[COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN - PREMIER ISSUE - JULY 1978]

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CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7
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July 1, 1978
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Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 C OVERTACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN PREMIER ISSUE JULY 1978 CONTENTS WHO WE ARE WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER, BY PHILIP AGEE THROWING A CASE: THE TRIAL OF ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA "RESEARCHING CONSUMERS": THE MARKET FOR DESTABILIZATION RECENT NEWS NAMING NAMES PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST 15 22 23 24 FREE CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 1, July 1978, published by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit Cor- poration, P.O. Box 50272, F Street Station, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone (202) 296-6766. All rights reserved; copyright ?1978, by Covert Action Publications, Inc. Permission to reprint will be liberally granted. Typography by Art for People, Washington, DC. Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 DIRTY WORK The CIA In Western Europe Edited by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf SPECIAL OFFER This startling and invaluable new expose of the CIA, just published, lists for $24.95. If you order your copy through the CovertAction Information Bulletin, and at the same time subscribe to the Bulletin, we will give you a $10.00 discount from the cost of your subscription. Just send the enclosed order form in along with your subscription blank. For the past several years, beginning in 1974, new "enemies" have haunted the Central Intelligence Agency - journalists and ex-agents. These people are bent on exposing the CIA's unscrupulous tactics so the American public can see what the CIA has spawned and what is being done under the deceptive cover of "national security." John Marks, Victor Marchetti, Morton H. Halperin and especially Philip Agee have shown considerable courage in informing the world about the seamy side of American espionage. They have opened much of the secret portfolio, ranging from the routine planting of phony news stories to assassination attempts and the overthrow of legitimate governments. In this startling hooka comprehensive picture of the CIA emerges. More important, the authors explain the simple way in which any competent researcher can recognize the people behind the dirty work - thus breaking the "coves' of thousands of CIA agents around the world. Dirty Work is a major expose of the CIA - what it does and who does it -- on it scale never before revealed. PIIILIP ACES, an ex-CIA operative, is the Agency's number one nemesis and author of the best-selling Inside The Company: CIA Diary. LOUIS WOLF is a journal- ist who has done intensive research into the American intelligence community. DIRTY WORK: Order Form Please send me a copy ofDirry Work. My check or money order for $24.95 (U.S. funds, please), is en- closed. Name: Mailing Address: Number 1 (July 1978) Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 WHO WE ARE One and a half years ago the last issue of CounterSpy Magazine appeared. Although the scope of coverage, the depth of research, and the impact of CounterSSpy around the world were on the rise, personal and political disputes coupled with CIA harassment led to an impasse among the staff. Those of us who had been working most closely with Phil Agee left the magazine to continue research, and others stayed on, ostensibly to continue the magazine. They were not successful. We have felt, since the beginning, that there is an im- portant and vital role to be played by the sort of exposes for which Counterspy had become world-famous. We decided that the dissemination of such information must resume. That CounterSpy and its uncovering of CIA per- sonnel and operations around the world were so violently hated by the Agency was our best endorsement. The com- pliments and encouragement we received from progressive people everywhere convinced us that we could not leave this void in the mosaic of struggles against the U.S. intel- ligence complex. We begin modestly with a small Bulletin which we in- tend to publish approximately bi-monthly. This first issue is being distributed at no charge. We are confident that there will be sufficient subscribers to make this publication a permanent weapon in the fight against the CIA, the FBI, military intelligence, and all the other instruments of U.S. imperialist oppression throughout the world. We know that the information and the research is there, crying out to be published and disseminated. We encourage everyone to keep in touch with us, to cor- respond, to submit leads, tips, suggestions and articles. We will try to track down all your leads. Most especially, we will never stop exposing CIA personnel and operations whenever and wherever we find them. We are particularly anxious to receive, anonymously if you desire, copies of U.S. diplomatic lists and U.S. embassy staff and/or tele- phone directories, from any countries. A major step in that battle has already been taken. Two of our group, Phil Agee and Lou Wolf, have edited and pre- pared a new book, Dirty Work, just published by Lyle Stuart, Inc. This book describes in detail how to expose CIA personnel, includes dozens of articles