HOW THE US INFILTRATED ITALY'S SECURITY SERVICES FRIENDLY PENETRATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000100390026-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 2, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

STAT-
Approved For Release 2004/1f02 8 : CI1-RDP88-01314R00~0100390026-5
NEW STA~M1A II
-Article appeared 2 March 1979
o:i page 2S0
How the US intiltratecl italy s security Survicus
STAT
THE LEAKED intelligence report which led.
tot .s hasty expulsion of a US agent from Italy,
t~~o ,s ago has greatly embarrassed Italian
and US officials. The report - a full copy of,
which has reached the NEW STATESMAN -
demonstrates the remarkable extent to which
the Italian security and anti-terrorist services
had been penetrated by the `friendly' US'
intelligence services. It also highlights the
shambles into which the Italian security ser-!
vices have fallen, commenting profusely on
the personalities of three leading Carabinieri
generals in charge of operations.
One of these generals had an apparently
insatiable urge to appear before television
ca ?reras during anti-terrorist hunts, while"
ready to condone, it is hinted, torture of
prisoners or, indeed, any illegal methods. A
second was characterised as unable to establ-
ish or runt the newly-formed anti-terrorist
agency SISDE (Servizio per le informazione e
per la Sicurezza Dernoctatica; or Intelligence
and Democratic Security Service) unless pre-
viously supplied with a full instruction man-
ual. i he third would brook no course of action
unless it seemed li';ely to lead him to the
eventual post of Carabinieri commander-in-
chi,ef.
The US official who left Italy under a
24-hour expulsion order was Dominic A. Per-
rone, a liaison officer to Italian military and
security services from US Army European
Command, based in Rome. His intelligence)
report on the 'status of (Italian) anti-terrorist,
orientation' was leaked, apparently from
Washington, to the Romer left-wing daily
Repro bblica. The report, written in Italy on 29I
January and forwarded to Washington a days
later, was compiled from information given by'
a 'group of contacts'. Five contacts are.
described in Perrone's report, each of whom
had clearly been used to obtain detailed ands
sensitive information on the operation of the
Italian security services. The report's authen-
ticity has not been disputed: Repubblica took
the precaution before publicati6n of obtaining
an analysis and assessment of its contents
from the former agents working for the ;
Washington-based Covert Action Informa-
tion Bulletin" - in particular former CIA
Latin. American agent Philip Agee. They told-,
the N w STATESMAN that analysis indicated
the report to be wholly authentic - in particu-
lar the practice of infirra.ting the operations of
intelligence services in friendly countries.
Perrone indicates that he is responding to
specific intelligence tasks assigned to him by a,
CIR - probably Central Intelligence!
Requirement of the CIA - numoer v- r T Diu.
SCP-49501 In I p ifctrtAel&aw12004/10/28 : C -e d `-3' ,`
reports with the DIA on exactly the same officers, one counter-espionage chief and a
subject. He grades his intelligence sources I CESIS sourer all concurred that Crrassini
Perrone discovered that Italy had
developed an 'entire official and unofficial
intelligence and security services structure
(which) was operating in violation of the
reform law (on) anti-terrorism'.?The Intellig-
ence and Military Security Service., SISMl,
had illegally become involved in anti-terrorist
activities - and was almost unable to perform
at all as a counter-espionage service, leaving
Italy wide open to hostile intelligence
activities, as well as `friendly' ones. To cap off
this wholesale leak Perrone's source added
that a recent Parliamentary report on SISDE
had been `mishmash and pap' intended to
mislead.
APART FROM THIS, the Perrone'teport
lucidly describes the proliferating special
investigations in response to the Aldo Moro
murder and other incidents. A network of
national and local 'special operations' offices I
had been set up by the Interior Ministry:
the Prime Minister had appointed as Coor-
dinator for Anti-Terrorism and Aldo Moro
case Chief Investigator, Carabinieri General
Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa. None of these had
legal authority, which was vested in the judi-
cial police. Unsurprisingly perhaps, 'the only
agency assigned the and-terrorist function by
law was SISDE, which was probably conduct-
ing the least amount of actual activity --- the
anti-terrorist operation was in chaos.'
General dalla Chiesa's penchant for per-
sonal publicity dominated many anti-terrorist
activities. He was 'looming over the (effort),
appearing at raids and other publicity valuable
scenes, levying and tasking the other agencies
and ta'--ing credit for what the other agencies
had done. As a result the operation was
haphazard... and operating at the expense of
the security of the country'. Dalla Chiesa vas :
also responsible for special prisons to hold
Brigate Rosso terrorists; a colleague who had
worked for him in the Carabinieri intelligence
section told Perrone that he was `action
oriented ... and not too concerned with how
results were obtained. If he received orders to
eliminate the Brigate he would start in
immediately, worrying about increasing his
capability as he went along. The fine points of
legality or illegality would not interest him.'
In the special prisons which he controlled
the Carabinieri officer expected that he
'would use whatever means possible to obtain
information.' The colleague modestly con-
cluded that dalla Chiesa was 'inclined to be a
little ruthless.'
All of Perrone's five main informants are
quoted in constructing a profile. of another