color our judgment for the future, all of us can suffer.
The question we are examining is not new. The
Rockefeller Commission report lists ten different official ex-
ternal examinations of the functioning of the intelligence
community going back to 1949, some covering the specific
question before us. It has been debated extensively in private
and public forums and the news media.
In 1974, the Senate considered this question before us and
rejected Senator Abourezk's bill, 68 to 17, to bar all covert
action and the House rejected Congressperson Holtzman's
bill, 291 to 108, to bar specific political action against
foreign governments. But the Foreign Assistance Act of
1974 in effect required the President to rind that funds ex-
pended in covert operations in foreign countries are impor-
tant to the national security and to report a description of
such operations to the Senate and House Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the other appropriate Congressional
committees. The current committee hearings of both houses
of the Congress are still in process.
The most recent in-depth study of the question is that of
the so-called Murphy Commission, authorized by statute in
1972, in which the question of covert action was discussed
within the context of the title of its report, "The Organiza-
tion of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy."
The twelve-person committee consisted of two senators, two
representatives, two from the executive branch, and six from
private life. The committee chairman was former Am-
bassador Robert D. Murphy and a large staff was headed by
two former senior State Department officers. After two
years of study and extensive hearings, a report was issued on
June 27, 1975. One salient conclusion was that
Covert action should not be abandoned but should be employed only
where such action is clearly essential to vital U.S. purposes, and then
only after careful high level review. I
Leaving aside the interpretation of what is "clearly
essential to vital U.S. purposes," I subscribe to that
I I h, end other not- ue on page 19
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Why did we create the CIA in the
first place?
conclusion. The Murphy Commission report in toto and the
section dealing with covert action merit particular
consideration because they consider covert action as a
function of foreign policy.
It is in the interest of all of us that the question before us be
resolved by our government quickly after exhaustive inquiry
and thoughtful study. Prolonged delay in this process can
only serve to exacerbate the damage that has been done to
the covert action capability directly and to the national
interests indirectly, some of which damage may be
irreparable and some of which cannot be corrected for a long
time.
History of covert action
There is almost a tacit assumption that covert action is of
recent spontaneous origin. A resume of the history of such
operations may dispel this misconception and indicate their
potential usefulness in current and future events.
Covert action is as old as the moment when man first
believed it desirable to conceal his participation in events.
Covert action by governments is as old as governments for
the same reason. It was not invented by the U.S.
Government or CIA2 As early as the fourth century B.C.,
the Chinese Sun Tzu, author of the classic "The Art of
War," wrote basic doctrine on covert action by
governments 3
It is a well developed technique in current use by nations
and forces hostile to us. It is also a method used by
democracies allied with or friendly to our own, to protect
their own security and to further foreign policy. It is a
method employed by Third World governments.
Early in American history, the Continental Congress
engaged in covert action in Bermuda to enlist the support of
Bermudan citizens in obtaining gun powder and other war
materiel for our own revolution.' In the same period we
engaged in covert paramilitary action in providing arms and
otherwise supporting the privateers who were attacking
British shipping. In 1847, President Polk instructed his
consul in Monterey in covert political action to insure that if
California seceded from Mexico it would join the United
States and not England.'
In World War I, the German government engaged in
covert attempts to incite the Mexican government against
ours. When this was discovered by the British government
through secret intelligence in deciphering a telegram to the
German Ambassador in Mexico, the British government
used this same information brilliantly in a psychological
warfare campaign designed to involve us in the war.
Before World War II, both communist and fascist
governments engaged in covert paramilitary action in the
Spanish Civil War. Before and during World War II, the
Nazi government engaged in an effective covert action
against the Czech and Austrian governments and waged an
effective campaign of psychological warfare, political
subversion and black propaganda to demoralize the allied
continental powers.
The American government did not establish a permanent
organization for secret foreign intelligence, counter-
intelligence and covert action until after World War II. The
failure of intelligence at Pearl Harbor, making it evident that
there was a need to establish a permanent civilian
intelligence organization, culminated in the organization of
the CIA in 1947.
But it was the events that followed World War 11 that
impelled the organization of a covert action arm of our
government. When first organized in 1947, CIA had only a
very limited covert action charter, which was insufficient to
meet the requirements of the historical situation in which we
found ourselves. While Russia was fighting for her life on the
western front during the war, the satellite communist parties
in Asia and elsewhere continued a program of clandestine
action. But following the victory of World War II the USSR
renewed its goal of communist expansion into Europe. It
expanded its political borders by the absorption of
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and expanded its political
hegemony over Eastern Europe into Poland (through a gross
violation of the Lublin agreement), Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary and East Germany. This was accomplished with
relative ease in those defeated countries with their war-
ravaged economies. The continuing Soviet military and
civilian presence and, of course, the local communist parties
insured de facto control. Any attempt at political
independence or democratic government in those countries
was ruthlessly suppressed. The Soviets tried and failed to
establish satellite states in Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey
where they had no military presence, through covert action
backing dissident and guerrilla movements. The Soviets
tried to expand in the Middle East through setting up a
puppet Republic in Azerbaijan. Perhaps the most sickening
example of expansion of the Soviets was their ruthless
subversion of democratic government in Czechoslovakia by
a combination of political pressure and clandestine action
culminating in the so-called suicide of Jan Masaryk, and the
absorption of that country within the Communist bloc.
The Soviet desire for such controlled buffer states is
understandable but not excusable given their methods. The
real threat to Western interests and the free world was
signalled by the organization of the Cominform in 1947, and
a large scale covert action campaign to take over Western
Europe, not only for ideological and political authority over
those countries but also for their natural resources and
industrial capability. Soviet efforts were massive at every
level: political, through their satellite parties; military
threats and overt political pressure backed by a wide scale
covert action program through subversion; and in labor,
youth, and student organizations through a number of
communist international front organizations, using local
communist parties and Soviet clandestine agents. Western
Europe was weak and vulnerable to these assaults. The
Allies' military presence had been drastically reduced;
European economies had been wrecked by the war; and vast
rebuilding programs would have to be completed before
normal agricultural and industrial life could be restored. The
democratic political parties had been liquidated during the
occupation, except for those returned from exile. When their
leaders returned they found their parties fragmented, and
without organization and resources. France and Italy
particularly teetered on the brink of communist takeover.
The communist efforts were not limited to Europe.
Communist clandestine efforts began in strength in the
Middle East and the Far East, notably in Malaysia, the
Philippines and China.
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The first outright Soviet challenge came in the Berlin
blockade in 1948. While it is difficult to pinpoint any one
event or period as crystallizing American popular and
political opinion it is my belief that this was rightly viewed as
a threat not only to Western Europe. but to the free world
and the United States. We were the only economically
healthy nation among the Western allies, and if we were
going to take a stand, this is where it had better begin. We
had not expended our men and resources to defeat the fascist
plan to conquer the free world only to allow that world to be
taken over by the communists. The American response was
marked by a dogged determination not to be forced out of
Berlin as evinced by a remarkable achievement, the Berlin
air lift and, perhaps most important, by Marshall Plan
assistance to Western Europe.
It was felt that these overt efforts were not enough to meet
Soviet clandestine actions all over Europe. In 1948. on the
initiative of the policy making agencies of government,
rather than of CIA, a mechanism was created within CIA to
meet the global clandestine threat and supplement the overt
action of our government. The Soviets were already active in
the field through their own covert action resources to negate
American diplomatic and economic aid. Communist
controlled labor unions tried to block the unloading of
Marshall Plan supplies at Marseilles.
The CIA was late in the field and, in the vernacular, had to
play catch-up ball. American covert action officers had to be
trained and deployed in the field. Time was needed to
develop agent resources and begin a program of covert
action to meet and turn back the Soviet effort. Democratic
political structures had to be revived and strengthened and
psychological warfare programs begun to revive the
democratic spirit in Western Europe.
The covert action component of CIA, already strained,
was also asked overnight to counter the communist
clandestine action along the perimeter of South Asia, and in
North Asia after the outbreak of the Korean War.
Through a combination of diplomatic action, economic
assistance and covert action, backed by good intelligence,
the communists' expansion was arrested. It is conservative
to say that American covert action made a substantial
contribution. Given the age of the covert action component,
the urgency of the requirements levied on it, and its limited
experience, it had made relatively few mistakes and had done
well.
Communist expansion in the Northern hemisphere
through overt and covert means having been arrested, the
communist powers turned to Africa and Latin America. The
unsuccessful Cuban effort for revolution in Bolivia in 1967
through Che Guevara is a conspicuous example in South
America. The Soviet/Cuban paramilitary effort to
communize southern Africa is evident in Angola.
Covert action in foreign policy
Governmental action between nation-states has tradi-
tionally been conducted by the heads of states, directly or
through ambassadors, or through war or threat of war. The
range of the peaceful relationship between states has
broadened in recent years to include economic, technical.
cultural, scientific and peaceful military contacts, but these
still are subsidiary functions of the foreign policy of the
states involved. In the furtherance of national interests with
another state or group of states or the protection of the
Covert action is no better or
worse than the foreign policy on
which it is predicated.
security of the state, the choice remains essentially between
the diplomatic and the military.
War or the threat of war is inherently the undesirable
alternative. It not only has the potential for enlargement to
other states beyond those initially involved, but today it has
the almost unthinkable potential for increase from the level
of conventional weapons to the nuclear. History has taught
us that even a military victory may be Pyrrhic because of the
economic and social disruption. Recent history has also
shown that conventional military force has a limited
capability against guerrilla warfare or terrorist action.
Similarly, peaceful diplomatic action even by a major
political power such as our government has distinct
limitations. Even the most forceful diplomatic
representations can be unproductive and even counter-
productive. This has also been true of the proffer of
economic, technical or military support or the threat of their
withdrawal. Further, where there is no direct or indirect
communication channel between our government and the
foreign state concerned, the use of diplomacy may be
difficult if not impossible.
The choice between force or the threat of force and the
diplomatic channel are almost by definition antithetical
alternatives, both of which publicly and openly involve the
state. Covert action is not necessarily a complete alternative
to either force or diplomacy, but it may be a complement or
supplement to both. It may provide a flexible optional course
of action with a wide range of mutations in expression which
cannot be fully or completely satisfied by either course of
overt action. It is equally fundamental that covert action is
not necessarily a weapon of last resort. There may be
international situations that do not lend themselves to any
course of affirmative action, and the government concerned
must await developments to evolve naturally to the point
where no action is needed or desirable, or deteriorate to the
point where affirmative action becomes a matter of national
necessity.
in any case, the use of covert action is no better or worse
than the foreign policy on which it is predicated. Covert
action cannot make permanent positive gains or
permanently neutralize hostile forces unless the foreign
policy involved is enunciated and carried out to back up the
covert action which is authorized.
But where the foreign policy is firm and backed by
governmental action, covert action has a number of
favorable attributes. The techniques employed are not
limited by the methodology and conventionality of overt
action. Covert action can be limited in size and duration to
the requirements of particular situations and are not so
susceptible to the application of Parkinson's Law.
By the same token, and possibly more important, the
covert approach does not involve a public commitment of
the government and its prestige to a position and a course of
action from which it may be difficult to withdraw or reduce
without damage. The scope and pace of covert action may be
enlarged, reduced or terminated as the action develops.
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 Cumulative Index of Freedom at Issue
Approved For qlp kqJ ~J gla _F IAf rr q134l)4R000100520047-7
Advice to U.S. and India-from an Indian: P. K. Roy The Quota Mentality N/D 1973-10 Social Disorganization as a Threat to Freedom (Theodore A.
Mr/Ap 1972.3 Busing: Sumberg) N/D 1974-12
Advocacy, Busing Is Not the Issue (John A. Morsel!) My/Je 1972-12 Gastil's Response to Sumberg N/D 1974-14
The Cement of Civilization (William H. Stringer) S/O 1971-7 Is "Busing" A Scare Word? (Freedom House special committee) Comparative Survey of Freedom (Gastil) JaIF 1975-3
Affirmative National Leadership Toward Equal Opportunity: Jl /Ag 1972-16 JaIF 1976-11
Freedom House Board of Trustees N/D 1974-2 Will "Phase 2" Calm the Boston Schools? (James Worsham) Compeeat Repression, The: Raul S. Manglapus Mr/Ap 1975-10
Africa: S101975-7 Congress, the President and the War Powers: Robert Yeager
Africa-Individual Rights Widely Protected (William R. Cotter) Busing Is Not the Issue: John A. Morsell Myy/Je 1972-12 N/D 1972.7
Ja/F 1971-10 Byrnes, Robert F.: When the Academic Door to Peking Opens Conquest, Robert: Maxima Carta J!/Ag 1973-5
Africa: Bars to Opposition Increasing (William R. Cotter) Mri,vp 1972-6 Constitutional Crisis: Gale McGee My/Je 1973-7
JaIF 1972-9 Calcutta: Continuing Crisis in the Universities: Nicholas It. Farnham
Africa: Not A Happy Year (William R. Cotter) Jo/F1973-16 A Dying City Out of Hand (Aaron Levenstein) N/D 1971-1 JaIF 1974-22
Africa-Tensions Ease in Independent Black Africa (Leslie Rubin) Call to Action: Negro7Labor Coalltion:Norman Hill N/D 1971.7 Corporate Politics on Campus: Sidney Hook S101970-11
JaIF 1974-16 Cambodia: Cotter, William R.:
Africa: Survey '75 (Leslie Rubin) JaIF 1975-9 Into a Dark, Bottomless Hole (Leo Cherne) S101975-10 Africa-Individual Rights Widely Protected JaIF 1971-10
Africa: Survey '76 (Leslie Rubin) JaIF 1976-29 Campaigns, Political: Africa: Bars to Opposition Increase JaIF 1972-9
Agar, Herbert: The Darkest Year: Britain Alone (book review by On TV News-Twisting (Katherine Gauss Jackson) N/D 1971-14 Africa: Not A Happy Year Ja/F 1973-16
Leonard R. Sussman) My/Je 1974-22 Can Extremists Using TV Move An Audience? (Roger Cracks in the Liberal Alliance: Nicholas Capaldi S101973-26
Agency for International Development (AID): Seasonwein and Leonard R. Sussman) S101972-12 Cyclical Trends and Futurology: Seymour Martin Lipset
Murder In Montevideo: The AID/Mitrione Story (Ernest W. Canham, Erwin D.: The Human Factor S101973-7 S/O 1970-8
Lefever) S/01973-14 Capaldl, Nicholas: Cuba:
Agor, William Harris: Science at the Stake Mr/Ap 1971-6 Castro's Growing Dependence on the USSR (Robert J.
Is Chile Still Free?-A Test J!/Ag 1971-1 Cracks In the Liberal Alliance S101973-20 Alexander) N/D 1973.18
Latin American Legislatures-Their Role and Influence Case for Patriotism: Duane E. Smith My/Je 1973-9 Czechoslovakia-Communist Occupation:
Mr/Ap 1972-12 Castro's Growing Dependence on the USSR: Robert J. Alexander Mark the Soldier in the Photograph (A. B. Wierzbianski)
Alexander, Robert J.: N/D 1973-18 Ap. 1970-9
Social Democracy in Latin America Has A FutureMy/Je 1972-15 Cement of Civilization: William H. Stringer S101971-7 Defense of Straight Line Projections: Frank E. Armbruster
Report on Chile: Opposition Takes Offensive N/D 1972-9 Censorship: S101970-8
Castro's Growing Dependence on the USSR N/D 1973-18 India's Press Freedom (P.K. Roy) S101972-14 Democracy:
The Chilean Tragedy JaIF 1974-19 Watching the Watchdog (Gerald L. Sleibel reviews How CBS U.S. Support for Democracy in Poor Countries (Raymond Gastil)
Chile: A Year After the Military Copp N/D 1974-4 Tried to Kill a Book, by Edith Efron) Mr/Ap 1973-16 N/D 1971-9
American Freedom: Philip van Slyck Ja F 1976-20 Challenge of Watergate: Leo Cherne and Roscoe Drummond U.S.: Survey (Philip van Slyck) Ja/F 1975-2
American Violence: h-Myth: Freedom House Editors Jl /Ag 1973-2 Democratic Left in Latin America Has A Gloomy Future: Andres
Mr/Ap 1971-1 Characteristic Weaknesses in U.S. Arms Control Negotiations: Suarez S101972-10
Amnesty: William R. Van Cleave My/Je 1973.3 Democratic Ste
s in the USSR Would Help "Peaceful
Amnesty! (Bruce N. Kesler) Mr/Ap 1973-13 Cherne, Leo: Coexistence: Albert Shanker JaIF 1974-7
Armaments: see also Disarmament Students, I Salute You! N/D 1970-8 Detente:
Arms Race, No; R & D Race, Yes? (William R. Kintner,) Reflections on Two Dead Presidents Mr/Ap 1973-8 In Europe: Toward Several Detentes? (William E. Griffith)
Ap. 1970-1 The Challenge of Watergate JI /Ag 1973-2 Ja/F 1973-10
Two U.S. Dilemmas: Arms Sales and Aid (Philip W. Quigg) Institutional Revolt S101973-8 Solzhenitsyn-The Power of Humanity Mr/Ap 1974-2
Ja/F 1972-18 Into a Dark, Bottomless Hole S/O 1975-10 Every Detente Ends (Allan E. Goodman) Mr/Ap 1974-3
Armbruster, Frank E.: Chile: Detente: The Road Ahead (Allan E. Goodman) My/Je 1974-21
USA-1985: Straight Line to Chaos S101970-3 Is Chile Still Free?-A Test (Weston Harris Agar) J1 /Ag 1971-1 Mount the Helsinki Watch (Leonard R. Sussman) N/D 1975-4
A Defense of Straight Line Projections S101970-8 Latin America: Eyes on Chile (Frances Grant) Ja/F 1972.12 Diebold, William, Jr.: Art of Global Corporate Scanning
Armed Forces: see U.S.-Armed Forces Report on Chile: Opposition Takes Offensive (Robert J. Disarmament My/Je 1972-13
Arms Race, No; R & D Race, Yes?: William R. Kintner Alexander) Chilean Coup Completes Erosion of Freedom V/D 1973-2 We Most Not Mismanage SALT II (Henry M. Jackson)
f
Ap. 1970-1 MylJe Art of Global Corporate Scanning: William Diebold, Jr. The Tyranny of Chaos (Ernest W. Lefever) Ja/F 1975-23 Characteristic Weaknesses Negotiations
U.S. Arms Control Ne 119s
My/Je 1972-13 Chile A Year After the Military Coup: Robert J. Alexander (William CharR. Van Cleave) ne MylJ
Ashby, Lord: A Hippocratic Oath for the Academic Profession NID 7444 Prevention of n of Nuclear clear War ar In y/J C.
(with George R. Urban) N/D 1975-20 Chilean Tragedy: Robert J. Alexander J/F aIF 9ar In a World of Uncertainty (Fred C.
1974-19 Ikle) My/Je 1974-7
Asia: China: Nuclear Disarmament Without Secret Fred C. lkle
Asia-Year of Transition (Robert Shaplen) Ja/F 1971-8 When the Academic Door to Peking Opens (Robert F. Byrnes) Y ( )
Asia: Profound Change (Lucian W. Pye) Ja/F 1972-4 Mr A 1972-6 SALT and Old Salts My/Je 1975.
