[COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN - PREMIER ISSUE]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01314R000100380006-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 1, 1978
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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COVERTACTION
INFORMATION
BULLETIN
PREMIER ISSUE JULY 1978
CONTENTS
WHO WE ARE
WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER, BY
PHILIP AGEE
THROWING A CASE: THE TRIAL OF
ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA
"RESEARCHING CONSUMERS": THE
MARKET FOR DESTABILIZATION
RECENT NEWS
NAMING NAMES
PUBLICATIONS OF INTEREST
15
22
23
24
FREE
tv1! F lar!? C
CovertAction Information Bulletin, Number 1, July 1978, published by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit Cor-
poration, P.O. Box 50272, F Street Station, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone [phone]. All rights reserved; copyright ? 1978, by Covert
Action Publications, Inc. Permission to reprint will be liberally granted. Typography by Art for People, Washington, DC.
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DIRTY WORK
The CIA In Western Europe
Edited by Philip Agee and
Louis Wolf
For the past several %ea s, beginning in 1974, new
"cuenries" have haunted the Central Intelligence Agency
- journalists and ex-agents. These people are bent on
exposing the CIA's ,msernpulons tactics so the American
puhli' can see what the (:IA has spawned and what is
In iug clone under the deceptive cover of "national
securih'.
John Alarks, Victor Marchetti, Morton II. Halperin
.uid , speci:dly- Philip :Agee have shown considerable
cnnr,rt;e in inlonning the world about the seamy side of
:Americlnr espionlge. "hhcy hate opened mach of the
secret portfolio, raliging from the routine planting of
phony news stories to assassination, attempts and the
usrrihrnsc of lr,1 hehiod the dirty work - this
hrc.il_in till ' (oS r1 of ihouS,lodS of ('IA agents around
fIw world.
I)irtrj Work is a nc,jor expose of the CIA - what it
due's 111(1 5( 110 dnrs it - rnn a scale never before revealed.
Ylltl.ll' ,\(:1':P:_ .,n cx-CIA operative, is the Agencv?s
~nnnln r ou, ue,nrsis .,nd author of the h?st-selling In.sith
11? l',-n,lnui: ('l.1 1)htrnl LOt 1S \\ OI.F is a journal-
ist wino 11.u ,lone- mtl'>ISIS1 rrs,.10In into the American
int Ili{ n r,otnnin?it'.
DIRTY WORK: Order Form
SPECIAL OFFER
Please send me a copy 01 Dirit? Work. My check or
money order for S24.95 (U.S. funds, please), is en-
dosed.
This startling and invaluable new expose of the CIA. just
published, lists for S24.>)5 If you order your copy through
the Covertfl eliurt Iulirrmutiuu Bulletin. and at the saute
time subscribe to the Bulletin, we will give s ou a S 10-00
discount from the cost of ~ our subscription. lust send the
enclosed order form in along with our subscription blank.
Mailing Address:
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WHO WE ARE
One and a half years ago the last issue of CounterSpy
Magazine appeared. Although the scope of coverage, the
depth of research, and the impact of CouuterSpy around
the world were on the rise, personal and political disputes
coupled with CIA harassment led to an impasse among the
staff. Those of us who had been working most closely with
Phil Agee left the magazine to continue research, and others
stayed on, ostensibly to continue the magazine. They were
not successful.
We have felt, since the beginning, that there is an im-
portant and vital role to be played by the sort of exposes
for which CounterSpy had become world-famous. We
decided that the dissemination of such information must
resume. That CounterSp_ and its uncovering of CIA per-
sonnel and operations around the world were so violently
hated by the Agency was our best endorsement. The com-
pliments and encouragement we received from progressive
people everywhere convinced us that we could not leave
this void in the mosaic of struggles against the U.S. intel-
ligence complex.
We begin modestly with a small Bulletin which we in-
tend to publish approximately bi-monthly. This first issue
is being distributed at no charge. We are confident that
there will be sufficient subscribers to make this publication
a permanent weapon in the fight against the CIA, the FBI,
military intelligence, and all the other instruments of U.S.
imperialist oppression throughout the world. We know that
the information and the research is there, crying out to
be published and disseminated.
We encourage everyone to keep in touch with us, to cor-
respond, to submit leads, tips, suggestions and articles. We
will try to track down all your leads. Most especially, we
will never stop exposing CIA personnel and operations
whenever and wherever we find them. We are particularly
anxious to receive, anonymously if you desire, copies of
U.S. diplomatic lists and U.S. embassy staff and/or tele-
phone directories, from any countries.
A major step in that battle has already been taken. Two
of our group, Phil Agee and Lou Wolf, have edited and pre-
pared a new book, Dirty Work, just published by Lyle
Stuart, Inc. This book describes in detail how to expose
CIA personnel, includes dozens of articles from many
countries which have done just that, and presents, in
Appendix form, detailed biographies of more than 700
undercover CIA and NSA personnel lurking in embassies
and military installations in virtually every country on earth.
We urge all our readers to study this book, and the simple
methodology it sets forth. And, of course, to let us know
the results of your own research.
The book, which is at present only in hardcover, is un-
fortunately expensive. While we recognize that the years of
research which went into it, and the expensive, complicated
and lengthy printing which it involved, justify such a cover
Number 1 (July 1978)
price, we have arranged for a special offer for our readers.
If you order a copy of the book through us-see the ad on
page 2--we will give a $10 rebate on all charter one-year
subscriptions to the CovertAction Information Bulletin.
If you are in the United States, this is the full price; if you
are overseas, you will only have to pay the postage.
One of our group was a CIA case officer for twelve
years; two others worked in finance and support for the
CIA for nine years; the rest of us have devoted much of the
past several years to direct research on U.S. intelligence
operations. We hope that we can put this experience to
valuable use through the pages of the CovertAction Infor-
mation Bulletin. We hope you will agree, and will support
Phil Agee
Ellen Ray
Bill Schaap
Elsie Wilcott
Jim Wilcott
Lou Wolf
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WHERE MYTHS LEAD TO MURDER
by Philip Agee
Copyright 1c)78 by C.I. Publications. Inc-
[This article is a slightly modified version of the intro-
duction to the book 1)irtt' Rork The CIA in Western
Europe- by Philip Agee and Louis Wolf. just puhlished.