from many countries which have done just that, and presents, in Appendix form, detailed biographies of more than 700 undercover CIA and NSA personnel lurking in embassies and military installations in virtually every country on earth. We urge all our readers to study this book, and the simple methodology it sets forth. And, of course, to let us know the results of your own research. The book, which is at present only in hardcover, is un- fortunately expensive. While we recognize that the years of research which went into it, and the expensive, complicated and lengthy printing which it involved, justify such a cover Number 1 (July 1978) price, we have arranged for a special offer for our readers. If you order a copy of the book through us-see the ad on page 2-we will give a $10 rebate on all charter one-year subscriptions to the CovertAction Information Bulletin. If you are in the United States, this is the full price; if you are overseas, you will only have to pay the postage. One of our group was a CIA case officer for twelve years; two others worked in finance and support for the CIA for nine years; the rest of us have devoted much of the past several years to direct research on U.S. intelligence operations. We hope that we can put this experience to valuable use through the pages of the CovertAction Infor- mation Bulletin. We hope you will agree, and will support us. Phil Agee Ellen Ray Bill Schaap Elsie Wilcott Jim Wilcott Lou Wolf Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER by Philip Agee Copyright 1978 by C.I. Publications. Inc. This article is a slightly modified version of the intro- duction to the book Dim, Work: The CIA in Western I.urope, by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf, just published. It expresses much of the philosophy of the CovertAetion Information Bulletin.) Today the whole world knows. as never before, how the U.S. government and U.S. corporations have been secretly intervening in country after country to corrupt politicians and to promote political repression. The avalanche of re- velations in the mid-1970s, especially those concerning the CIA. shows a policy of secret intervention that is highly refined and consistently applied. Former President Ford and leading government spokes- men countered by stressing constantly the need for the CIA to retain. and to use when necessary . the capability for executing the kinds of operations that brought to posher the military regime in Chile. Ford even said in public that he believed events in Chile had been "in the best interests of the Chilean people." And even with President Carters human rights campaign there has been no indication that the CIA has reduced or stopped its support of repressive dictatorships in Iran. Indonesia. South Korea. Bra/d, and other bastions of "the free world." The revelations, though. have not only exposed the operations of the CIA, but also the individual identities the names, addresses. and secret histories of many of the people who actually do the ('IA's work. Yet. with all the newly available information. many people still seem to be- lieve the uryths used to justify this secret political police force. Some of the myths are. of course, actively spread by my former CIA colleagues: others come front their liberal critics. But whatever the source, until we lay the nrv the to rest. they will continue to confuse people and permit the CIA literally to get away with murder. flirtlr Number One. The CI;t is I,rinrarilr' engaged in Kathcr- . inK intelligence information against the .Sorict 011,111 This is perhaps the CIA's longest-playing myth. going hack to the creation of the Agency in 1947 and the choice of the name "Central Intelligcncc Agency." As the Agency's backers explained the idea to the American Congress, afraid even in those early days of getting dragged into un- wanted foreign adventures, the CIA was needed to find out what a possible enemy was planning in order to protect the United States from a surprise attack. Americans at the time still shared a vivid memory of the unexpected Japanese at tack at pearl I larbor. and with the likelihood that the new enemy the Soviet Union would soon have atomic bombs, rnr one could really doubt the aced to know if and when an attack Wright come. The real success in watching the Soviets. however, came Irony technological brcaktlrrouglrs like the U-2 spy plane and spy-in-the-sky satellites, and the job of strategic intel- ligence fell increasingly to the technically sophisticated U.S. National Security Agency. The CIA played a part, of course, and it also provided centralised processing of information and data storage. But in its operations the CIA tended to put its emphasis on covert action financing friendly poli- ticians. murdering suspected foes, and staging coups cf'etat. This deeply involved the Agency in the internal politics of countries throughout Western Europe. Asia. Africa, the .Middle East, and Latin America, as well as in the Soviet bloc. And even where CIA officers and agents did act as spies- gathering intelligence information, they consistently used that information to further their programs of action. -lire CIA's operatives will argue that the ultimate goal of discovering Soviet and other governments' intentions re- quires live spies at work in places like the Kremlin that the Agency exists to recruit these spies and to keep them alive Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314ROO0100380007-7 and working. A Penkovsky or two