2
In Asia: A Hopeful If Checkered Picture W. Robinson / p (Gerald L. Steibel) My/Je 1975-2
(Thomas Communications Revolution: Chinese Style (Ithiel de Sola Pool) Mount the Helsinki Watch R. Sussman N D 19754
(Leonard ) /
and William J. Burnds) JaIF 1973-7 S101974-13
Asia-Thais Reverse Continent's Trend SALT and CSCE: Problems of Soviet Compliance (Robert L.
(Lucian W. Pye) The Shaping of the "Red Guard Mind" (Miriam and Ivan D. Pfaltz raft, Jr. N D 1975-7
JaIF 1974-13 London) N/D 1975-14 g ) l
Dissent see also Russia
Asia: Survey '75 (Robert Scalapino) Ja/F 1975-12 Civil Liberties:
Helsinki and Asia: A Matter of Relevance (Donald C. Hellman) The University as Staging Ground to "Close Down the Courts" Where Are the American Dissenters? (Whitney North
N/D 1975-12 (Arthur Bestor) S/0 1970-9 Seymour, Jr.) Ja/F 1974-3
State of Freedom in Asia (Lucian W. Pye) Ja/F 1976-23 Cold War Revisionism: Abusing History: Robert James Maddox Libe al Marx Is Not
Bad Year for Freedom: Public Affairs Committee Ja/F 1971-6 S101972-3 Why D Marx I Democracy s "
MylJe For1971-1
Ball, George: Unilateralism J!/Ag 1973-8 Colleges and Universities: see also International Committee Why 'noughts" tand s" Here v Were Forbidden to Discuss "Forbidden
d rd R.
Bangladesh: on the University Emergency Douglas, Paul A.: In Ias, Paul A.: In the Fullness of Time (review by MLeoe Leonar1974-20
Advice to U.S. At India-From an Indian: (P. K. Roy) "Politicization" " of of Knowledge (Aaron Ixvcnstcin) Ap. /970-6 Sussman J1 A 1972-15
Mr/Ap 1972-3 Reconstitute Universities? (Paul Scabur) S/01970-1 Dr, ) r g
The Thomas Jefferson of Ban&ladesh MrlAP 1972-19 Corporate Politics Roscoe: o Paul: e:: The What About Challenge of Watergate of Wa.tergate J ,'Nr/Acs 1973-2
Barn 1973-2
/D 1 1
ids, William J.. In Asia: A Hopeful If Checkered Picture Students, I Salute e an You! Cleo Campus Cherne) (Sidney look) N/ !9979070--8 8 Drummond, Duker, Sam: A A Man for the Times JI/ /Ag Ail 19771-110
(Thomas W. Robinson and Barnds) JaIF 1973-7 Replies of A Candidate for College President (John H. Bunzel) Dying City Out of Hand: Aaron Levenstein N/D 1971-1
Basket Connection: George R. Urban N/D 1975-10 - N ID 1970-9
Beam, Jacob D.: Ambassador Beam Speaks Ja/F 1974-6 The Restoration of Academic Authority (Robert Nisbet) East Germany.
Behind the Berlin Wall: An Encounter In East Germany (Steven N/D 1070-18 Behind the Berlin Wall (Steven Kelman) N/D 1972.3
Kelman) N/D 1972-3 These "Quiet" Times at Berkeley My/Je 1971-6 Why the U.S. Should Not Recognize East Germany (an East
Belchman, Arnold: "Red Cells" at West Berlin's University (Ernst Nolte) German) Mr/Ap 1973-12
Beware the Proctors N/D 19704 My/Je 1971-7 Ecology.
The 5 Big Lies About the U.S. Mr/Ap 1971-5 German Youth Leaning East? (Ernst Nolte) S101971-1 Man-No Ecological Monster Richard Gambino) Jl1A 1971-7
Fascism U.S.A-A Decade Off? J!/Ag 1971-3 The University-Mission Betrayed (Harry D. Gideonse) ( g
University the Enemy of Simplification JaIF 1972-I6 S101971-9 When An the A: seecademmal Busing; icD Door oor to to in Peking Opens Colleges
O(Robert bert F. Byrnes)
Beloff, Max: The Threat to Universities Mr/Ap 1974-5 HEW Regionals-A New Threat to Educational Integrity Mhe e Byrnes)
Berkeley:. see Colleges and Universities
by
GOnth George R for the Academic Profession (Lord Ashby
Bcstor, Arthur: The University as Staging Ground to "Close Down N/D 1man) A Hippocratic
ty The University Is the Enemy of Simplification (Arnold Beichman wnh Ge. Urban) N D 1975-20
the Courts" S101970-9 Ja F 1972-16 g l
Beware the Proctors!: Arnold Beichman N ID / Efron, CBS Tried to Kill A Book (reviewer: Gerald
/D Force Faculty Quotas-HEW (Sidney Hook) Mr/Acs 1972-1 L L. Stei Steibel) Mr /Acs 1973-16
Bickel, Alexander M.: Semantic Evasions Jl /Ag 1972-12 Herod, Soren: Three Charters JI A 1973-6
The Press and Government: Adversaries Without Absolutes The Quota Mentality (John H. Bunzel) N/D 1973-10 Employment:
/ g
My/Je 1973.5 Continuing Crisis In the Universities (Nicholas H. Farnham) Will Protection From Imports Save U.S. Jobs? van SI ck
The Pentagon Papers/Times Adversaries Agree S101973-6 Ja/F 1974-22 (Philip 7 )
Aspects of Constitutional Position S101973.9 1973-11
The Threat to Universities (Max Beloff) Mr/Acs 1974-5 End of the Protestant Ethic: David Martin Me Mr/A A 1971-9
9
Blacks: see also Minorities A Fresh Commitment to Academic Integrity (Francis West) End of p 1Mr/A 1974-7 Equal Rig htsmericen Era.?. / Era?: Manchester Guardian S101971-12
High Cost of Discrimination (Walter W. Heller) J1/Ail 1970-1
Needed: Black-White Power (Gilbert Jonas) Mr/Ap 1971-12 Travail of a Moderate Student At Free University of Berlin The Quota Mentality (John H. Bunzel) V bi 1973-10
(language) / Michael Wolffsohn Mr A 1974.9 Q Rack Nonsense J1 Agg 1971-12 /
Two Years in Fayette Gilbert Jonas) S O 1971-13 ( ) / F The Government's Spur to Group Rights (Richard Gambino)
( ) / Council on Future of the University Sets Plans (Nicholas
Call to Action: Negro/Labor Coalition Hill Mytun 7974-1!
(Norman 1974
N ID Farnham) My/Je 1974-10 Affirmative National Leadership Toward Equal Opportunity
Book Reviews: /D 1971-7 The Idea of of A Modem University (Harry G. Frankfurt) (Freedom om House Board of Trustees) N/D 1974-2
S101974-19 Erosion of Democracy in South Korea: Robert A. Scalapino
The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko by Zhores A Medvedev Command Responsibility in Modem War: William V. O'Brien
(reviewer: Aaron Levenstein) Ap. 1970-6 J1/Ag..1970-6 Ethics: JaIF 1974-21
The Pursuit of Loneliness by Philip Slater (reviewer: Arnold Communications: Science at Stake (Nicholas Capaldi) Mr/Ap 1971-6
Beichman) Jl /Ag 1971-3 Communications Revolution: Chinese Style (Ithiel de Solo Pool) Europe:
Francis Pickens Miller: Review of an Autobiography (reviewer: S101974-13 Leonard R. Sussman) S101971-11 Communism: Europe-East and ofMovem (William iam (William am Griffith) F. Griffith) JJaIF 1972-6
In the Fullness ofTimebY Paul A. Douglas (reviewer: Leonard R. Mark the Soldier in the Photograph (A.B. Year f'(eul Drischle r/JalF Ap 197 1972-8
Sussman) J1/Ail 1971-15 . Wierzbianski) What About Europe? (Alvin Paul r) Mr Ap -8
Ap. 1970-9 In Europe: Toward Several Detentes (William E. Griffith)
of Conscience by Margaret Chase Smith (reviewer: Liberal Marx Is Not Democracy (Milovan Djilas) My/Je 1971-1 )
Leonard R. Sussman) J!/Ag 1972-15 "Red Cells" at West Berlin's Free University (Ernst Nolte) ith 1973-10
How CBS Tried to Kill a Book by Edith Efron (Gerald L. Steibel, My Je 1971-7 Europe: Atmosphere of Confusion (William E. Griffith) )
Ja F 1974-10
reviewer) Mr/Acs 1973-I6 German Youth Leaning East? (Ernst Nolte) /01977-1 /
The Darkest Year: Britain Alone by Herbert Agar reviewer: Europe: Survey '75 (William E. Griffith) Ja/F 1975-15
Leonard R. Sussman) Y (reviewer:
1974-22 The Way Into the Impasse (Mihajlo Mihajlov) Mr/ 1971-5 European American E. Griffith) 1976-31
/ Communism's Democratic Opposition to the "New Po ley"
llIF 1 European Americe rican Defense Burden-Sharing: Who Is to Pay How
How
Communism in Korea by Robert A. Scalapino and Clang-Slk Lee (Mihajlo Mihajlov) JaIF 1974-20 Much for What?: Robert L. Pfaltz raft, Jr. Ny/Je 1974-3
(reviewer Lucian W. Pye) JI/Ag 1974-10 Communism's Democratic Position to the "New Policy": Mihajlo European Security Conference. g y
Handbook of Communications (Leonard R. Sussman: reviewer) Mihajlov Ja/F 1974-20 Mount the Helsinki Watch (Leonard R. Sussman) N/D 19754
S/O 1974-13 Comparative Survey of Freedom: Raymond D. Gastil JaIF 1973- The Helsinki Basket Case M ster Scabur ND 1975-5
Briefs for Freedom:Gerald L. Sleibel S101972-20 2 o y (Paul Y) /
J1/Ail 1973-13 SALT and CSCE: Problems of So Compliance (Robert L.
Bunzel, John H.: JaIF 1974-9 Replies ofaCandidate forColle pproved' o'r77elease 2004/10/12: CIA-RDP&8971'f314 b"NaO -'urban) N%D1D 1975-7
975--10
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
Ile(sinki and Asia: A Matter of Relnance [Donald C. I lellnran) War Again? V D 1974.10
,4/D 1975.12 Gorerntacm'sSpur to Croup Riglus: Rsehard Gamhior
Failure of the Iilstorians:Oscar I landlin
Farnham, Nicholas H.:
Continuing Crisis in the t'nlcisllles Ja/F 1974.22
CaupcB on Future of Uni er city Sets Plans .(f i,-Je 1974.10
Fascism:
Fascism. U.S.A.-A Decade OR? (Arnold Ikichman)
l1/Ag 1971-3
Film Fascism?(I lerbert London)
SfrIAp 1973-9
15 DFxsertlers---Not Dissidents: Harry D. Gideonsc Ja/F 1974.4
Film:
Film Fascism? if lerbert London) Mrl.4p 1973-9
Flydsrttt:
Finnish Neutrality-Example or Warning? (Wolf H. I /abed and
George Urban) Alr/Jr 1975-7
Finnish Neutraity- Example or Warning?: Wolf H- I lalsti and
George Urban Mr/Jr 1973-7
Fischer. Wolfram: The Student Rnol[ in Gnmany S/O 1972.7
Fire Big Lies About the US.: Arnold Beichman Sfr/Ap 1971-5
Force Faculty Quotas: Sidney I look WrlAp 1972.1
Foreign Policy: see U.8.-Foreign Poky
Framework for Freedom: Ferdinand A. Hermcns Mr/.4p 1974.17
Frankel, Charles: International Committee on the Unherslty
Emergency N, ,D 1970.1
Frankfurt. I tarry G.: The Idea of a Modern Uaherskv
S;O 1974.19
Free Unlrushy of BarOn: see Colleg" and Urdwnetiee
Fresdortc.rce also ChB Lined/..; 8wsy of Freedom
The New Criteria of Freedom ( Raymond D. Gasul) Ja/F 1973-2
The Map of Freedom Jo/F 1973-3
Freedom How.. Board of Trustees:
Not Recrimination, But Resolse JaI F 1971.1
Toward A New American Consensus Mr`A 1973-2
Impeachment and the Healing of the Nation (1 r/Jr 1974.1
ARrmative .Action Needs National Leadership N; D 1974.2
"Not Good" Is Not Good Enough :tl, Ap 1975.2
Freedom House. Editors:
Who Is Responsible for the Race Problem J1/.4g /970.2
American Violence: ~ -Mytb .ilr/.4pp 1971.1
Questions We Ask Nixon, McGocem ;4`/D /972.1
Freedom How.. Public Affairs Comvn)t(ar.
Bad Year for Freedom Ja/F 1971.6
Slate of the World: 1972 Ja/F 1972.1
Freedom House. Bp.cial CominIti r.
Is "Busing" A Scare Word? i//.4g 1972.1d
Freedom House. Wide Memorial Building:
The Superior Man in America (Roy Wilkins) Mr/Je 1973.15
Reminiscence and Rededication (harry D. Gideonse)
(l r/Jr 1973-17
Freedom of the Prsaa
India's Press Freedom (P.K. Roo) 5/O 1977.14
Watching the Watchdog (Gerald L. Steibel reviews Edith tfron s
I low CBS Tried to Kill A Book/ Afr/Ap 1973.16
The Press and Gosernment: Adsersarles Without Absolutes
Afr/Je 1973.5
The News Media and the Gosemment: (lash of Concentrated
Power S/O 1973-3
The Pentagon Papers (Alexander M. Bickel and Whitney North
Seymour. Jr.) S/O 19736
The Human Factor (Erwin D. Canham) S/O 1973-7
Press and Gorernmeot: Aspects of Consitutianal Pusitlon
(Alexander M. Bickcll S101 973-9
The Incitation of America (Leonard R. Sussman) S101974_3
The Indian Press Under Pressure (C.R. Irani) MrJAp 1975-7
Freedom Radios Tuned to the 70's .(I rile 1972-17
Fresh Commitment to Academic Inlegrily: Francis West
SlrtAp 1974-7
Fuhrr.
USA-1985: Straight Line to Chsas (Frank E. Armbruster)
5/0 1970.3
Cyclical Trends and Futurology (Martin Seymour Upset)
S/0 1970.7
A Defense of Straight Line Pro)ectbns IF rank E. Armbruster)
S,'O 19708
Gallagher, Buell G.:
John Morseil: The People's Intellectual .V `O 1974-19
Gambino, Richard:
Mind-Blowing Tactics of Resolution Jl/Ag 19706
Man No Ecological Monster Jl/Ag 1971.7
Tice Militant Mentality: Chic Idol of Today sTrier ll/Ag 1972-8
Watergate Lingo
.V/D 1973.7
The Government's Spur to Group Rights
Sfr/Jr 1974.11
Gardner. Richard N.: laternatfonat Organuatkar
-A Mixed
Report
Ja/F 1971-14
Oaatlt, Raymond D.:
Should "Regional Cultures" Shape Public Potky'
-V/ D 1970-12
t' S. Support for Democracy In Poor Countries
.%/D 1971-9
The New Criteria of Freedom
la/F 1973-2
Comparatbe Surrey of Freedom II
Jl /Ag 1973-13
Comparatlse Sunny of Freedom III
Ja/F 1974.9
Comparatbe Surrey of Freedom IV
ll1Ag 1974.13
Soda] Disorganization as a Threat to Freedom: Response
.V/D 1974-14
ComparstheSurvey of Freedom V Ju/F 1975-3
ComparatheSursey of Freedom VI Ja/F1976.11
Generation Gap In Foreign Policy: Elliot L. Richardson
11/Ag 1971.15
German Youth Leaning Fast?: Ernst Nolte S101 971-1
Germany:
German Youth Leaning Fast? (Ernst Nolte) S/O 1971.1
Student Resoit in Germany (Wolfram Fischer) S1101972-7
The Radicalization of Germany? (George K. Romoser)
J1 /Ag 1974-17
Gld.orr., Harry D_*
A Man for the Times (Sam Dukcr)
JI/Ag 1971-10
The University: Mission Betrayed?
S/O 1971-9
The Philippines: Speak Frankly to Friends
ifr/A 1973.11
Rem fnlsctence and Rededication
:(f r/Je 1973.17
15 Dissenters-Not Dissidents
Jo/F 1974.4
Fad Warren
.5j0 1974-8
Goodman, Allen E.:
What Went Wrong in Saigon!
Ja/F 1972-14
Vietnam and the Limits of Scholarly [mention
9/U 1973.17
Emery Detente Ends
Sfr/Ap 1974.3
strmr, warner..
Lathe America: ILas Regression Run Its Cows,.? Jo/F 1971-13
Latin Atneri s: E)yrs on Chile Jar F 197,-12
/nuts America In Political Flux Ja/F 1973-14
lord.. Amer ca - - Erosion of Democracy ('ontiotus Ja/F 1974.17
Latin America: Surrey 75 JuI F 1975
lath America: Surrey 76 Jai F 1976.27
Ot611!!(, WiBsm E_
Europe Fist and Wnt
Europe -A Year of Mmenn rr
In Europe: Toward Snersd Detentes
Europe Atmosphere of Confasioa
Europe: Survey "75 E
HH Wolf H_ 16
Ja=F 19.'1-7
Jail' !972.6
Ja/F 1973.10
Ja;F 1974.10
Ja/F 1973.15
Jai F 1976-3!
Finnish Neutrality --Example or Warning? (with George Urban)
Hant n Oscar: .(fy/Je 1973-7
Resl,;atddsl 116ttwy; A Base foe Neo- Isoiatkasirm S/0 1971.2
Watergate: Refactions from Afar 5, 0 1973-11
The Failure of the Htstorlam 5;/0 1975.3
IIEW Raglan s :4 New Theat to Fd.rational lntegrlty: Sidney
I look .V/D 1971-5
I Fula, Walter W.: I ligh Cost of DiQimtnaHan J1 1.4g.1
I lellnun. Donald C.: I letsinki and Asia: A Matter of Re' hnce
ti/D1975.12
Helsstkl and Ash: A Mlaner of Relnauat: Don old C. Hellman
Nil) 1975-12
Helsinki Basket Cam Mystery: Paul Seabur) V'/D 1975-5
Hst" Cordn.nos. sir European Security CortMertos
I lermetn. lerdinand A.: Framework fan Freedom iir/Ap 1974-
/7
FRO Costoftyescriminatton:Walter W Idler 11/Ag /970.1
I lilt. Norman: Cal to Action: Negro/Labor Coalition
5/D 1971-7
ltlppocratk Oath for the Academic Profession: Lord Ashbs with
corporate (icon CO . Urban Y/ D 1975-.V
H
alesm Cates S;01970-/I
i DEW Regkruls. .t New Threat to Educational Integrity.