It expresses much of the philosophy of the
CorertAclion Iufiirmatton Bulletin I
Today the whole world knows, as Weser before, host the
U.S. government and U.S. corporations have been secretly
intervening in country after country to orrupt politicians
and to promote political repression. The avalanche of re-
velations in the mid-1970s, especially those concerning the
CIA- shows a policy of secret intersenuun that is highly
refined and consistently applied.
Fourier president Ford and leadim-, goscrrunent spokes-
nien countered by stressing constantly the need for the CIA
to retain. and to use sullen necessans, the capability for
executing the kinds of operations that hiought to poser
the military regime in ('bile. Ford evens said in public that
he believed events in Chile had been "in the hest interests
of the Chilean people." And even with President Carters
human rights campaign there has been no indication that
the CIA has reduced or stopped its support of repressive
dictatorships in Iran. Indonesia. South Korea. Brasil. and
other bastions of "the free world.''
The revelations, though. have riot only exposed the
operations of the CIA. but also the individual identities
the names, addresses. and secret histories of litany Of the
people who actually do the CIA's yolk. 'net. sith all the
newly available information. litany people still ,cent to be-
lieve the myths used to justify this secret political police
force. Sonic of the myths are. of course. actively spread
by ntv former CIA colleagues. others conic horn their
liberal critics. But whatever the source. until sc la% the
myths to rest, they will continue to confuse people and
permit the CIA literally to set asay soli uturdci-
;limb .'1-umber Ono,: The (Y:I is primarilt? ru_s;ur;rtl in eatltr r
in,t; intelligence information against the .S'ui1I Cni,in.
This is perhaps the CIA's longest-playing myths. going
back to the creation of the ;1,encv in I947 and tie choice
of the name "Central Intelligence Agency ." As the Agency 's
backers explained the idea to the American Congress,
afraid even in those early days of getting dragged into un-
wanted foreign adventures. the CIA was needed to find out
shat a possible enemy was planning in order to protect the
(-noted States from a surprise attack. Americans at the
tittle still shared a vivid memory of the unexpected Japanese
attack at Pearl Ilarboi. and with the likelihood that the new
enemy the Soviet Union would soon have atomic bombs,
no inc could really doubt the need to know if and when an
attack might come.
fine real success in watching the Soviets. however. carne
Iroar technological breaktlirou is like the l-2 spy plane
and spy-in-the-sky satellites, and the job of strategic intel-
ligence tell increasingly- to the technically sophisticated U.S.
National Security Agency. The CIA played a part, of course.
and it also provided centralised processing of information
and data storage. But in its operations the CIA tended to
put its emphasis on covert action financing friendly poli-
tician., murdering suspected foes. and staging coups cl'etat
Ihis deeply involved the Agency in the internal politics
of countries throughout Western l'.urope, Asia. Africa. the
Middle Fast, and Latin America, as well as in the Soviet
hloc And evens where CIA officers arid agents did act as
gathering intelligence information, they consistently
used that information to further their programs of action.
'I he CIA's operatives Will argue that the ultimate goal of
discovering Soviet and other governments' intentions re-
quires live spies at work in places like the Kremlin that the
Agency exists to recruit these spies and to keep them alive
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and working. A Penkovsky or two should be on the payroll
at all times to keep America safe from Russian adventures.
This argument may influence some people, because theo-
retically, spy satellites and other forms of monitoring only
give a few minutes' warning, whereas a person in the right
place can report on decisions as soon as they are made,
giving perhaps days or weeks of warning. Such a spy might
also be of great value for the normal conduct of relations-
whether in negotiations, cooperation, or confrontation.
Nevertheless, the vast CIA effort to recruit officials of
importance in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry,
KGB, and GRU has never had significant success. There
have indeed been defections, but these, I was told in the
CIA, had nothing to do with the elaborate traps and snares
laid out by the CIA around the world. They resulted from
varying motivations and psychological pressures operating
on the official who defected. In this respect, the CIA's
strengthening of repressive foreign security services, neces-
sary for laying out the snares (telephone tapping, travel
control, observation posts, surveillance teams, etc.), can
scarcely be justified by the nil recruitment record.
Today, notwithstanding recent "reforms," the CIA re-
mains primarily an action agency -doing and not just
snooping. Theirs is the grey area of interventionist action
between striped-pants diplomacy and invasion by the
Marines, and their targets in most countries remain largely
the same: governments, political parties, the military,
police, secret services, trade unions, youth and student
organizations, cultural and professional societies, and the
public information media. In each of these, the CIA con-
tinues to prop up its friends and beat down its enemies,
while its goal remains the furthering of U.S. hegemony so
that American multinational companies can intensify their
exploitation of the natural resources and labor of foreign
lands.
Of course this has little to do with strategic intelligence
or preventing another Pearl Harbor, while it has a lot to do
with the power of certain privileged groups within the
United States and their friends abroad. The CIA spreads the
myth of "intelligence gathering" in order to obscure the
meaning of what the Agency is really doing.
Myth Number Two: The major problem is lack of control;
that is, the CIA is a "rogue elephant. "
This myth comes not from the CIA, but from its liberal
critics, many of whom seem to believe that all would be
well if only Congress or the President would exercise tighter
control. Yet, for all the recent horror stories, one finds little
evidence that a majority in Congress want the responsibility
for control, while the executive branch continues to insist-
rightly-that the Agency's covert action operations have,
with very few exceptions, followed the orders of successive
presidents and their National Security Councils. As former
Secretary of State Kissinger told Representative Otis Pike's
Intelligence Investigating Committee, "Every operation is
personally approved by the President."
For its part the Pike committee concluded in its official
report, first published in "leaked" form by the Village
Voice, that "all evidence in hand suggests that the CIA, far
from being out of control has been utterly responsive to the
instructions of the President and the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for National Security Affairs."