should be on the payroll at all times to keep America safe from Russian adventures. This argument may influence some people, because theo- retically, spy satellites and other forms of monitoring only give a few minutes' warning, whereas a person in the right place can report on decisions as soon as they are made, giving perhaps days or weeks of warning. Such a spy might also be of great value for the normal conduct of relations- whether in negotiations, cooperation, or confrontation. Nevertheless, the vast CIA effort to recruit officials of importance in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, KGB, and GRU has never had significant success. There have indeed been defections, but these, I was told in the CIA, had nothing to do with the elaborate traps and snares laid out by the CIA around the world. They resulted from varying motivations and psychological pressures operating on the official who defected. In this respect, the CIA's strengthening of repressive foreign security services, neces- sary for laying out the snares (telephone tapping, travel control, observation posts, surveillance teams, etc.). can scarcely be justified by the nil recruitment record. Today. notwithstanding recent "reforms." the CIA re- mains primarily an action agency doing and not just snooping. Theirs is the grey area of interventionist action between striped-pants diplomacy and invasion by the Marines, and their targets in most countries remain largely the same: governments, political parties, the military, police, secret services, trade unions, youth and student organizations, cultural and professional societies, and the public information media. In each of these, the CIA con- tinues to prop up its friends and beat down its enemies, while its goal remains the furthering of U.S. hegemony so that American multinational companies can intensify their exploitation of the natural resources and labor of foreign lands. Of course this has little to do with strategic intelligence or preventing another Pearl harbor, while it has a lot to do with the power of certain privileged groups within the United States and their friends abroad. The CIA spreads the myth of "intelligence gathering" in order to obscure the meaning of what the Agency is really doing. Myth Number Two. The major problem is lack of control; that is, the CIA is a "rogue elephant. " This myth comes not from the CIA, but from its liberal critics, many of whom seem to believe that all would be well if only Congress or the President would exercise tighter control. Yet, for all the recent horror stories, one finds little evidence that a majority in Congress want the responsibility for control, while the executive branch continues to insist- rightly-that the Agency's covert action operations have, with very few exceptions, followed the orders of successive presidents and their National Security Councils. As former Secretary of State Kissinger told Representative Otis Pike's Intelligence Investigating Committee, "Every operation is personally approved by the President." For its part the Pike committee concluded in its official report, first published in "leaked" form by the Village Voice, that "all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far from being out of control has been utterly responsive to the instructions of the President and the Assistant to the Presi- dent for National Security Affairs." So the problem is said to be with the presidents Democratic and Republican--who, over the past 30 years, Number 1 (July 1978) have given the green light to so many covert operations. But why were the operations necessary? And why secret? The operations had to be secret, whether they involved political bribes, funding of anticommunist journals, or fielding of small armies, because in every case they implied either government control of supposedly non-governmental institutions or violation of treaties and other agreements. In other words, hypocrisy and corruption. If the government was going to subvert free, democratic, and liberal institu- tions, it would have to do so secretly. There is, however, a more basic reason for the secrecy and for the CIA. Successive administrations--together with American-based multinational corporations-have continu- ally demanded the freest possible access to foreign markets, labor, agricultural products, and raw materials. To give muscle to this demand for the "open door," recent presi- dents have taken increasingly to using the CIA to strengthen those foreign groups who cooperate-and to destroy those who do not. This has been especially clear in countries such as Chile under Allende, or Iran 20 years earlier under Mossadegh, where strong nationalist movements insisted on some form of socialism to ensure national control of econ- omic resources. The CIA's covert action operations abroad are not sui generis. They happen because they respond to internal U.S. requirements. We cannot wish them away through fantasies of sonic enlightened President or Congress who would end American subversion of foreign peoples and institutions by the wave of a wand. Not surprisingly, the U.S. Senate rejected by a very wide margin a legislative initiative that would have prohibited covert action pro- grams by the CIA. Only prior radical change within the U.S., change that will eliminate the process of accumulating the value of foreign labor and resources, will finally allow an end to secret intervention abroad. Until then, we should expect more intervention by the CIA and multinational corpora- tions-not less. Increasingly important will be the repres- sive capabilities of the Agency's "sister" services abroad. Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314ROO0100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Mrth Number Three: Weakening the CIA opens teider the door for Soviet expansion and eventual world donnnation. This myth is peddled especially hard at times when liberation movements make serious gains. Former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger used it frequently during the CIA's ill-fated intervention in Angola, and we continue to hear it again as liberation movements seek Soviet and Cohan help in their struggles against the apartheid policies of the white Rhodesians and South Africans. The problem for America. however. is not "Sot let eS- pansionisnm." despite all the anticommunism with which sse are indoctrinated practically from the cradle hhc problem. rather. is that the American gosernnmenI. flicclullicl](1% tile CIA. continues to umtersenc on the side of "fimends chose property and privilege rest on the remnants of archaic social systems long since discredited. The political repression re- quired to preserve time old order depends on American and other Western support which quite naturally is turning more and more people against the I, nitcd State, acne effectively- for sure. than any thing the k(,B could ever concoct. As Senator Frank Church explained in an interview on British television. "1'nm apt to think that the Russians are going to choose Isidesl better than we will choose nine times nut of ten. After all sse're two hundred seats assn from our resolution; were a yen conwi%,it sc comrnt %.. 'Nish Vulnher 1-lair. Th?sr teho attack the ('I.1. rylrectallm' those who hark tcc,rkcr1 tit tltr ilttellwcmc r,unnuutitr, arc traitors, turncoats, or agent. ?1 the is GB This has been the Agency's chief attack on me personally and I'm certain that the fear of being tarred slob the same brush is keeping mans ('IA veterans Iron] voicing their own opposition. But as with earlier charts to hod the "foreign hand" in the America] antissar 111wcolcut. tile CIA has failed to produce a shred of cyidence that any of its major American (or I.uropeanI crrucs are in the service of any foreign power. Would-be "reformers" of the CIA base also discovered flow the Agency reacts to criticism. Aceordml, to Represen- tative Pike. the CIA's Special Counsel threatened to destroy Pike's political career. In a cr]nsenauon isitli Pike's elite/ investigative staff person. the Special Counsel was quoted thus: "Pike will pay tic this Iduecnng the sole to ipprosc the committee report on the C1,\1 on ss:ui and see. l'nt serious. Ilmere will be political retaliation. Any political ambitions in New York that Pike had are through. \4c will destroy hinm for this." CIA veterans most not he nitinudated by the Agency's false and unattributed slander. We hale a special responsi- bility for weakening this organisation. If put at the service of those sve once oppressed. our knowledge of how the CIA really works could keep the CIA from ever really ssorking again. And though the CIA will brand us as "traitors." people all Over the world, including the United States. will respond. as they have already. with enthusiastic and effective support. ,11t'th .%umber 1-7rc .A-aminv individual CL I o/firrrs c/-es little to rhan,ge thr Agenrl', and is none 'tilt' h' t'.Tl,nse ill not ens individuals to the threat ?t a.ssassrvtation. Nothing in the anti-CIA effort has stirred up more anger than the puhlishing of the nannies and addresses of CI iA officials in foreign countries. especially since the killing of the CIA Station Chief in Athens, Richard Welch. CIA ,pokesnmen and journals such as the [t'ashington Post were quick to accuse tire and C'ounlcrSpv nmagarine of haling "fingered" Welch for the charging that in publishing his name. we were issuing "an open invitation to kill loin." Tile Agcncs also managed to exploit Welch's death to discredit and weaken those liberals in Congress who wanted only to curtail some of the Agency's more ohylous abuses. Subsequent research. noted in Dirty Work, makes ahundantly clear that CotcltterSln' had nothing to do whim the Welch killing i he result (d tile ALenes's manipulations isn't hard to predict l'he (IA. IM all its sins. cattle out of the recent umsesugauons strrns,thencd by the Ford "reforms." sshile the ( ongress nay attempt to pass an official secrets act that will attempt to make it a crime for any present or fnrn]ci government official user again to blow the whistle by snaking public classified information. No more Pcnta- e'm I'ul,rrs. No gnome Watergate revelations. No more (Y. -I i)iane%. Nonetheless. the naming goes on. More and amore CIA people can now he field personally accountable for what they and the Agency as an institution do for the real harm tlmeS cause to teal people. I heir nmilitars coops, torture chan]heis, and terrorism cause untold pain and their backing of multinational corporations and local elites helps push Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 millions to the edge of starvation, and often beyond. They are the Gestapo and SS of our time, and as in the Nuremberg Trials and the war in Vietnam, they cannot shed their in- dividual responsibility simply because they were following a superior's orders. But apart from the question of personal responsibility, the CIA remains a secret political police, and the