,V/Ii 1971-3
Face Fanny Quotas -11EW (lr/Ap 1972-1
Semanrk Enamors JI/Ae 1977.12
('hat the Cold War Was About 11 r/ Ap 19754
Hopkins, Scan- TneTwolrela?ds l) 'Ag 1973.16
Itow Much Does Freedom Mince? Daniel P. Moynihan
Mr/Jc 1075.11
Human Factor, The: Lrwin D. Canham S/O 1973.7
Ht.nan Rlphla:
11o'. X)udt Does Freedom Matter? (Daniel P. Moynihan)
Mr/J, 1975.11
Ls Teener A Design to I'm human Rights To Undermine the
Leyltlmarv of Precisely Those Nations Which ob,,er,,
Human Rights? (Daniel P days/ an) Jo/F 19764
Needed: Wider Disclosure of I lunar Rights Red)ties Abroad
I Leonard R. Sussman) Jo/F 19,6-9
Idea O( A Modern V'dsersh): t tarry G. Frankfurt S/0 1974.19
(
The MC WU Memility; Chic Idol of Today iTrle (Richard
Gambinol JI/Ag 19724
Bob, Fred C_
Prnemion of Nuclear War in a World o/Unmtahty
Alr/Jr 1974.7
Nu fear Disarmament Without Secrecy \I 'D /974-7
[inflation of America: Leonard R. Sussman SJO 19744
ImpascIsnant
Impeacbmrni and the Ilealntg of the Notate (Freedom I loose
Board of Trustm) .(1 rile 1974-2
1 ich
11, WWI Crisis (Gale Solent Afr/Je /973.7
India: AdsketoU:.S.&Indlaa fromanladlaniP.K Royt
Mr/Ap 1972-3
Ierdta's Press Freedom (P K. Ro) ) S/01972-14
Indian Press Under Presstue: C. R. Irani Mr/Ap 1973.7
toytituilxut Rnolt: Leo Cbernc S/O 1973.8
I=t ,r, 8tsing
If arm
Inte&siuafs, Scholars and the Common People (Dak Vice)
M(?/Jr 1975.3
IntsinrBonal Cormtttfse on the University Emergency-
international Commftiee our the t'nhcr#y Emergency (Charles
Frankel) 5/D 1970.1
It.. IC'I'E Was Formed: List of Signatory N:; D /970.2
Fat~~ag~Stalcaxoof[Cut. V/D1970-3
ineemedf[ated Massacre of Pakistaal Scholar Resealed by iCT!E
Al, /7, 1971-5
Internatbmal Committee oft the Utdters$y Emrmgene ; Charles
Frankel .4/D 1970.!
Interna[bnal Orgaeizrtiuos % Mixed Report Richard N.
Gardner Ja/F 1971-14
Intaa Dark Bottoolev }tole L e Clscrne 5/01975.10
Irani. C.R.. The Indian Press Under Pressure SfrjAp 1975.7
IrsEr(d:
TheTwo lrelaads(Sean Hopkins) l!/Ag 197346
Ia Chile StI9 Fire - A Test: Weston I lams Agor Jl /Ag 1971-/
Is T Ism A Design to ('me the Issue Of human Rights...?: Daniel
Patrick Moynihan la/F /976-4
terse( and the Arabs: Trading Borders For Peace: Elizabeth
Monroe Afr/Ap 1974.11
Fairest err /Addle East
Jackson. I tcnry Ml.: We Muse Not Manage SALT H
MyiJr 1973.2
Jackwn. Katherine Gauss: Ow TV Newj.TwEsehq V,D 1971.14
Japan:
Japan and the US.-New Directions tWilliam I I. Kintner)
S/0 1971.3
Japan and America In the 711'stNobuhiku Usluba) Jl/Ag 1972-5
Prospects for US.-Japan Rrlmtlom: Tie Durable Par(ne shlp
(Mas)ushi Ohiral S101974-10
Johnson. Ly neon Baines Reflection On Two Dead Presidents
(Leo (/terse) 4lr/Ap 1973-8
Needed: Black-While Passer .(fr/Ap 1971-12
Two Years in Fayette S101971-13
Kclman, Stereo.. Brft ni the Berlin Wall: An Encounter in East
Germany V/D 1972-3
Kesler- Bruce N.: Amnesty! :(1r/.-lp 1973-13
1Debasr, William R.:
Arms Race, No; R & D Race, Yes? Ap- 1970-1
Japan and the U.S.-New Directions S101971-3
Unwrapping the McCown Defense Plan J//Ag 1972-2
Kissinger, Henry A.: Titre to End Our Cnll War JI /Ag /973-0
Erosion of Democracy In South Korea (Robert A. Scalapino)
JalF 1974-2/
Korean Peninsula-- .Anther Vietnam?: Robert A. Sca apino
S101975-14
Labor.
Beware ofrheProctors!(Arnoll Beichman) V/D 1970-4
Cal to Action: Negro/Labor Coalition (Norman Hill)
Lam Am.rdca: N/D 1971-7
Latin America: liar Regression Run Its Course? (Frances Grant)
Ja/F 1971-13
labor America: Eyeson Chile (Frances Grant) Ja/F 1972-12
lath American Legislatures- -Their Role and Influence (Weston
I larris Agor) Afr/Ap 1972-12
Social Democracy In Latin America 11as A Future (Robert J.
Alexander) Md/Je 1972-15
Democratic Left in Latin America Has A Gloomy Future (Andres
Suarez) S101972-10
lath America in Political Flux (Frances Grant) Ja/F 1973-14
Latin America-Erasion of Democracy Continues (Frances
Grant) Ja/F 1974-17
Latin Amvnica;Sw-.ey '75 (Franc-cs Grant) Ja/F 1975-17
Latin America: Surrey '76 (Frances Grant) Ja/F 1976-27
Lee. Chong-Sik: Communism in Korea by Lee and Robert A.
Sealapinotreviewer: Lucian W. Pyc) Jl/Ag 1974-10
L..firer, Em.at W_
Murder in Montesldeo; the AID/Mitrlorte Story S101973-14
The Tyranny of Chaos -A Foamote on Chile Ja/ F 1975-23
Leniner. Howard I L: Rnolutionary Terrorism in Democratic
Society (Canner and Thomas J. Lewis) Mt?/Je 1971-3.
Lawn.bin, Aaron:
PoBlkiratlon" of Knowledge A p p 19706
A Dying City Out of Hand NI D 1971-1
Work-V.'hat Is Its Future? J1 /Ag 1974.5
Levy. Leon: Random Thoughts on Arabian Nightmares
Ja/F 1975.21
Lewis- Thomas J.. Resolutbnary Terrorism in Democratic Society
(I toward It. Lcntmr and Lewis) Abp/Je 1971-3
liberal Marx Is Not Democracy: Milovan Djilas Ali/Je-1971.1
Llkwonsm.
Cracks in the L lberal Alliance (Nicholas Capoldi) S101973-20
I tpsrtt. Seymour Martin: Cyclical Trends and Futurology
S101970-7
London, tlahert: Film Fascism? Sfr/A 1973.9
London. Miriam and Ivan D.: The Shaping of the "Red Guard
Mid" N/ D 1975-14
McGee. Gale: Constitutional Crisis 517?/Jr 1973.7
MaGovem. the
Unwrapping George.
rem Defense Plan (Willis. R. Kintner)
J1/.4g 1972-2
Questions W'e Ask Nhonn, McGovern (FI I editors) N/D 1972-1
Masi eish. Archibald: He Restored the Future S/01974-9
Maddox, Robert Jarrmw
Cold War Redsiooism: Abusing I //story S101972-3
Rerlskedsm and the Liberal IFistorians Sf t?/Je 1973.19
Man for theTimesfll. D. Gideose): Sam Duker JI/.Ig 1971-10
Man ---No Ecological Monster: Richard Gambino Jl/Ag 1971-7
Mar(glaptts, Raul 8.:
/larch) Law: The Truth and the Fiction J1 1.4g 1973-18
The ompleat Repression Sfr/Ap 1975.10
Margolis. Larry: Urban Ctisls is Not In the Citles ."0 /9706
Mar, the Soldier In the Photography: A. B. Wierzbianski
A p- 1970-9
Macon. David. The End of the Protestant Ethic i/r/Ap 1971-9
Mlaxfma Carta: Robert Conquest Jl/Ag 1973-3
Mayor Challenges Congress on Sharing: Richard G. Lugar
Middle East MrJJr 1971-8
Middle East: Many Wars, Little Freedom (Don Pcretz)
JalF 1971-12
Middle East: Restrictlors Increasing (Don Peretz) Jo/F1972-/1
Middle East: Unrest, Reprisals Crow (Dun Peretz) Ja/F 1973-18
Middle Essig- -War Removed Modes[ Progress (Dun PereLz)
Ja/F 1974-14
Lsrael and the Arabs; Trading Borders for Peace (Elizabeth
Monroe) Mr/Ap 1974-11
Middle Fast: Surrey 751 Don Peretz) Ja/? 1973-19
Middle Fast:~sey 76 (Dun Perctz) Ja/F 1976- 25
MI
The `ay into the Impasse ifr//Ap 1972-5
Communism's Democratic Opposition to the "New Policy"
Ja/F 1974-20
Why D}'Bas a d Mil ajlor Were Forbidden to Distress -Forbidden
is Here Sfr/Je 1974-20
Text of A let Dissenter's Appeal to Tto to Release MBtajlom
and Permit film to Write .(fr/Ap 1975-23
Mict$o Judged "In Far of The Ruler" SJ0 1975.22
Militant Mentality: Chic Idol of Today's Tribe: Richard Gambino
Jl/Ag 1972-8
Miller. Francis Pickens: A Southern Aristocrat Born Liberal
(review of an autobiography) S101971-11
Mimi-Biassing Tactics of Resolution: Richard Gambino
Minorities: err a&. Racial Discrimination i//Ag 19706
The Search for the Qppressed (Aaron Wildavsky) :V/D1972-5
The Quota Menality (John H. Bunzel) .YID 1973-10
Mortal, John A.:
Busing Is Not the Issue tl r/Je 1972-12
John Morsel]: The People's Intellectual (Buell G. Gallagher)
Detente;TlreRoad Ahead Appro did"FI uL Re @ 2b04/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-013` Cldl nb~1 ~2804'~R assman
N/D 1974-19
N/D 19734
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
Mgmihen, Daniel P.:
How Much Does Freedom Matter? My/Je 1975-11.
Is There A Design to Use The Issue of Human Rights to
Undermine The Legitimacy of Precisely Those Nations
Which Still Observe Human Rights Ja/F 1976-0
Multinational Corporations: Art of Global Corporate Scanning
My/Je 1972-13
Murder in Montevideo: The AID/Mitrione Story: Ernest W.
Lefever S/O 1973-14
Must the Third World Choose: Respect Human Rights or Abolish
Poverty?: Theodore A. Sumberg Mr/Ap 1974-13
Needed: Black-White Power: Gilbert Jonas Mr/Ap 1971-12
Needed: Wider Disclosures of Human Rights Realities Abroad:
Leonard R. Sussman Ja/F 1976-9
News Media: are also Press
On TV News-Twistng(Katherine Gauss Jackson) N/D 1971-14
The News Media and the Government: Clash of Concentrated
Power S101973-3
The Human Factor (Erwin D. Canham) S101973-7
Institutional Revolt (Leo Cherne) S101973-8
Press and Government: Aspects of Constitutional Position
(/tlexander M. Bickel) S/O 1973-9
News of Freedom House:
Four News Media Studies Probe Tel Coverage Ap. 1970-11
Teacher's Course Surveys Diverse Tests of Freedom Ap. 1970-12
Hoopes Cites FH Asian Report in Deescalation Ap. 1970-12
Board Elects Ned Bundler, Bums Roper, Max Singer
1970-16
Medvednev Is Arrested J1 /Ag 1970-16
Senator Smith Accepts FH Role To Help Bolster American
"Center"/Margaret Smith on Polarization S/O 1970-15
Meet Our Board of Contributing Editors My/Je 1971-20
No Unilateral Cut In European Force, FH Urges Congress
16
Social Scientist Has No Special Right (Abby Lerner)
lAg /971 17
Nicholas Capaidi Replies JI /Ag 1971-17
4,000 Books for 10 Teacher-Training Colleges In Ghana
J1/Ag 1971-18
Nisbet, Robert: Restoration of Academic Authority N/D 1970-18
Nixon, Richard:
Nixon Doctrine: What About Europe? (Alvin Paul Drischler)
Mr/Ap 1972-8
Questions We Ask Nixon, McGovern (FI-l editors) N/D 1972-1
North America:
North America: Extremists Test Democracy (Leonard aR. 1971-15
Sussman)
North America: Clash of Rights (Leonard R. Sussma
JalF n)
1972-7
North America: In Transition (Leonard R. Sussman)
JalF 1973-11
Nolte, Ernst.
"Red Cells" at West Berlin University My/Je 1971-7
German Youth Leaning East? S/O 1971-1
Northern Ireland:
The Two Irelands (Scan Hopkins) J1 /Ag 1973-16
"Not Good" Is Not Good Enough: Freedom House Board of
Trustees Mr/Ap 1975-2
Not Recrimination, But Resolve: Freedom House Board of
Trustees Ja/F 1971-2
Nuclear Disarmament Without Secrecy: Fred C. We N/D 1974-
7
Nuclear Power. see Disarmament
O'Brien, William V.: Command Reponsibility in Modern War
Jl/Ag 1970-8
Of Civil Disobedience: Eugene V. Rostow Mr/Ap 1971-3
011:
Random Thoughts on Arbatan Nightmares (Leon Levy)
F 1975-21
Portugal:
Revolutionary Summer (Leonard R. Sussman) 5/O 1975-18
prealdentlal Candidates: see also Campaigns, Political
Questions We Ask Nixon, McGovern (FH editors) N/D 1972-1
Presidential Power.
Congress, the President and the War Powers N/D 1972-7
A Constitutional Crisis (Gale McGee) My/Je 1973-7
Press:
Press Reaction (Survey of Freedom, 1970) Ja/F 1971-18
Watching the Watchdog (Gerald L. Steibel reviews How CBS
Tried to Kill a Book, by Edith Efron) Mr/Ap 1973.160
The Press Reaction (Survey, 1972) Mr/AP
The Press and the Government: Adversaries Without Absolutes
MylJe 1 1973-5
The Pentagon Papers/Times Adversaries Agree (Alexander M.
Bickel and Whitney North Seymour, Jr.) S101973-6
The Human Factor (Erwin D. Canham) S101973-7
Press and Government: Aspects of Constitutional Position
(Alexander M. Bickel) S101973-9
The Indian Press Under Pressure (C. R. Irani) Mrr/Ap1975-7
Press Reaction (Freedom Survey '75) n/ P 1975-11
Press and Government: Adversaries Without Absolutes: /~l Alexander
9 der
M. Bickel
Press and Government: Aspects of Constitutional Position:
Alexander M. Bickel S101973-9
Prevention of Nuclear War in A World of Uncertainty: Fred C.
lkle MylJe 1974-7
Proportional Representation:
A Framework for Freedom (Ferdinand A. Hermens)
Mr/Ap 1974-17
Prospects for U.S.-Japan Relations: The Durable Partnership:
Masayoshi Ohira /er 1974-10
Protest Demonstrations: A 1970-8
Politics in the Streets (Dan Rather) p
The University as Staging Ground to "Close Down the Courts"
(Arthur Bestor) S/O 1970-9
Beware of the Proctors! (Arnold Beichman) N/D 1970-4
Protestant Ethic:
The End of the Protestant Ethic (David Martin) Mr/Ap 1971-9
Pye, Lucian W.: 1972-4
Asia: Profound Change Ja/F
Asia-Thais Reverse Continent's Trend Ja/F 1974-13
Review: Communism In Korea by Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-
Sik Lee Jl/Ag 1974-10
State of Freedom in Asia Ja/F 1976-23
Quigg, Philip W.: Two U.S. Dilemmas: Arms Sales and F 1972 I8
Quota Mentality, The: John If. Bunzcl N/D 1973.10
Racial Discrimination:
High Cost of Discrimination (Walter W. lieller) J1/Ag 1970-1
Radicalization of Germany?: George K. Rontoser Jl/Ag 1974-17
Radio Free Europe: 1971-l7
Freedom Radios-Tuned to 70's M1'/Je
Urge "Full" Support of Freedom Radios S101975-21
Radio Llbert)r 1972-17
Freedom Radios-tuned'to 70's My/Je
Urge "Full" Support of Freedom Radios S101975-21
Random Thoughts on Arabian Nightmare: Leon Levy JalF 1975-21
Rather, Dan: Politics in the Streets 4 t. 1970-8
Reconstitute Universities?: Paul Seabury 5/10 1970-1
"Red Cells" at West Berlin University: Ernst Nolte My/Je 1971-7
Reflections on Two Dead Presidents: Leo Cherne Mr/Ap 1973-8
Reminiscience and Rededication: I larry D. Gideonse
MylJe 1973-17
Revenue Sharing:
The Mayor Challenges Congress on Sharing (Richard
MylJe G. ugar)8
Scalapino, Robert A.:
Urgent: Foreign Policy Debate (Scalapino and Paul Se
MylJe bhu y) 1
Erosion of Democracy In South Korea Ja/F 1974-21
Communism in Korea by Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee reviewer:
1 eLucian W. Pye) Jl/ F1974-10
Asia: Survey '75 /
The Korean Peninsula-Another Vietnam? S/O 1975-14
Science at the Stake: Nicholas Copaldi Mr/Ap 1971-6
Seabury, Paul:
Reconstitute Universities? S/01970-1
Urgent: Foreign Policy Debate (Robert A. Scalapino and Paul
Scabur)) My/Je 1972-1
The Helsinki Basket Case Mystery N/D 1975-5
Search for the Oppressed: Aaron W ildavsky N/D 1972-5
Seasonwein, Roger: Can Extremists Using TV Move an Audience
(Seasonwein and Leonard R. Sussman) S101972-12
Semantic Evasions: Sidney Hook J1/Ag 1972-12
Seymour, Whitney North, Jr.:
The Pentagon Papers/Times Adversaries Agree (Alexander M.
Bickel) S/01973-6
Where Are The American Dissenters? Ja/F 1974-3
Shanker, Albert: Democratic Steps in the USSR Would Help
"Peaceful Coexistence" Ja/F 1974-7
Should 'Regional Cultures' Mold Public Policy?: Raymond D.
Gastil N/D 1970-12
Shaping of the "Red Guard Mlnd":Miriam and Ivan D. Lon ondon
NID 75-14
Sino-American Relations:
2
When the Academic Door to Peking Opens (Robert
MrlAp F. Byrnes)
Smith, Duane E.: Case for Patriotism My/Je 1973-9
Smith, Margaret Chose:
Senator Smith Accepts FH Role to Help Bolster American
"Center"/Margaret Smith on Polarization S101970-15
Declaration of Conscience (reviewed by Leonard R. Sussman)
la15
Social Democracy in Latin America Has A Future (Robert J.
Alexander) Ny/Je 1972-15
Social Disorganization as a Threat to Freedom: Thcol re A.
NID 1974-12
Suntbcrg
Social History:
Should "Regional Cultures" Shape Public Policy (Raymond D.
Gastil) N/D 1970-12
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr.