So the problem is said to be with the presidents -
Democratic and Republican-who, over the past 30 years,
have given the green light to so many covert operations.
But why were the operations necessary? And why secret?
The operations had to be secret, whether they involved
political bribes, funding of anticommunist journals, or
fielding of small armies, because in every case they implied
either government control of supposedly non-governmental
institutions or violation of treaties and other agreements. In
other words, hypocrisy and corruption. If the government
was going to subvert free, democratic, and liberal institu-
tions, it would have to do so secretly.
There is, however, a more basic reason for the secrecy-
and for the CIA. Successive administrations-together with
American-based multinational corporations have continu-
ally demanded the freest possible access to foreign markets,
labor, agricultural products, and raw materials. To give
muscle to this demand for the "open door," recent presi-
dents have taken increasingly to using the CIA to strengthen
those foreign groups who cooperate-and to destroy those
who do not. This has been especially clear in countries such
as Chile under Allende, or Iran 20 years earlier under
Mossadegh, where strong nationalist movements insisted on
some form of socialism to ensure national control of econ-
omic resources.
The CIA's covert action operations abroad are not sui
generis. They happen because they respond to internal
U.S. requirements. We cannot wish them away through
fantasies of some enlightened President or Congress who
would end American subversion of foreign peoples and
institutions by the wave of a wand. Not surprisingly, the
U.S. Senate rejected by a very wide margin a legislative
initiative that would have prohibited covert action pro-
grams by the CIA.
Only prior radical change within the U.S., change that
will eliminate the process of accumulating the value of
foreign labor and resources, will finally allow an end to
secret intervention abroad. Until then, we should expect
more intervention by the CIA and multinational corpora-
tions-not less. Increasingly important will be the repres-
sive capabilities of the Agency's "sister" services abroad.
Number 1 (July 1978) CovertAction 5
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,L1vth Number Three: Weakening the Cl.-1 opens raider the
door for Soviet expansion and eventual \rorlcl donunatinn.
This myth is peddled especially hard at fillies when
liberation movements make serious gains. Fanner President
Ford and Dr. Kissinger used it frequently during the ('IA's
ill-fated intervention in Angola, and we continue to hear it
again as liberation movements seek Soviet and ('uhan help
in their struggles against the apartheid policies of the white
Rhodesians and South Africans.
The problem for America. however, is not "Soviet es-
pansionism," despite all the anticommunism with vvhicli we
are indoctrinated practically front the cradle The piohleni,
rather. is that the American government. preeminently the
CIA. continues to nnter%enc tin the side ,,I "friends., whose
property and privilege rest on the remnants of archaic social
systems long since discredited The political repression re-
quired to preserve the old order depends on American and
other Western support which quite naturallti is tanning
more and more people against the united States enure
effectively. for sure, than anv thing the KGB could ever
concoct.
As Senator Frank Church explained in an interview on
British television, "I'm apt to think that the Russians are
going to choose Isidesl her ter than we will choose nine
firiies out of ten, After all were tWo hundred \ears as1;l\
from our revolution: were a very conservative Lutintr\ :.
,tli?tli .Vumhcr to-,,u': Those IN,,) attack the C/- 1. rype?( iallr
those ielto have worked ill the iutelli'ertrc rotttrrluttiti?, are
traitors, turncoats, or a.L'euts o f the A'(Jt
This has been the Agency's chief attack ott etc personally
and I'm certain that the fear of being tarred with the same
brush is keeping many CIA veterans Irony voicing their
Own opposition. But as with earlier eltorts to find the
"foreign hand" in the Arneriear, antiwar nr(ivenient, the
CIA has failed to produce a shred of evidence that arts of
its major American (or I urupean) critics are in the service
of any foreign power.
Would-he "reforiners" of tire ('IA have also discovered
how the Agency reacts to criticism. Acc 'tiling to Represen-
tative Pike. the CIA's Special Counsel ihreatened to destiu\
Pike's political career. Ina conversation will) Pike's chief
investigative Staff person. the Special Counsel was quoted
thus "Pike will pa\ for this (directing the vote to approve
the committee report on the CIAJ you leant and sec. f'nr
serious. There will he political retaliation. An\ political
ambitions in New York that Pike had are through. We will
destroy him for this."
CIA veterans must not he intimidated hs the Agency's
false arid unattributcd slander. We have a special responsi-
bility for weakening this organisation. It put at the service
of those we once Oppressed. Our knowledge of ho\v the CIA
really works could keep the CIA front ever really working
again. Arid though tire CIA will brand us as :'Ifjltors.''
people all over the world. including the Linited States.
will respond, as they have alrcad\. with enthusiastic and
effective support.
31t'tlt .Vuotber hire. Naming indn?idual C1.-i , li(cr.' d)e,
little to change the jlgettci'? and is (lone ~,ulr t'' t' vp(,sc lit-
not ent uuliridttals to the threat of a.s.suvsinati 'ft.
Nothing in the anti-CIA effort has stirred up stoic anger
than the publishing of the names and addresses of ('IA
officials in foreign countries, especially since the killing of
the ('IA Station Chief in Athens, Richard Welch. CIA
spokesmen arid journals such as the Rasltittgtort Post
were quick to accuse tire arid Cotuttc'rSpt? magazine of'
hasnrg "fingered" Welch for the "hit." charging that in
publishing his Warne. wve were issuing "an open invitation
to kill hint." The Agency also managed to exploit Welch's
death to discredit and weaken those liberals in Congress
who wanted only to curtail some of the Agency's more
obsious abuses. Suhsequent research. noted in Dim, Rork,
retakes abundanttl\ clear that CouttterSpi, had nothing to
do with the Welch killing.
the result of the Agency's manipulations isn't hard to
predict The CIA. for all its sins. carte out of the recent
tnsrstigatiors sIrcttetlt(wc(1 by the Ford ''refurnis," while
the Congress nna\ attempt to pass an official secrets act
that swill attempt to make it a crime for any present or
former govertnirient official ever again to blow the whistle
by making public classified information. No more Peuta-
Paters. No more Watergate revelations. No snore
(7:1 Diaries.