exposure of its secret operations-and secret operatives-remains the most effective way to reduce the suffering they cause. Al- ready a handful of journalists and former intelligence of- ficers have managed to reveal the names and addresses of hundreds of CIA people, and even the Washington Post- which condemns us for doing it-has admitted that our efforts added greatly to the CIA's growing demoralization. We also noticed from our own investigations that the Agency was forced to step up its security precautions and to trans- fer many of those named to other posts. All of this disrupts and destabilizes the CIA, and makes it harder for them to inflict harm on others. Of course, some people will always raise the cry that we are "trying to get someone killed." But, as it happens, violence is not really needed. By removing the mask of anonymity from CIA officers, we make it difficult for them to remain at overseas posts. We hope that the CIA will have the good sense to shift these people to the increasingly smaller number of safe posts, preferably to a desk inside the CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. In this way the CIA will protect the operatives named-and also the lives of their potential victims. From the old song and dance of the "intelligence gather- ing" to the claim that "those who expose are the murderers," these five myths won't simply vanish. The CIA-and its allies-will continue to propagate them, and the CIA's critics will have to respond. We must increasingly expose these myths and the crimes they cover up. But besides debating, there is much more that we can do-especially in furthering the exposure of the Agency and its secret operatives. The CIA probably has no more than 5,000 officers experienced in running clandestine opera- tions and it should be possible to identify almost all of those who have worked under diplomatic cover at any time in their careers. Dirty Work lists mainly those named as CIA operatives in Europe; we hope additional volumes can be published on the CIA's people in other areas. All that is required is a continuing effort-and a novel form of international cooperation. Here's how: 1. In each country a team of interested people, in- cluding journalists, should obtain a list of all the Americans working in the official U.S. Mission: the Embassy, consulates, AID offices, and other U.S. installations. This list can be acquired through a friend in the host Foreign Ministry, in the American Embassy-or by other means. 2. The team should then get past editions of neces- sary public documents-U.S. Foreign Service Lists and Biographic Registers (both published by the Department of State) from a local library, and the Diplomatic List and Consular List published regularly by every Foreign Ministry. The Diplomatic and Consular Lists will contain the names and addresses of the higher ranking members of the official mission, including some of the CIA people. Number 1 (July 1978) 3. Check the names as suggested in the various ar- ticles in Dirty Work, especially John Marks' "How to Spot a Spook." Watch carefully for persons carried on the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic and Consular Lists, but who are missing from the recent Bio- graphic Registers and Foreign Service Lists. Most of these will be CIA people purposely left off the State Department lists. 4. After narrowing down the list of likely suspects, check them with us and with other similarly oriented groups. CovertAction Information will follow up on all leads, and publish all the information it can con- firm. 5. Once the list is fully checked, publish it. Then organize public demonstrations against those named- both at the American Embassy and at their homes- and, where possible, bring pressure on the govern- ment to throw them out. Peaceful protest will do the job. And when it doesn't, those whom the CIA has most oppressed will find other ways of fighting back. Naturally, as new CIA people replace the old, it will be necessary to repeat the process, perhaps every few months. And as the campaign spreads, and the CIA learns to correct the earlier and more obvious flaws in its use of State De- partment cover, we will have to develop new ways to spot them. Already the Agency has gotten the State Department to restrict circulation of the all-important Biographic Register, and it is likely that the Administration will in future place more of its people under cover of the Depart- ment of Defense (for example, in military bases, and in Military Assistance Groups), the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the multinational corporations. In rare cases, the CIA may even attempt changing the identities of certain operatives. Nonetheless, the CIA will always need a secure base in embassies and consulates to keep its files and communications facilities, and there are many ways to identify the CIA people in these missions without relying on public documents. Within the United States, people can help this campaign by supporting the groups struggling to stop covert inter- vention abroad. There is also the need for continuing re- search into current CIA operations, and new programs to identify and keep track of all the FBI special agents and informers, military intelligence personnel, and the Red Squads and SWAT groups of local and state police depart- ments. Together, people of many nationalities and varying political beliefs can cooperate to weaken the CIA and its surrogate intelligence services, striking a blow at political repression and economic injustice. The CIA can be defeated. The proof can be seen from Vietnam to Angola, and in all the other countries where liberation movements are rapidly gaining strength. We can all aid this struggle, together with the struggle for socialism in the United States itself. Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 THROWING A CASE: THE TRIAL OF ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA "The testimony will essentially be this. On approxi- mately August 15th of 1977 at approximately 10:00 a.m., Special Agei.t ? United States Customs Service went to the It.;... Pedro Gil at 52 Northwest 58th Avenue Ili .:,. ,. Florida. Just a short ways off Flagler Street. "At that location, which b a house, or a house that is fairly close to the street, a single family dwelling, there was a boat parked on a trailer in the driveway. "The evidence will show that this is a Formula outboard boat. "At the time the agents went there they stet Mr. Gil and after a brief conversation with Mr. Gil, they boarded his boat and searched it. "What they found on the boat then becomes the subject of the evidence in this case. "They found on the boat one 20 111111. cannon, one .50 caliber machinegun, one .30 caliber ntachinegun. two Browning rifles, five weapons that are contntonly known as AR-15 Colt rifles, two of which had been converted to fully automatic. "Approximately ninety rounds of 20 inn. ammuni- tion and thousands of rounds of additional ammuni- tion to fit these other weapons."l Thus begins the prosecutor's opening statement in the trial of four Cuban exiles charged with unlawful possession of unregistered firearms. Never once did any of the four deny that they possessed the weapons. or that they were intended for an armed raid against the Republic of Cuba. Four days later. on January 10. 1978, they were acquitted. What happened, and why? ('r,vert.-lction 1111'rtnat(nu Bulletin obtained the complete transcript of the trial, never before available. and carefully studied it and the surrounding events. The conclusion is inescapable that the acquittal was foreordained, and that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Justice were responsible. What is also clear is that the Carter Administration's alleged detente with Cuba, well before the recent Shaba incident and Brzezinski's ravings, was hypocritical at best, and, on some levels. a simple lie. 1 United States r. Pedro Gil, Annandu Lopez Estrada. Juan Raimondo Arcc arnd Isidoro PineiroCastineira. No. 77-?181-Cr-JI . United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Official Transcript (hereinafter "Transcript"), January 6. 1978. Part 1. pp. 5-6. 8 CovertAction The CBS Documentary The opening scene can be pinpointed. On June 10, 1977, ('BS-TV aired a Bill Moyers special: "CBS Reports--The CIA's Secret Army." The show documented the paramili- tary roles of certain segments of the Cuban exile com- munity in the United States. It reviewed the preparation and implementation of the CIA-directed invasion at the Bay of Pigs in 1061 . the ignominious defeat of the benighted invaders, and the subsequent recruitment by the United States government of the veterans and sympathizers of the fia.,:o into bands of terrorists hell-bent on attacking Cuba and overthrowing the government led by Fidel Castro. The TV correspondent of the Miami Herald reported this in his review of the show: "The Kennedy vengeance began, reports Moyers, as soon as the members of the Brigade 2506 captured during the invasion were ransomed months later. Bobby Kennedy gave top priority to the CIA's mus- tering of a secret army. based in Mianti, to start covert sabotage operations against Castro and his regime. It was called 'Operation Mongoose.' "A CIA agent. Grayston Lynch. was its recruiter. An Army general. Edward Lansdale. was its military director. "The CIA virtually dropped 'Operation Mongoose' by 11)72, but few involved were aware of that ... . Now . . . the onetime CIA soldiers are simply pro- ceeding on their own. conducting their own war."2 The Moyers show had interviews with various members of Brigade 2506, including Armando Lopez Estrada, the "Chief of Military Operations" of the Brigade. It also ex- posed to U.S. audiences some shocking scenes filmed in a warehouse in Miami which was stacked floor to ceiling with weapons. Two exiles one of them as it turns out being Lopez Estrada again were filmed in the warehouse stand- ing proudly in front of the weapons with sacks over their heads to disguise their identities. It was a difficult time, diplomatically, for such a show to air. The U.S. and Cuban administrations were negoti- ating the lessening of tensions, cultural exchanges, and the mutual opening of Interest Sections in each other's country. At the saute time. right-wing forces within the United States were decrying any improvement in relations, self- interest notwithstanding. Ironically, the same day that the CBS documentary was aired, Senator Howard Baker was Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 quoted as saying, "I think this is the worst time in history to be cozying up to Cuba."3 Despite sentiments such as Baker's, it was clear that something had to be done. The Cuban exiles had it, and they were flaunting it: Warehouses full of weapons in downtown Miami. Cuban exiles bragging about armed attacks. Bombings and killings around the world. And Brigade 2506 stage center, and proud of it. But, as we shall see, what was done