Solzhenitsyn-The Power of Humanity Mr/Ap 1974-2
Unstable As Water, Thou Shalt Not Excel Jl /Ag 1974-3
South Korea:. see Korea
Spain:
Revolutionary Summer (Leonard R. Sussman) S101975-18
State Government
Urban Crisis is Not in the Cities (Larry Margolis) N/D 1970-6
Slate of the World: Ja/F 1971-1
197 Ja/F 1972-1
1472 2
Stelbel, Gerald:
Vietnam Election-Pre-Democracy NS /D 199 1971-3
13
Briefs for Freedom /
Summary: A Year of High Risks, High Stakes Ja/F 1973-6
Watching the Watchdogs Me/Ap 1973-16
SALT and Old Salts My/Je 1975-2
Stringer, William H.: Cement of Civilization S/01971-7
Student Activism:
"Politicization" of Knowledge (Aaron Levenstein) Ap. 1970-6
Reconstitute Universities? (Paul Scahury) S101970-1
Corporate Politics on Campus (Sidney Hook) S101970-11
Students, l Salute You! (Leo Cherne) N/D 1970-8
Student Revolt in Germany (Wolfram Fischer) 5101972-7
Suarez, Andres: Democratic Left in Latin America Has A
Gloomy Future S/01972-10
Sullivan, William H.: Why Did the Vietnam Peace- iiigne 1973 Sign
UrlAp -20
Sumberg, Theodore A.:
Must the Third World Choose: Respect Human Rig is or Abolish
Poverty? / / 197-13
Social Disorganization as a Threat to Freedom N/D 1974-12
Superior Man in America: Roy Wilkins My/ 1973-15
Survey of Freedom Issues: Ja/F 1971
Ja/F 1972
Ja/F 1973
Ja/F 1974
Ja/F 1975
Ja/F 1976
Oshira, Masayoshi: Prospects for U.S.'Japan Relations: The Revlslonlsm:
Durable Partnership S101974-10 Revisionist History: A Base for Isolationism (Oscar Handlin)
OnTV News-Twisting: Katherine Gauss Jackson N/D 1971-14 SlO 1972-2
Pakistan: Cold War Revisionism: Abusing History (Robert James Maddox)
Premeditated Murder of Pakistani Scholars Revealed by ICUE S101972-3
MylJe 1971-5 Revisionism and the Liberal Historian MylJe 1973-19
Pakistan University Deaths-Propaganda Aftermath (Leonard The Failure ofthe Historians (Oscar Iiandlin) S101975-3
R. Sussman) J//Ag 1971-6 Revisionist History: A Base for Isolationism (Oscar I landlin)
Patriotism: 5/0 1972-2
A Case for Patriotism (Duane E. Smith) MylJe 1973-9 Revolutionary Summer Leonard R. Sussman S101975-18
Penniman, Howard R.: U.S. Aid and Political Accommodations Revolutionary Terrorism in Democratic Society: I Toward H.
in South Vietnam Mr/Ap 1975-9 Lentner and Thomas J. Lewis My/Je 1971-3
Pentagon Papers/Times Adversaries Agree: Alexander M. Bickel Richardson, Elliot L.: Generation Gap in Foreign Policy Jl /Ag
and Whitney North Seymour, Jr. S101973-6 1971-15
Peretz, Don: Robinson, Thomas W.: In Asia: A Hopeful if Checkered Picture
Ja/F 1973-7
Middle East: Many Wars, Little Freedom Ja/F 1971-12 (Robinson and William J. Barnds)
Middle East: Restrictions Increasing Ja/F 1972"11 Romoser, George K.: The Radicalization of Germany? JI/Ag
Middle East: Unrest, Reprisals Grow Ja/F 1973-18 1974-17
Middle East-War Removed Modest Progress Ja/F 1974-14 Rogow, Eugene V.:
Middle East: Survey '75 Ja/F 1975-19 Rogow, Disobedience MrlAp 1971-3
Middle East Survey '76 Ja/F 1976-25 Too Much Puritanism N/D 1973-3
Petrodollars: Roy, P.K.:
Random Thoughts on Arabian Nightmares (Leon Levy) Advice to U.S. & India-from an Indian Mr/Ap 1972-3
Ja/F 1975-21 Threat to India's Press Freedom S101972-14
PlaltzgraD, Robert L., Jr.: Rule of law Needs Support: Alexander Volpin Ja/F 1974-5
European Defense Burden-Sharing My/Je 1974-3 Rubin, Leslie:
SALT and CSCE: Problems of Soviet Compliance N/D 1975-7 Africa-Tensions Removed Modest Progress Ja/F 1974-16
Philippine Martial Law: The Truth and the Fiction: Raul S Africa: Survey '75 Ja/F 1975-9
Mangglapus Jl/Ag1973-18 Africa: Survey '76 Ja/F 1976-29
Phill 'live Philippines: Russia: see also Detente; Disarmament
The Philippines: Speak Frankly to Friends (Harry D. Gideonse) USSR Cannot Democratize; Its Foreign Policy Is Total MylJe
Mr/Ap 1973-11 1972-11
Philippine Martial Law: The Truth and the Fiction Jl /Ag 1973-18 Castro's Increasing Dependence on the USSR (Robert J.
leat Re session (Raul S Manglapus) MrlAp 1975-10 d N/D 1973-18
Th C
om
l
Sussman, Leonard R.:
North America: Extremists Test Democracy Fa/F1971-15
Pakistani Massacre-Propaganda Stage JI /Ag 1971-6
Francis Pickens Miller: Review of an Autobiography .5/01971-I1
North America: Clash of Rights Ja/F 1972-7
The Thomas Jefferson of Bangladesh Mr/Ap 1972-19
Book Reviews: In the Fullness of Time by Paul A. Douglas;
Declaration of Conscience by Margaret Chase Smith Jl /Ag
1972-15
Can Extremists Using TV Move An Audience (Roger Sea Seasonwein
and Sussman) S101972-12
North America: In Transition Ja/F 1973-11
The Darkest Year And Some Who Carried the Torch for Freedom
(book review) My/fe 1974-22
The Imitation of America S101974-3
Handbook of Communications (review) S101974-13
Revolutionary Summer 5/0 1975-18
Mount the Helsinki Watch N/D 1975-0
Needed: Wider Disclosures of Human Rights Realities Abroad
Ja/F 1976-9
p
e
p A
exan er)
Political Terrorism: The Freedom Award to 15 Soviet Dissenters Ja/F 1974-2 Terrorism: see Political Terrorism
Mind-Blowing Tactics of Revolution (Richard Gambino) 15 Dissenters-Not Dissidents (Harry D. Gideonse) Ja/F 1974-4 Television: see also News Media
JI/Ag 1970-6 Rule of Law Needs Support (Alexander Volpin) Ja/F 1974-5 Can Extremists Using TV Move an Audience (Roger Seasonwein
Revolutionary Terrorism in Democratic Society (Howard Ii. Ambassador Beam Speaks (Jacob D. Beam) Ja/F 1974-6 and Leonard R. Sussman) S/01972-12
Lentner and Thomas J. Lewis) My/Je 1971-3 Democratic Steps in USSR Would Help "Peaceful Coexistence" Thailand:
Murder in Montevideo: The AID/Mitrione Story (Ernest W. (Albert Shanker) Ja/F 1974-7 Asia-Thais Reverse Continent's Trend (Lucien W. Pye) Ja/F
Lefever) 5/01973-14 Russia: 1974-13
Political Campaigns:. see campaigns, Political What the Cold War Was About (Sidney Hook) Mr/Ap 19754 Thomas Jefferson of Bangladesh: Leonard R. Sussman MrlAp
Politiolzatlon:.see Colleges and Universities The Helsinki Basket Case Mystery (Paul Seabury) N/D 1975-5 1972-19
"Politicization" of Knowledge: Aaron Levenstcin Ap 1970-6 The Basket Connection (G.R. Urban) N/D 1975-10 Threat to India's Press Freedom: P.K. Roy S/O 1972-14
5
Threat to Universities, The: Mix Beloff Mr/Ap 1974-
Politics in the Streets: Dan Rather - Ap 1970-8 SALT and CSCE: Problems of Soviet Compliance: Robert L.
Pf? r /D 1975.7 Three Charters: Soren Egerod JI/Ag 1973-6
Pool, Ithiel de Sola: Commusl'cg(igq~v0: / eas6llt"slid/t9,211:LGIA6RDPBi1.0113-1 4R0D(1e Ie 5.2013/4 i-I ry A. Kissinger Jl/Ag 1973-4
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
Tao Much Puritanism: Eugene V. Rostov VID 1973.3
Toward A New American Coaaemn: Fruedo n House Board of
Trustees Mr/Ap 1973.2
Tuynbee, Arnold: Unstable As Water. Thou Shalt Not Excel
Travail ofA Moderate Student at Free L'nitee$ty of BBerBa 1974.3
Michael aWroryIITsohn MrlAp 1974-9
Truman, H "
Retkrtions on Two Dead Presidents
(Leo
Two Irelands, The: Sean Itopkins Cherie) Afr/Ap 7718
Two U.S. Dilemmas: ArmsSales J11,4; /9973-/6
1972.18 and Aid: Philip W. Qmgg Jo/F
Two Years In Fayette: Gilbert Jonas S/O 1971-/J
Tyranny of Chaos-A Footnote no Chile: Ernest W. Lefever Jo/F
1975.23
United Natloem
Intmutional Organiratkrrn -A Mixed Report (Richard N.
Gardner) Jn/F 1971.14
How Much Does Freedom Matter? (Daniel P. Moynihan) Mr/Jr
1975-11
Is There A Design to Use the Issue of Human R~}}gh~(Cys to Underanine
the Legitimacy of Precisely Those Nations' lich SO
Observe Human Rights? (Daniel P. Moynihan) Jo/F1976.4
Unilateralism: George Ball it/A; 1973.8
U.S.
US.:Soney7-(Philip vanSlyck) JaIF 1975.2
American Freedom (Philip van SI)ck) Jo/F 19764V
U.S. Aid and Political Acconsodatlum do South Vietnam: Howard
R. Penniman MrlAp 197j.9
U.S.-Armed Forces:
Command Responsibility In Modern War (William V. O'Brien)
U.S.-Congress: Jl /A-.e 1970.8
Congress. the President aid the War Not us V/ D 1971-7
A Constitutional Crisis (Gale McGee) Mr/Je 1973-7
U.S.-Debme:
Unwrapping the McGorern Defense Plan (William R. Kintner)
J11Ag 1972-1
European-American Defense Burden-STuriag (Robert L.
Pfalttgraf. . Jr) My/Je 1974-1
U.S.-Do meodc
Toward A New American Consensus (Freedom House Board of
Trustees) Mr/AP 1973.1
Time to End Our (iiii War (Henry, A. Kissinger) J1/AD19714
Too Much Puritanism (Eugene V. Rustow) / 1971.3
U.S. Const tutlatalkm Rediscovered (Philip van Slyck) Ja/F
1974.11
"Not Good" Is Not Good Enough (I reaium House Board of
Trustees) Mr/Ap 1975-2
U.S.-Economy.,
Will Protection from Imports Save U.S. Jobs? (Philip van St ck)
U.S. JII.4g 1973.11
-Fps)pn POAcT. 'e also DHsmtr Dharmis/rvi
European Security Conference Not Recrimination, But Resolve Ja/F 1971.2
Generation Cap ks Foreign Polley (Elliot L. Richardson) J1/AS
)971-15
Japan and the U&-New Directions (William R. Kintner) S/O
1971-3
US. Support for Democracy In Poor Countries (Raymond D.
Gastil) :V/D 1971.9
Advice to U.S. & India -From an ted(ai (P.K. Royl Mr/Ap
1972-3
What About Europe? (Alvin Paul Driichkr) Mr/Ap /972-8
Urgent: Foreign Policy Delvaate (Robert A. Scalapino and Paul
Seahu ) My/Je 1972.1
Democratic Steps In USSR Would Help "Peaceful Coexp(eixe"
(Albert Shanker) JoIF1974-7
"Not Good" Is Not Good Enough (Freedom House Board of
Trustees) Mr/Ap /975-2
U.S. Aid and Pofiical Aceomudation to Vietnam (Howard R.
Penniman) Mr/Ap 1973.9
How Much Does Freedom Matter? (Daniel P. Moynihan) My/Jr
1975.11
Cold War Revis:ondsm: Abusing History (Robert James Maddox)
Toward An American Consensus (Freedom House B&xhrd of 971-3
Trustees) MrlAp 1973-2
PhAipphses: Speak Frankly to Friends (t larry D. Gideunse)
Maxims Carta (Robert Cu uest 'Mrl /9 11
mi ) 1/A g 19 3 973-6
Three Charters (Soren Egerod) J11Ag 1473fi
Unilateralism (George Ball) J/ Agg 1973.8
Too Much PurltimLsm (Eugene V. Ros(ow) .4/D 1971-1
U.S.-Foreign Relation:
When the Academic Door to Peking Opens (RobertF. Byrnes)
Japan and America In the 1970's(Nabuhiko Ushiba) 3fr/A1972.6
J11Ag 1972-5
Maxima Carta (Robert Conquest) J11Ag /973-5
Three Charters (SorenEgerod) Jl A 1973-6
Uniateralisn(George Ball) JilAg Castro's Crowing Dependence on the USSR (Robert J.
Alexander) .VID 1973-18
Rule of Law Needs Support (Alexander Vulpin) Ja/F 1974.5
Prospects for Japan-L'S. Retatlore: The Dtaab a Putambip
(Masayoshi Ohira) S101974-10
U.S.-History:
The 5 Big Lles About the U.S. (Arnold Dochman)Mr/Ap 1971.5
U.B.-Hisol , Education and Waifans Dsfot o11
HEW Regionals- :A New Threat to Educational lotegrky(Sidn cy
Hook) V/D 1971-3
Force Faculty Quotas--HEW (Sidney Hoak) MrlAp 1972.1
Semantic Evadom(Stdney Hook) JI/Ag 1972-12
USA-1985: Straight IJnne to Chaos: Frank Armbruster
5/0 1970-J
U.S. Such net for Democracy In Poor Countries: Raymond D.
G: stn) :V'/D 1971-9
L'niters)ltes: ire Colleges and I'nisersitics
University as Staglag Ground to "Clone Down the Courts": Arthur
Bestor 5101970.9
UMVersity Is the Enemy ofSimplifkatloo: Arnold Bcichman Ja/F
1971.16
L'ahersiy:Mission Betrayed: Ilarry D. Gidoonu S101971.9
Unstable As Water. Thorn Stint Not Excel: Arnold Toymbee
k JI/Ag 19741
U nwrapptg the McGovern [Weer Plan: William R. Kintner
Urban. George R.: 11/Ag 1972.2
Fhk!JA Nmtralky--Example or Wamiag?(with Wulf H. Halsti)
The Basket ( conectioMr/Jr 1975.7
A )IIPPoceac-Oath for the Academic Note". (withlLord 197540
Ashb)) /V/D 1975-20
Urban Crhb (s Not to me Cities: Larry Margolis :A'/D 1970.o
Urban Prob(urma
Urban Crisis Is Not in the CWes(larry Margo),) :V/D 19768
UaNba, Nobt#o((to:
Japan aid America is the 70`s J1/AX 1972.5
Van Slyck Philip
WIB Protection From taipor7s Sere U .S. Job. J11Ag /973-11
US.-Co'mHpttkmaBsattRedincwered Ja/F1974.11
U.S.: Suncy 75 Ja/F 1975.2
American Freedom Jo/F 1976-10
'Van Cleave. William R - Characteristic Wraknesb(n U.S.
Amer Control Negotiatiims Mv/Jr 1973-3
vubnartt:
Vietnam Election - Pre-Democsacy?(Gerald Stabd) .YID 1971-
3
What Went Wrong Its Saigon? (Allan E. Goodman) Ja/F 1972.14
Why Did the Vietnam Peace-Signer Sip I William It, Sullivan)
War 1973.20
s(Allan F. Goodman) N U 1974.10
U.S. A aid Palk(cat Accomodat)uo Vietnam (Howard R.
Penniman) Mr1Ap 19714
Vietnam and the L)m)tsaf Schaialy lattesentioa: Arlan L
Goodman S/O . 1973-17
VietnamEketims..-Pro-Democrary!:GeraldStnbd .V/0I971
Vlsbum-War Pro, Im
Polities a the Streets (Dan Rather) Ap 19708
TheCem~ofCblratiaa(Wdum H-Strinnggeer~) 3/01971.7
Vietnam and the Limits of Scbdaty tcecrventloe (Allan E.
Goodman) 3/01973.17
V1lolantae
Aaaerdcan Vin lence:'?`-Myth (lraxdarn Hshuac Editam) MrlAp
1971.1
Of Cho Disobedience (Euguic V. Rostov) Mr/Ap 1971-J
The Fero Big Lks About the US, (Arnold Beichhnan) Mr/Ace
1971-5
Vulpin, Alexander. Rule of Law Need, Support Ja/F 1974.3
Vree, Date: )meBecM~la Scholars and the)Commoo People
MylJe 1975-J
Wu Again?: Alton E Goodman .V/D 1974.10
vhv In,
PuBto in the Streets I Dan Rather) Ain1970.8
wartwt. East
Earl Want, (I tarry D. Okko e) 3/01974.8
Earl Waneos Freedom Award Address S101974.8
He Restored the Future tArchibakd MacLeish) 3/01974.9
Wald tching the W'atcli&tgs: Gerald I. Steibel WrlAp 1973.16
The Challenge of W'ateryale (Lco Cheri and Roscoe
Drummond) JI/Ag 1973.2
Watergate: Reflection From Afar (0> ar I Irtdlin) 3/01973.11
Watergate llago: A Language of NanRespooiS8hy (Richard
Gambino) A'/D 1973-7
WAY1010theimps : Mihajb Mthajlov WrlAp 1972.5
We Must Not Mitmartagir Salt 11: Henry M. Jackson My/Jr
1973-2
West, Franca Fresh Coaanltmeoi to Academic Integrity Air/Ap
1974.7
What About Europe': Alvan Paul Driachkr Mr/AP /972.8
What the Cold Was Wits Abot: Sidney Hook .Wfl.4p 1973-4
What Went Wroag at Salgon: Allan E Goodman Ja/F 1972.14
When the Academic Door to Peking Opens: Robert F. Byrnes
AlrAip 1972.6
Wbrre Are the American De.ewtm*: Whitney Nort
h Seymour,
Jr. Jo/F 1974-3
Who Is Responsible, for the Race Pruhkm?: I reedom at issue
Editors J1/AS. 1970.1
Why Did the Vietnam Peace.SlgeenSiga: William H. Sullivan
ecognize lAp Lai 1973.20
W'hyi the L'S. Should Not R Air
Gcr ~ ?y: an si
man Mr1Ap 1971.12
W ierebianski, .A.B.. Mark the Soldier in the Plsotogiapb .4p
1970.9
Wddacsk Aaron: The Search for the Oppreoud .V/D 1972-3
WBic . Momorial Suldnil: sir Freston Mouse
Wilkins. Roy: Superior Man In America Ali IJe 1973-15
Will "Phase 2" Calm the Boom Schooln(James Wunham) S/O
1975.7
Will Protection From Imports Save U.S. Jobs': Philip van SI ck
Wulfsohn. Michael, Travail of a Moderate Stsdmt At Free 33-1!