Viiictheless. the naming goes on. More and more CIA
people can now be held personally accountable for what
they and the Agency as all institution do for the real harm
they cause to tcal people. Iheir military coups, torture
eharnhers. and terrorism cause untold pain. and their hacking
,,f multinatiornal corporations and local elites helps push
Number I (July 1978)
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millions to the edge of starvation, and often beyond. They
are the Gestapo and SS of our time, and as in the Nuremberg
Trials and the war in Vietnam, they cannot shed their in-
dividual responsibility simply because they were following
a superior's orders.
But apart from the question of personal responsibility,
the CIA remains a secret political police, and the exposure
of its secret operations-and secret operatives-remains the
most effective way to reduce the suffering they cause. Al-
ready a handful of journalists and former intelligence of-
ficers have managed to reveal the names and addresses of
hundreds of CIA people, and even the Washington Post-
which condemns us for doing it-has admitted that our
efforts added greatly to the CIA's growing demoralization.
We also noticed from our own investigations that the Agency
was forced to step up its security precautions and to trans-
fer many of those named to other posts. All of this disrupts
and destabilizes the CIA, and makes it harder for them to
inflict harm on others.
Of course, some people will always raise the cry that we
are "trying to get someone killed." But, as it happens,
violence is not really needed. By removing the mask of
anonymity from CIA officers, we make it difficult for them
to remain at overseas posts. We hope that the CIA will have
the good sense to shift these people to the increasingly
smaller number of safe posts, preferably to a desk inside the
CIA headquarters at Langley, Virginia. In this way the CIA
will protect the operatives named-and also the lives of
their potential victims.
From the old song and dance of the "intelligence gather-
ing" to the claim that "those who expose are the murderers,"
these five myths won't simply vanish. The CIA-and its
allies-will continue to propagate them, and the CIA's
critics will have to respond. We must increasingly expose
these myths and the crimes they cover up.
But besides debating, there is much more that we can
do-especially in furthering the exposure of the Agency and
its secret operatives. The CIA probably has no more than
5,000 officers experienced in running clandestine opera-
tions and it should be possible to identify almost all of
those who have worked under diplomatic cover at any
time in their careers. Dirty Work lists mainly those named
as CIA operatives in Europe; we hope additional volumes
can be published on the CIA's people in other areas. All
that is required is a continuing effort-and a novel form of
international cooperation. Here's how:
1. In each country a team of interested people, in-
cluding journalists, should obtain a list of all the
Americans working in the official U.S. Mission: the
Embassy, consulates, AID offices, and other U.S.
installations. This list can be acquired through a
friend in the host Foreign Ministry, in the American
Embassy-or by other means.
2. The team should then get past editions of neces-
sary public documents-U.S. Foreign Service Lists
and Biographic Registers (both published by the
Department of State) from a local library, and the
Diplomatic List and Consular List published regularly
by every Foreign Ministry. The Diplomatic and
Consular Lists will contain the names and addresses
of the higher ranking members of the official mission,
including some of the CIA people.
Number 1 (July 1978)
3. Check the names as suggested in the various ar-
ticles in Dirty Work, especially John Marks' "How to
Spot a Spook." Watch carefully for persons carried
on the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic and Consular
Lists, but who are missing from the recent Bio-
graphic Registers and Foreign Service Lists. Most of
these will be CIA people purposely left off the State
Department lists,
4. After narrowing down the list of likely suspects,
check them with us and with other similarly oriented
groups. CovertAction Information will follow up on
all leads, and publish all the information it can con-
firm.
5. Once the list is fully checked, publish it. Then
organize public demonstrations against those named-
both at the American Embassy and at their homes-
and, where possible, bring pressure on the govern-
ment to throw them out. Peaceful protest will do the
job. And when it doesn't, those whom the CIA has
most oppressed will find other ways of fighting back.
Naturally, as new CIA people replace the old, it will be
necessary to repeat the process, perhaps every few months.
And as the campaign spreads, and the CIA learns to correct
the earlier and more obvious flaws in its use of State De-
partment cover, we will have to develop new ways to spot
them. Already the Agency has gotten the State Department
to restrict circulation of the all-important Biographic
Register, and it is likely that the Administration will in
future place more of its people under cover of the Depart-
ment of Defense (for example, in military bases, and in
Military Assistance Groups), the Drug Enforcement Agency,
and the multinational corporations.
In rare cases, the CIA may even attempt changing the
identities of certain operatives. Nonetheless, the CIA will
always need a secure base in embassies and consulates to
keep its files and communications, facilities, and there are
many ways to identify the CIA people in these missions
without relying on public documents.
Within the United States, people can help this campaign
by supporting the groups struggling to stop covert inter-
vention abroad. There is also the need for continuing re-
search into current CIA operations, and new programs to
identify and keep track of all the FBI special agents and
informers, military intelligence personnel, and the Red
Squads and SWAT groups of local and state police depart-
ments.
Together, people of many nationalities and varying
political beliefs can cooperate to weaken the CIA and its
surrogate intelligence services, striking a blow at political
repression and economic injustice. The CIA can be defeated.
The proof can be seen from Vietnam to Angola, and in
all the other countries where liberation movements are
rapidly gaining strength.
We can all aid this struggle, together with the struggle for
socialism in the United States itself.
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THROWING A CASE:
THE TRIAL OF ARMANDO LOPEZ ESTRADA
"The testimony will essentially be this. On approxi-
mately August 15th of 1977 at approximately
10:00 a.m.. Special Agci.i United States
Customs Service went to the is Pedro Gil
at 52 Northwest 58th Avenue its Florida.
just a short ways off Flagler Street.
"At that location, which IS a house, or a house that
is fairly close to the street, a single fancily dwelling.
there was a boat parked on a tr.iler in the driveway.
"The evidence will show that this is a _23 Ioorntula
outboard boat.
"At the time the agents went there they net Mr.
Gil and after a brief conversation with Mr. Gil,
they boarded his boat and searched it.
"What they found on the boat then becomes the
subject of the evidence in this case.