by the U.S. government was little more than show. Astonishingly, nothing ever happened to the warehouse full of weapons. Presumably it is still there in Miami. CBS was never questioned, never subpoenaed, nor were the cameramen and still photographers from many newspapers, all of whom saw the inside of the warehouse. Had the par- ticipants been left-wing activists instead of right-wing terrorists, one can imagine what would have happened. Because of the public outcry, though, some kind of investigation surveilling and following leading Brigade 2506 members was conducted, and as the Assistant United States Attorney explained to the jury some months later, on August 15, 1977, two months after the TV show, the Customs agents searched Pedro Gil's boat. Thus began the trial that, in the final analysis, might just as well never have taken place. The Arrests Pedro Gil, 41, was immediately arrested. Shortly there- after, based on fingerprint identifications and interrogations, Armando Lopez Estrada, 38, Juan Raimundo Arce, 37, and Isidoro Pineiro Castineira, 38, were also arrested. They were all charged with possession of unregistered Firearms and vio- lation of the Neutrality Act. To this day, Pedro Gil has never made any public statement about the case. The others, however, from the day of the arrests, admitted that the weapons were theirs, said they had been given to them by the CIA, and proudly proclaimed that they were for use against Cuba. The Miami Herald noted: "Lopez Estrada confirmed that the boats and weapons were part of a plan to attack Cuba. Ile said one boat was to be used to transport the weapons to a fourth `intermediary boat' somewhere outside the U.S. limits. Lopez Estrada said that he didn't feel that the group was doing anything wrong since the attack was to be launched from outside the United States. `If I take weapons outside the United States to be used outside of the United States, is that wrong'?' he asked."4 Following the arrests, Roberto Carballo, President of Brigade 2506, called several meetings to gather support for the defendants in the Cuban exile community and to raise funds for their defense. Brigade 2506 The Brigade, with perhaps 500 active members, is com- prised of veterans of the Bay of Pigs and other sympathizers. Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380007-7 Approved For Release 2006/11/07: CIA-RDP88-01314ROO0100380007-7 They are a powerful force in the Miami area where well upwards of 100.000 Cuban exiles reside A Miami cits Commissioner is a member, as is the state Democratic Party Chairman. A few years ago, when the Brigade held its "I-irst Congress." Miami Mayor Maurice I?erre and V.S. Representative Claude Pepper were featured speakers. On the day of the arrest, the .lfiwni lleruhl news story pointed out that the Brigade was "well respected' in the community. Ironically, the editorial in the same issue of the l/eruhl took a less-laudatory position: "I'ntil the mid 1960s, overtluowinm, Fidel Castro seemed to be the official policy of the I mired States government. Toward that purlxlsc an agency of the government armed and supported a group of exiles in an abortive attempt to invade Cuba. Other efforts were made to depose the Cuban dictator. "But the policy gradually changed, and in recent months the rate of chance appears to have increased. Most Cuban exiles many of them now citizens of the United States find the changes in policy hard to accept. Some merely grumble. Others take their cues from the fiery oratory of demagogues who promise to turn back the clock. And a few a tiny number, really take the law into their own hands."s They did more than take the law into their own hands, though: they seemed to have ignored it with relative im- punity. On June 29, 1976, there was a meeting at the New England Oyster House in ('oral Gables. Florida. involvine, as a recent 1'cvthousc .lIa'a:iiu' article put it, hyo Chileans. two Cuban exiles, and an American.t' It now appears that the participants included Ilector Duran, Bernardo de Torres and Armando Lopez Estrada, from the Brigade' 2506: General Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the notorious then-head of DINA, the Chilean secret police :and Michael V. Townlex , the American who conspired with the fascist, paramilitary I'utriu e /.ihertarl against the regime _I his meeting, which was apparently conducted under police and FBI surveillance, and which may have included an infumtant, centered on the murder of Letelier and several sabotage actions. No police action followed this meeting. What is more, it is public knowledge that Carballo and I ()Pei Estrada were also present at the secret meeting in Juls of 1976 in the Dominican Republic which organized the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations t('ORU1, which claimed credit for the heinous bombing of a (ubana Airliner in October 1976.7 We will return to the terrorists no ''tiny number" by the way and to the Chilean connection, presently. But what of the Miami trial?After so many years of openly defiant and illegal behavior, Armando Lopez Estrada and three of his colleagues were charged with possession Of LID- registered weapons and violation of the Neutrality Act. The Neutrality Act Charges . iAl! of Salvador Allende. became a DINA operative after the coup, and was directly involved in the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt in September of that year. : Ihm i. 1 mist \"olkn>an and .11-h11 C lllnlllrng',, ..1hC ,~11J1 In tl n