University of Berlin Mr/Ap 1974.9
Work
Work--What It Its Fuhae?; Aaron Levenstcin J1/Ag 1974-5
World Sane
Must the Third World Choose: Respect Human Rights or Abo/Jsh
Pmserty? (Tbrodorc A. Sumber Me/Ap 1974-13
Worsham. James: Will "Phase 2" C~ the Boston Schools S, ,o
/975.7
Yeager. Robert C.: C egress, the PrnsiBmt, the War powers .V/D
1972.7
Why cad M$Ajlos Wm Forbidden to Dbeusa "Fabiddm
Thoughts" fit" My/Jr 1974..V
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Akuaraler. Robert J.: LA National Revolutionaries: A Rebuttal
N/D 1972-22
Baldwin. Roger: AS ynthesis of Freedoms Mr/Alp 1975-21
Balkan. Donna: Letters to the Editor (re: "Cracks in the Liberal
Alliance" by Nicholas Capaldit V/D 1973-24
Blan. A I I.: Hog, Hug. Bear M) /Je 1972-19
Breciow,ki, Zbigniew (with Francois Duchene and Kiichi Saeki):
The "('are issues" in the Middle East-Three Scholars View
Bumpers. Dal Responses to the News Media/Government 973-13
Guidelines in Our last Issue ;V/D 1973-24
Busty, James L.: Progress 5fylJe 1972-19
Capaldi. Nicholas: Social ScieMlst Has No Special Right-The
Author Replies J11Ag 1971-17
Cherne. Leo (with Harry D. Gickunac and Margaret Chase
Smith). Nixon Urged to Support Freedom Radios J11Ag 1972-
/9
Colter. William R: "Majority Rule" Not Applicable to South
Africa?-The AurMr Replies Me/Ace 1973-18
Cuna, Kenneth M : Responses to the News Media/Government
Gridelines in Our Last Tube ,\/D 1973-24
Dasid- Saul Letter to Editors ao the News Media Studies
/I/Ag 1970-15
Ducfirne. Francois (with Zbigniew Brrcrinski and Kiichi Sacki):
The "Core Issues" in the Middle Fist-Three Scholars' View
S101975-23
Epstein. Beinish: The "Core Issues" In the Middle East-.A Zionist
View S101975-23
Leh, Robin L.: Correction Ire: "Rule of 12w Needs Support" by
Alexander % thpinl Afp//r 1974-24
Fisher. Ralph T., Jr.: Otcve rimating USSR in Freedom Survey?
Afr/Ace 1975-12
Frascr. Ernest L.: Reintroduce PR SIO 197410
Gallon. Iicrbert.IluFrryalltv'?Gone W1id"? air/Ace 1973.19
Gat)), Raymond D.:
Does India Ilse Subordinate Peoples?-Dr. Gastil's Reply
Mr/Ace 1975-14
Oa the Chinas -The Surrey Director Res?onds Mr/Ace /974-24
O*errstlmating USSR in Freedom Surrey.-Dr. Raymond Gast)
Responsds Afr/Ap 1975-22
Gidesvnse, Iharry D. (with Leo Cherne and Margaret Chase
Smith): -Nixon Urged to Support Freedom Radios J11Ag 1972-
19
Glaser, Kurt: "Majority Rule"Nut Applicable to South Africa?
Mr/.4p 1973-18
Gokbtein. Stanky Sound "Quota" Alarm :\'/D 1972-23
Griswold. I min N: "Pentaggonnn Papers Alr/Ace 1972-24
l landlin. Oscar: Oscar idand)in's "Failure of the
Illstularm"- Can and Pro Professor I landlin's Response
N/D )975.2.4
(lam,,. C_ Lowell: On the Chinas Mr/Ace 1974-14
Hcrmens. Ferdinand A.: Reintroduce PR-The Author Replies
S101974-21
Hieben. Ray E.: Responses to the News Media/Goiemmen
Guideines in Our last live ?\ JD 1973-24
I lirvhkifer, Jack: HEW Pesky Mr/Ap 1972-2.r
Roland, James R.. Responses to the News Media/Government
Guidelines in Our Lag Issue ,\/D /973-24
Hook. Sidney: The Issue Redefined: the Cold Wu-What Was
It?-Slthie Hook's Response tly/Jr 1975-18
Jonas, Gil: Rigged F)ectionvs Deter Blacks from'Yhe System"
Mr/Ap 1972-23
Kantath. M.V.: Does India IlaseSubordinate Peoples?
Afr/A, 1975-22
Kuttkc, Frank J.. letters to the Editor tre; "Unstable as Water.
Thou Shalt Not ExceC" by Arnold Toynbeei S101974-24
Lee. Maurice L: USIA and India Mt-/Je 1972-19
Laemer, Abbe P.:
'Group-Think" Said to Flow from IIEW Polley J11Ag 1972-19
Social Seterltist ties No Special Right J11Ag 1971-17
Lesser. Harry: Con and Pro: U.S, Guarantee for Israel and the
Pok-Aini. AIiIJe 1975-19
t ewts, Alfred Baker: Group is. (ndisidrat Rights il/Ag 1974-1
Llpold, Alexander.
How Fare Chinese Intetretuals? Jl /Ag 1974-10
Inds Justified Afr/Ap 1972-23
Manglapus, Raul S.: (lurch Survey on the Philippines
Afr/Je 1974-24
Minn. Ashur: Oscar I landlin-s "Failure of the Historians"-Con
and No F/D 1975-28
New hall, Richard A.. On Resolutionary Terrorism J11Ag 1971-18
Nunn, San: Scminer Respond to PfaltegralT on European Troop
Burden STur'ing J11Ag 1974-2
Pachter. I lenry: The Issue Reitefated; the Cold War-What Was
It?? Mi-/Jr 1973.17
Rostov. Eugene \.: Re: Cold War Resislonisnh V /D 1972-22
Rucker. Bryce W.: Responses to the News %iedia/Government
Guidelines in Our I" Issue .\/D 1973-24
Sacki. Kiichi (with Zhigniew Brrednski and Francois Duchene):
The "Core Issws" in the Middle Fist-Three Scholars View
S'/0 1975-23
Sergeant. Howland H: On Broadcasts to USSR Afr/A 1974-24
Scal.Moo. Robert A.: Underestimating Thailand?-Prof
Sntapino Replies .ilyjJe 1975-17
Schlesinger. Arthur. Jr.: Oscar ltandlin s "Failure of the
Historians" Con and Pro V//) 1975-28
Smith. Howard K.: The Bast Man Is tit W irm(nga/:/Je 1975-2(1
Smith. Margaret Chase (with Leo Chernc and )tarry D.
Gidkursc). Nixon Urged to Support Freedom Radios
Boahuk,Jacob: J1/.4g 1972.19
Con and Pro: U_9. Guarantee for Israel and the Palestinians
Mi/Je 1975-19
flit, "Racial lm)raaliurs" Jl/Ag 1972-19
I honson. Meldrin. Jr.: Responses to the News
Media/Governmeat Guidelines in Our last issue .\ /D 1973-24
Tou.cn. R. Kenneth: Responses to the News Media/Government
C.uldelhws in Our Iasi I. .\/ D 1973-14
Ts. Leon O.: On thePlWippirKS .17rjAp 1974.24
I nderestlmaiing Thailand? ?(Ij/Jr 1975.17
Watvm. DR: Re: Cord W'ar Res)sionlsm .%,'/) 1972-22
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Covert action is usually more economical in men, money,
and materiel than overt action. Costs of covert action are far
less expensive than warfare with conventional weapons, and
even large-scale paramilitary undertakings are cheaper than
conventional or unconventional war. Covert non-violent
action is not likely to be more costly than the overt
diplomatic channel.
There have been instances, and there are likely to be again,
where a government, organization or individual who might
be the recipient of overt U.S. support would find this
unacceptable and unusable because the beneficiaries'
interest would be prejudiced domestically or in its foreign
relationships by the identifiable U.S. government
connection. The use of the same benefits through covert
channels relieves the beneficiary of this disability and avoids
the visible image of U.S. government intervention. Thus
there may be bilateral agreement of the need to conceal the
U.S. government's interest-in the mutual interest of both.
The inherent limitations in the use of covert action in
effecting a nation's foreign policy have been stated. We
would do well to consider its operational limitations, as well
as the objections to the use of covert operations as a
legitimate form of governmental action.
At the outset, it must be recognized by the policy makers
of government that there can be no guarantee that any covert
action which they authorize can be accomplished as planned;
even if it is so accomplished that it will have the desired
effect; and even if the action is accomplished as planned and
has the desired effect, that the cover will stand up and the
governmental interest remain concealed. Even the most
skilled and experienced covert action operators under ideal
conditions can offer no such assurances. The essential
resources are human beings working under conditions of
secrecy or within the limitations of cover, and performance
cannot be predicted mathematically. The results are
intangible and the effect desired is at best a judgment,
subject to human fallibility. Also, there are the hostile forces
who will, if aware of the operation and have the capability,
do their best to frustrate the action. But these characteristics
are equally true of overt action, whether they be military or
diplomatic. It would be a brave diplomat who would predict
the outcome of the expression and representation of a
governmental policy. And it is characteristic of most
military commanders to demand an overabundance of men,
money and materiel to support a military action in order to
reduce the inherent risk. There can be no assurance that any
overt action or covert action in our foreign policy will be
executed successfully. These are risks that must be
calculated and then assumed in undertaking such an action,
or rejected because it is felt the chances and value of the
objective are outweighed by the risks.
Perhaps the most universal objection to the use of any
covert action is that it is immoral and beneath the dignity of
a nation-state. Implicit within this belief is the Wilsonian
concept of "Open covenants openly arrived at." However,
there are friendly, neutral and hostile nations who have used
and do use covert channels even in diplomatic action, and it
would be inappropriate for our own nation to moralize and
instruct other nations on how they should conduct their
foreign relationships, even with our own government. The
renewal of a working relationship with China was ac-
complished through a secret channel, and it is unlikely that
Secrecy is not sinister of itself nor
is it incompatible with demo-
cratic government.
China would have consented to begin the negotiations openly
or that it could have been otherwise accomplished.
As has been pointed out, since time immemorial nations
have used covert action to further their interests, and the
practice prevails today. This is not to say that other nations
believe that the ends justify the means. This is to say that the
means are not considered so pernicious or so meretricious as
to be foresworn, as is evidenced by the long established
custom and practice of nation-states. The comparison of
covert action with espionage is apt. Covert action is no more
moral or immoral than espionage, and there are few, even to-
day, who would urge the rejection of espionage as a
legitimate means of protecting the security of the state.
The indictment of covert action as an immoral and un-
acceptable form of governmental action is voiced in another
way: that covert action is meddling in the internal affairs of
other nations, interference we would find unacceptable if
done to our own nation. The naked fact is that nations, in-
cluding our own, do meddle in the affairs of other nations by
overt as well as covert means. We do forcefully meddle in the
internal affairs of other nations which we war on, both dur-
ing and after the war. The victorious state invariably im-
poses or tries to impose its will on the external as well as the
internal affairs of the defeated state, e.g. after the defeat of
Japan we imposed a constitution on that state which
drastically altered its internal structure. "Forceful
diplomatic representations," a euphemism for pressure,
has been used and will be used by all nation-states (including
our own) on nations we think vulnerable to such pressure in
order to alter their external or internal policies. It has been
plain in recent history that our government has, with public
support, used the proffer of economic, technical and military
support, or denied such support or threatened to withdraw it
in order to shape the domestic and foreign policies of other
nations.
Also, it is self-evident that espionage by its very definition
is meddling in the internal affairs of the nation being spied
on. We face the paradox: a U-2 airplane over the USSR is
bad; a U-2 over Cuba is good; and the Soviet and American
satellites over each others' air space is an accepted intrusion.
Another common objection to covert action is that the
policymakers authorizing covert action maintain the secrecy
of such authorization and its implementation. The statement
is true, but the statement begs the question and poses the
dilemma: if the authorization for and conduct of covert ac-
tion is not kept secret, covert action would not be possible.
This is reasoning in a circle. The need for covert action, and
its concomitant secrecy are the responsibilities of the policy
making bodies of the government, not of the operating agen-
cies. From the point of view of the operational agency,
covert action cannot be undertaken if the secrecy of
governmental interest is not maintained. If this indispen-
sable secrecy is not maintained or is so incompatible with
our democratic process, then we face a world where both our
friends and foes have no such disability.
Secrecy is not sinister of itself nor is it incompatible with
democratic government, provided the secrecy is held to be in
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the public interest and in the protection of the constitution
and the rights which it guarantees to its citizens. Thus, the
secrecy of the ballot box is deemed sacred. The secrecy of
grand jury proceedings protects the constitutional rights of
those who might be injured by public exposure of this
pretrial ex parte inquiry. Nobody has suggested that the
deliberations of the Supreme Court or the executive sessions
of the Congress and its committees or our contingency war
plans ought to be open to the public. And the need for
secrecy within the Atomic Energy and National Security
agencies is understood and accepted.
In American social mores, secrecy is to be avoided, and it
is believed that our government should have no secret from
its citizens. The paradox is that clandestine services and their
work are essentially devoted to maintaining the security of
our nation and the protection of the citizens' fundamental
rights from those foreign powers which, for ideological or
other reasons, wish to subvert both.
In the words of the Murphy Commission report:
Many dangers are associated with covert action. But we must live in
the world we find, not the world we might wish. Our adversaries deny
themselves no form of action which might advance their interest or
undercut ours. In many parts of the world a prohibition on our use of
covert action would put the U.S. and those who rely on it at a
dangerous disadvantage.
Lastly, we cannot gloss over the potential damage when
covert action operations are compromised and the
governmental interest exposed. The ultimate question is
whether the achievements of such action warrant that risk.
The risk-versus-gain evaluation is essential in every
foreign policy operation, both overt and covert. As stated
above, diplomatic pressure may be counterproductive, and
many diplomats who have been excessive or inept in their
diplomatic functions have found themselves on their way
home before the end of their prescribed tours of duty.
Economic pressure may be counterproductive as we learned
in the case of the Aswan Dam loan and in our embargo on
scrap iron and oil to Japan before World War II. Espionage
operations, however productive, may cause severe damage
to the relationship between the nations involved, as they did
when Khrushchev cancelled the Paris Conference after
Eisenhower refused to apologize for the U-2 shot out of
Soviet skies.
Obviously, certain types of covert action operations are
potentially damaging if exposed by the target nation. But it
should not be assumed that all covert action operations are
necessarily self-destructive. Covert action operations can
succeed or fail in their objective without exposing
governmental interest. And even in cases where governmen-
tal interest is exposed to the target nation, the very existence
of the cover permits the target nation not to take cognizance
of the operation if this is in its own interests.
I do not minimize the risk factor. All aspects of any covert
action operation should be carefully weighed: the value of
the objective to the nation; whether there are any overt
means to attain the same objective; the probability ofsuccess
or failure; the costs in terms of men, money and materiel; the
chances of compromise and the political and other damage
that might result should compromise occur. In that caldula-
tion, the covert action agency can evaluate the probability of
technically executing the operation and the risk of com-
promise by accident or hostile counteraction. The remainder
of the calculation is a matter for the determination of the
policy making agencies of government, and not the covert
action operators.
Present and future need for covert action
Obviously, the world we live in is quite different from the
world in which covert action was organized 27 years ago. But
it is not a better world; it is not a safer world. We have been
through large-scale political, economic, military, and social
changes. Communications have shrunk the world to the
point where we can travel on peaceful journeys at supersonic
speeds and can be destroyed by air ships and missiles travel-
ing at the same speed.
In 1948 our government was the only healthy nation in the
free world. We gave of ourselves and our resources to protect
freedom for ourselves and those in the free world who
wanted to become or remain free. We have been through
cold war, hot war, prosperity and depression. At the end of
that period we face a world in which the gap between our
superior military strength and that of our potential adver-
saries has considerably narrowed. Our relative wealth and
economic capability and its superiority over the rest of the
world has shrunk dangerously, as measured by the fact that
our share of the world GNP has been cut in half, thus
limiting our ability to help ourselves and others. The
monolith that we faced in the cold war has been broken, but
it would be a brave geopolitician who would say that it could
not be restored. Meanwhile, the Chinese and Soviets con-
tinue their separate and competitive campaigns of subver-
sion, most recently in Africa. Soviet support for a com-
munist take-over in Portugal is of direct concern to our
country.
The number of nation-states in the world has trebled and
the Third World constitutes a new factor replacing the
polarity that existed before. There are supranational forces
such as terrorism and drug traffic, and international com-
binations that never existed before which are inimical to our
national interests.
Our foreign policy must be directed to meet these new
problems. Whether they are all susceptible of solution by
overt peaceful action is something for the policy makers to
determine. In my belief some of them are not. As I have
pointed out, guerrilla warfare and terrorism are not suscepti-
ble to diplomatic or conventional military or police action.
They threaten the peace of nations directly involved and, in-
directly, world peace. I do not know whether or what the in-
telligence collectors or the covert action operators are doing
about these threats, but I hope that the appropriate means
are being considered or employed.
It has been suggested that covert actions endanger
detente. Evidently, the Soviet and its agent, the KGB, do
not think so. But detente is not a fact; it is an evolutionary
movement in an historical process. Our national security is
not packaged in neat, tight time segments. Even wars are no
longer susceptible to precise dating. The concept of a war
fought by nations against other nations after formal
declarations, with soldiers crossing national frontiers to fight
other soldiers by an almost chivalric code, has been over-
taken by other forms of armed conflict between nations.
Undeclared wars are fought by "volunteers" in "wars of
national liberation," frontiers are crossed by radio waves
from open and clandestine stations; and crossed secretly by
clandestine agents to accomplish by subversion what is im-
politic or impossible by overt means.
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To abandon or suspend the covert
action capability is tantamount
to unilateral disarmament.
Whether and what covert action is desirable and feasible
is beyond my competence, but it must depend on the judg-
ment of those who have been elected or appointed to exercise
that judgment in our interests. If distrust is to paralyze or
limit our action all of us will suffer. The system has built-in
checks for those who abuse that trust. The spate of "ex-
posure" by the news media, criminal prosecution and civil
suits, legislative action and public discussion sustain my con-
fidence that no misuse of secret power can do irreparable
harm before it is discovered, and corrective and punitive ac-
tion taken. To withhold that trust because of fear and ap-
prehension is to strip us of our capability to meet threats to
our well-being. No better example of the necessity of placing
that trust in responsible and accountable government of-
ficials is the power in the hands of the President of the
United States over the secret arsenal having the most
destructive force the world has ever known. He can use that
power solely on his judgment and decision because there is
no successful way that we can limit that power and still
protect ourselves against the same potential destructiveness
by hostile forces, against whom ours is a deterrent and
counterforce.
Conclusion
Covert action is an appropriate function of government.
Its first mission is the protection of the security of the state.
It offers an optional form of action or supplement to overt
action which is thought to be unacceptable or ineffectual.
The necessary secrecy of such operations is in the public
interest. The scope and methodology of such operations can
be delineated. Management responsibility and accountabili-
ty can be adjusted and specified in the public interest.
The potential for abuse or misuse of covert action is
minimal. It provides no real threat to the constitutional
structure of our government or the rights of its citizenry that
a governmental system of management from within and con-
trol from without the operating agency by the executive and
through legislative oversight would not detect and correct
before any irreparable damage was done.
To abandon or even suspend the covert action capability is
tantamount to unilateral disarmament. A nation does not
abolish the office of its chief executive because a single in-
cumbent has abused his authority; a municipality does not
abolish its police department because a policeman may have
violated the laws; and a national army is not disbanded in
peacetime.