"They found on the boat one 20 Went. cannon, one
.50 caliber machinegun, one .30 caliber machinegun,
two Browning rifles, five weapons that are coninlonly
known as AR-l5 Colt rifles, two of which had been
converted to fully automatic.
"Approximately ninety rounds of 20 nun, ammuni-
tion and thousands of rounds of additional aminuni-
tion to fit these other weapons."]
Thus begins the prosecutor's opening statement in the
trial of four Cuban exiles charged with unlawful possession
of unregistered firearms. Never once did any of the fotu
deny that they possessed the weapons. or that they were
intended for an armed raid against the Republic of Cuba.
Four days later. on January 10, 1978, they were acquitted.
What happened. and why" CovertActitrn Injortnation
Bulletin obtained the complete transcript of the trial. never
before available, and carefully studied it and the surrounding
events. The conclusion is inescapable that the acquittal was
foreordained, and that the Central Intelligence Agency and
the Department of Justice were responsible. What is also
clear is that the Carter Administration's alleged detente
with Cuba. well before the recent Shaba incident and
Brzezinski's ravings, was hypocritical at best, and, on some
levels, a simple lie.
limited States r. Pedro Gil, Armando Lope: zistrada. loan
Raimondo Arce and Isidoro Pinciro ('astlncira, No. 77481-(-r-J F,
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
Official Transcript (hereinafter "Transcript"), January 6, 1978,
Part 1. pp. 5-6.
The CBS Documentary
The opening scene can be pinpointed. On June 10, 1977.
CBS-TV aired a Bill Moyers special: "CBS Reports- The
CIA's Secret Arm y." The show documented the paramili-
tary roles of certain segments of the Cuban exile com-
munity in the United States. It reviewed the preparation
and implementation of the CIA-directed invasion at the Bay
of Pigs in 1961, the ignominious defeat of the benighted
invaders, and the subsequent recruitment by the United
States government of the veterans and sympathizers of the
fiaso into bands of terrorists hell-bent on attacking Cuba
and overthrowing the government led by Fidel Castro.
The TV correspondent of the .lfiami Ileralcl reported
this in his review of the show:
"The Kennedy vengeance began, reports Moyers,
as soon as the members of the Brigade 2506 captured
during the invasion were ransomed months later.
Bobby Kennedy gave top priority to the CIA's mus-
tering of a secret army, based in Miami, to start
covert sabotage operations against Castro and his
regime. It was called 'Operation Mongoose.'
"A CIA agent. Grayston Lynch, was its recruiter.
An Army general, Edward Lansdale. was its military
director.
The CIA virtually dropped 'Operation Mongoose'
by 19722, but few involved were aware of that ... .
Now . . . the onetime CIA soldiers are simply pro-
ceeding on their own, conducting their own war., ")
--
The Movers show had interviews with various members
of Brigade 2506, including Armando Lopez Estrada, the
"Chief of Military Operations" of the Brigade. It also ex-
posed to U.S. audiences some shocking scenes filmed in a
warehouse in Miami which was stacked floor to ceiling with
weapons. Two exiles one of them as it turns out being
Lopez Estrada again were filmed in the warehouse stand-
ing proudly in front of the weapons with sacks over their
heads to disguise their identities.
It was a difficult time, diplomatically, for such a show
to air. The U.S. and Cuban administrations were negoti-
ating the lessening of tensions, cultural exchanges, and the
mutual opening of Interest Sections in each other's country.
At the same time, right-wing forces within the United
States were decning any improvement in relations, self-
interest notwithstanding. Ironically, the same day that the
CBS documentary was aired, Senator -Howard Baker was
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quoted as saying, "I think this is the worst time in history
to be cozying up to Cuba."3
Despite sentiments such as Baker's, it was clear that
something had to he done. The Cuban exiles had it, and
they were flaunting it: Warehouses full of weapons in
downtown Miami. Cuban exiles bragging about armed
attacks. Bombings and killings around the world. And
Brigade 2506 stage center, and proud of it. But, as we
shall see, what was done by the U.S. government was little
more than show.
Astonishingly, nothing ever happened to the warehouse
full of weapons. Presumably it is still there in Miami. CBS
was never questioned, never subpoenaed, nor were the
cameramen and still photographers from many newspapers,
all of whom saw the inside of the warehouse. Had the par-
ticipants been left-wing activists instead of right-wing
terrorists, one can imagine what would have happened.
Because of the public outcry, though, some kind of
investigation -surveilling and following leading Brigade
2506 members was conducted, and as the Assistant
United States Attorney explained to the jury some months
later, on August 15, 1977, two months after the TV show,
the Customs agents searched Pedro Gil's boat. Thus began
the trial that, in the final analysis, might just as well never
have taken place.
Pedro Gil, 41, was immediately arrested. Shortly there-
after, based on fingerprint identifications and interrogations,
Number 1 (July 1978)
Armando Lopez Estrada, 38, Juan Rairnundo Arce, 37, and
Isidoro Pineiro Castineira, 38, were also arrested. They were
all charged with possession of unregistered firearms and vio-
lation of the Neutrality Act. To this day, Pedro Gil has
never made any public statement about the case. The others,
however, from the day of the arrests, admitted that the
weapons were theirs, said they had been given to them by
the CIA, and proudly proclaimed that they were for use
against Cuba. The Miami Herald noted:
"Lopez Estrada confirmed that the boats and
weapons were part of a plan to attack Cuba. He said
one boat was to be used to transport the weapons to
a fourth `intermediary boat' somewhere outside the
U.S. limits. Lopez Estrada said that he didn't feel that
the group was doing anything wrong since the attack
was to be launched from outside the United States.
`If I take weapons outside the United States to be
used outside of the United States, is that wrong?' he
asked."4
Following the arrests, Roberto Carballo, President of
Brigade 2506, called several meetings to gather support
for the defendants in the Cuban exile community and to
raise funds for their defense.
Brigade 2506
The Brigade, with perhaps 500 active members, is com-
prised of veterans of the Bay of Pigs and other sympathizers.