In the world of today and tomorrow, the retention of the
covert action capability is desirable if not essential, if we are
to survive and further our interests with other nation-states.
We cannot allow the domestic problems of our times to color
our judgment on that need, or so restrict that capability that
it would be ineffectual.
Some of the newly decolonized infant nation states are un-
stable economically as well as politically. Some of the heads
of those states show definite signs of being mentally un-
stable. They represent potential threats to themselves and
their neighbors. And they have shown a disposition to act by
themselves and in concert with others to hold the older and
more developed nation-states hostage to economic warfare
over natural resources, some of which are essential to the
security and well-being of our own country.
The monopoly on nuclear weapons has been broken. The
nations moving into the nuclear field have a potential for
massive destruction to themselves, their neighbors, our own
country and world peace. The supranational forces in
terrorist groups and international drug traffic have bases in
countries which are unwilling or unable to control them. In
all of these new threats to world peace, covert action may be
able to meet these problems independently of overt action or
to supplement it.
Notes
I. In this context, the Commission recommended that:
"Covert action should only be authorized after collective consideration of its benefits and risks by all
available 40 Committee members, and that:
"Besides granting initial approvals, the 40 Committee should regularly review the continuing ap-
propriateness of activities still being pursued.
"PL 93-559 be amended to require reporting of covert actions to the proposed Joint Committee on
National Security, and to unfit any requirement for the personal certification of the President as to
their necessity."
2. Francis Dvornik, Origins o/Intelligenee Services, Rutgers U. Press, New Brunswick, 1974; p. 102
3. "Denigrate everything that is good in your opponent's country. Involve the leaders in ci uninal
enterprises and deliver them up to the Scorn of th'eir fellow countrymen. Undermine them in every
way you can. Use the most vile and execrable of individuals, cause trouble by every means within their
government, spread discord and quarrels in the opposing nation. Agitate the young against the old,
destroy all their means, all of their weapons and above all the discipline of their armed forces. Cover
with ridicule their traditions and values, be generous in your offer of rewards to obtain information
and accomplices. Put secret agents everywhere. Never stint on your money and promises; you will
reap rich rewards. The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred hattles; the
supreme excellence is to subdue your enemies without having to fight them."-Sun Tzu, The Art of
War, translation by Samuel B. Griffith, Clarendon Press, Oxford U. Press, London, 1963.
4. 1 Men Augur,. Secret War of Independence, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, N.Y., 1955; p. 58 ei.veg.
5. See I lenry Merritt Wriston, Executive Agents in American foreign Re(raiuns, Albert Shaw Lec-
tures on Diplomatic Ilistory, 1923; Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1929, and Peter Smith,
Gloucester, Mass., 1967, pp. 717-19, 767, 775, 823-4,
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
(before reorganization, February 17, 1976)
PRESIDENT
National Security Council
Intelligence Committee 40 Committee
NSA STATE
1 ,N (INR)
FBI TREASURY ENERGY RESEARCH
& DEVELOPMENT
AR6Y / NAVY N AIR FORCE
1 ~
Intelligence // Intelligence N -Intelligence
Cryptologic Cryptologic ~Cryptologic Service
chart by W. Thomas Nichols Overhead Reconnaissance
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Before Reforming
the "Intelligence Community,"
What Questions Must be Asked.
by W. Thomas Nichols
This article was prepared before the President announced,
Feb. 17, a reorganization of intelligence operations. Since
the reforming of intelligence services will con tinue for sonte
time, the central theme of this article-questions to be asked
in making changes in intelligence- is no less pertinent.
W ith so much attention being focused on the American
intelligence community today, it is possible that
public concern might be whipped to such a high peak by
overzealous reformers that serious harm could be done to
one of the most important bulwarks of our national securitN .
Perhaps reform is in order;however, before we consider
reform, we should look at the entire community to see what
is being done, and then question whether that work can be
done better.
George Washington began the process which grew into the
American intelligence community when he hired several
espionage agents to report on British troop movements
during the Revolutionary War.
From that handful of men the community has grown.
especially since the Second World War, to include more than
150,000 workers in seven agencies and the three military
services. These people undertake various projects which cost
the American taxpayer approximately $6 billion a year,
according to data inserted into the Congressional Record by
Senator William Proxmire on April 10, 1973.
The intelligence structure
At the top of the intelligence community is the President
of the United States who as commander-in-chief of our
armed services and main foreign policy maker needs the
most reliable information upon which to base his estimates
of fast-breaking international events. He also needs
information with which to study policy alternatives in order
to select those which best promote our national interests and
security. The President is never more than moments away
from a red telephone link with the watch officers of the
community so that he can be alerted to any danger or any
major international event.
Before the President goes abroad on a diplomatic tour, or
receives a foreign dignitary here at home, he is given oral and
written background briefings to bring him up to date about
the issues likely to be raised in the expected meetings. The
President also receives routine briefings and reports in the
White House.
Dr. Nichols Is director of the International Studies Institute of
Westminster College, Pennsylvania. He worked for eight
years as an Intelligence research analyst for NSA.
Working for the President as the general overseer of the
intelligence community is the National Security Council. Of
its several committees, two give the main direction to the
intelligence community. The first is its Intelligence
Committee (NSCIC) the membership of which includes the
President's National Security Adviser (chairman), the
Director of Central Intelligence (vice chairman), the Deputy
Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Under
Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs. This
committee sets requirements and provides supervision for
the overall intelligence gathering and analysis efforts of the
entire community.
A second important National Security Council group, the
40 Committee, has the same membership as the NSCIC
except that the representative of the Treasury is not a
member and the Deputy Secretary of State is replaced by the
Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs. This group
approves all covert actions abroad and other special high-
risk activities. By approving covert actions this committee
serves as a general control over such projects and acts as a
buffer for the President who is therefore not directly involved
in 40 Committee decisions.
Working below these two committees is the Director of
Central Intelligence. Although he is a member of both
committees, he serves as their focal point for the day-in and
day-out coordination of all community activities. His
assistant, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
usually serves as the chief administrator of the Central
Intelligence Agency. However, this distinction becomes
blurred when the Director of Central Intelligence chooses to
run the CIA himself.
The Central Intelligence Agency was created as the
successor to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), an
intelligence agency of the Second World War. The CIA was
established by the National Security Act of 1947 (a law
which also created the National Security Council, the
Department of Defense, and a separate military service for
the Air Force). That law authorized the CIA to gather
intelligence from the entire community and from its own
sources abroad, and to evaluate and piece together bits of
information into end-product reports and estimates for the
President and other civilian and military leaders.
Also included in the CIA mandate in that 1947 Act is its
task "to perform such other functions and duties as the NSC
may from time to time direct," in short, clandestine
activities approved by the 40 Committee; however, that act
specifically denies the CIA any "police, subpoena, law
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A description of the intelligence structure, questions to be asked and
reforms suggested-by a former National Security analyst
enforcement, or internal security functions."
A military version of the CIA was created in 1961, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates the military
intelligence operations of the three armed services and
produces military reports and estimates for the top leaders of
the Department of Defense.
In a semi-autonomous relationship with the CIA, each of
the armed services has its own intelligence organization to
meet the tactical intelligence needs of the field commanders
and Pentagon staffs. Each of the three services also
maintains a cryptologic service to protect its own
communications and to gather intercepted communications
materials for the National Security Agency.
The largest of all intelligence agencies in size of personnel
is the National Security Agency, so named in 1952 but
created earlier. The NSA is a cryptologic agency which both
monitors foreign communications and provides for the
security of all U.S. governmental communications. Often
the press refers to NSA as the "super-secret" agency
because of the sensitivity of its double tasks.
Our most expensive intelligence agency is involved with
overhead reconnaissance. It like the NSA is also within the
Department of Defense and semi-autonomous. Operated by
the Air Force this agency conducts all air and space
surveillance missions for the entire community. Although
the effort is very costly because of the extreme expense of the
vastly complicated technological equipment involved (we
spend over one-third of all our intelligence funds in this area,
if reports are correct), the cost is justified by the great
reliability of this type of information.
Parts of other agencies are formal members of the
intelligence community. In the State Department the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR) coordinates information
from our diplomatic posts abroad with intelligence from
other community sources to meet the needs of the State
Department. The INR is the smallest of the major
intelligence agencies.
Other small parts of the intelligence community are units
within the FBI (for keeping track of illegal internal
subversive and conspiracy activities, in addition to criminal
records), the Treasury (counterfeiting, smuggling, and the
personal security of the President and major presidential
candidates), and the Energy Research and Development
Administration which joined the intelligence community
within the past two years. This last agency keeps watch on
information relating to oil and other sources of energy.
All of these agencies form the U.S. intelligence
community, but any agency of government may become
involved if asked to supply the community with any specific
information.
Our intelligence system is not perfect, of course. Abuses
have occurred and measures should be taken to avoid their
recurrence. But reform should have one major objective:
the creation of a streamlined system more responsive to our
nation's needs.
I worked in intelligence for most of the 1950's. Now from
the academic world quite removed from the constant race to
keep our leaders the best informed in the world, let me
suggest a few basic questions which are preliminary to any
thought of reform.
1. Does the vast amount of communications, electronic,
photographic, and diplomatic intelligence data which is fed
into the system every day produce an overload for the system?
The channels of communication should be open for both
the regular flow of information from the bottom to the top,
and for any emergency crisis warning.
Just prior to the Cuban missile crisis Fidel Castro's own
pilot was overheard in a Havana bar boasting that Cuba now
had long-range missiles and feared the U.S. no more. This
was reported without comment and went unnoticed. Later
photographs taken of two of the ships en route from the
USSR to Cuba showed wide hatches on the side. The
photographs also clearly showed that the ships were riding
high in the water. Missiles of the Soviet Union at that time
were large in size but not heavy in weight. Those ships
obviously contained missiles, so an analyst reported. But the
photographic report did not reach Washington until after the
crisis was in full bloom.2 The system was apparently
overloaded with so much other information that these
reports could not move up to provide an urgent warning.
2. How frequently are the existing priorities for
intelligence collection examined?
The year 1941 was one in which two surprise attacks
occurred. Stalin was caught off guard when Hitler attacked
the USSR on June 22, 1941, and the United States was
completely surprised by the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor. Hence the first priority for all intelligence systems is
to prevent another surprise attack. But below this first and
most important priority, the lesser items in which we are
interested change with the flow of events.
Since our world changes so fast, I wonder if we are seeking
information no longer necessary. Do we keep our priorities
under constant review?
3. Does our ranking of priorities provide enough guidance
for intelligence officials who must consider the opportunity
costs of using resources for one purpose rather than another?
In November 1971 the Director of Central Intelligence
established a new advisory group called the Intelligence
Resources Advisory Committee to pull together a
community-wide intelligence budget so the President could
better see where the money was being spent across the entire
community. Even if money were of no concern, and in
today's economic condition it certainly is, time alone would
force a choice among information requests in the assignment
of men and equipment to their specific tasks.
4. Would better efficiency be served by having all joint
intelligence collection, overt as well as covert, controlled by
one agency with analysis and publication dispersed among the
various agencies?
The centralization of collection could produce economic
savings, but it could also produce bad results, especially if
such a centralized program were to be misdirected. Our
present system of dispersed collection and analysis provides
a form of checks and balances, one agency against the
others. For example NSA in fact warned the Navy that the
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How can the intelligence community best be supervised?
intended 1968 Pueblo trip into the North Korean region was
in the high risk category. Unfortunately the warning had no
effect, and the resulting Pueblo story is too well known for
further commentary.
I personally do not see much advantage in centralized
control over the collection of intelligence, but I think the
question could be studied at length to see if the Proposition
has any merit.
After collection, the next step is the processing of raw
information into intelligence by translation, evaluation,
analysis, and interpretation.
5. How much of each agency's resources is allocated
toward the accomplishment of its own basic mission and how
much is shared in support of the other agencies within the
community?
The main purpose of the intelligence community is to
produce vital information for the President and other top
civilian and military leaders of government. In performing
their assigned tasks the agencies ask each other for
assistance. This lateral transfer in fact makes the
arrangement into a community.
However, instead of simply replying to requests for
assistance, some agencies duplicate research and analysis in
areas mainly assigned to others. Inter-agency rivalry often
produces this in-house duplication of effort as one agency
does for itself tasks which it considers not being done well or
not being fully shared by other agencies within the
community.
Some of this duplication is wasteful. but some of it
provides a cross check on the validity of the work being done
by the agency mainly assigned the basic task at hand. Each
agency sees a piece of information in terms of its own
perspective, military, economic, or political. Diversity of
interpretation provides a variety of aspects for the top
decision makers to consider. However, if agency bias
distorts its own reports, then decisions may be based on
faulty intelligence analysis.
An example was described by Patrick McGarvey in his
book on the CIA. In late 1967. military analysts
underestimated energy strength in Vietnam. CIA analysts.
reportedly not trying to support "victory-is-around-thc-
corner" statements, estimated a much higher figure. The
initial success of the Viet Cong in their Tet Offensive early in
1968 showed that the higher figure was the more accurate. 3
Our last question deals with the vital issue of control.
6. How can the intelligence community best be supervised?
Congress from the outside and the Executive Branch from
the inside both have supervisory functions over the in-
telligence community. In Congress at present there arc four
subcommittees containing appropriations and military ser-
vices members. These four subcommittees have a total
membership of only I I senators and 19 representatives.
Hence these four subcommittees represent a rather small
club. For this club to be enlarged some long-standing com-
mittee rivalries will have to be solved. All efforts to add
membership to this select group, particularly to add
members from the foreign and international relations com-
mittees, have been rebuffed since Mike Mansfield's first
proposal for a joint watchdog committee was turned down in
1956.
Both the Rockefeller and Murphy commission reports,
which were released at about the same time in June 1975,
suggest the creation of a joint congressional watchdog com-
mittee to provide better supervision by Congress over the in-
telligence community. However, the first obstacle to such a
joint committee is Congress itself because of the internal
rivalries among the various committees.
Another obstacle is the intelligence community. A protec-
tive instinct produced by years of trying to prevent in-
telligence leaks to foreign governmental agents and agencies
brings many intelligence community leaders to a point of
permanent fear that information shared with any larger
number of congressmen will be leaked to our press and thus
to all foreign intelligence agencies.
It seems to me that the problem could be solved in a three-
part process. First, all members of a new joint intelligence
watchdog committee could go through the same intelligence
clearance as do all others with access to top secret informa-
tion. Second, congressional watchdogs could waive all im-
munity and be subject to exactly the same laws which
guarantee the security of our classified information. Third,
Congress could pass a law providing for the declassification
of secret documents and information in addition to the usual
executive procedures, by means of a court order. Before such
an order, a federal judge could listen to a congressman's
arguments for the release of the information, and to
arguments against such release by a representative of the in-
telligence community.
This third process would be slow, but the courts have
worked exceptionally well during the Watergate process and
judicial settlement of disputes between legislative and ex-
ecutive officials is a long standing (and sometimes the only)
remedy.
Perhaps with these safeguards, such a watchdog com-
mittee might be at least tolerated, if not exactly welcomed,
by members of the intelligence community. Its main work
would evolve around budgetary hearings.
Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution states:
"No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in conse-
quence of appropriations made by law; and a regular state-
ment and account of the receipts and expenditures of all
public money shall be published from time to time." At pre-
sent the total intelligence budget is hidden within the general
budget, unknown to most senators and representatives ex-
cept for those in the four subcommittees mentioned earlier.
It is very difficult to determine just how to meet the
Constitutional requirements and yet keep important
developments within our intelligence community from being
detected by foreign agents who avidly study all published in-
formation from our Congress. Perhaps a general appropria-
tion for each agency could be recommended to Congress by
the committee, but this step needs far more study before it is
actually implemented.
The President has at least three avenues of control over
the intelligence community. About once a month the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board meets to
examine intelligence successes and failures. It is a blue rib-
bon panel of extremely gifted people, like Dr. Land who con-
tributed much to the development of the famous U-2 air-
craft, which flew with special Polaroid cameras. Members of
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this panel, however, are so busy that it is difficult to see how
they could become further involved with time consuming
tasks of more intensive supervision. I would guess that the
PFIAB will continue to function about the way it does at
present, as a trouble shooter for the President.
A second tool of control from outside the community is
the Office of Management and Budget which has a small
staff of five persons who review budget estimates from the
intelligence community. This small OMB office with its tiny
staff is simply not able to do more than give the $6 billion
budget a quick going over. If the President wanted to check
the community more thoroughly, he could enlarge this office
and increase the extent of its review of the entire intelligence
budget,
But the most effective tool would be inside the community
itself. For years the Director of Central Intelligence has been
mainly the director of the CIA. Recently, William Colby has
worked very hard on his community-wide activities.
However, he was hindered by his rank. He had to try to
supervise all the other agencies from about the same level as
their own directors. I believe the Director of Central
Intelligence would have more supervisory clout throughout
the community if he were elevated to cabinet rank in a posi-
tion similar to that of the Attorney General, who is above the
FBI. The Senate already holds hearings before confirming
the person nominated to fill the position of Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. I believe elevation in rank would increase
the supervisory capabilities of the DCI without interfering
with the duties of the National Security Advisor to the Presi-
dent.
These, then, are some of the questions which I believe
should be considered in any study of the possibilities of
reform of our intelligence system.
Notes
1. Most of this section was based on public information contained in the Report of the Conmtission
on the Organization of the Govenunent jdr the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Robert D. Murphy, chair-
man, June 1975, Government Printing Office, pp. 91-95.
2. Roger I lillsman, To Wien Nation, 1964, Delta paperback #8954, pp. 175, 197.
3. Patrick McGarvey, The New York, Saturday Review Press, 1972, pp. 139-144.
4. Commission on CIA Activities, The Nelson Rockefeller Report to the President, reprinted in
Manor Books #22100, 1975, and Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Robert D. Murphy, Chairman, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1975,
Chapter 7.
The End of Indian Democracy?
Plainclothesmen mix with philosophers,
reports this participant in an academic meeting at Delhi.
Fear and tension silence once-free scholars.
by Paul Kurtz
I s democracy at an end in India, or will Mrs. Gandhi and
the ruling Congress Party eventually restore freedom? On
June 26, 1975, Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared an "emergen-
cy," and as a result summarily threw into prison an es-
timated 50,000 or more persons (some have said that the
figure is as high as 140,000), including the leaders of the op-
position, imposed strict press censorship, and banned all
meetings of more than five persons. Since that time she has
been systematically spreading confusion and terror by
destroying civil liberties, emasculating the judiciary, under-
mining academic freedom, and postponing elections.
It is generally believed that the reason for the proclama-
tion of emergency was Mrs. Gandhi's fear that she would be
deposed from power by the courts on the grounds of gross
irregularities in her election campaign; and thus to avoid an
Indian Watergate, she imposed strong dictatorial measures.
But the extent and depth of the measures are far beyond
anything anticipated; and those who believe in democracy
are fearful that she will continue to use the emergency as a
pretext for maintaining herself in power-as the reigning
Empress of India-and possibly for establishing a new
dynasty, with her son Sanjay as heir apparent. Not only has
she moved ruthlessly against her political opponents, but she
has virtually nullified the independence of her own Congress
Party, which has been rubberstamping her decrees. Indeed,
Dr. Kurtz is professor of philosophy at State University of
New York, Buffalo, and editor of The Humanist, which is
publishing this article concurrently.
there are many observers who have concluded that
democracy in India-which at one time was heralded as the
largest democracy in the world-is now dead and that it may
be a long time before it can be restored. If this were so, it
would have devastating repercussions in the entire
democratic world, affecting the ideological struggle and
direction of development of the third and fourth worlds.
Although there have been accounts in the Western press
about recent events in India, I had the opportunity to see
firsthand what was happening. I visited India in order to par-
ticipate in two conferences: a meeting of the All-Indian
Radical Humanist Association in Ahmedabad (December
26 to 29) and the World Philosophy Congress in New Delhi
(December 29 to January 5). 1 came away deeply concerned;
democracy has been virtually dismantled, and the trappings
of a police state are everywhere in evidence.
The Radical Humanist Association had originally
planned to meet in Bombay, but was forced to move its
meeting to Ahmedabad in the state of Gujarat. Of the
twenty-one states, only two, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, were
then controlled by the opposition parties. Although strict
press censorship prevailed there, as throughout India, it was
still possible to hold meetings in these two states. (Since
then, the central government has also taken over the state of
Tamil Nadu, which leaves only Gujarat relatively free-for
how long remains to be seen.)
Some two hundred delegates came from all over India to
attend this meeting. They included former Supreme Court
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judges, lawyers, professors, student leaders, labor-union of-
ficials, editors, and journalists. Strongly committed to
democracy, they were in a state of shock at the rapid erosion
of democratic rights. Even as we were meeting in
Ahmedabad, the Congress Party was holding its own con-
gress in Chandigarh and issuing new edicts and
pronouncements daily, which meant Net more repression.
The Radical Humanist Association was founded by M. N.
Roy, in 1948. Roy, a prolific author, was an extremely con-
troversial figure. fie had the dubious distinction of having
founded the Mexican Communist Party in 1918, the first
communist party to be established outside the Soviet Union.
Later he was invited to Moscow by Lenin. A fervent Com-
munist, Roy worked for a decade as one of the top men of the
Comintern. He was instrumental in laying the foundation for
communism in India. He eventually broke with the com-
munists because they would not join an anti-communist
alliance with the socialist trade unions in Germany. During
the 1930s he was imprisoned for six years. Iie labored within
the Indian National Congress for the liberation of India
from British rule. lie founded the Radical Democratic Party
of India in 1940. This was eventually transformed into the
Radical Humanist Association: for Roy believed that the
problems in India transcended a political solution alone.
The keynote addresses at the Radical Humanist Congress.
held at Gujarat University, were delivered by the president
of the conference, Mr. J. B. If. Wadia, a well-known film
producer from Bombay, and Professor L. S. Joshi, both of
whom argued for the need for universal education if India is
to progress. The tasks of education are mammoth. the) said.
since 66 percent of the people arc illiterate. I read a paper at
the conference in which I maintained that, although the need
for universal education is evident, it is necessary to go
beyond it, and that if we are to combat gullibility, whether in
the advanced countries or in the developing ones, an essential
function of education is to develop critical thinking in
students.
Freedom of the individual
The key principle of the Radical Humanist Association is
its uncompromising commitment to democracy and
freedom. This philosophy is very close to that of John
Dewey. It maintains that education not only is essential to
the democratic process but that democratic values have to be
cultivated as the very precondition for the reformation of
society. The Radical IIunmanists believe that their basic task
in India is to contribute to a cultural, social, and
philosophical renaissance, which, unlike the k%'cstcrn world,
India never experienced. Hence, there needs to be it
reconstruction of society, from the rice-roots level up, and a
birth of democratic values. The Radical Ifunianists are dis-
illusioned with political parties. which they believe to be
divisive and intolerant. They also hold that there can be no
submission to totalitarianism, no abandonment of ethical
principles, no appeal to the ends justifying the means. They
are especially critical of the religious values of traditional In-
dian society: the Hindu caste system, which includes un-
touchability, a philosophy of passive spiritual renunciation.
vegetarianism, the Moslem suppression of women, the
arrangement of dowry marriages, and so on. They
emphasize instead the building of a democratic social order
with maximum local control and the need for pragmatic ac-
tion in order to ameliorate wretched social conditions. T1ie%
are emphatic that the ideal of democracy is always the
freedom of the individual.
The Radical Humanists are critics of the ruling Congress
Party, which they claim is ridden with graft and corruption.
They believe that there are major economic tasks to be un-
dertaken in India-particularly in overcoming poverty-in
which the Congress Party has been unsuccessful. The RHA
is issuing People`s Plan If, which emphasizes the need for
drastic measures to control population and for the develop-
ment of a productive agricultural economy.
The Radical Humanists maintain that to achieve genuine
democracy there is a dire need to develop a democratic in-
frastructure in India, which is now lacking. They do not
believe that the key to economic development is a capital-
intensive technology, as in the affluent Western societies, but
rather, they emphasize (like Mahatma Gandhi) a rural
economy with small-scale industry. India, they said, could
not have both democracy and affluence. Their aim is to
achieve a labor-intensive, relatively prosperous, self-
sustaining agricultural society with a technology of the mid-
dle range. The Radical Humanists do not accept state
socialism-the nationalization of all industry-fearing its
totalitarian implications. They focus instead upon the need
to develop cooperative organizations in which there is sell'-
management, participatory democracy, autonomy, and
shared decision-making, though this could be concomitant
with centralized planning.
Political fraud
The present political situation in India, they said, is based
upon a fraud. In effect, the proclamation of emergency
guarantees that Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress Party will
continue in power with no effective program to democratize
the country or eliminate poverty. It has had twenty-eight
years to achieve its goals. Now, it will be immune to
criticism and dissent. The Congress Party is not sincere in its
promises, even though it issues slogans to the effect that it
believes in democracy (it has just abandoned it), seculariza-
tion (it has done little to overcome religious superstition),
and socialism (a ruse, for it is still dominated by the wealthy
landowners and industrialists). There are those who main-
tain that needed economic reforms and bureaucratic ef-
ficiency will conic out of the emergency: but we know from
bitter experience that suspending freedom in order to get the
trains to run on time is dangerous business.
The meetings of the conference were filled with drama.
What could the Radical Humanists do, they asked, with en-
forced press censorship and the opposition leaders in prison'?
Ilow can sincere democrats operate to save democracy'? In
1974, many humanists had formed an organization called
Citizens for Democracy, headed by J. P. Narayan, the dis-
tinguished political leader who had been imprisoned and
subsequently released because of ill health, and V. M.
Tarkunde, former Supreme Court judge in Bombay and now
the president of the Radical f lunmanists. They would work in
the open, they affirmed, to do what they could to promote
democracy. They passed resolutions deploring the emergen-
cy and the destruction of democracy. But there was no way
that their statement could be published in the Indian press
because of the press censorship, although it might be
published in the association's small-circulation journal, The
Radical flutnanisi, not yet suppressed.
The high point of the conference for me was the eloquent
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statement by Maniben Kara, which was warmly applauded.
A dignified woman in her seventies with long-flowing robes
and dazzling gray hair, and former head of the railway un-
ion, she was an important figure in the Indian labor move-
ment. Mrs. Gandhi had used the Indian army to break the
railway strike earlier in the year and had imprisoned the
leaders of the union. Maniben told everyone of her recent
letter to Mrs. Gandhi, in which she expressed grave concern
about the deteriorating political situation. Mrs. Gandhi had
replied that she wanted to do whatever she could to preserve
democracy, but Maniben found the explanations given for
the emergency to be inadequate.
During the meeting the respected constitutional attorney,
C. T. Daru, general secretary of the Radical Humanist
Association, and V. M. Tarkunde reported new arrests daily.
Those arrested were not informed of the charges against
then. Two humanists had been imprisoned, M. V. Rammur-
ty and Gour Ghosh. Given heavy press censorship and
government control of radio (TV still has a negligible in-
fluence), it was difficult to know what was going on in India.
Those who attended the conference, however, feared that
they too might be arrested when they returned home; for a
member of the Indian Central Bureau of Intelligence was
present at some of the meetings.
That week, Mrs. Gandhi had issued charges of violence in
Gujarat and elsewhere to justify the emergency. Babubhai
Patel, chief minister of Gujarat, had denied this and accused
her of being "power hungry." Under the guise of the
emergency, he said, she has nullified the constitutional rights
of citizens to apply to the courts for enforcement of the
"seven freedoms" provided in the Indian Constitution,
which include freedom of speech and expression, the right to
peaceful assembly, the right to form voluntary associations
and unions, freedom of movement, the right to acquire and
dispose of property, and the right to practice a profession or
carry on an occupation or trade.
Even more ominous were suggestions by Congress Party
officials that India's Constitution needed to be drastically
overhauled. They proposed to establish a strong presidential
form of government. This would only further weaken
democracy, said the Radical Humanists; moreover,
proposals to change the judicial system would ensure that in-
dividuals would be deprived permanently of their democratic
rights.
My visit to Ahmedabad was preceded by two days in
Bombay, where I was overwhelmed by the contrast of
modern skyscrapers and Western hotels with incredible
poverty. Some two and a half million people are living either
on the streets or in hovels scattered throughout the area. The
hunger and living conditions were unbelievable. I was
followed everywhere by pleading beggars, including crippled
children. One morning there were eight or nine children on
one corner asking for money. I gave some rupees to the
tallest when he.said that he would divide them with the rest,
but he immediately pocketed them and disappeared; and
more children appeared. One child, missing an arm and a
leg, followed me everywhere I went, like a puppy looking for
scraps.
I visited Makarba, a model village of 2,000 people 12
miles south of Ahmedabad, to which Unesco had donated
hatching ovens for a poultry farm in order to introduce eggs
into the diet of the villagers. The director of the farm told me
25
that there was considerable opposition in the village to eating
eggs; for many of the people were vegetarians, and it was a
slow process to convince then to do so. The poverty in the
village was oppressive. The beautiful children with brown
eyes again followed me wherever I went. The caste system is
still in existence, blocking off the untouchable harijans from
the others. The failure of birth-control efforts to make a
significant dent in population was also apparent. Population
continues to grow at an annual rate of 2 percent. There are
12 million new mouths to feed every year. I was told that
even though the birthrate had fallen from 42 per thousand it
decade ago to 35 per thousand today, it is still a massive
problem. It was hard to get the villagers, especially the men,
to accept family planning. Sex seemed to be the main source
of recreation, and children were considered old-age in-
surance. The point is that 35 to 40 percent of the Indian pop-
ulation lives below the subsistence level, and 40 to 45 percent
barely above it, with per capita income of under $ 100 a year.
It is distressing that population control does not appear on
Mrs. Gandhi's twenty-point economic program; though as
we were leaving India the Punjab government had in-
troduced a measure for compulsory sterilization of' those
who had more than three children.
India has made economic progress since independence,
doubling her food production and tripling her industrial out-
put. Yet, because of the population explosion, though India
is moving ahead, it seems to stand still. The recent increase
in the price of oil and fertilizer and a runaway inflation rate
of 32 percent last year dealt a devastating blow to its
economy. The landless peasants, when they work, earn only
three rupees a day (about thirty-three cents) barely enough
to buy bread-which is the reason that so many children do
not attend the schoolhouse I saw in Makarba. They have to
work in the fields, we were told, in order to earn money to
prevent starvation. Education is compulsory in theory, but
not in practice. Health care is still beyond the means of' the
average peasant, and the most elementary sanitation is ab-
sent.
One gets a deep sense that there is little hope for a better
future. I net with university students at Gujarat, who told
me that few had opportunities for getting a job when they
graduated. Life seemed to be a desperate struggle just to find
enough to eat. One often encountered graduates with B.A.'s,
M.A.'s, and even Ph.D.'s working as busboys in the hotels.
My Indian colleagues impressed upon me the fact that
the middle classes comprise only 8 to 10 percent of the pop-
ulation and that the rest of the people really do not fully un-
derstand or care about the meaning of democracy and
freedom. Although there have been numerous reports of'
satyagraha (passive protests and demonstrations) against
the emergency-and they will no doubt continue-this does
not seem as yet to affect the vast mass of the people. In addi-
tion, I was given underground leaflets and Sanrizdat
literature. They seemed largely written for the intellectuals
and professionals, not the ordinary man. Whether a serious
resistance movement could be mounted, remains to be seen.
Philosophers and plainclothesmen
The Philosophy Congress at the University of Delhi was
held in an atmosphere of tension. There were Indian Central
Bureau of Intelligence plainclothesmen everywhere.
Professors in the departments of Sanskrit, political science,
and philosophy had been arrested prior to our coming, as
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
were several hundred students. Moreover, I heard reports of
constant questioning and harassment of professors by in-
telligence agents. The Congress went on-it would have been
difficult to cancel it at this late date-but our Indian
colleagues were fearful of saying anything against the
government. At the congress. I read it paper on humanism
and the ethic of freedom, in which I argued that any ideology
that abandons freedom for other goals, however
humanitarian, really compromises humanism. I was cut off
by the chairman at the end of nay' paper and no one in the
audience was permitted to discuss it. It was considered too
controversial. Later. I raised with colleagues the question of
whether or not a resolution should be introduced from the
floor protesting the destruction of academic freedom in the
university: but I was told by a grandson of Mahatma
Gandhi, Ram Chandra Gandhi. who had himself been
arrested for being outspoken against the emergency, and
subsequently released, that its only effect would be to ensure
the arrests of the organizers of the congress after we left. It
seemed scandalous to debate philosophical issues while the
very basis of philosophical dialogue was being undermined.
The day I left India, Mrs. Gandhi announced the post-
poning of elections to the Lok Sabha (the parliament). Will
they ever be held again'? Every day since has brought forth
new controls of the press and new acts of repression. What
can be done to save the situation? My colleagues said that.
given the press blackout, their only hope was to get the full
story about what was happening to the Western press. Mrs.
Gandhi constantly attacks the Western press. say ing it is in-
filtrated with "foreign agents." She is now using it as a
whipping-boy to justify the emergency. Nevertheless, she
reads the Western press; and if there were any hopes of
restraining action, said my Indian colleagues, it might come
only from the influence of world opinion.
Some Indian humanists were disturbed by the fact that In-
dia was moving rapidly into the Soviet orbit. The Soviet
Union has provided massive economic aid to India over the
years-for example. Soviet aid accounts for an estimated 30
to 50 percent of India's steel-making capacity (though per
capita steel production is the same as it was in 1962, due to
the vast population increase). There are three communist
parties in India. The only party leaders besides those of the
Congress Party not in prison are members of the pro-
Letters
The Red Guard Mind
This is to express my appreciation for your
publication of "The Shaping of the 'Red
Guard Mind."' At the same time. I should
like to urge you to draw special attention to the
deplorable lack of freedom in Communist
China. Ever since our rapprochement with
China has begun. our news media have gone
out of their way to extol the virtues of the pre-
sent regime and to deemphasize its repugnant
features. That is, of course, what was done
during World War II when the USSR became
our ally. A rapprochement may' be necessary
in the interest of Realpolitik, but not at the
price of concealing the unpleasant truth about
China. Furthermore, it is known that leftist in.
Communist Party of India; and the only
newspapers and journals not suppressed are organs of this
party. India is allied with the Soviet Union against China
and Pakistan. and there is considerable resentment of U.S.
foreign policy vis-a-vis India. The government daily attacks
the United States, although it says it wishes to maintain
good relations. It would be relatively easy for the CPI to ex-
tend its influence on the Indian subcontinent. With Mrs.
Gandhi effectively destroying the opposition. a coup d'etat
might be simple, though most thought that what was emerg-
ing was not a Soviet-style dictatorship but if Brazilian-type
quasi-fascist system.
I low to achieve modernization is the great issue for India.
I visited the Jantar Mantar Observatory, a huge astrological
monument in the center of New Delhi, constructed in 1725,
that enables one to plot the position of the planets and other
heavenly bodies and to determine one's horoscope rather
precisely. When I observed that many Westerners still
believe in astrology, my Indian colleagues told me that,
regretfully, 99 percent of Indians do. The Indian press had
covered the September/October issue of The humanist,
which attacked astrology, and it was still being debated when
we were there. They laughed when I said that many
Americans today are disciples of Indian spiritual gurus and
that the mystic cults of unreason are in vogue. If India
needed anything, they said, it was to break loose from its
religious orientation. For here was a society hidebound in
tradition, overwhelmed by a reactionary value system of'
spiritual renunciation and dominated by irrational religious
taboos. Flow break out of the fatalistic view of the universe
and cultivate self-reliance and a sense that one's problems
can be solved'?-this is the great task for India's future, and
it is formidable.
I had the feeling that the Radical Humanists, however
beleaguered they are. are the group in India most sensitive to
the country's needs. They are committed to the use of science
and reason, economic development, and population control,
and to the fundamental transformation of society by
democractic methods of' education and persuasion.
However, that their viewpoint will prevail and that
democracy can be restored is highly doubtful at the present
juncture.
tellectuals wbo have become disillusioned with
the USSR have found the pure. ideal com-
munist society in Maoist China. The myth of
that ideal communist society is disseminated
by means or -us. China Pcoplc's Friendship"
societies springing up on our university cam-
puses. In the interest of the preservation of
freedom, it therefore seems to me essential to
correct our China image. A Sulzhenitsyn, an
Amalrik or a Sakharov cannot even exist in
China. The Chinese "Gulag Archipelago"
may not be written for a long time.
Alexander Lipski
Professor of History
Long Beach. CA
The Cold War Revisionists
In the Sept.-Oct., 1975 issue of your
magazine, Prof. Oscar I landlin commented on
the reaction to the attacks made on left
revisionist historians by Robert Maddox. I
shall not repeat my argument that Maddox
failed to make a case against the historians he
attacked. My views have been published in
"The Cold War Warmed Over," (.American
Historical Review. Oct. 1974, pp. 1119-36), and
persons interested in pursuing this dispute can
start there. I do, however, want to respond to
some of Handlin's remarks and insinuations
about my motives and arguments as set forth
in that essay.
llandlin claims that I have "preached the
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Freedom at Issue
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
The Helsinki Watch II
Two sharply differing conceptions of detente have emerged.
The USSR believes "world forces" favor it
and the U.S. should act accordingly.
by Gerald L. Steibel
Our Nov.-Dec. 1975 number discussed standards for
testing the fulfillment of pledges made at the Final Act of the
European Conference on Security and Cooperation, con-
cluded in Helsinki Aug. 1. We announced The Helsinki
Watch-a continuing effort to evaluate the progress of
detente. Our first update follows.
Seven months after the 35-country European Security
Conference at Helsinki, there is progress on some of the
approved principles, retrogression on others, and most of
those closest to the hearts of people, East and West, remain
words on paper.
On the positive side, negotiations on strategic arms
limitation (SALT) and troop reductions in central Europe
are continuing. A SALT agreement amplifying the weapons
ceilings set up at Vladivostok, in 1974, is probable this year.
Trade between the Soviet bloc and the West is substantial;
Rumania and Poland have increased their volume, and the
USSR itself is buying in large quantity from the West,
including the United States.
Despite its arms and other supply efforts in the Middle
East, the USSR is observing considerable discretion in the
complex search for peace there. Its advice to the Arabs has
been to avoid the kind of action that would precipitate a
general Big-Power intervention.