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They are a powerful force in the Miami area. where well
upwards of 100,000 Cuban exiles reside. A Miami city
Commissioner is a member, as is the state Democratic
Party Chairman. A few years ago, when the Brigade held
its "First Congress." Miami Mayor Maurice Eerie and IS.
Representative Claude Pepper were featured speakers.
On the day of the arrest, the .tliarni Herald news stop
pointed out that the Brigade was "well respected" in the
community. Ironically. the editorial in the same issue of
the Herald took a less-laudatory position
"Until the mid 1960s. overthrowing Fidel Castro
seemed to be the official policy of the United States
government. Toward that purpose an agency of the
government armed and supported a group of exiles
in an abortive attempt to invade Cuba. Other efforts
were made to depose the Cuban dictator.
"But the policy gradually changed. and in recent
months the rate of change appears to have increased.
Most Cuban exiles many of them now citi/ens of
the United States find the changes in policy hard to
accept. Some merely grumble. Others take their
cues from the fiery oratory of demagogues who
promise to turn back the clock. And a few a tiny
number, really take the law into their own hands.- 5
They did more than take the law into their own hands.
though; they seemed to have ignored it with relative inn-
punity. On June 29, 1976, there was a meeting at the New
England Oyster House in Coral Gables, Florida. involving,
as a recent Pent{r,rsc ;hla,Ka:rrrc article put it, tsyo Chileans,
two Cuban exiles, and an American.(' It now appears that
the participants included Hector Duran. Bernardo de
Torres and Armando Lopez Estrada, from the Brigade
_'506; General Juan Manuel Contreras Sepulveda, the
notorious then-head of DINA, the Chilean secret police ' and
Michael V. Townley, the American who conspired with
the fascist, paramilitary I'atria r I.ihertad against the regime
of Salvador Allende, became a DINA operative after the
coup, and was directly involved in the murder of Orlando
Letelier and Ronnie Moffitt in September of that year.
5lhr,l.
('I rnest VAkman and John ( ummmunes. "Ihc Assassin atmon ur
Orlando Letcher." A-whuuse. Jule 1978, p. 52. at p. 59.
This meeting, which was apparently conducted under
police and FBI surveillance, and which may have included
an informant, centered on the murder of Letelier and
several sabotage actions. No police action followed this
meeting.
What is more. it is public knowledge that Carballo and
Lopez Estrada were also present at the secret meeting in
July of 1976 in the Dominican Republic which organized
the Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations
(LORI'), which claimed credit for the heinous bombing of
a (ubana Airliner in October 1976.7
We will return to the terrorists no "tiny number" by
the way and to the Chilean connection, presently. But
what of the Miami trial"After so many years of openly
defiant and illegal behavior, Armando Lopez Estrada and
three of his colleagues were charged with possession of un-
registered weapons and violation of the Neutrality Act.
The Neutrality Act Charges
On January 4, 1978, the day before the trial proper
was to begin, on the motion of the defense attorneys,
l'nited States District Judge of the Southern District of
Florida Joe Eaton severed the Neutrality Act charges from
the case. The Neutrality Act count of the indictment charged
the defendants with planning, from the United States, to
attack Cuba. "a country with which the United States is at
peace." This particular phrase, essential to a Neutrality Act
charge, was at the heart not only of the defense motion to
sever, but of the entire trial as well. And this is because (as
the defense incessantly pointed out to the judge and jury)
of Public Law 87-733 passed by the Eighty-Seventh Con-
gress and signed by John F. Kennedy on October 3, 1962.
It reads:
"Resolved, by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Con-
gress assembled,
"That the United States is determined to prevent
by whatever means may be necessary including the
force of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba
from extending, by force or the threat of force, its
aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this
hemisphere.
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"To prevent in Cuba the creation of an externally
supported military capability endangering the security
of the United States, and
"To work with the Organization of American
States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support
the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-
determination."8
This Resolution--this Cold War Monroe Doctrine-is
still on the books despite three unsuccessful attempts to
repeal it. And because, Judge Eaton said, "it calls for the
overthrow of Fidel Castro," he withdrew the Neutrality
Act charges until the prosecution could prove to him that
Cuba was "a country with which the United States is at
peace." So far, there has been no disposition of those
charges. The case which went before the jury in Miami in
January did not include Neutrality Act charges. Neverthe-
less, the Act and this Resolution were constantly referred
to. Although the defendants were merely charged with
possession of unregistered weapons, the defense continu-
ally implied that the United States was at war with Cuba,
and that the defendants were simply well-meaning patriots.
And so, Jerome Sanford, Assistant United States Attor-
ney for the Southern District of Florida, commenced his
prosecution of the four Cuban exiles for the knowing and
unlawful possession of unregistered firearms.
The prosecution's case was simple. Sanford proved that
the weapons and ammunition were found on Pedri Gil's
boat in front of his house; he proved that they were in
working order; and he proved that they were not registered.
He also proved that the fingerprints of the other three were
all over the weapons and the boat. Ile even demonstrated
that the defendants did not deny that they were their
weapons, and, in fact that they intended to use them to
attack Cuba.
Edward O'Donnell and his partner Donald Spain repre-
sented the defendants. Although they were well-known
Miami criminal lawyers, their entry into the case was some-
what unusual, because Spain had been an Assistant State's
Attorney who had prosecuted many Cuban exiles in the
local courts. But at present he is well-ensconced in the
exiles' legal defense teams, and is representing Guillermo
Novo Sampol, a key figure in the Letelicr-Moffitt assas-
sinations, on a parole violation charge. He is also the lawyer
for Alvin Ross Diaz, like Novo one of the New Jersey
exile terrorists, charged with possession of explosives,
firearms and drugs.
O'Donnell presented the defense's argument in his
opening statement. He concentrated on Lopez Estrada.
He was trained, he told the jury, by the CIA for the Bay of
Pigs invasion. Afterwards, he was brought to the United
States to meet Robert F. Kennedy. "Armando .Lopez
Estrada personally met with Robert F. Kennedy and was
asked if he wanted to continue his fight against Cuba, the
Castro Communist regime that was in existence in Cuba at
that time. His reply was in the affirmative."9 Then he even
met President John F. Kennedy, in addition to many CIA
agents who trained him in the use of various weapons.
8Transcript, January 6, 1978, Part II, p. 99; January 9, 1978,
Part I, pp. 87-88.
9Transcript, January 6, 1978, Part I, p. 95.
With the express approval of Bobby Kennedy, he took part
in dozens of invasions and attacks against Cuba. He also
spent several years in the early 1960s in the United States
Army, while receiving pay from the CIA. All this time,
O'Donnell pointed out, he handled many weapons and was
never, obviously, told that he had to register them.
Some time later, Lopez Estrada was given a map by a
member of the CIA which gave the location of an arms
cache on a small island in the Bahamas, not far from Cuba.
There he went with some friends, dug up the weapons, and
brought them to Miami for cleaning and for an attack
against Cuba to be launched from some place outside the
United States. Yes, the defense agreed, Lopez Estrada and
his friends had these weapons, but they never dreamed
they had to register them. They were still proceeding under
Bobby Kennedy's personal orders given seventeen years
before. And, yes, the defendants were familiar with Public
Law 87-733, and that, to them, was the law of the land,
regardless of any so-called detente in the late 1970s.
It was only because of the CBS-TV show that these
defendants-"scapegoats"-were before the court at all:
"That documentary did not go far towards ce-
menting relationships with Cuba. A good faith effort
towards the cementing of those relationships with
Cuba had to be shown.
"Armando Lopez Estrada, Mr. Pineiro, Mr. Arce
and Mr. Gil, the evidence will show you, are that
good faith effort to show Fidel Castro we mean
business.
"The arrests were applauded from the front
pages of the Miami Herald by Fidel Castro.
"He, in his own words, said this is a step in the
right direction towards cementing relationships be-
tween the United States and Cuba. That is why we
are here."10
Unfortunately, Fidel Castro had no idea how little
good faith there was. As a knowledgeable Miami reporter
put it to CovertAction, "The prosecutor was ordered to
bring the charges, but he sure wasn't ordered to get a
conviction."
The Peculiarities of the Trial
There are a number of instances in the trial which do
not ring true to an experienced criminal lawyer, or indeed
anyone farnilar with criminal law. In order to highlight
them, we give a brief overview of the proceeding. The
prosecution's case was uneventful. The defense first pre-
sented Lopez Estrada himself, the only defendant who took
the stand. He testified about his Bay of Pigs history and
subsequent meetings with high officials, his training in the
Army, and his twenty-six commando raids against Cuba.
But he also testified that his last payment from the CIA
was in 1965, and his last raid was in 1963. He did testify
that he had remained in contact with Grayston Lynch until
the present time, and was still in contact with him. (Lynch,
in fact, was present at court for the entire trial, and testi-
fied on behalf of the defendants.) Lopez Estrada also testi-
fied that he had received the map of the weapons cache in
1976 from a man he knew only as "Red Bob," whom he
had known in 1961 as a member of the CIA, and whom he
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assumed still was. lie said that the weapons "were very
dirty and in very bad situation because I think, if I recall
correctly, that the weapons were hidden in 1966."1l
Finally, lie mentioned in passing that he had been to the
White House in 1976 to meet with an aide of President
Ford.
What is important to remember is the following: except
for the alleged meeting with "Red Bob" in 1976, Lopez
Estrada testified to rig substantive contacts with the CIA
since 1965; lie also testified that the weapons had been
buried for 11 years. and were very dirty; and he men-
tioned. regarding 1976 simply that he had been to the
White House. All of these points figured prominently in
the subsequent crumbling of the government's case.
Grayston Lynch
The defense then called Gras stun Lynch. CIA case
officer for the Bay of Pigs invasion and Brigade 2506.
Lynch testified about Lopez I.strada's training, particu-
larly with respect to weapons. pointing out that the weapons
provided to the Brigade by the Clay in the earls Ir+trOs were
not registered so they could not be traced. Ile also testified
that although sonic operations planned by the exiles re-
ceived express approval. and sonic express disapproval.
"there were sonic that we neither approved nor disapproved.
[11 f they didn't bother anything they just ignored
them.
It was during Lynch's testimony that the first legal
puzzler arose. The following colloquy occurred during the
direct examination:
"Q. Could you indicate to the ladies and gentle-
men of the jury how these weapons are acquired hs
the agency before distribution to the people that
work under you for training purposes"
"A. I don't think. I do not think I could answer
that.
"Q. Why would v on be unable to answer that to
the ladies and gentlemen of the lurs
"A. I think it is classified information.
"Q. I lave you taken a certain oath as a member of
the Central Intelligence Agency".
"A. Yes. I have.
"Q. All right. Dues that oath preclude you from
commenting on matters affecting national seenrity".
"A. Unless it has been brought out before.
"Q. The question that I have just asked s on is a
matter that has been brought out before in which
there is sonic is pc of public record oil it.
"A. Yes, but I could not contnncnt nn it. neither to
confirm nor deny it.
"Q. And you are restricted by your oath to the
United States Government front doing, so"
"A. That's right."13
O'Donnell. conducting the defense, had already be-
labored Lynch's refusal to answer certain questions more
than he should have. Arid in ans other trial tire exchange
would have waved a red flag in front of the prosecutor.
There is a well-known legal doctrine that if a witness pre-
11Thr,.. Part IL p. 23.
12 Transcript, January 9. 1978. Part 1. p 94
131hiJ., p. 85.
sented by one side refuses to answer relevant questions put
by the other side. that side can move to strike the entire
testimony of the witness. A vigorous prosecutor, one would
think. would have taken that advantage. Yet the cross-
examination of Lynch was very brief, virtually insignificant,
and touched on no sensitive areas. It would seem obvious
that had the prosecutor gone to the heart of the matter of
the CIA's dealings with Lopez Estrada and the others, and
its providing them with weapons, he surely would have
hit on a number of areas where Lynch would have refused
to answer. And at that point he could have had his entire
tcstinrons striken from the jury's consideration by tire
judge something which has a substantial impact on a jury.