These currents keep the detente process alive, and are
therefore to be welcomed as helping fulfill the so-called
"Baskets One and Two" of the Helsinki accords. But they
are not, unfortunately, the whole of the story, as the
discussions between Secretary Kissinger and General
Secretary Brezhnev revealed in January.
Dr. Steibel is chairman of Freedom House's public affairs
committee and a member of its board of trustees.
academic cover-up" by arguing that it is im-
proper to attack the left revisionists, even if
they may be incorrect. That is arrant non-
sense! To quote my article: "The left
revisionists can and have been effectively and
searchingly criticized, but the Maddox book is
not an example of how to do it." (p. 1134)
Moreover, Handlin conveniently ignores my
criticisms of the left-revisionist book, The
Limits of Power, written by Joyce and Gabriel
Kolko; even though those criticisms appear in
the same essay in which I reviewed the Mad-
dox book.
More troubling is Handlin's sarcastic in-
nuendo: "In a touching plea for a return to the
genteel tradition, Kimball explains that we've
all got a good thing going; let's not splatter
each other's wash." I read that statement as a
variation on a theme which Maddox in his
book and Handlin in this magazine have
previously brought forth-that revisionist
historians and persons like myself have either
lied or covered up such lies in order to achieve
success and academic advancement. Perhaps
the best answer to such accusations is to quote
The strategic arms ceilings of Vladivostok have not kept
either the numbers of weapons or their technological
sophistication in check. New Soviet multiple-warhead
systems are being deployed that could eventually place
Russia far ahead of the U.S. in deliverable nuclear
warheads. New U.S. cruise missiles-a highly accurate
pilotless airplane-and an advanced Soviet bomber, the
Backfire, will open a quality arms race, if not brought under
control. The somber prospects are reflected in increased
military spending by both countries. And charges of cheating
and faithlessness on both sides forecast how difficult the
negotiations will be.
The picture is no less grim on "Basket Three" of Helsinki.
Insisted upon by the West Europeans and agreed to by the
Soviet negotiators, Basket Three calls for the freer
movement of people and ideas between the two halves of
Europe. But it has been all but ignored by the USSR, and in
fact denounced as totally unacceptable.
The USSR has made a few token concessions. It
compelled East Germany to withhold gunfire against West
Germans attempting to rescue people who have fallen into a
Berlin canal. Boris Spassky, the chess champion, was
allowed to marry his French fiancee. Physicist Leonid
Plyusch was permitted to emigrate to the West.
Against these concessions, physicist Andrei Sakharov was
forbidden to go to Oslo to receive the Nobel Prize awarded
him in 1975. Emigration, especially of Soviet Jews, has been
drastically reduced. Throughout the Soviet bloc, even in the
countries trading more with the West, the internal
repressions have been noticeably tightened. Western
journalists have had greater difficulties getting their exit and
re-entry visas extended.
the final paragraph of my article:
We can hardly expect our students to
understand or believe in the importance
of civility and respect for the opinions
of others if their teachers and intellec-
tual leaders ignore it. Historiographical
warfare is no substitute for scholarship;
dark hints of conspiracy should not
replace the awareness that our opinion
might be wrong; name-calling and sar-
casm must never be confused with
careful criticism. (p. 1136)
Warren F. Kimball,
Rutgers University,
Newark College;
Senior Fulbright Lecturer
University of Madrid, 1975-1976
Professor Handlin responds
Professor Kimball's quotation relieves me of
the necessity for a reply. Q.E.D.
Still, very few readers will ~ - o scurrying.off
to the October 1974 American Historical
Review for evidence of his critical treatment of
a revisionist hook. The negative passages of his
article conclude that "thus the Kolkos suffer
from the same limited horizons as the liberal
historians they argue against." Having thus
covered up the charge of misused evidence by
blanketing it along with liberal interpretations,
Kimball sums up with the following para-
graph: "Even with these faults the book adds
much to our knowledge. Their investigation of
those motives they find important is thorough,
and their evidence forces us to integrate the
economic and social drives that underlay much
of our foreign policy with the more traditional
treatments of power and politics. As a
bibliographical guide alone the book provides
a definitive compilation of the primary sources
available for studying American foreign policy
from 1945 through 1954." So much for
evenhandedness.
Oscar Handlin
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Basket Three, Soviet style
The Soviet leaders have taken great pains to explain that
Basket Three was not to be taken as the Westerners at
Helsinki had envisioned it. French President Giscard
d'Estaing pleaded with Brezhnev to loosen the bindings, last
fall, but Brezhnev replied with a lengthy and firm refusal,
stressing that these questions arc-internal affairs" not to be
interfered with by outsiders, a position echoed throughout
the bloc. East Germany, for example, says that '"security" is
paramount in the accords, and that means security of people
and ideas as well as military.
These restrictions are backed up by a drumfire of
theoretical support from Soviet and other East European
media. Pravda criticized the French TV network for
interviewing people "deliberately hostile to our socialist
society." Its leading commentator, Yuri Zhukov, also
attacked the "masters of the capitalist press" for failing to
understand the "necessary conclusions" of Helsinki. and
trying to convert the event into ""psychological warfare."
The USSR's chief Americanologist. Georgi Arbatov,
summed up the Soviet view of Helsinki. last September.
defining it as friendly cooperation at the state-to-state level,
and continuous ideological struggle at all other levels.
especially in the realm of the international class struggle.
Arbatov laid down the theorem that "just wars" and the
"liberation struggle" were outside the boundaries of
Helsinki, and that the USSR would give all support to them.
What this means in practice has been all too evident.
Soviet help in all forms has flowed to the Portuguese
Communist Party, whose leader, Alvaro Cunhal, is sworn to
pursue nothing short of a full Marxist-Leninist victory. The
determined stand of the moderates has thwarted Cunhal, but
many of them, like Melo Antunes, still believe in
cooperation with the Communists, and the Soviet stake in
Portugal is by no means ended.
The really deep shock has been in Angola. Tanks, trucks,
MIG fighter planes, 36,000 pistols, rifles and machine guns,
clothing for 30,000 troops, and 90,000 gallons of diesel fuel
have gone to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA). Over one hundred 122 nom. rocket
launchers have been instrumental in decimating the other
two Angolan factions, whose U.S. aid is far less and entirely
inadequate. Most disturbing of all, some 9 to 10,000 Cuban
regular troops are lighting for the MPLA. with a good deal
of advice and support from Russia's Asian ally, North
Vietnam.
Within the top Soviet leadership, there are signs that at
least one faction believes that even the appearance of
accommodation with the West is a mistake. Strong voices
are demanding that the West European Communist Parties
abandon their flirtation with constitutional governmental
processes, and these voices are getting a hearing. For them,
the Cunhat "model," not the Italian or French, is the only
proper course for Western Communists to follow. In the
future, especially if Brezhnev retires or is ousted, these voices
may become the dominant factor in Soviet behavior, and the
promises of Helsinki will be more remote than ever.
Two views of detente
It was widely recognized at Helsinki that good intentions
could be translated into operational good will only slowly.
What has emerged clearly after Helsinki is at least two
sharply differing conceptions of detente. Even without the
more militant pressures, the Brezhnev leadership sees
detente as a concord limited to the more dangerous aspects
of the U.S.-USSR rivalry, in arms especially. It has stood
firm on its present military advantages in Europe, and
expects the U.S. to accept the imbalance as "normal." Its
spokesmen repeat Brezhnev's declaration that "the balance
of world forces has turned in the USSR's favor." Americans
who do not understand are described as "cold warriors" who
oppose detente and who are out of touch with the American
people.
The U.S., it should be noted, never took Helsinki as
seriously as the West Europeans. Kissinger was particularly
unenthusiastic about Basket Three, acceding to its inclusion
only at the urging of the allies. In sonic ways, he tends to
agree with the Soviet assessment of Ielsinki-that the so-
called "human" considerations cannot be enforced, and only
get in the way. Ile also sees the process of detente as more
important than this or that specific agreement or lack of
agreement.
Perhaps the process will gain momentum in the future,
despite Soviet interpretations of it. There is no doubt,
however, that Kissinger, the President, and the American
public are at the moment considerably disenchanted with
Iclsinki and what it has wrought. On balance, therefore,
Helsinki has clarified the problems and the measures
required to deal with them. The Helsinki Watch has just
begun.
The CIA, the Times and Freedom House
Following the President's Feb. 17 appointment of
Leo Cherne, long-time board member of Freedom
House, to the new three-man intelligence oversight
board, the New York Times in a news story raised the
question of CIA channelling of $3,500 to Freedom
House through a private foundation.
The fact: Freedom House has never, overtly or
covertly, received funds or any other assistance from
the CIA or any other intelligence agency. The Times
ascertained this fact from its own sources before it
published the account linking the name of Freedom
House with the CIA. Yet the Times mentioned
Freedom House in the Feb. 20 story.
Freedom House immediately wrote the director of
the CIA demanding explicit proof that no CIA funds
had ever gone to Freedom House by any channel,
overt or covert. At the same time, Freedom House told
the Times that "in 35 years" Freedom House had
never "accepted CIA funds for any purpose."
The Times reported, Feb. 21, that Freedom House
sent the letter to the CIA but again excluded from its
story our denial that CIA funds had ever been
received by Freedom House.
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
Aa?rtt??m?pt
For subscribers/members:
Order ? $15.00. After ? this 1,000-page, 2-volume work will sell for
$45.00. Reserve now and your price is $30.00 for 2 ? a 33% saving. Fill out and mail the
reservation card NOW. (Offer valid ? to Freedom House, 20 West 40 Street, New
York, N.Y. 10018.)
BIG STORY
How the American Press and Television
Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of
Tet-1968 in Vietnam and Washington
by Peter Braestrup
with special opinion poll analysis
by Burns W. Roper
introduction by Leonard R. Sussman
Hanoi's dramatic Tet offensive of February-March 1968 had a significance far beyond
any military gains or losses by either side, for its impact on the American public helped
to topple a President, Lyndon Johnson, and led to the fading of support for the
Vietnam War. Thus it becomes absolutely crucial to examine how American
journalism-both print and broadcast-covered this historic event, what perceptions
it conveyed to the readers and viewers at home. Using Tet as a case history in depth of
the press portrayal of the war in Vietnam, Peter Braestrup-who covered the war
himself for both the New York Times and the Washington Post-has compiled a
remarkable document that reflects the analysis of millions of words published in
newspapers and news magazines and broadcast over radio and television, the
examination of thousands of feet of TV film, and interviews with scores of
participants. Reportage by leading journalists (some of whose reputations were
created in Vietnam) appears in the work, and their reports and commentaries are
matched-not against official claims or a critic's polemics-but against the facts and
resources available to news organizations at the time the original accounts were
written. The key question Braestrup persistently asks is: What were the available
"facts" at the moment when a particular event occurred, and how were those "facts"
reported? The answer is inescapable: First news reports are always partly wrong; in
the reporting of Tet-which included some courageous, thoughtful coverage-much
was wrong. The book also includes an appraisal by BurnsW Roper, the noted public
opinion analyst, of all the pertinent polling responses before, during, and after the Tet
offensive; Roper's finding is that President Johnson (and his critics) thoroughly
misread the initial public reaction to Hanoi's coordinated assault on South
Vietnamese cities in 1968. Altogether, this is a landmark work-the first dispassionate
analysis of the role of the U.S. press in the Vietnam War, and the most extensive study
ever made of how print and electronic newsmen cover a major event.
Peter Braestrup has been an investigative reporter for the New York Herald Tribune, a
Nieman Fellow at Harvard, and a member of the Washington Bureau of the New York
Times. After covering Algeria, Paris, and Southeast Asia for the Times, he joined the
Washington Post in 1968 as Saigon bureau chief. He is now editor of publications for
the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars at the Smithsonian.
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March-April/ 1976 /No.. 5
 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
Extensive radio, TV, press coverage of Survey of Freedom
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FREEDOM-
AN ENDANGERED
SPECIES?
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At th. slut 1976. coIlr m fie
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ONLY 1 IN 5
IN THE WORLD
LIVES IN
FREEDOM
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y
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OUth 1'ielnam ,i what partial free
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Africa-Fie dum declined to many
74040 a tho 11.440..
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Freedom at Issue
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 Approved For Release 2004/10/12 : CIA-RDP88-01314R000100520047-7
Editorials in more than 70 newspapers
A Few Words for Freedom
Every two months the postperson brings to our
office a copy of a publication called Freedom at
Issue.
Every two months it provides a new instalment
in a 33-year-old chronicle of the continuing battle
to keep freedom alive in the world.
Every two months it offers exclusive reports
The Denver Post and informed opinions about how the battle is
going; from both headquarters and field comes
information-about advances and retreats in the
never-ending struggle to preserve the ideals of
Western liberal democracy.
Freedom at Issue is published by .Fr edont
jan organization founded by Wendell Will-
kie, Eleanor Roosevelt and others to uphold free
men and free institutions and undermine despo-
tisms of both right and left. One of its main tasks
today is to try to restore the confidence of Ameri-
cans in the viability and responsiveness of their
democratic system of government.
It is a hard task at a time when human liberty is
being constricted in country after country around
the world.
Freedom House supports equal opportunity for
all but opposes violent dissent which undermines
the democratic process. It keeps 'tabs on the
The 19 `most free'
Once free, always free - if only this were
the way of the world. But the past year's
record of freedom around the globe empha-
sizes how dramatically freedom can decline in
one place even as it inches upward in another,
It needs appreciation and protection where it
is found if the circle of freedom is to widen
once again.
Freedom - compared to what? That is the
question which complicates judgment. Mea-
sured against the past of no more than 50 years
ago, the gains for women's rights, especially
in the already "free" countries, add greatly
to freedom's ledger. So do the gains against
official racial discrimination. And how should
the world weigh the increment of freedom
granted Soviet citizens since the Stalin days?
Where does this much emergence from total
repression rank beside, say, Britain's new
women's rights laws in an already free
society?
Despite an overarching trend toward free-
dom - or at least the demand for it - the
recent ups an d downs in political and civil
rights are not encouraging. Freedom (louse,
an organization which has long studied the
subject, uses criteria that might not be
exactly those of other observers of freedom.
But it seeks to apply them consistently to all
countries for a "comparative survey of free-
dom." By these criteria, "the movement in
1975 was generally, dismally down," says
Freedom House.
In civil rights, for example, those who take
freedom for granted would not expect any-
thing less than living where "there is a free
press and the rule of law, and few persons
walk in fear of expressing their opinions." But
Freedom House found only 19 countries in this
"most free" category of civil rights, and they
are worth listing: Australia, Austria, Bar-
bados, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Den-
mark, West Germany, Iceland, Japan,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, and United States. Do the people in
these countries realize how few they are?
India's tarn away from democracy last year
was counted a setback for the freedom of
hundreds of millions. In Freedom (louse's
general categories of "free," "partly fret,"
and ".not free," these were some details:
Where 1,366 million persons were found to
be free in 1974, only 803.6 million -- less than
20 percent of the world's more than 4 billion
population - were so designated in 1975. Four
countries dropped from the category of free to
tharof partly free - India, Lebanon, Comoro
Islands, and Sri Lanka. Four went from partly
free to not free -- Angola, Bangladesh, Laos,
and South Vietnam.
Heart can be taken from the few instances of
progress: Thailand, the Seychelles, and the
Solomon bringing their 40.3 million persons
from the partly free to the free category; Peru
and Senegal bringing their 19.7 million from
not free to partly free.
But clearly the warning sounds louder than
the comfort in the latest Freedom (louse
message, and it behooves us all to heed it.
"?,M er New Year,
Nefreedom Torch Dim in This
u a""". ^~?"w"Mw
S st"~~ _ ^ -_ fa Think of Freedom
F T~l
.975 Wae SA,r ngrle; ", ?",.,
Veleraell Sigue Sielt
Intl Drutor~r~cit~ fndudable
The Decline of Freedom
m's Fading Flower
_ _y?bMa Freed.
Freedom Took
A Beating In 1975
Inia
1Jert10CPAC~' m
Freedom Declines Itr `I
Takes More Blows
~. Bad roar for Freedom L.overam~ '
World apathy to death of
democracy
Frreedorn Fades
~....,.
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March-April/1976/No. 35 - -
iFreedom shrinks
status of political and civil liberty in every nation,
and the comparative report It issues each year
receives wide attention.
Executive director Leonard R. Sussman said
recently, "For 35 years we have been freedom's
advocate. We wish we could report great suc-
cess, the wide conversion of repressive societies
to free. But we cannot. Instead, we reluctantly
Verify the decline of freedom around the globe.
We believe such analyses, as well as our
recommendations for strengthening free institu-
tions, provide an essential service-particularly
for those still living in lands of freedom."
We agree, The accomplishments of Freedom
House and its staff, and of other organizations
and individuals devoted to the same and similar
goals, may not be as tangible as those of the
International Red Cross, UNICEF, UNESCO or
even the Society of Friends.
But the accomplishments are no less impor-
tant, for they help to guarantee a climate in which
those latter organiziations can function.
Freedom House deserves the support of all.
who cherish liberty. It accepts contributions at its
headquarters, the Willkie Memorial Bldg., 20
West 40th St., New York, N.Y. 10018.
DITORIAL
A Nets,
World
Sheinking Political Freedom ..,.. y ^f e
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Moscow criticizes Freedom House Survey
Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 76 p 9 LD
'Text] The various kinds of "voices" broadcasting to the Soviet Union decided to sum up
one or two results and weigh the pros and cons of what we experienced last year, what
curious information did they give their listeners?
"The Voice of America" [VOA] said: "The private, nonpolitical and nonprofitmaking Now
York organization 'Freedom House' has published the results of a public opinion poll on
the question of political and civil liberties throughout the world," (It is a curious
organization which, although "nonpolitical," deals with the problem of "political liberties"I
--L.L.) "The results of the poll show that less than 20 percent of people on earth enjoy
liberty and this is 15 percent less than the poll conducted last year showed." (That
obviously also confirms that "Freedom House" is indeed a nonprofitmaking organization.
In any event, the "free world" is taking a loss--L.L.)
.1 The report goes on to say," VOA continued, "that more than 740 million inhabitants of
eight countries were deprived of their civil rights in 1975."
In general, it would be curious to hear who was "polled" about this by "Freedom Houses"
bosses and how they were "polled"--either the bosses discovered the opinions of the above-
mentioned 740 million, or they confined themselves to the opinions of the notorious 20 percent
who "enjoy liberty." The data on that question was not broadcast. However, one fact was
pointed out: 'Freedom House' regards the restriction of civil rights and press freedom
in India as the chief reason for the sharp reduction in civil Liberties...."
And so something clear emerged= The measures by Indira Oandhi's government aimed at
curbing reactionary, pro-imperialist forces in the country also signify, from the viewpoint
of New York's "Freedom House," a "restriction of liberty."
True, the question as to which are the other seven countries referred to remains open. Per-
haps they are Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau" Or South Vietnam (what a loss for "civil
liberties" is the elimination of the "tiger cages!"), or Laos (what kind of political
liberties exist with out a monarchy!)....
we have not counted some countries here, but it is not altogether simple to grasp
"Freedom House's" calculations if you are guided merely by common sense.
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?w -
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