But the government passed up the opportunity.
the defense called only one other witness. Bay of Pigs
veteran and Brigade member Roberto Perez, who briefly
reiterated the same experiences as Lopez Estrada, particu-
larly the meetings with Bobby Kennedy and other high
officials in the 1960s. Perez didn't know "Red Bob," but
said he was always paid by "Grey Pete." Perez. much to
the chagrin of the defense no doubt, also testified that he
had not been involved in any raids since 1962, and didn't
know anything about any other raids.
At this point the defense rested. The prosecution was
now faced with a relatively simple credibility case which
should have hinged oil several points: First. were these
weapons really given to Lopez Estrada by the CIA? If
not. did Lopez Estrada and the others really believe they
were? Arid even if they thought so, did that constitute a
legal excuse?
At this point. the prosecution was entitled to bring on
rebuttal witnesses. presumably to stress that the CIA had
no involvement with the defendants, and had not planted
these weapons for them or provided a map to them. And
there was a further peculiarity here. Lopez Estrada showed
the trap to the court. and insisted there were still explosives
on the island. and that Ire would lead anyone to it who
wanted to sec their. There is, however. no indication that
any such cache really existed, nor any indication of any
communication with the government of the Bahamas to
check on this location, much less to warn them of live
explosives lying in a hole on an island. There were a number
of ways one might have proceeded to punch holes in the
defendants' story. The prosecutor, however. called Robert
Barteaux.
It there was a sandbag thrown in this case, Barteaux was
it. lie took the stand as Edward Cohen, Assistant General
Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, joined the
prosecution tahle. Ile identified himself as follows: "I ant
chief of the information processing group of the informa-
tion services staff of the Director of Operations of Central
Intelligence Agency."14 This was the first clinker. Know-
ledgeable journalists lase indicated to Covc?rtActiutr that
Barteaux was in fact an operations case officer, that there
was no such thing as the title he gave to the court. that it
was made up for the occasion (Whether this would consti-
tute perjury is problematical.)
Barteaux stated, "My duties are to manage that part of
the organization which conducts name traces and handles
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the records for the Director."15 What then was he asked:
"Q. Upon request, sir, did you perform such a
name tracing to one Armando Lopez Estrada?
"A. I did.
"Q. Did you come across his name?
"A. I did.
"Q. And, did you determine from your records
whether there had been any contact between your
agency and Mr. Lopez Estrada in 1976?
"A. In May of 1976 Mr. Estrada called the agency,
Lopez Estrada, excuse me, called the agency on the
public phone, a published number, and refused to
give us any subject matter which he would like to
discuss and that, after considerable effort, the call
was terminated because we did not know what he
wanted to talk about."16
Here was the second clinker. Why on earth did the
prosecutor ask this question? All it did was establish that
Lopez Estrada had in fact been in touch with the Agency
as late as 1976, and open the door to embarrassing cross-
examination by the defense. In fact, as the defense attorney
correctly pointed out when he then succeeded in having
Lopez Estrada recalled to counter this testimony, "It is
not true rebuttal."17
Barteaux was then asked if he had conducted a name
check for "Red Bob," and indicated that he had, and that
there were no records of any such name. This, and this
alone, would seem to be what he should have been called
for, if he were a legitimate witness. But his cross-examination
was mind-boggling. Consider O'Donnell's opening questions:
"Q. Sir, did you look for the name of Grayston
Lynch in your records?
"A. Grayston Lynch?
"Q. Yes.
"A. I don't believe so, no.
"Q. Do you know him to have been a former CIA
agent?
"A. No, I do not."18
Ilere we have the head records keeper for the CIA, who
knows all about Lopez Estrada, and, as we shall see, Pedro
Gil, and he doesn't know who Grayston Lynch is, the same
Grayston Lynch whom the entire world knows of as the
CIA man in charge of the Bay of Pigs. Technically, however,
employees of the CIA are case officers and members, and
"agents" applies to non-employees engaged by case officers
in various ways. It is likely that Barteaux was answering the
question literally, deliberately misleading the court a
typical CIA practice.
In any event, Barteaux's concluding testimony on cross-
examination was perhaps the most damaging single item for
the prosecution in the entire trial. It follows:
"Q. Sir, as custodian for the Central Intelligence
Agency, are you aware that Mr. Pedro Gil was in the
employ of your agency until 1974?
"MR. SANFORD: Objection, Your Honor, beyond
the scope of the direct.
15Ibid.
161bid.
171bid., p. 40.
18lbid., p. 31.
"THE COURT: He can answer if he knows. Do
you know whether he was?
"THE WITNESS: Yes, I do know.
"Q. He was, was he not? You paid him right up to
1974, did you not?
"MR. SANFORD: Objection, again going beyond-
"THE COURT: Let's say that he is. We are going
to allow the question and the answer. You can
answer the question.
"THE WITNESS: What was it?
"THE COURT: You paid him up until 1974?
"THE WITNESS: He received money through
'74."19
Here is where the prosecution's case went down the
drain. Pedro Gil never took the stand. Up until this point
there was no testimony of contact between the defendants
and the CIA since at the latest 1965, except for Lopez
Estrada's poignant reunion with "Red Bob" fifteen years
after the Bay of Pigs. Robert Barteaux, records keeper,
just happens to know that Pedro Gil received payments
until 1974. It is as if the CIA and the Justice Department
dragged up, from the bowels of the building at Langley,
the one person who would put into evidence just what the
defense wanted to but couldn't. Contacts, actual payments
by the CIA to one of the defendants continuing for thirteen
years after the Bay of Pigs.
According to one observer at the trial, the CIA lawyer,
Edward Cohen, ostentatiously tensed in his chair and glared
at Barteaux when he testified about the payments. One
would think that the Assistant General Counsel of the CIA
would be more circumspect, unless, of course, he was
playing to the jury.
191bid., pp. 38-39.
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The prosecutor's final weak argument was structured . .,, . ,,,,r, Tr.-,-, ..r
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